An inspection of the West Midlands regional response to serious and organised crime

Introduction

About our inspection

As part of our overall police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy inspections, we inspected how well police forces tackle serious and organised crime (SOC). In 2022, we changed how we inspect this aspect of policing, to incorporate inspections of the ten regions, as well as the nine regional organised crime units (ROCUs) throughout England and Wales, and the 43 police forces. This improves our understanding of how well forces and ROCUs work together to tackle SOC.

About us

His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) independently assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of police forces and fire and rescue services, to make communities safer. In preparing our reports, we ask the questions that the public would ask, and publish the answers in an accessible form. We use our expertise to interpret the evidence and make recommendations for improvement.

About our report

This report includes sections on the following:

• Regional findings – a summary of inspection evidence that identifies good or poor performance within the region; in other words, involving or relating to the ROCU and constituent forces. The performance of the region is not given a graded judgement. Instead, we highlight areas for improvement, causes of concern and innovative and promising practice in this section, where applicable.
• The ROCU and individual forces – the ROCU and each individual force are given a graded judgment, with a summary of the findings from our inspection and highlighted sections for areas for improvement, causes of concern, and innovative and promising practice.

Terminology used in this report

Our reports contain references to, among other things, ‘national’ definitions, priorities, policies, systems, responsibilities and processes.

In some instances, ‘national’ means applying to England and Wales. In others, it means applying to England and Wales and Scotland or the whole of the United Kingdom.

About ROCUs

Each ROCU serves between three and seven constituent forces (see map in Appendix 1).

The Strategic Policing Requirement defines ROCUs as:

“collaboration arrangements between forces that deliver specialist policing capabilities” that is the “primary interface between the NCA [National Crime Agency] and forces”.

It sets out that:

“The ROCU network mission is to protect communities by disrupting organised crime groups, individual criminals and those who enable them.”

The Government’s Serious and organised crime strategy 2023 to 2028 states:

“ROCUs are the operational and intelligence link between the NCA and police forces in England and Wales and lead the law enforcement response to serious and organised crime in their regions.”

ROCUs provide a range of specialist capabilities to forces. These include the regional organised crime threat assessment (ROCTA) units, surveillance, undercover policing, sensitive intelligence units, regional asset recovery teams, cybercrime teams, the Government Agency Intelligence Network, prison intelligence units and others.

ROCUs are set up under collaboration agreements (made under section 22A of the Police Act 1996) between the chief constables and police and crime commissioners (PCCs) in each region. ROCUs aren’t statutory bodies. They rely on forces to supply the administrative and support functions they need, including human resources, finance and IT. As a result, each ROCU is set up differently, under different terms of collaboration.

Each ROCU’s financing is mostly provided by chief constables and PCCs, with additional funding from the Home Office. In each region, forces negotiate their financial contribution to the ROCU.

Changes to how SOC threats are managed nationally

Our previous PEEL inspection reports have referred to how well forces have managed and mapped or assessed organised crime groups (OCGs).

In this report, we refer to SOC threats, which encompasses OCGs, SOC priority individuals and SOC vulnerabilities.

This reflects changes introduced nationally to provide a “single picture of demand”. This has been achieved by establishing a national database of SOC threats called the SOC master list, which is held on the agency and partner management information system (APMIS). This is used to assess which SOC threat is a priority for each agency or force. It holds information from the National Crime Agency (NCA), ROCUs, police forces and government agencies that tackle SOC. APMIS is also where forces, ROCUs and other agencies record their disruption activity against SOC threats.

Regional findings

The West Midlands region consists of four forces (Staffordshire Police, Warwickshire Police, West Mercia Police and West Midlands Police) and their ROCU, the Regional Organised Crime Unit for the West Midlands (ROCUWM).

Most SOC demand comes from West Midlands Police in terms of high threat and high volume.

The SOC lead for the West Midlands region should make sure regional change is managed effectively

At the time of our inspection, the chief constable of Warwickshire Police had taken additional responsibility to oversee the regional response to SOC. The chief constable was supported by an assistant chief constable (ACC) responsible for managing how the region tackles SOC and counter-terrorism. A regional SOC board was holding the ROCUWM and forces to account for their progress on tackling SOC.

During our inspection, we found that several changes had been made to the ROCUWM’s structure and funding. Chief officers and PCCs in the West Midlands region had stopped transferring officers into the ROCUWM from regional forces. These officers had originally been pledged to the ROCUWM as part of the Police Uplift Programme. And West Midlands Police had transferred some units from ROCUWM back to the force.

Several interviewees told us that they didn’t expect any difficulties because of these changes. But we did identify some risks. For example, the ROCUWM has hosted most of the region’s surveillance teams for several years. Returning some surveillance officers to West Midlands Police means that the ROCUWM will have less surveillance capacity. As a result, regional forces that have relied almost entirely on the ROCUWM for surveillance support may not get the same level of assistance. The ROCUWM was planning to recruit into the surveillance teams in September 2023. But for several reasons (including training), it may take time for these teams to be fully operational.

