The Metropolitan Police Service’s handling of the sexual and criminal exploitation of children

Foreword

Children are among the most vulnerable in society. Most children grow up in loving, caring families and reach adulthood unharmed. But some don’t – they fall prey to people who coerce them into criminal enterprises or exploit them for sexual gratification. Children who don’t grow up in loving, caring families face heightened risks, as do children who go missing from home.

These things are well known. Public services, including the police, have a shared responsibility to look for the warning signs, be alert to the risks and act quickly to protect children.

In June 2023, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime in London commissioned us to inspect how well the Metropolitan Police Service protects children.

We explored what the Metropolitan Police Service does in its efforts to establish the true nature and scale of child exploitation in London. We explored its governance arrangements, numbers of officers and staff allocated to child exploitation work, internal systems and processes, information-sharing arrangements and work with other public services. We examined the quality of its intelligence and investigations, its internal culture and how it treats the children with whom it comes into contact.

As is very often the case with our inspections, we met many committed and enthusiastic officers and staff, who described having more work than they were able to complete.

In some respects, we found evidence of good work to protect children. Examples of this include the Metropolitan Police Service’s online child sexual abuse and exploitation teams, which have been established across London. They are supported by clear guidance and bespoke training.

But the balance of negative evidence from this inspection far outweighed the positive.

Put simply, the force isn’t doing enough when children are suffering from, or at risk of, exploitation.

We examined 244 investigations and graded over half of them as inadequate. We found delays in action being taken, lines of enquiry not being followed and poor supervision of investigations.

We were so concerned about the findings and the force’s approach to dealing with missing children that we reported our concerns publicly before the inspection ended.

We are also concerned about how many officers and staff use victim-blaming language that implies (intentionally or unintentionally) a child is partially or wholly responsible for abuse that has happened to them.

The 55 examples of victim-blaming language we saw raise questions about how well officers and staff understand the risks of exploitation, as well as concerns about the prevailing attitudes and culture in some areas of the force.

Several leaders we spoke with during our fieldwork were aware of, or said that they recognised, the issues this report highlights.

It is therefore vital that the senior leadership response to these enduring issues is based on sound understanding and analysis of the underlying causes.

We make 11 recommendations in our report.

For the benefit of London’s children, the Metropolitan Police Service should implement them in full and without delay.

At present, the Metropolitan Police Service is subject to additional scrutiny and support through our Engage process (sometimes referred to as ‘special measures’). Through this, we will continue to closely monitor the force’s progress in implementing our recommendations.

Lee Freeman KPM

His Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary

His Majesty’s Inspector of Fire & Rescue Services

Summary

In the Metropolitan Police Service, there is insufficient focus on child exploitation at a senior level. Overall, its response to the criminal and sexual exploitation of children is not effective.

Senior leaders acknowledged they haven’t recently commissioned force-wide analysis in relation to child exploitation because the results would be inaccurate or have important information missing. This means the force can’t fully understand the nature and scale of child exploitation in London.

Several key issues contribute to this situation.

The force currently uses different IT systems for different tasks. These IT systems aren’t linked. Although officers and staff can manually add a flag to individual reports, indicating they relate to forms of exploitation, we found flags are used inconsistently. Many flags are missing or inaccurate, information about people is missing and names are often misspelled.

The force plans to replace its IT systems in February 2024.

In addition, many officers and staff in the force fail to identify exploitation or understand the links between missing children and exploitation.

In cases involving children reported missing, we found a consistent lack of understanding of risk by those responsible for assessing it. As a result, they grade cases incorrectly.

When children go missing regularly, the force’s response is poor. There are also significant gaps in the force’s efforts to help prevent children going missing in the first place. Many officers and staff don’t understand the risk and simply wait for them to turn up.

We found the force often uses officers and staff to investigate child exploitation who don’t have the necessary skills or knowledge to do this effectively. We also found their supervisors lack the same knowledge and experience.

We saw many delays in starting and progressing investigations. We also found many missed opportunities to identify suspects and disrupt their activity, and to carry out evidence-led prosecutions. This is leaving children exposed to risk.

We found the force often prioritised the likelihood of a successful prosecution rather than safeguarding children and promoting their welfare.

The force has committed to increasing the number of officers and staff in some teams dealing with child exploitation. But it needs to make sure officers and staff have the skills and knowledge they need to carry out their roles effectively.

We are also concerned about the frequent use of victim-blaming language among the force’s officers and staff. Based on records we have reviewed, this went unchallenged by their supervisors and managers. This indicates there is a practice and culture in which officers and staff believe children are partially or wholly responsible for the abuse that has happened to them.

Most frontline officers and staff, and many in specialist roles, told us they had received no guidance or training about interacting with children or speaking with them in an age-appropriate way. This was confirmed in a survey we carried out with officers and staff.

In many cases, we saw no evidence that investigating officers spoke with the child victims.

The force’s approach to the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime was poor. It doesn’t follow some of the basic principles required to make sure support is available for victims of crime.

Also, many of the force’s policies and processes don’t differentiate between children and adults.

Good child exploitation investigations are usually characterised by:

• investigators working directly with children;
• timely information-sharing;
• co-ordinated joint working following a strategy discussion;
• prompt allocation of investigations;
• following up available lines of enquiry;
• carrying out disruption activity; and
• effective supervision.

We saw some examples of investigations with these characteristics in our case file reviews. This resulted in better outcomes for children. It demonstrates the force’s ability to improve its response for more children in London. Many officers and staff we met were committed to providing a better service but were frustrated by having too much work to complete.

We also found some examples of good interactions with children. But most of the officers and staff we spoke with saw their role in safeguarding children and promoting their welfare as simply submitting a report about it.

Few officers and staff we met knew about local services they could direct children and families to for help.

During our fieldwork, we were so concerned about the force’s approach that we issued two accelerated causes of concern and two recommendations for immediate action. In addition, we now issue a further cause of concern and make nine additional recommendations.

Introduction

About us

His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) independently assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of police forces and fire and rescue services, in the public interest. In preparing our reports, we ask the questions that the public would ask, and publish the answers in accessible form. We use our expertise to interpret the evidence and make recommendations for improvement.

Our commission

On 19 June 2023, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) wrote to us, requesting an inspection under section 54(2BA) of the Police Act 1996.

Our terms of reference asked us to inspect and consider how effectively the Metropolitan Police Service responds to the sexual and criminal exploitation of children.

During our inspection, we focused on three broad areas:

• the Metropolitan Police Service’s understanding of the nature and scale of child sexual exploitation and child criminal exploitation;
• the effectiveness of the Metropolitan Police Service’s response to child sexual exploitation and child criminal exploitation; and
• how the Metropolitan Police Service supports and safeguards victims and survivors.

Methodology

Our inspection took place between September and October 2023.

During our inspection, we carried out:

• a document review, including policies, procedures and other material;
• about 200 interviews, which included senior leaders, managers, supervisors and frontline officers and staff;
• 12 focus groups with both specialist and frontline police officers and staff;
• reality testing across London;
• a survey of the force’s officers and staff; and
• an examination of 244 investigation case files involving child exploitation offences and children reported missing between April 2023 and September 2023.

Our grades for these case files were:

• 43 good;
• 80 require improvement; and
• 121 inadequate.

We returned 39 of those cases to the force for review because we were concerned children remained at risk.