The newly appointed regional SOC leaders should manage the introduction of these changes to reduce any effect on service delivery, particularly on the smaller forces in the region.

The ROCUWM has a new set of strategic groups to manage SOC

The ROCUWM has introduced a new governance model, which includes the establishment of three strategic groups. ACCs from the regional forces chair these groups, which cover the SOC themes of commodity, undermining the economy and vulnerability. The ROCUWM ACC told us that relationships with force senior leaders are good.

Not all forces request ROCUWM support at the regional tasking meeting

A regional tasking and co-ordination meeting is held monthly to consider requests from forces for specialist support from the ROCUWM. West Midlands Police is the largest force in the region and manages a high number of significant SOC threats. This means West Midlands Police tends to get more support from the ROCUWM. Other forces in the region are reluctant to ask for ROCUWM support because they feel their requests are unlikely to be successful. The ROCUWM needs to understand the levels of SOC demand in the region. Therefore, it is important that forces ask for support even if they are aware that they are unlikely to receive it.

Between November 2022 and March 2023, the ROCUWM invited lead responsible officers (LROs) and senior investigating officers from regional forces to ROCUWM roadshows to explain the support available. Despite this, the number of requests for ROCUWM support at tasking meetings didn’t increase significantly. Senior leaders from the ROCUWM should continue with their efforts to increase requests for support.

A ROCUWM senior leader told us that some investigations that forces referred to them weren’t developed enough for them to proceed with. Placing covert teams in the ROCUWM has led to some force personnel becoming less experienced in how to deal with covert information. This is a problem that the ROCUWM and the regional forces should address.

There is a regional communication strategy to promote work done to tackle SOC

Forces in the region have agreed to introduce a communications strategy, called Operation Target, to publicise operational work to tackle SOC. Its aim is to provide consistent messages about SOC to the public as well as to police personnel. This strategy was being implemented at the time of our inspection, so we were unable to assess its effectiveness.

Regional Organised Crime Unit for the West Midlands

The ROCUWM is adequate at tackling serious and organised crime.

Understanding SOC and setting priorities to tackle it: ROCUWM

The ROCUWM has effective structures and processes to gather and assess intelligence

The ROCUWM has dedicated threat desks aligned with the regional control strategy priorities. These threat desks have specialist personnel who analyse intelligence and produce regional threat assessments.

The regional intelligence unit has developed standard operating procedures to make sure intelligence is managed consistently. For example, the unit has a process to analyse intelligence from call data records from different operations. Analytical staff examine this data to identify users of particular mobile phones and find out if they also appear in different operations. They then highlight operational opportunities to investigative teams.

Forces in the region submit threat assessments to the ROCTA team for moderation. This makes sure that mapping SOC threats throughout the region is consistent. We interviewed some ROCTA personnel and found that they understood the regional SOC threats. They told us that the number of threats identified in the region had doubled since 2020.

The ROCUWM has a gateway team to receive all requests made for specialist ROCUWM support. This team keeps a record of whether these requests were approved.

Some interviewees told us that sensitive intelligence isn’t always made available to intelligence teams, including the ROCTA and tackling organised exploitation (ToEx) teams. This means that sensitive intelligence isn’t always being used to assess the region’s SOC threats. This should be addressed.

The ROCUWM should make sure it collects intelligence for all types of SOC

Managers at the ROCUWM accept that intelligence collection for some crime types needs to improve. Child sexual abuse and exploitation and organised immigration crime are identified as regional priorities. But we found that most operations led by the ROCUWM targeted drugs and firearms criminality. Some of these operations had been developed from existing investigations. The regional tasking meeting reviews these new operations to make sure resources are being allocated correctly.

The ROCUWM works with local forces to respond to emerging threats. For example, they target those responsible for the organised theft of vehicles, which has been identified as a regional problem. Some personnel from the ToEx team told us they work closely with investigators from the ROCUWM to target crimes involving the exploitation of vulnerable people, such as modern slavery and human trafficking.

Resources and skills: ROCUWM

The ROCUWM makes effective use of its specialist capabilities

The ROCUWM has a range of specialist operational capabilities and makes sure its personnel and regional forces are aware of them. Personnel from the regional intelligence unit hold monthly professional development events for force LROs and ROCUWM personnel to improve their understanding of the available capabilities. A weekly ROCUWM leads’ meeting is held to review resources and support the tasking and co-ordination process.

The ROCUWM focuses on tackling vulnerability

During our inspections of forces in the region, we found that the ToEx team was supporting operations and identifying opportunities to safeguard vulnerable people.

Members of the ToEx team told us during interviews that they had enough training and technology to carry out their role effectively.