Terminology in this report

Our reports contain references to, among other things, ‘national’ definitions, priorities, policies, systems, responsibilities and processes. In some instances, ‘national’ means applying to England and Wales. In others, it means applying to England and Wales and Scotland, or the whole of the United Kingdom.

Accelerated causes of concern

If our inspection identifies a serious or critical shortcoming in a force’s practice, policy or performance, we will report it as a cause of concern. A cause of concern will always be accompanied by one or more recommendations. When we identify a cause of concern during our inspection, we normally provide details in the published force report.

In some cases, such as when we discover significant service failures or risks to public safety, we report our concerns and recommendations earlier. This is called an accelerated cause of concern.

On 6 October 2023, we issued two accelerated causes of concern to the force, because of its failure to:

• identify and assess risks appropriately, and to respond adequately, when children are reported missing; and
• carry out sufficiently effective investigations when children are at risk of, or harmed by, criminal or sexual exploitation.

Further cause of concern

Further recommendations

How well does the Metropolitan Police Service understand the nature and scale of child sexual exploitation and child criminal exploitation?

The force doesn’t effectively understand the nature and scale of child sexual exploitation and child criminal exploitation in London. Several key issues contribute to this situation.

The force currently uses different IT systems for different tasks, which aren’t linked to each other. Although officers and staff can add a flag to individual reports, indicating they relate to forms of exploitation, we found they are used inconsistently. Many flags are missing or inaccurate. Often information about people is missing and names are often misspelled.

In addition, many officers and staff in the force fail to identify exploitation or to understand the links between missing children and exploitation. In cases of children reported missing, we found a consistent lack of understanding of risk by those responsible for assessing it. As a result, they grade cases incorrectly.

Senior leaders acknowledged they haven’t recently commissioned force-wide analysis in relation to child exploitation because the results would be inaccurate or have important information missing.

The force plans to replace its IT systems in February 2024.

How the force defines child sexual exploitation (including online child sexual exploitation) and child criminal exploitation as forms of child abuse

The force uses consistent definitions in its materials

We found the force does use consistent definitions for child sexual exploitation, child criminal exploitation and missing people. These are in line with nationally recognised definitions, for example, from the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice (APP) or the Home Office’s child exploitation disruption toolkit.

These definitions appear in guidance, policy and toolkits used by the force. They also appear in The London Child Exploitation Operating Protocol (PDF document). This is a shared protocol for safeguarding partnerships across London.

This should help the force’s officers and staff understand what child exploitation is and consistently recognise, report and tackle it.

The force’s missing persons policy toolkit provides comprehensive guidance about how to respond when people are reported missing. Many aspects of this guidance help officers and staff to understand who has responsibility for the case, depending on the level of risk identified. The guidance also clearly advises on when cases should be reviewed and who should do this.

The force’s officers and staff don’t understand what high risk means when children go missing

The College of Policing APP and the force’s policy state high risk means “the risk of serious harm to the subject or the public is assessed as very likely”.

In defining high risk, the force’s guidance doesn’t define what serious harm means. The APP defines it as: “A risk which is life threatening and/or traumatic, and from which recovery, whether physical or psychological, can be expected to be difficult or impossible.”

In our interviews, focus groups and case file reviews, we found almost all officers and staff, and their managers, who are responsible for grading missing person incidents didn’t understand this. For example, two detective inspectors we spoke with specifically said high risk meant a threat to life only.

We found this significantly affects risk assessments when children at risk of exploitation are reported missing. They are almost always graded as at medium risk, even when it is clear they are very likely to suffer serious harm. We reviewed 60 cases of when children went missing and found the force had graded 38 as medium risk when they should have all been graded high risk.

Grading incidents incorrectly dramatically affects the level of response. It also prevents the force from obtaining an accurate understanding of its true demand in this area, and therefore the resources it needs.

How effectively the force records and flags incidents, locations, victims and suspects linked to child sexual exploitation and child criminal exploitation

Flagging and recording information about the risk of exploitation is a problem for the force

Officers and staff record individual crime and non-crime reports on the force’s crime report information system (CRIS). These reports can be flagged to highlight those that involve different types of child exploitation.

There is a separate system to record missing children and children at risk of harm, known as MERLIN. Officers and staff can flag individual reports on this system too.

The force’s intelligence system is also separate. This doesn’t allow individual items of information to be linked together and to people and places.

We found flags were missing in many cases. The force’s own audit work found the same problem.

We also found examples of officers and staff adding incorrect flags to reports, which creates confusion and inaccuracy.

The force uses the Police National Computer to apply flags to people. This is useful when officers or staff encounter that person, but it doesn’t allow effective analysis.

In addition, we saw multiple different spellings of names for the same person, both in CRIS and MERLIN. In one case, we found seven spelling variations in CRIS and five in MERLIN for the name of the same child.

Important information, such as disability, ethnicity and nationality, is also routinely missing from reports. This makes it much harder for the force to understand and analyse risks to a person or particular groups.

There are few analytical products to help understand the nature and scale of child exploitation in London

Senior leaders acknowledged that because of these problems they haven’t recently commissioned force-wide analysis in relation to child exploitation as the results would be inaccurate or have important information missing. This means it is virtually impossible for the force to fully understand the nature and scale of child exploitation in London.

The force had, however, worked with some local authorities to try to understand the problem at borough level. We saw a problem profile for exploitation covering one local authority area that was published in February 2023. This used both force and partnership information. But the author found issues similar to the ones we found and so they couldn’t be sure it provided an accurate assessment.

Senior leaders also told us about analysts within basic command units (BCUs) who were working with two other local authorities to share data. But this work hadn’t been finalised at the time of our inspection.

In April 2023, the Police and Crime Committee of the London Assembly published a wide-ranging report about missing children in London. This gathered evidence from safeguarding partnerships and the voluntary sector. It provided details about the links between children who go missing and the risks of exploitation. This report found similar issues to those we found during this inspection, including the force’s inability to provide accurate data. This is making it harder to get an accurate and up-to-date understanding of the nature and scale of the problem in London.

The lack of in-depth knowledge of the nature and scale of child exploitation, including missing children, is a significant problem for the force’s decision-making when allocating officers and staff. This is also negatively affecting the force’s understanding of the capabilities it needs based on the profile of exploitation in specific areas. For example, the force has agreed to increase the number of officers working in exploitation teams by 72 across the force. But this assessment is based on estimated need rather than analysis of data. Some senior leaders in BCUs told us they have already moved their officers and staff to meet demand and are concerned they may not receive additional officers and staff.

In February 2024, the force plans to introduce the next phase of a new IT system called Connect. This system aims to integrate force information and help link it to individual people. This may improve the force’s ability to more effectively understand the nature and scale of child exploitation. But this approach will still rely on those responsible for recording the data to recognise exploitation in the first place and record information accurately.

The force has completed audit work to better understand the quality of its practice

In April 2023, the force’s dedicated inspection team began a large audit of child sexual exploitation crimes. In July 2023, the team shared its initial findings with senior leaders and the final report was published during our inspection fieldwork. The findings are detailed and highlight that the force needs to improve how its officers and staff assess risk to children, recognise when children need help and support, record information and supervise investigations.

This audit mirrors many of our conclusions relating to the sexual exploitation of children. Although this audit may not provide the force with a better understanding of the nature and scale of the problem, because it looked into the quality of practice, it will provide the force with a better understanding of how it can make improvements.

The force’s understanding of the links between child sexual exploitation, child criminal exploitation, missing children and other criminality

Leaders have a good understanding but those in frontline roles don’t

The senior leaders we spoke with understood the links between child sexual exploitation, child criminal exploitation, missing children and other criminality. But we didn’t find a similar understanding among:

• frontline officers and staff;
• those responsible for the initial activity when children are reported missing;
• those investigating criminality that may be linked to exploitation; or
• supervisors.

When someone calls to report a child is missing, the force control room, known as Met CC, decide whether an immediate response is required or not. They have a question set to go through with the caller. The public can also report a missing child online.

When making the response decision, Met CC only consider what they are told by the person making the report. They don’t consider risks the force may have already recorded in other information or intelligence it holds.

A BCU incident risk manager, known as the 400 inspector, considers whether the incident is high risk, based on the same information considered by Met CC. If it isn’t considered high risk, the case is passed to the risk and demand (RaD) team. This team is then responsible for further research, submitting a MERLIN report and adding information about the child to the Police National Computer database.

Those cases graded as low or medium risk usually remain with the RaD team. The force’s missing persons policy specifies this team should retain responsibility for 48 hours unless there are complex concerns.

The policy does suggest officers and staff submit a MERLIN form labelled as ‘enhanced concern’ in complex cases. This can include exploitation. But the guidance doesn’t explain how risk differs for children and adults. This affects the decisions officers and staff make.

When a case is labelled as enhanced concern, it should be allocated to the missing persons unit to progress. We saw mention of its use in one BCU we visited, which had a flow chart with a separate risk grading of medium-complex concern. This showed an intention to transfer exploitation cases to other teams more quickly.

But we found even cases with complex concerns often remained with the RaD team. In addition, that 48-hour period is from the time the MERLIN report was submitted, so a child could have been missing for much longer than 48 hours.

Our case file reviews and interviews identified that the 48-hour period is seen as an arbitrary reason for the force to be more concerned. It is at this point, and not after considering risk, that the force is prompted to use more specialist resources.

The grading of missing children is often incorrect and children are left at risk

We reviewed case files on children who had gone missing at least ten times in the previous six months. Usually these involved children who were in care – some of the most vulnerable children in London.

Almost all cases we reviewed were graded as medium risk, even when there were clear indicators that serious harm was very likely. Throughout the force, risk is usually assessed on the basis of whether a child will return rather than on the likelihood of harm to them while missing.

When children go missing regularly, it is helpful to have a trigger plan in place. These plans can help to find a child quickly by giving practical advice and information about a child. This includes information such as where they were found previously, contact numbers and social media usernames. We saw very limited evidence of their use. Most trigger plans we saw were out of date.

When cases are graded as being at medium risk, whether correctly or not, the force should carry out proportionate activity to locate missing children and make sure they are safe.

We saw very little evidence that anything meaningful was happening to locate these children in the first 48 hours. In some examples, the RaD team did try to assign some basic enquiries to Met CC for allocation, but often these weren’t completed.

Routinely, we found the force is simply waiting for children to turn up. Genuine activity to find a child and make sure they are safe happens only after the RaD team moves the case on to someone else. Usually, this occurs only after they have been missing for 48 hours.

But even this doesn’t happen in all cases. We carried out a dip sample of cases when the risk grading had been raised to high during the missing episode. In one case, a 14-year-old girl believed to be involved in class A drug supply had been missing for 20 days before the force decided she was at high risk.

We completed audits of 60 case files relating to children who went missing regularly. We graded one as good, 15 as requiring improvement and 43 as inadequate.

Failing to grade risk correctly when children go missing means some of the force’s oversight processes aren’t used effectively

Each BCU holds a ‘pacesetter’ meeting twice a day. These give local leaders the opportunity to discuss ongoing issues and make sure adequate resources are in place.

Although some BCU pacesetter agendas don’t specify a risk grading for the missing people they will discuss, around half of those we reviewed only refer to high‑risk cases.

Similarly, ‘grip and pace’ meetings assess resourcing and issues across the force. These meetings are held three times a day. In respect of missing people, they also only consider cases graded as high risk.

This means that cases incorrectly graded as medium risk don’t receive the oversight they should, and opportunities to allocate additional or specialist resources may be missed.

The force plans to improve the way it deals with missing people

Senior leaders informed us the force plans to disband the RaD teams in BCUs and create a central vulnerability hub, which will be managed centrally.

The force intends to use knowledgeable officers and staff within the central vulnerability hub to assess risk and co-ordinate an initial response when people are reported missing.

At the time of our fieldwork, the force hadn’t decided on a location for this hub or started to recruit personnel.

The force had tested the proposal over 48 hours in one BCU. We reviewed the evaluation of that test and proposal for its implementation. A significant part of the argument for its introduction was the reduction of missing people episodes linked to mental health. It was much less focused on issues relating to children.

An experienced 400 inspector informed us that the 48-hour test also focused on reducing demand on resources rather than dealing with risks to children.

Senior leaders told us the intention was to reduce the overall demand, so that officers and staff could focus on longer-term safeguarding of children.

But there remains a risk that the benefits of the new central vulnerability hub will be limited. The hub team will be asking the same BCU officers and staff to find missing children. The hub team will have limited ability to manage that activity, which will potentially result in other matters taking priority and the work not being carried out.

The force is tackling some criminal exploitation of children connected to the supply of drugs

In respect of crime linked to the exploitation of children, the force’s focus is mainly on drug supply. In their briefing at the start of our fieldwork, senior leaders highlighted Operation Orochi and Operation Yamata as key components of the force’s response to the criminal exploitation of children.

Operation Orochi seeks to tackle county lines drug supply when London suppliers cross into other authority areas to supply controlled drugs. The Home Office and the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) support the operation financially. When county forces identify this activity, they contact the Operation Orochi team. The team assists in developing intelligence about the suspects. It also travels anywhere in the UK to help forces carry out activity such as making arrests and executing search warrants.

The resulting investigation and any child safeguarding response remain the responsibility of the home police force.

We were encouraged to hear that Operation Orochi works alongside the Rescue and Response service. When it is discovered a child is involved in county lines drug supply, that service physically removes the child to a safe place and carries out work to divert them from criminal behaviour.

The force also told us that when intelligence indicates a child is involved in drug supply activity, that case is given priority.

Throughout 2023, the force used the expertise of this team to help locate missing children linked to county lines drug supply. This is positive. But it also means that less expertise and fewer resources are used to locate missing children who may be at equal or higher risk but who aren’t connected to county lines drug supply.

Officers and staff also told us that to refer a case to the Orochi team, they are required to supply a substantial amount of information. Sometimes it is information they don’t have or that would take a long time to gather. This makes it harder for officers and staff who want to use that resource. Operation Yamata is similar to Orochi but focuses on drug supply lines within London. Its aim is to reduce serious violence by tackling that drug supply.

The force told us that the age of suspects in both operations is generally young adults and that Operation Yamata rarely sees child suspects. Neither operation investigates other forms of criminal exploitation. So their impact in tackling the exploitation of children is limited.

BCU personnel told us they can go to those operational teams for support. But once the intelligence is developed and an arrest made, child safeguarding, further investigation and file preparations are left to BCU personnel.