Some interviewees told us that safeguarding vulnerable people is a high priority during operational activity. They said any safeguarding concerns identified during investigations are actively managed. But others said they hadn’t received any safeguarding training.

The ROCUWM should review the training needed to make sure all personnel understand their responsibility to safeguard the vulnerable people they encounter.

The ROCUWM is dealing with an increase in demand

ROCUWM managers expect a significant increase in their workload because of changes made to how the NCA tackles SOC, as outlined in the National Strategic Assessment.

Like other ROCUs, the ROCUWM is dealing with increased demand because of illicit commodities, such as drugs, being imported from overseas. The ROCUWM works with SOC partners to identify the most effective response.

ROCUWM managers told us they are having to quickly change how their teams are set up to respond to these challenges.

The ROCUWM doesn’t consistently record organisational learning

The ROCUWM has a closing report that investigators should complete at the conclusion of operations. But some interviewees in a focus group told us that these documents aren’t always being completed. Some personnel didn’t know where these reports are stored or who should review them.

Specialist debrief officers are available to review live investigations into crimes in progress, such as kidnap and extortion.

Tackling SOC and safeguarding people and communities: ROCUWM

The ROCUWM should improve how it records disruption activity

During our inspection, we found that some personnel didn’t fully understand what information they needed to record about disruption activity. This was most evident for prevent, prepare and protect activity. For example, although the economic crime unit was regularly working with community members to warn them about current frauds and prevent them from becoming victims, this activity wasn’t always recorded on APMIS. We also heard that investigation teams in the ROCUWM were encouraged to recognise exploitation and vulnerability. But we believe some disruption activity that ROCUWM teams carry out isn’t being recorded.

We examined disruption data recorded by the ROCUWM for the year ending 30 June 2023. We found a good distribution of activity, with 52 percent of recorded disruptions for pursue activities. Most of the remaining disruption data related to tackling cybercrime and SOC activity in prison.

Staffordshire Police

Staffordshire Police requires improvement at tackling serious and organised crime.

Understanding SOC and setting priorities to tackle it: Staffordshire Police

The force has a strategy and meetings to manage its response to SOC

The force has a SOC strategy for the period 2022–25. The strategy includes actions and is set out clearly against four objectives:

1. building safe and secure communities;
2. developing an exceptional workforce;
3. developing active and productive partnerships; and
4. building an outstanding organisation.

The force uses a series of local and force tasking and co-ordination meetings to manage its response to SOC, which are held on a weekly, monthly and quarterly basis. During our inspection, we observed some of these meetings and found them to be well structured and supported by analytical products to inform decision-making.

The force told us it had recently established a strategic partnership board for SOC that will meet on a six-monthly basis. At the time of our inspection, there had only been an inaugural meeting, chaired by the ACC for specialist crime. This inaugural meeting lacked the presence of some key SOC partners. But the force was aiming to increase membership and introduce a rotating chair arrangement to increase partner involvement. This board has written terms of reference, which provide a clear governance framework. Since our inspection, the force has told us that attendance by partners has increased.

The force analyses intelligence to help it understand its SOC threats

The force produces an annual SOC profile that explains its SOC threats, but relevant recommendations aren’t always included. We found that the force wasn’t always using the profile to inform local or partnership activity. The force should make sure police and partners are aware of this profile.

The force also produces precision policing plans, which are analytical documents that help it identify locations vulnerable to SOC. The force identifies six priority neighbourhoods in which to concentrate its resources. We found that LROs in these neighbourhoods were using the plans to inform activity.

Additional partnership data, particularly on public health and education, would help the force improve these plans.

The force doesn’t routinely use partnership data to inform its understanding of SOC

The force has a data-sharing agreement with partners. But some personnel we interviewed described this as outdated and not fit for purpose. We also found examples of local agreements for sharing data, but these weren’t consistent across the force. For example, each of its policing areas has different arrangements for information sharing. Some police and partner personnel told us that they are uncertain about what can be shared. We heard that all partnership meetings would address this issue, but it would take up to 12 months to resolve. The new strategic partnership board is leading this work.

Resources and skills: Staffordshire Police

The force would benefit from more resilience and flexibility within its knowledge hub

At the time of our inspection, the force had 24 analysts, who were based in its knowledge hub. Three analysts were externally funded and concentrated on tackling serious violence, offender management and county lines.

Half of the analysts, two researchers and nine intelligence officers were working with the SOC and exploitation (SOCEX) team. Individual analysts in the SOCEX team were concentrating on specific threats, such as firearms and foreign national offenders. They also had responsibility for geographical areas of the force. For example, two analysts were supporting OCG investigations in the north of the force area, while two others were supporting investigations in the south.

Some analysts told us that they sometimes have to carry out other duties, such as processing intelligence, because of staff vacancies within the SOCEX team. We also heard that, although the analysts are given specialist threats to focus on, there is little resilience or flexibility in the team to cover each other’s areas of specialism.

The force doesn’t consistently record organisational learning

We found an inconsistent approach to debriefing operations and recording best practice. Some investigators told us that they don’t routinely debrief operations and there is no central location for storing or sharing best practice. Some LROs told us that operations are sometimes debriefed, but it isn’t mandatory.

Tackling SOC and safeguarding people and communities: Staffordshire Police

The force should improve how it works with its SOC partners

Some partners told us that the force doesn’t fully work with them to tackle SOC. Some described the organised crime group mapping (OCGM) meeting as a police meeting, and others said they felt like observers rather than active participants. During fieldwork, we heard examples of some force personnel not routinely working with partners to tackle SOC or using them to develop 4P plans.

The force aims to prevent people from becoming involved in SOC

We saw that the force had initiatives aimed at preventing people from becoming involved in SOC. The PCC funds SOC and violence prevention awareness sessions in schools. The violence reduction unit (VRU) identifies a cohort of young people and refers them to diversion schemes such as Catch 22. A governance board assesses the effectiveness of these schemes and monitors the progress of the young people in this cohort.

We found examples of the force working with academic institutions to evaluate its initiatives to tackle SOC. For example, Staffordshire University is helping the force to understand the effect of intervention activity in Stoke-on-Trent to tackle emerging drugs markets.

The force has a process to manage SOC offenders

The force’s offender management team provides support to LROs and investigators when making serious crime prevention order (SCPO) applications to make sure that these orders align with licence conditions. The team checks the force custody system every day to identify any SOC offenders suitable for preventative orders. Members of the team also visit SOC offenders in prison to prepare management plans ahead of their release.

During our inspection, we saw examples of the force tackling known SOC offenders who were continuing to offend. For example, it uses prison recalls when appropriate and works with HM Prison Service to transfer prisoners between prisons if they are believed to still be active in SOC.

But we found that the management of SOC offenders in the community varied across the force. Some offenders are managed by the offender management team, while others are managed by local policing teams. As a result, some SOC offenders are being managed by inexperienced personnel.

Warwickshire Police

Warwickshire Police requires improvement at tackling serious and organised crime.

Understanding SOC and setting priorities to tackle it: Warwickshire Police

The force has a structure to manage its response to SOC

Warwickshire Police has separate threat desks to assess and develop intelligence received from SOC partners and across the force area. The monthly force SOCEX meeting considers emerging SOC threats and, when appropriate, assigns an LRO. The force uses the management of risk in law enforcement (MoRiLE) model to help prioritise SOC threats. LROs are responsible for developing 4P plans after they are assigned an OCG to manage.

The force has introduced a system that allows SOC partners to submit intelligence directly to the force intelligence bureau. The force told us that this has increased the amount of intelligence on SOC.

The force uses several strategic and local meetings to manage its response to SOC. The chief superintendent with responsibility for SOC chairs the strategic governance board. During our inspection, we observed several meetings and found they were well structured and supported by analytical documents.

The force should improve how it gathers intelligence in some geographical areas

During interviews, we heard that some geographical areas of the force don’t have enough sources to gather intelligence. This is because the teams that manage this in these areas are understaffed and unable to proactively recruit intelligence sources. This is a risk that the force is aware of and is trying to address.

Resources and skills: Warwickshire Police

We last inspected Warwickshire Police’s response to SOC in our 2018 integrated PEEL inspection. We graded the force’s response as good but identified three areas for improvement:

1. the quality of 4P plans;
2. organisational learning and the force’s understanding of how its work affects SOC; and
3. the management of SOC offenders.

During this inspection, we found that problems remain in all three areas.

Tackling the threat from SOC may be affected by the ongoing force restructure

At the time of this inspection, the force was adopting a new operating model. This started in March 2023 and involved restructuring resources across the force into three local commands, rather than controlling all resources centrally.

The SOC team undertaking specialist SOC investigations was to be split into three area hubs to work with investigators and other proactive officers who tackle serious acquisitive crime (theft, robbery or burglary). It was too soon for us to assess whether this will be effective.

SOC analysts aren’t always supporting SOC investigations

The force has centralised its analytical team and has processes in place to manage demand for analysts. As a result, departments are required to submit requests for support. This can lead to delays in producing analytical documents. Some intelligence officers and investigators told us they complete their own analysis. The force is aware that demand on analysts means there isn’t enough capacity to do proactive work to tackle SOC.

Tackling SOC and safeguarding people and communities: Warwickshire Police

The force has partnership arrangements to tackle SOC

The force has strategic and tactical meetings with SOC partners to manage its SOC threats, known as SOC joint action groups (SOCJAGs). They adopt a 4P approach and are chaired by non-police personnel, such as senior representatives from the community safety partnership and Trading Standards. The force provides intelligence updates to each SOCJAG meeting.