For those cases linked to serious and organised crime, the force has a significant resource in the modern slavery and child exploitation team. This team takes on investigations based on specific criteria. At the time of our fieldwork, the team was working on 73 active operations, but these weren’t necessarily linked to child exploitation.

The team told us most of their cases relate to the trafficking of adult foreign nationals into the UK for forced labour or criminality.

Those cases of child exploitation operating at a community level are usually allocated to local investigation teams in BCUs.

On 6 October 2023, we issued the following accelerated cause of concern and recommendation.

How effective is the Metropolitan Police Service’s response to child sexual exploitation and child criminal exploitation?

We found there is insufficient focus on child sexual exploitation and child criminal exploitation at a senior level. Overall, the force’s response to the criminal and sexual exploitation of children is not effective.

When children go missing regularly, the force’s response is poor. There are significant gaps in the force’s efforts to help prevent children going missing in the first place. Many officers and staff don’t understand the risk to children who go missing and simply wait for them to turn up.

We found the force often uses officers and staff to investigate child exploitation who don’t have the necessary skills or knowledge to do this effectively. We also found their supervisors lack the same knowledge and experience.

We saw many delays in starting and progressing investigations. We also found many missed opportunities to identify suspects and disrupt their activity, and to carry out evidence-led prosecutions.

The force was more focused on the likelihood of a successful prosecution than on safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children.

We met many committed and enthusiastic officers and staff, who described having more work than they were able to complete.

The force has committed to increasing some of its resources. But it needs to make sure officers and staff have the right skills and knowledge to carry out their roles effectively.

The force’s structures and governance to safeguard children, carry out investigations and work with partner agencies

There is insufficient focus on child exploitation at a senior level

Until recently the force had a public protection improvement plan. Many actions were shown as complete. But our previous inspection findings, and those of the Baroness Casey review, demonstrated that improvement in many areas has been limited.

Within the scope of this inspection, we did find improvements in the force’s approach to cases relating to the possession and distribution of child abuse images. The force’s online child sexual abuse and exploitation (OCSAE) teams are skilled and knowledgeable.

This is an example of how the force has made significant improvements. But this isn’t the case for the force’s work involving children who are exploited in other ways or are reported missing.

In 2023, a ‘‘New Met for London’ plan was published, which gives greater priority to public protection activity. The force has introduced a strengthening public protection programme as part of a drive to improve its service to vulnerable victims. This aims to highlight the areas the force knows it needs to improve, explains how it will do this and provides timescales.

A public protection and violence against women and girls board oversees that activity. The board has representation from force leaders, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) and the Vulnerability Knowledge and Practice Programme. An assistant commissioner chairs the board meeting, which is held every three months.

The force has decided to increase officer and staff numbers in public protection roles by 565. Most will be deployed to roles investigating rape, serious sexual offences and domestic abuse. It intends to have an additional 72 officers across the force working specifically on the exploitation of children.

A public protection delivery group is responsible for making sure improvements are put in place. This is chaired by the public protection commander and attended by relevant lead responsible officers and basic command unit (BCU) public protection superintendents.

Lead responsible officers are the force’s professional leads for specific policing themes. They formulate force strategy but usually aren’t responsible for the teams that carry out the work.

In assessing the priority the force has given to tackling the exploitation of children, we noted at the time of our inspection that the lead responsible officer for exploitation (which also covers exploitation of adults) was also lead for significant operational resources. This arrangement differs from that for the lead responsible officers for child abuse within families and schools engagement, which are both full‑time posts.

The lead responsible officer for missing people had recently been made a full-time role. Senior leaders said the force intended to make the exploitation role full time.

In February 2023, the force appointed an experienced chief superintendent to support the public protection commander and oversee child protection throughout the force, including child exploitation. In April 2023, he introduced an exploitation improvement group, which meets quarterly. This is in addition to established regular meetings for operational officers and staff working to tackle child exploitation.

This should provide the force with more effective oversight of its approach to dealing with child exploitation and may help it to make the improvements needed.

The group has agreed actions the force needs to take. This includes agreeing terms of reference for exploitation teams, improving the force’s ability to identify exploitation and improving the response when children linked to exploitation are missing. But we saw that these haven’t yet had an impact on operational practice.

Almost all superintendents in BCUs, which are responsible for public protection, told us they don’t receive BCU-level performance data in relation to the exploitation of children. They also aren’t held to account for performance or practice in their BCU relating to tackling child exploitation.

Some senior leaders told us:

“Exploitation hasn’t been given sufficient focus for too long, we’re about ten years behind.”

“A lot of people don’t see CSE [child sexual exploitation] as a priority, there’s a lot of complacency … [they] say it’s the child’s choice.”

“All I want is for the DCIs [detective chief inspectors] and DIs [detective inspectors] to understand child exploitation, but they don’t.”

We reviewed the minutes of each of the most recent BCU tactical tasking co‑ordination group meetings. These meetings allow local leaders to consider and agree tactical options and align resources to priorities. We found they focus on crimes like robbery and burglary. Although meetings mentioned violence against women and girls, none of the meetings mentioned child exploitation. We also found no references to tackling the risks to children who go missing regularly.

Processes and systems for sharing information about child sexual exploitation and child criminal exploitation effectively

The force is working to improve how it shares information, but the pace is slow

We reported on how the force shares information with its safeguarding partners in our national child protection inspection assessment of progress report in 2021. We said:

“The force sends most Merlin information forms as a notification rather than a referral. That means the force passes on the forms but does not expect any particular action by children’s social care services. Current processes don’t show clearly if the force is referring a case to children’s social care services because officers are concerned that a child is (or is likely to be) suffering significant harm. If the force shares a Merlin form with a local authority as a notification only, there is no statutory requirement for that authority to tell the police what action and decisions it has taken. Also, unless a child abuse investigation team (CAIT) is handling the case, the force doesn’t prompt strategy discussions when officers are concerned about a child. This means the force can’t challenge decision making or make sure other organisations are safeguarding children.”

At the time of this inspection, the force had been working to improve this. It had agreed with local authorities which safeguarding concerns require a referral or notification. The force had approved extra resources. But the new process and people weren’t in place.

Some officers and staff are expected to contribute to strategy discussions without sufficient knowledge or experience

When an issue relates to missing or exploited children, or other abuse outside the home, the force’s approach to strategy discussions and who should attend them is inconsistent. We saw several cases where a strategy meeting hadn’t occurred when it should have or the person who attended from the force hadn’t recorded what was discussed.

Officers and staff in missing persons units, exploitation teams and gangs teams told us they do attend strategy meetings when asked. But they rarely have experience or training in relation to Working Together to Safeguard Children, or more broadly in child protection work.

In one case we returned to the force for review, we were concerned that it hadn’t shared significant information about risk to a child. A BCU detective chief inspector confirmed they would share that information and that they “expected” children’s social care services would request a strategy discussion. But the force should make the request and chase it up if the strategy discussion doesn’t take place. This is an example of current poor understanding in the force in relation to joint working.

How effectively the force identifies children at risk of exploitation or child victims of exploitation

Officers and staff often don’t recognise child exploitation

Except for some centralised functions, such as the operations mentioned above, the response to children at risk of exploitation is the responsibility of BCU resources.