We observed a SOCJAG meeting and saw representatives from SOC partners sharing information directly with the police. We also noted that much of the time spent in the SOCJAG meetings was dedicated to identifying people linked to OCGs and opportunities to divert them from these groups.

Partners we spoke with were generally supportive of the SOCJAG meetings. They recognise the importance of tackling SOC and the links to serious youth violence.

At the time of our inspection, the force was preparing to introduce the Clear, Hold, Build model. Although this was in the first stages of preparation, the force had briefed its strategic and tactical partners.

The force doesn’t have enough resources or expertise to use covert tactics

At the time of our inspection, the force had no officers qualified to carry out covert investigations. It relied entirely on the ROCUWM to do this work. But the ROCUWM was providing operational support to all the regional forces, so it couldn’t take on all the operations referred to it. Force leaders said they are satisfied with the support they receive from the ROCUWM. But some personnel told us they are frustrated that the force isn’t able to carry out much covert work.

During our inspection, we reviewed several SOC operations. One involved an OCG suspected to be involved in organised immigration crime and the exploitation of vulnerable people. We found that the force couldn’t provide enough personnel to tackle this.

The force works with partner agencies to protect vulnerable victims and prevent people from becoming involved in SOC

The force told us about several examples of its work with SOC partners to jointly use their powers and expertise to tackle SOC. This included work by local policing and partners to protect victims of cuckooing by county lines gangs. Private letting agents and local authority partners were working with residents to make them aware of the actions they were taking to support victims. Partners from a local authority Trading Standards office and the Food Standards Agency told us that together with the police, they use their powers to gain entry to premises suspected of being linked to exploitation.

The force told us it works with partners to divert people away from organised crime. They invite those who have been identified as at risk to attend a voluntary interview with professionals who prepare individual plans to prevent reoffending. These plans involve various schemes, including the Prince’s Trust, Catch 22, Barnardo’s, further education providers and local sports clubs.

Youth engagement officers have developed virtual reality training, covering SOC and county lines. They use this training during lessons in some schools across Warwickshire. This helps young people understand how gangs can groom and exploit them.

West Mercia Police

West Mercia Police is inadequate at tackling serious and organised crime.

Understanding SOC and setting priorities to tackle it: West Mercia Police

The force has a structure to manage its response to SOC

The force consistently uses MoRiLE to assess and prioritise its SOC threats. The risk relating to individual OCGs is subject to regular review and rescoring.

The force is managing its response to SOC through a series of local and force tasking and co-ordination meetings. During our inspection, we observed some meetings and found them to be well structured and supported by analytical products that informed decision-making.

The force has limited available data relating to the level and nature of SOC

The force is using both the vulnerable localities index (PDF document) and the Cambridge crime harm index to identify potential vulnerability to SOC at a local level.

But we found that the force wasn’t always using partnership data to help it understand the nature of SOC within communities. At the time of our inspection, the force told us that each of the five community safety partnerships had up-to-date information-sharing agreements. But some interviewees told us that the agreements weren’t fit for purpose. This has led to different arrangements across the force and doesn’t encourage effective information sharing. Senior leaders within the force told us that accessing data held by other organisations, such as the NHS and local authorities, is challenging.

At the time of our inspection, the force had no plans in place to address this issue. As a result, its knowledge of SOC was primarily based on police data.

SOC local profiles aren’t being used to inform multi-agency activity

The force produces SOC local profiles, which it calls community profiles, to identify the threat from SOC in each of its five local policing areas. These profiles are updated annually and should be used to tackle SOC. During our inspection, we found little knowledge of these documents among police personnel or SOC partners. In the force, some local policing leaders demonstrated a lack of understanding of SOC community profiles.

The force isn’t routinely using intelligence products

We found that intelligence products, such as problem profiles, weren’t always being used in the force to help progress SOC investigations. This is partly because analytical teams are understaffed and are experiencing high demand, which is highlighted in the next section. We also found that some investigators lacked awareness about the products available to help their investigations.

The force doesn’t emphasise the priority attached to SOC to the workforce

The force control strategy describes SOC as a national strategic policing requirement to inform operational priorities. We found that some managers and personnel felt that the control strategy lacked enough detail about SOC to help them prioritise it.

Some personnel across the force told us that they aren’t always able to tackle SOC because of other competing priority work.

Resources and skills: West Mercia Police

The force has enough specialised resources to tackle SOC

The force has a task force consisting of specialist firearms officers and surveillance-trained officers. It is mostly deployed to support local operations but is also available to support national or regional activity. The force has created dedicated SOC teams in both the north and south force areas to deal with complex SOC investigations.

The force lacks analytical capacity

Staff from analytical teams told us that the number of researchers and analysts in the force has been reduced significantly because of funding cuts. Also, over a third of the analysts were absent due to sickness or secondment.

Some analytical personnel expressed frustration that the high demand and lack of staff prevented them from carrying out thorough research and analysis. This was affecting their ability to proactively identify SOC threats. Analytical managers told us that about 75 percent of analytical demand relates to the examination of communications data for reactive investigations.

Some analysts told us of instances where they weren’t being involved at the start of investigations. This means that some evidential opportunities may have been missed. Some personnel in proactive teams told us that they have stopped asking for analytical support as they know they won’t get it.

During our inspection, some analysts told us that they aren’t confident in the stability of IT systems. They also told us that some IT systems aren’t compatible with others.

There isn’t enough training and support for LROs in the force

The force appoints detective chief inspectors in the force’s crime teams as LROs. This work is in addition to their other detective chief inspector responsibilities. Some areas of the force have significantly more OCGs than others, so workloads for these LROs varies.

Some LROs felt that the force would benefit from having LROs from different backgrounds, such as safer neighbourhood and problem-solving teams. This would increase capacity and experience.

Some LROs told us that they hadn’t received enough training to carry out their LRO roles. Similarly, they hadn’t been trained in the completion and use of 4P plans. As a result, they relied on support from colleagues. While we found that detective chief inspectors did meet regularly, the purpose of these meetings was to talk about matters related to ongoing investigations rather than LRO-specific concerns. At the time of our inspection, we saw no evidence of a programme to provide continuing professional development for LROs.

The force doesn’t consistently record organisational learning

We found that evaluation of operational activity across the force was inconsistent and not understood by some personnel. We did observe that the OCG management meeting identified some good practice. Some interviewees also explained that the force had introduced new processes to identify learning.

Some LROs told us that examples of good practice are held on a database maintained by the OCG mapping unit (OCGMU). But our own examination of this database didn’t reassure us that it provides an effective corporate record for organisational learning related to SOC.

Tackling SOC and safeguarding people and communities: West Mercia Police

LROs should co-ordinate and quality assure 4P plans

We found little evidence that LROs were managing the quality of 4P plans. It wasn’t always clear to us who created the plans, who was responsible for them or if they had been reviewed. Staff from the OCGMU explained that some personnel confused 4P plans with other management plans.

We found that, on occasions, some LROs were primarily focused on pursuing SOC offenders. And some LROs considered prevention and protection to be the responsibility of other teams or SOC partners. Some 4P plans contained little detail about preventative activity or how this was being prioritised.

Thematic leads are in place for each of the 4Ps. But we found that these leads weren’t always working with LROs or holding them to account for progress.

At the time of our inspection, senior leaders within the force accepted that its partnership arrangements meant that preventative activity wasn’t always co-ordinated. For the year ending 31 March 2023, 93 percent of recorded disruptions were for pursue activity. Since our inspection, the force has improved its recording of disruptions.

The force isn’t consistently working with partners to tackle SOC

The force doesn’t have effective strategic governance arrangements in place with partners to tackle SOC. We did see some good examples of partnership working at a local level including, for example, problem-solving to address issues such as antisocial behaviour. But these aren’t widespread.

Some partners expressed concern about elements of the community safety partnership meetings, including structure and leadership.

We found reluctance among some senior police leaders to challenge partners when they hadn’t completed SOC actions. This may indicate that the relationship between the force and its partners to tackle SOC isn’t robust enough.

The force was planning to work with partners to implement the Clear, Hold, Build model. For this to be successful, the force should do all it can to promote more effective partnership working and information sharing.

The force should improve how it prevents people from becoming involved in SOC

We found that the force had some prevent programmes aligned with SOC activity. But some LROs struggled to give examples of prevent programmes to divert people away from SOC. Prevention leads could only name two projects specific to SOC: one relating to preventing knife crime and the other to diverting females from crime.

The majority of prevent programmes the force told us about appeared to be localised and not specifically tailored to working with groups at risk of being involved in SOC. For example, in interviews, force personnel often mentioned local sporting activities, but these weren’t specifically designed for SOC intervention.

The force should review how it assesses progress when tackling SOC

The force has a delivery plan to help it to improve how it tackles SOC. We found that the plan was lengthy, and updates weren’t always dated, which made the timeline for delivery difficult to understand. We also found that the objectives in the plan didn’t appear to be prioritised.

The delivery plan contains a section for each 4P lead to provide an update on their strands of work. In some cases, these updates simply listed activities the force was carrying out instead of providing an update or evaluating effectiveness.

The force is using ancillary orders to manage high-threat SOC offenders

At the time of our inspection, the force had 19 SCPO orders. Four of these were being actively managed. The remaining 15 SCPOs concerned individuals in prison.