We met many officers and staff working within the BCU child exploitation teams who were committed and trying their best to improve outcomes for children. But many investigators we spoke with saw their role as investigating the case in front of them, without regard to wider safeguarding concerns. Such an approach misses the risk of the exploiter remaining free to continue abusing the child subject of the report and doesn’t consider whether they are abusing other children. Investigators often had little understanding of child protection and their obligations to consider joint investigations with their safeguarding partners.

We also saw that officers and staff investigating children suspected of committing crime often don’t recognise the children are being exploited.

When an officer or staff member recognises exploitation, they are expected to create a separate non-crime report, called a 588, on the crime report information system (CRIS). This is to document safeguarding activity and information that is separate from the investigation of an offence.

We saw several examples of officers or staff completing a 588 and using it effectively to manage and record interactions with children they recognised as being at risk.

But we found the use of 588 reports was inconsistent and they were often absent. A 588 is a standalone CRIS document. It may have been created several months or even years ago. This means they are very difficult for officers and staff to find when they are trying to understand the risks to a child and any activity taking place in connection with them.

A search can reveal dozens of CRIS reports connected to the same child. As a result, each CRIS report has to be physically checked to locate the 588. For example, in the positive case above, it was three hours after the initial report before the 588 was used to inform the response.

Also, CRIS doesn’t alert the officer in the case that the child has come to police notice – for example, when they go missing, are arrested or become a victim of crime. The process relies on officers and staff manually scanning systems and updating the 588 report as necessary.

This obviously creates many opportunities for important information to be missed and causes delays in finding it.

There are limited systems or processes to identify children being exploited

When a child is the victim or suspect in several different investigations, these are often allocated to multiple investigators who seem to have little or no knowledge of the other investigations. As a result, investigators often fail to identify the links that may indicate the child is being exploited. It also means children deal with several different investigators, depending on the offence under investigation.

Identifying exploitation relies on officers and staff simply spotting it. They are unlikely to notice people involved in exploitation across different BCU areas.

There is a regular linked crimes meeting, which brings together local analysts to share intelligence and information. Their aim is to identify linked crimes by location, method and suspects. In addition, the central specialist crime team instigated Operation Bassano, which uses data to try to identify those people who haven’t been convicted but who pose the most risk of sexual offending.

Apart from these systems, other systems to scan for links between children, locations and suspects are limited. In addition, the force often fails to follow up lines of enquiry to identify suspected abusers, unless there is a complaint from a child. This approach means suspected abusers remain hidden, their identities unknown and unrecorded.

How effectively the force investigates and disrupts those suspected of child exploitation

Investigations are allocated according to the type of offence rather than the needs of the victim

The force’s various investigation teams often have a specific remit or terms of reference for case types they deal with. For example, the child abuse investigation team deals almost exclusively with abuse within the family or abuse by people in positions of trust. Those investigators are often knowledgeable and experienced in child protection work. The force has invested both time and effort into making sure they complete the specialist child abuse investigation development programme. It has also developed a tailored induction course to assist those investigators when they first join the team.

OCSAE teams are present in each BCU. In the absence of sufficient national guidance or training, the force has worked hard since 2020 to develop its own. It also set clear standards about its expectations for investigators to share information and work with safeguarding partners. As a result, the force’s OCSAE teams are among the best trained and supported teams we have seen in England and Wales dealing with this type of offending.

But the remit of the team is usually confined to dealing with cases relating to the possession and distribution of child abuse images. These are cases the National Crime Agency brings to the attention of the force, or the force finds through its intelligence systems.

Cases when offenders approach and groom children online, incite them to engage in sexual activity or coerce them into sharing images generally aren’t allocated to OCSAE specialists. The force estimates that OCSAE teams deal with less than 60 percent of online child sexual abuse and exploitation cases.

Each BCU has a Sapphire team, which deals with rape and serious sexual offences. The force doesn’t distinguish between child and adult victims when allocating investigations to these teams. Therefore, when a child is a victim of sexual exploitation, the case is usually allocated to that team. We spoke with many investigators and their supervisors. Few had completed the specialist child abuse investigation development programme, had any previous experience in child protection work or understood joint working and what is required.

In one case, a mother reported the sexual exploitation of her 15-year-old daughter. A Sapphire investigator told her to take her child to the GP and ask the GP to make a referral to children’s social care services.

Each BCU also has a dedicated child exploitation team, with the force defining the role profile of officers and staff working in these teams. But the force doesn’t define the team’s remit or provide terms of reference. Instead, BCU commanders agree their responsibilities locally. This is a problem because the force doesn’t have a clear understanding of the nature and scale of child exploitation in London, so it can’t be sure the teams are tackling what they should.

We found significant differences in what these teams saw as their responsibilities. All were clear that they should review all 588 reports and decide whether their team should have responsibility for them. But one team told us they were entirely desk based. Another said they only dealt with criminal exploitation. The sergeant in that team said he didn’t believe incidents of sexual exploitation existed in that BCU outside criminal exploitation. Some saw their role as engaging with children and co‑ordinating the police response. Others told us they carried out investigations and disruption activity.

We found there is no agreed and consistently used tool or process to help officers and staff decide which children they should prioritise their responses to.

Some teams used the Safeguard mnemonic to help score the risk to a child:

S – sexual identity, wellbeing and choice

A – absence, truancy and going missing

F – familial, physical or sexual abuse/problems at home

E – emotional and physical health

G – gang involvement

U – use of technology and sexual bullying

A – alcohol and drug misuse

R – receipt of unexplained gifts or money

D – distrust of authority figures

This could be a useful tool to help understand risks to exploited children. But it is used inconsistently throughout the force. Some teams have attached a score to each letter, some use it to articulate their concerns. In some teams the sergeant simply uses their professional judgment to assess the level of risk.

Investigations are often delayed, inadequate and not focused on perpetrators of exploitation

We saw numerous delays in initiating investigations, with crime reports passed from team to team before any ownership was taken. We saw cases that had been passed from response teams to local investigation teams and back again. We also found cases that were referred to the child abuse investigation team but then passed on to other teams. Officers and staff we spoke with said this is common. They said that teams only think about their specific areas of responsibility, rather than working together or collaboratively. Officers and staff often described this as “silo working”.

This approach creates significant delays in seeing and speaking with victims, arresting suspects and securing evidence.

In addition, we saw examples of sergeants appointing cases to sexual offences investigation trained officers, but officers in the case taking no action until a child made a disclosure of an offence. Sexual offences investigation trained officers are responsible for the contact and initial work with a victim, not the investigation of the offence. This practice leads to further missed opportunities to secure evidence and focus attention on the suspect.

Officers in one Sapphire team told us that when they didn’t think the victim would provide witness evidence, the case would be allocated only to the sexual offences investigation trained officers. If the victim later disclosed that they didn’t want to provide evidence, the crime wouldn’t be allocated to a detective at all. The investigation would be closed at that point. The detective sergeant in that team explained this was because his officers and staff were overwhelmed with investigations.

Some investigators we spoke with told us they believed the force’s priority was a focus on successful prosecutions. This leads to investigators quickly closing cases they believe won’t pass the evidential test for a charge. The result is that the force doesn’t work with the child, follow up lines of enquiry and pursue evidence-led prosecutions or consider other types of disruption activity.

This approach is also leading to situations where a victim may change their mind, and vital evidence that could have been recovered is lost.

We found in the cases we examined that the force could have followed many lines of enquiry to identify and disrupt suspects, but it didn’t. Intelligence that could be used to pursue suspects is also often ignored. This shows a lack of understanding that those suspects will continue to exploit the child and may also be exploiting other children.