During our inspection, we were told that personnel in the OCGMU consult with the National Probation Service six months before an offender is released from prison. This allows time for them to jointly prepare a management plan. If an offender is being released to another force area, the OCGMU contacts the relevant force to make sure it has enough time to create a management plan.

West Midlands Police

West Midlands Police is adequate at tackling serious and organised crime.

Understanding SOC and setting priorities to tackle it: West Midlands Police

The force prioritises its SOC threats

We saw a threat grid the force had produced that it uses to prioritise its top 25 SOC threats. It uses professional assessment of risk combined with MoRiLE to rank the threats on this grid. The force SOCEX meeting, chaired by the head of intelligence, uses the threat grid to support decision-making and resource allocation. SOC threats are also prioritised through local and regional tasking and co-ordination meetings.

The force doesn’t map all the SOC threats that feature on the threat grid on APMIS. For example, the county lines task force separately assesses and prioritises county lines gangs.

Intelligence is used to inform operational decision-making

Analysts routinely scan intelligence reports to identify emerging issues and opportunities to disrupt criminals. Analysts specialise in specific SOC threat areas and have enough training to apply their skills to other threat areas when required. The force intelligence academy makes sure that intelligence personnel can maintain their skills and national accreditation.

Resources and skills: West Midlands Police

At the time of our inspection, the force had a new leadership team, which had changed the operating model. This has been described in the force’s PEEL report.

The force supports LROs but some face excessive demand

The force appoints chief inspectors in each of its local policing areas as LROs. They develop 4P plans to manage identified SOC threats in their areas.

The force head of SOC co-ordinates LRO training, including guidance on completing 4P plans. Other agencies, including the ROCUWM and HM Revenue and Customs, have provided training. But some LROs told us they felt they hadn’t received enough training before taking on the role.

LROs have access to proactive resources to tackle SOC. In two local policing areas, this includes dedicated gangs teams. They also attend SOCEX meetings, which means they can request covert support, including from the ROCUWM and the NCA. The SOCEX team monitors the progress of operations, and local policing area commanders hold their own LROs to account.

But we found that in one local policing area, the LRO was managing 45 SOC threats as well as other significant issues that included live firearms incidents. As a result, this LRO was struggling to meet the demands of the LRO role combined with their other responsibilities. The force should make sure that there are enough LROs to manage the SOC threat in higher-demand geographical areas.

The force is tackling county lines effectively

In April 2022, the force established a county lines taskforce. The task force has significant capabilities, including five operational teams, dedicated analytical and legal support and access to mobile surveillance. The Home Office has provided funding for three years.

The task force targets the use of mobile telephones linked to county lines activity. The team also identifies premises being used by county lines gangs. It uses tactics such as closure notices and the enforcement of tenancy agreements to reduce this. The Crime and Policing Act 2014 allows the police to issue a closure notice if they believe that the use of a premises has or will result in nuisance to the public. A closure notice can also be used to prevent disorder associated with the use of a premise.

SOC demand isn’t being dealt with consistently across the force

We found that some local policing area personnel didn’t fully understand their role in tackling SOC and felt this was the responsibility of the SOCEX operational teams. When we met with local teams, some told us that competing demands and differing local priorities made SOC just one of several demands placed on them. Some interviewees were unclear on the specific roles of other force teams that target SOC and how they work together.

Information about SOC offenders and threats is available to police officers and staff on their handheld devices and the force intranet. Most local policing area personnel felt adequately briefed on the SOC threats in their geographical area. But we found some personnel weren’t using these tools and, as a result, had limited knowledge of SOC in their area.

Some local policing area supervisors told us that their teams were very inexperienced and student officers were frequently rotated. While we understand the requirement for student officers to gain experience in different roles, this may affect the local understanding of SOC threats.

The force has several proactive teams available, which include two gangs teams based in Birmingham, an illicit cash team, six force priority teams and a dedicated source unit. Their specific functions weren’t always clear.

In one focus group, some officers explained that proactive teams were sometimes under-resourced. For example, they have to support response and custody teams when required. We reported a similar scenario as an area for improvement in our PEEL inspection report in relation to neighbourhood officers often being diverted to response roles and away from important work to prevent crime. Clearly, the force needs to meet demand, but this means operational teams aren’t always able to function at the required level.

Tackling SOC and safeguarding people and communities: West Midlands Police

The force should improve how it uses SCPOs to prevent SOC offending

Overall, we found that the force wasn’t routinely considering the use of SCPOs to prevent SOC offending. At the time of our inspection, senior leaders couldn’t confirm how many SCPOs were in place. Of the figures quoted, the maximum was six, which we believe is low for such a large force.

But we did find that teams, such as the offender management teams and gangs teams, regularly considered other orders to prevent offending. These include gang injunctions, knife crime prevention orders and closure notices. We found that local policing teams were frequently used to enforce these orders. But some specialist SOC teams felt that they were expected to enforce orders without receiving relevant training.