We also found examples of suspects’ details remaining only in the narrative section of CRIS reports rather than being recorded in the suspect section. And other intelligence wasn’t being recorded so it could be easily found later. This means the linked crime meetings and Operation Bassano wouldn’t identify those suspects.

Supervision of investigations is often ineffective

We saw many examples of ineffective supervision, across all case types. Supervisors often use a template when they review a case, often simply copying a previous template entry without meaningful direction or challenge.

We also found supervisors rarely challenged their officers and staff when they hadn’t completed enquiries. In one case, the force hadn’t interviewed a child victim after six months. The supervisor had regularly reviewed the case in that period.

Supervisors also regularly confirm that cases comply with the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime when they don’t.

Officers and staff regularly assess the risk in their cases using the THRIVE+ model. But their overall assessment can change even when there has been no change to the circumstances. In some cases we saw, they contradicted previous assessments. Often supervisors don’t challenge the change in their assessment.

We found supervisors regularly close cases too soon, before lines of enquiry are complete and when it would still be possible to identify a suspect.

This practice contributes to the force often not carrying out disruption activity that may reduce risks to children or deter offenders. Some officers and staff we spoke with didn’t think it was their responsibility; some teams felt they didn’t have the capacity.

We didn’t find any examples of when force tasking processes considered disruption opportunities. Neighbourhood teams told us that they are usually assigned to patrolling areas experiencing crimes, such as burglary and robbery.

We reviewed 184 cases in which a crime had been committed and exploitation was evident.

We graded only 42 cases as good, with 41 of those cases having effective supervision.

This underlines the important role supervisors have in the force’s response to the exploitation of children.

We saw some examples of good work, even when a child didn’t immediately support an investigation

Good child exploitation investigations are usually characterised by:

• direct work with children;
• timely information-sharing;
• co-ordinated joint working following a strategy discussion;
• prompt allocation of investigations;
• following up available lines of enquiry;
• carrying out disruption activity; and
• effective supervision.

But all too often, people who exploit children act without fear of punishment: they know children are unlikely to make a disclosure to the police. The force often doesn’t pursue offenders without that disclosure, so there is little to deter offenders from continuing their abuse.

On 6 October 2023, we issued the following accelerated cause of concern and recommendation.

The use of intelligence and information about child exploitation to identify and prevent it at an early stage

The force isn’t doing enough work to help prevent children from going missing

When children regularly go missing it is important that the force, along with its safeguarding partners and those who care for children, understand the reasons why.

We saw little evidence of coherent joint working between the force and its safeguarding partners to prevent children from going missing in the first place and find them quickly when they do.

When a missing child returns, the force should carry out a prevention interview with them to help understand any problems they have and make sure they are safe. We found the force often completes these interviews over the phone or using a messaging service, or asks care providers to complete them. In the 60 cases of missing children we reviewed, the force completed only 7 interviews in person. This means in most cases the force can’t be sure a child is safe, uninjured and not in distress.

The local authority is responsible for arranging return home interviews with children who have been missing. An independent person should complete these interviews. These interviews can provide further important information, including intelligence, to help disrupt those who are a risk to children. But we saw few return home interviews in the cases we reviewed. Some missing persons unit officers and staff told us that although they could request return home interviews they don’t, and the local authority doesn’t routinely share them. When they do receive them, missing persons units often store them on a standalone system, where they aren’t easily accessible to all officers and staff. This makes it harder to research future missing episodes and to improve understanding of the specific risks in each child’s case.

The force has worked with care providers to introduce the philomena protocol

The force has worked with care providers to try to improve the response when children in care are reported missing, introducing the philomena protocol. The focus of this work has been on care providers making sure they have carried out their own enquiries, in much the same way a parent would. The idea of the protocol is also to make sure care providers can quickly share information that would help to find children sooner. At the time of our inspection, the force had agreements in place with 440 care homes throughout London.

The force hasn’t evaluated this work.

The success of this work is undermined by the fact that the question set used by call handlers when people are reported missing doesn’t mention the philomena protocol. Neither does the online reporting portal. This misses an opportunity to prompt the caller or person reporting to check for any additional information they hold that they should share to help find the child more quickly. Also, the force is unlikely to use the information it receives to help find those children until after 48 hours.

We didn’t see reference to the philomena protocol in any of our case file reviews.

Operation Makesafe

During 2022, the force spent a great deal of time and effort raising awareness of exploitation in London through Operation Makesafe. This included visiting various types of business premises to raise awareness of exploitation and encourage people to report suspicious behaviour.

But the force was unable to specifically target locations based on analysis because of the reasons we outline earlier in this report. It had to ask the local BCU staff where the greatest need was.

There has been no formal analysis of whether the operation had any effect on reporting or had improved the force’s understanding of the problem.

The force’s capacity and capability to tackle child exploitation

The force is increasing its capacity

It is difficult for the force to understand the capacity it needs to tackle child exploitation because it doesn’t know the full nature and scale of the problem in London.

We acknowledge it is adding 72 officers to the exploitation teams throughout the force. The force told us this would happen in two stages, with 36 officers in post by the end of 2023 and the remainder in April 2024. In the absence of other reliable analysis, this will allow the force to make an assessment about where the further 36 officers are most needed.

We note the force’s intention to increase resources dealing with rape, serious sexual offences and domestic abuse, by 300 officers and staff. The force aims to have 64 more officers and staff working in the multi-agency safeguarding hub. It will also recruit an additional 12 forensic practitioners to support the examination of digital media devices.

These additional resources should help. But, as we have described, many exploitation investigations are allocated to officers and staff without the skills and knowledge required to deal with them. Without significant changes to the way the force allocates these investigations, these extra resources won’t improve the quality of child exploitation investigations.

Also, the proposed additional resources don’t take account of the link between children going missing and the risk of exploitation. During this inspection, we heard about the force’s plan to improve its response when children are reported missing by creating a central vulnerability hub. We didn’t see evidence of plans to increase the capacity of the officers and staff in missing persons units, or how that linked with the central vulnerability hub.

The capability to tackle child exploitation

The force has made efforts to improve the capability of its officers and staff. In 2023, it introduced a new IT system called the learning and management system. This means the force, after many years, is now able to record and track the training and qualifications of its officers and staff. It should improve how the force identifies gaps in learning and make sure those officers and staff have the knowledge and skills to carry out their role. At this stage, it is too soon for us to assess how effective this has been.

As described earlier, the force has developed its own training programme for OCSAE officers and staff. This is a two-week course that provides them with the knowledge and skills they need to fulfil their role. The force has supported this training by producing comprehensive written guidance. We saw the positive effect of this approach in the quality of the work in the OCSAE teams.

OCSAE teams make effective use of technology to carry out triage examinations of media devices and prevent some unnecessary work. The central OCSAE team also uses technology to help prioritise cases.

Officers and staff have access to locally based facilities to recover information from mobile phones. But some officers and staff investigating exploitation cases expressed frustration about not receiving sufficient practical training or support, such as help on search terms using current slang when examining the data they recover.

To increase awareness of exploitation, the modern slavery and child exploitation team has designed training for the force. This is separate from other training and is an initiative by the team. The team has presented this training to over 9,000 officers and staff.

These sessions weren’t part of the force’s learning and development programme. Those responsible for training missing persons officers and staff, for example, weren’t aware of it.

The force provides missing persons unit officers and staff with three days of training when they are appointed to the role, or shortly afterwards. This training includes information and tactics to help them find missing people. It doesn’t focus specifically on the differences in risk profiles for children or on the links to exploitation. But we found officers and staff in the missing persons unit generally had a better understanding of the risks than their risk and demand team colleagues.

The force also provides specific training for their schools officers, which covers a wide range of subjects. Importantly, this includes dealing with cases when children share sexual imagery with their peers.

Some efforts to improve capability only have short-term impact

Through Operation Aegis, the force has worked to improve the knowledge and skills of its officers and staff in relation to public protection work. This includes a focus on missing people and child exploitation.

The Aegis team has now visited all BCUs in the force and spent 11 weeks in each. It identifies areas for improvement through audit activity and interviews, working with senior leadership teams to implement improvements. It also provides extensive coaching and feedback sessions.

We reviewed its training and found it provides a good level of information about exploitation and disruption tactics. It also includes content on missing people and how to spot links to exploitation.

The team uses surveys to measure the impact of its approach. Senior leaders told us this feedback is mostly positive. But the findings of our inspection show improvements aren’t necessarily maintained.

Once the Aegis team leaves a BCU, it is for local leaders to make sure the learning is accepted and understood by everyone. But senior leaders, officers and staff told us that some practice reverts to the previous ways of working. In addition, the learning doesn’t keep pace with changes in the workforce, such as when people change roles or are newly recruited.

How well does the Metropolitan Police Service support and safeguard victims and survivors?

We are concerned about the frequent use of victim-blaming language among the force’s officers and staff. This wasn’t challenged by supervisors and managers. It indicates a culture exists in which officers and staff believe children are partially or wholly responsible for the abuse that has happened to them.

Most frontline officers and staff, and many in specialist roles, told us they had received no guidance or training about interacting with children or speaking with them in an age-appropriate way. This was confirmed in our survey findings.

In many cases, we saw no evidence that investigating officers had spoken with the child victims.

The force’s approach to complying with the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime was poor. It doesn’t follow some of the basic principles required to make sure support is available for victims of crime.

In addition, many of the force’s policies and processes don’t differentiate between children and adults.

We did see some examples of good interactions with children. But most officers and staff seemed to consider their role in safeguarding children and promoting their welfare was just to submit a MERLIN report (the force’s system to record missing children and children at risk of harm).

Few officers and staff we spoke with knew what local support services were available for children and families. This means they are unable to give advice about where families can go for help.

The force’s treatment of children: adopting a sufficiently child-centred approach

There were limited examples of a child-centred approach

The London Child Exploitation Operating Protocol (PDF document) begins with the statement: “Children that come to notice must be treated as children, whatever the circumstances they find themselves in.”

Unfortunately, we didn’t see this reflected in the force’s practice.

The voice of children was often absent in the cases we reviewed. But we did see some good examples of when officers and staff had taken the time to understand children’s experiences and record them.

For example, when children share indecent images of themselves with their peers, the response is child centred. We saw a strong determination to avoid criminalising children in all such cases we reviewed. Schools officers often deal with these cases.

In the cases we examined, when the online child sexual abuse and exploitation teams investigated indecent images that appeared to have been uploaded by the child, they also made sure this wasn’t a result of pressure and coercion. They investigated the circumstances, took time to speak with the child and then made an appropriate decision about how to finalise the case.

But most frontline officers and staff, and many in specialist roles, said they hadn’t received guidance or training about how to interact with children or speak with them in a way that is appropriate to the child’s age.

Officers and staff frequently use victim-blaming language

We examined 60 cases involving children who had been reported missing. Most of those cases related to children who were looked after by the local authority. Children enter care for all sorts of reasons. But many have been abused or neglected. These experiences can leave children with complex needs.

In our case sample, almost all children were known or believed to be sexually or criminally exploited. In 33 of those cases – more than half of the cases we reviewed – we found language that implied the missing children were in some way responsible or to blame.

For example, we found officers and staff describing children as “making poor choices” or “placing herself at risk”. This fails to recognise an imbalance of power with the person exploiting them or coercion that may be used to keep them away from home.

There are several ways to describe victim-blaming language. In its guidance about challenging victim-blaming language when dealing with the online abuse of children, the UK government says: “Victim blaming is any language or action that implies (whether intentionally or unintentionally) that a person is partially or wholly responsible for abuse that has happened to them.”

We also examined 184 investigations into the exploitation of children and found 22 contained victim-blaming language. This amounts to 12 in every 100 children being in some way blamed for the abuse they suffered. For example:

• a 14-year-old girl was described as “seeking out sex with older men”;
• a 15-year-old girl was referred to as “engaged in sex work”; and
• a 12-year-old girl who had been raped was described as “sexually active with older men”.

Worryingly, we didn’t see any evidence that supervisors or managers challenged this language. In fact, in one of our interviews with a detective inspector, they spoke of children being promiscuous.

Officers and staff often don’t see children as children first

One senior leader told us: “There is a cultural issue here about how we see children.” Another said: “The culture is that missing children are seen as a problem.”

A senior leader from another organisation, who chairs multi-agency child exploitation (MACE) meetings, told us officers often see children as offenders. They don’t see them as victims at all.

We were concerned to see three examples where sexual offences investigation trained officers had contacted child sexual abuse victims by phone. Those officers were the first point of contact the child had with the force. The officers thought this was an appropriate way to speak with the child about their abuse.

We also saw language recorded on some crime reports that indicated the sexual offences investigation trained officers encouraged children not to pursue a complaint instead of offering support and reassurance.

In our case file reviews, 184 cases involved children who were the victims of some kind of exploitation that was recorded as a crime. In 100 of the cases, we saw no evidence that the officer in the case spoke with the child in person.

Few officers and staff we spoke with knew about the impact of childhood trauma, adverse childhood experiences or harmful sexual behaviour.

Knowledge and understanding among the force’s personnel

Those responsible for the response when children go missing show little knowledge and understanding of risk indicators linked to exploitation

Those in frontline roles we spoke with in interviews and in our focus groups, with some exceptions, said they didn’t really understand child exploitation and had received limited (if any) training in relation to it.

We also found officers and staff in risk and demand (RaD) teams had a variety of experience and knowledge levels. Some were covering roles for a shift only. Others were in these roles because they were on restricted duties. The officers and staff in RaD teams are responsible for initial risk assessments, but few understood the links between children who go missing and their exploitation.

Many of the cases we reviewed were supervised by a sergeant or inspector who signed off the risk assessment. Their understanding was also limited.

For example, one RaD sergeant said the “missing person team deal with proper missing people”. In relation to children looked after by the local authority, they said it is “more to do with truancy and behaviour than missing … more a children’s social care problem”.

Often, those responsible for investigating child exploitation also have insufficient understanding

Our case file reviews show that those investigating crime linked to exploitation often don’t recognise child exploitation or see exploitation as a child protection concern. They deal with the crime, regardless of the age of the suspect or victim. This was clear when we spoke with frontline officers and staff, local investigation teams and Sapphire teams.

Except for newer recruits, most officers and staff said they hadn’t received training or guidance from the force in relation to exploitation, or in recognising the signs.