The force works with partners to prevent people from becoming involved in SOC and to protect vulnerable victims

During our inspection, we heard examples of the force working with partners to tackle SOC and associated activities, such as gang crime and serious violence. We found that the force had good relationships with a range of partners and shared information appropriately. For example, the force holds regular meetings with local authorities to discuss concerns for children living with SOC offenders.

The force attends several forums aimed at tackling SOC, exploitation and serious violence. These forums include representatives from the seven local authorities, health, education and the PCC. There is also a violence reduction partnership meeting, which identifies repeat victims and perpetrators. The meeting considers appropriate prevention strategies to divert victims away from SOC and prevent them from entering the criminal justice system.

Most partners we interviewed were positive about the force’s approach to tackling gangs and county lines. But some shared concerns that its approach may have a negative effect on tackling more serious crime.

The force has established individual SOCEX partnership hubs in Birmingham, Coventry and Wolverhampton. These hubs collect and assess intelligence with the aim of identifying and safeguarding children and vulnerable adults at risk of becoming involved in SOC. The force also analyses intelligence and seeks to identify those at risk of becoming involved in county lines gangs.

The force has assigned prevention officers to every school in its area. Public community support officers visit primary schools, while police officers visit secondary schools. The officers give annual talks to all students but focus particularly on children in year six before they transfer to secondary school.

The force told us about the Step Together programme and research that concludes children are most likely to be pressured into becoming involved in criminality when they are half a mile from school. The Step Together programme provides volunteers who walk with children on specified routes to and from school.

Appendix 1: Map of regional organised crime units

There are ten regions in England and Wales containing nine regional organised crime units:

1. The North East Regional Organised Crime Unit covers Cleveland, Durham and Northumbria.
2. The Yorkshire & the Humber Regional Organised Crime Unit covers Humberside, North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire.
3. The North West Regional Organised Crime Unit covers Cheshire, Cumbria, Greater Manchester, Lancashire, Merseyside and North Wales.
4. Tarian covers Dyfed-Powys, Gwent and South Wales.
5. The Regional Organised Crime Unit for the West Midlands Region covers Warwickshire, West Mercia, West Midlands and Staffordshire.
6. The East Midlands Special Operations Unit covers Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire and Nottinghamshire.
7. The Eastern Region Special Operations Unit covers Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Kent, Norfolk and Suffolk.
8. The South West Regional Organised Crime Unit covers Avon & Somerset, Devon & Cornwall, Dorset, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire.
9. The Metropolitan Police Service, the City of London Police and British Transport Police work collaboratively in the London region.
10. The South East Regional Organised Crime Unit covers Hampshire, Surrey, Sussex and Thames Valley.

There is a separate collaborative arrangement for the London region, incorporating the constituent forces of the Metropolitan Police Service, the City of London Police and British Transport Police. The forces share some ROCU capabilities.

Appendix 2: Data methodology and caveats

The data used in this report was extracted from the national database: the Agency and Partners Management Information System (APMIS).

APMIS contains data that is recorded by police forces throughout England and Wales, regional organised crime units, the National Crime Agency and other agencies, such as His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and Home Office Immigration Enforcement.

APMIS data:

• The serious organised crime (SOC) master list contains all the MoRiLE assessments for the SOC threats identified by forces and agencies.
• Event-based disruption data (disruption data) is recorded in accordance with national minimum standards. At the time of our inspection, minimum standards stipulated that disruption data should only be recorded against organised crime groups and not priority individuals or SOC vulnerabilities.
• Police forces across England and Wales and regional organised crime units submit disruption data to APMIS differently. Police forces can only record disruptions that they have led. Regional organised crime units can record disruptions that they have led and disruptions they have carried out to benefit another force or agency. The latter are known as support disruptions. We report on lead disruptions. We exclude support disruptions and only report them by exception. We make it clear in the report when we are referring to support disruption data.

MoRiLE assessment data was extracted from APMIS on 3 April 2023, and therefore any changes made to assessments since that date won’t be accounted for in the analysis. The following filters were used on columns to extract this data: Type is Tactical, Moderation status is Moderated, SOC is SOC, Tier isn’t Tier 5 and Phase not contains closed.

Disruption data was extracted from APMIS for lead disruptions. At the time of our inspection, an extraction carried out for the year ending 31 March 2023 was available, which covered lead disruptions added to APMIS by that date.

Since the inspection, a further extraction was carried out for the year ending 30 June 2023. In the main, the data from the extraction carried out on 30 June 2023 is referenced in this report, unless otherwise stated.

The following filters were used on columns to extract this data: Disruption type is Lead disruption; Record data is greater than 30 June 2022, less than 30 June 2023; and Assessment category is Major, Minor and Moderate.

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An inspection of the West Midlands regional response to serious and organised crime