We saw a better understanding in the child exploitation teams. Some of those officers and staff had attended either multi-agency training or training designed and presented by the modern slavery and child exploitation team.

Also, those working in online child sexual abuse and exploitation teams had a good understanding of the risks to children and the risk offenders pose to children that may not be immediately obvious.

Some force policies, processes and guidance don’t sufficiently focus on children

The force’s missing persons guidance is comprehensive in terms of processes to follow, particularly in relation to who is responsible for the case, when it should be reviewed and who should do this. But it doesn’t differentiate between children and adults. It focuses on the time people have been missing, giving guidance on what should happen in the first 48 hours and afterwards. This promotes the belief that officers and staff should only be worried if a child is missing for more than two days. It is also contributing to a practice and belief that it is only necessary to make meaningful efforts to find them and make sure they are safe after that time.

We also found that when staffing levels mean the missing persons unit doesn’t work after 4pm, medium and low-risk cases aren’t handed over or work isn’t assigned to others. The case usually remains with the RaD team until the missing persons unit starts work again. This could mean a delay of a further 16 hours.

Similarly, when an investigation into alleged exploitation is allocated to a team, it is on the basis of the type of crime. The process doesn’t necessarily focus on the needs of the child, the harm they have been exposed to, the complexity of the investigation or which team would be most likely to achieve the best outcome for children.

Child exploitation is a form of child abuse, yet the force’s specialist child abuse investigators rarely deal with it.

The force estimates that 95 percent of missing children return within 48 hours. So the specialist missing persons unit is rarely involved during that period, unless the local authority requests a strategy discussion.

When investigations are allocated to officers and staff with the appropriate knowledge and skills, we saw a better response – for example, when online child sexual abuse and exploitation teams are responsible for online exploitation investigations.

But too many cases are allocated to those without the knowledge and skills required to carry out effective investigations.

Compliance with the ‘Code of Practice for Victims of Crime’

The force has a limited understanding of the ‘Code of Practice for Victims of Crime’

In assessing the force’s approach and whether there is a focus on the victim and their needs, we considered the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime.

Victims of crime have specific rights under the code, with children having enhanced rights. The force must complete a victim needs assessment to establish what support they need. This should include how and when the victim wants to be contacted. It should also include how their evidence should be recorded and later presented at court. All victims must be kept updated about specific events and the decisions the police make.

The force’s crime report information system (CRIS) prompts officers and staff to contact a victim at particular points. It also allows officers and staff to assign a priority status to the crime report when a victim has enhanced rights. But there isn’t a specific section to help officers and staff complete a victim needs assessment. Instead, they are expected to write a free-text description of that assessment.

Both children and their parent or carer have rights under the code. Both have a right to understand what is happening and to be understood. This may mean access to interpreters or simply providing information in an age-appropriate way.

In the cases we reviewed, there often wasn’t a clear victim needs assessment. It is therefore unclear what investigators had agreed with the victim and their parent or carer in terms of contact. We often saw investigators hadn’t made contact when they should have. As mentioned above, in 100 of 184 cases we reviewed, we found no evidence of contact with the child recorded. In our survey, most respondents who worked with child victims identified lack of officers and staff, including skilled personnel, as a barrier to meeting the rights under the code.

Where we saw contact had been made, it was often through the parent or carer, without mention of whether the child wanted to be kept informed.

The force’s public protection performance analysts have carried out some work to assess the quality of the force’s victim contact in relation to domestic abuse and serious sexual offences. Although this didn’t focus on child exploitation, they found:

• victims who should be eligible for enhanced rights aren’t being given priority status on the crime report information system in most cases;
• the correct codes aren’t being used when the victim is given a regular update; and
• the dates and times of victim contact recorded in the narrative section of the report don’t always match the section on the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime.

Those working on victim care improvement in the frontline policing delivery unit weren’t aware of this work. They had been reassured of the force’s compliance from basic data retrieved from the crime report information system and the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime user satisfaction survey, which only relates to volume crime and doesn’t survey children.

The force’s work with partner organisations to support children

MACE meetings aren’t working as well as they should

MACE meetings provide the force, its safeguarding partners and others connected to protecting children an opportunity to work collectively in the best interests of children. They are important because exploitation happens outside the family home and provides different challenges to services than abuse happening in the home.

The London Child Exploitation Operating Protocol (PDF document) provides guidance for the force and its safeguarding partners about how MACE meetings should be carried out. The meetings should provide strategic oversight of all exploitation cases, information, intelligence and activity across each local authority area and across basic command unit boundaries.

In 2022, the force commissioned a peer review of how MACE meetings were operating across London. This review found inconsistencies in approach, with different criteria, tools and thresholds used for children across boroughs. It also found there was a large variance in the force’s contribution to meetings.

Officers and staff working in child exploitation teams told us they aren’t necessarily involved in MACE meetings. The children they work with aren’t always discussed at MACE meetings.

We spoke with some non-police chairs of MACE meetings. Some told us the focus is almost entirely on criminal exploitation because of the number of drug supply cases. This focus negatively affects those children who are being sexually exploited. Emerging problems and issues may not be seen and opportunities to stop them from getting worse may be missed.

They also told us that police co-chairs often change. Those people the force asks to perform the role can have little knowledge or experience of child protection or the exploitation of children. This significantly affects the impact of the meetings.

We reviewed minutes of numerous meetings across London. Like the peer review in 2022, we found many inconsistencies of approach. These included what and how much information the police bring to the meeting and what activity should take place to disrupt suspects.

But we heard about the force working well in some areas with its partners in MACE meetings. One chair described the force as often going “over and above” what was asked of it to help a child. Another described the force attendees as knowledgeable and having the right skills to contribute well to the meeting.

The force is working with its partners to improve MACE meetings so they can provide better outcomes for children. It has introduced a MACE chairs meeting to focus on improvements. In this inspection, we examined the last two sets of minutes and found attendance by the police chairs to be poor.

Officers and staff have limited knowledge of local services for children and families

We saw schools officers have a good understanding of local services for children. They told us about their work alongside schools and with local services to tackle issues together. For example, they work with local football clubs or St Giles Trust to divert children from crime.

Similarly, the youth engagement team visits children when they are arrested, often working closely with St Giles Trust and the youth offending service to try to divert children from crime.

We heard of integrated gangs teams carrying out similar work. This includes police officers working alongside local authorities and other partners to reduce gang violence. But some teams only deal with young adults rather than children.

BCU officers and staff told us about local initiatives led by local authorities to raise awareness of exploitation. These included neighbourhood policing teams working alongside the local authorities, in some cases patrolling areas of concern and visiting premises such as vape shops and takeaways.

But most of the officers and staff we spoke with saw their role in safeguarding children and promoting their welfare as simply submitting a MERLIN report. Few knew what local support services were available for children and families. This means they are unable to give advice about where families can go for help.

Next steps

On 6 October 2023, we issued two accelerated causes of concern and asked the Metropolitan Police Service to provide us with an action plan by 30 October 2023. This plan set out how it intended to address our accelerated causes of concern.

We reviewed this action plan and, after discussion with senior leaders in the force, we agreed that those plans were adequate.

We have made 11 recommendations that will help the force to improve outcomes for children at risk of or experiencing exploitation, if the force acts on them.

We will revisit the force in 2024 to assess its progress against those recommendations.

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The Metropolitan Police Service’s handling of the sexual and criminal exploitation of children