An inspection of the south-west regional response to serious and organised crime

Introduction

About our inspection

As part of our overall police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy inspections, we inspected how well police forces tackle serious and organised crime (SOC). In 2022, we changed how we inspect this aspect of policing, to incorporate inspections of the ten regions, as well as the nine regional organised crime units (ROCUs) throughout England and Wales, and the 43 police forces. This improves our understanding of how well forces and ROCUs work together to tackle SOC.

In the south-west, we completed the inspection fieldwork in two phases. In March 2024, we carried out fieldwork in Avon and Somerset Constabulary and Dorset Police. In June and July 2024, we carried out fieldwork in Devon and Cornwall Police, Wiltshire Police, Gloucestershire Constabulary, and the South West Regional Organised Crime Unit (SWROCU).

About us

His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) independently assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of police forces and fire and rescue services, to make communities safer. In preparing our reports, we ask the questions that the public would ask, and publish the answers in an accessible form. We use our expertise to interpret the evidence and make recommendations for improvement.

About our report

This report includes the following sections.

Regional findings

We provide a summary of inspection evidence that identifies good or poor performance within the region; in other words, involving or relating to the ROCU and its constituent forces. The performance of the region isn’t given a graded judgment. Instead, we highlight areas for improvement, causes of concern and innovative and promising practice in this section, where applicable.

The ROCU and individual forces

We give the ROCU and each individual force a graded judgment. This includes a summary of the findings from our inspection and highlighted sections for areas for improvement, causes of concern and innovative and promising practice.

Terminology used in this report

Our reports contain references to, among other things, ‘national’ definitions, priorities, policies, systems, responsibilities and processes.

In some instances, ‘national’ means applying to England and Wales. In others, it means applying to England and Wales and Scotland or the whole of the United Kingdom.

About ROCUs

Each ROCU serves between three and seven constituent forces (see map in Appendix 1).

The Strategic Policing Requirement defines ROCUs as:

“collaboration arrangements between forces that deliver specialist policing capabilities” and “the primary interface between the NCA [National Crime Agency] and forces”.

It sets out that:

“The ROCU network mission is to protect communities by disrupting organised crime groups, individual criminals and those who enable them.”

The Government’s Serious and Organised Crime Strategy 2023–2028 states:

“ROCUs are the operational and intelligence link between the NCA and police forces in England and Wales and lead the law enforcement response to serious and organised crime in their regions.”

ROCUs provide a range of specialist capabilities to forces. These include the regional organised crime threat assessment (ROCTA) units, surveillance, undercover policing, sensitive intelligence units, regional asset recovery teams, cybercrime teams, the Government Agency Intelligence Network, prison intelligence units and others.

ROCUs are set up under collaboration agreements (made under section 22A of the Police Act 1996) between the chief constables and police and crime commissioners (PCCs) in each region. ROCUs aren’t statutory bodies. They rely on forces to supply the administrative and support functions they need, including human resources, finance and IT. As a result, each ROCU is set up differently, under different terms of collaboration.

Chief constables and PCCs provide most of the funding for ROCUs and additional funding is provided by the Home Office. In each region, forces negotiate their financial contribution to the ROCU.

Changes to how SOC threats are managed nationally

In our previous PEEL inspection reports, we have referred to how well forces have managed and mapped or assessed organised crime groups (OCGs).

In this report, we refer to SOC threats, which encompass OCGs, SOC priority individuals and SOC vulnerabilities.

This reflects changes introduced nationally to provide a “single picture of demand”. This has been achieved by setting up a national database of SOC threats called the SOC master list, which is held on the agency and partner management information system (APMIS). This is used to assess which SOC threat is a priority for each agency or force. It holds information from the National Crime Agency (NCA), ROCUs, police forces and government agencies that tackle SOC. APMIS is also where forces, ROCUs and other agencies record their disruption activity against SOC threats.

Regional findings

The south-west region consists of five forces (Avon and Somerset Constabulary, Devon and Cornwall Police, Dorset Police, Gloucestershire Constabulary and Wiltshire Police) and the South West Regional Organised Crime Unit (SWROCU).

SWROCU and its constituent forces show inconsistencies in learning from operational activity across the region

We found that SWROCU regularly reviewed what worked well in its SOC operations and shared this learning with its teams and regional forces. For example, some senior investigating officers (SIOs) told us they met weekly to review operational progress, record learning and share this with other appropriate teams.

When we reviewed one operation, the SIO told us that they had carried out a debrief and used the learning to improve how they managed investigations. SWROCU told us that its personnel met with surveillance managers from forces in the region every month to identify potential learning from its current operations. SWROCU was planning to train more personnel to carry out operational debriefs.

However, during visits to forces in the region, we found that learning from operational activity to tackle SOC was rare. All forces told us that they intended to learn from experience, and there were some processes in place to do this at a force level. But this didn’t consistently focus on SOC work.

We did find examples of forces in the region reviewing how they learned from their operations. For example, Wiltshire Police had asked Durham Constabulary to carry out a peer review. But Wiltshire Police couldn’t clearly explain to us how it planned to make the recommended changes identified in the review.

SWROCU and its constituent forces should improve the regional approach to managing SOC offenders

We found that forces in the south-west region varied in their approaches to managing serious crime prevention orders (SCPOs). We have included specific areas for improvement for Dorset Police and Wiltshire Police.

The assistant chief constable responsible for leading the regional response to SOC has completed a review of the management of SCPOs. The review contained ten recommendations. SWROCU is planning to dedicate someone to implement these recommendations. This is a positive step but will require the forces and SWROCU to work together.

South West Regional Organised Crime Unit

South West Regional Organised Crime Unit (SWROCU) is adequate at tackling serious and organised crime.

Understanding SOC and setting priorities to tackle it

SWROCU manages its response to SOC

SWROCU uses a strategic assessment and a control strategy to set out the priorities for the region. It considers NCA priorities and uses MoRiLE assessments to decide on these regional priorities.

SWROCU appoints senior officers to lead on each of these priority themes. Each theme also has a strategic governance group and tactical delivery group to manage the regional response. We found that these groups received a good amount of analytical support.

SWROCU assigns priority themes to designated managers. Assistant chief constables from the region lead the approaches to SOC in prisons and to drug supply (both in and out of prisons). Regional superintendents lead the approaches to organised immigration crime (OIC) and child sexual abuse.

During focus groups, we were told that sergeants frequently attend tactical delivery groups instead of chief inspectors. We understand that this may sometimes be unavoidable for operational reasons. But forces in the region should make sure that, whenever possible, suitable representatives attend these meetings. This will make sure that forces in the region complete any tasks assigned to them.

SWROCU has an effective process to manage requests for support

SWROCU effectively manages requests for support from police forces and other agencies. The chief inspector in the gateway function considers requests for support. They refer complex cases to the capabilities meeting for a decision. These meetings are chaired by a detective inspector, and every team from SWROCU attends. Attendees at this meeting decide whether SWROCU should adopt the case fully or support with advice or specialist assistance.

Resources and skills

Recruiting personnel to fill posts was difficult for SWROCU

We heard from some SWROCU leaders that the regional operating model created some difficulties. We heard concerns about this from the SOC portfolio of the National Police Chiefs’ Council. They told us that to introduce new posts each regional force developed individual terms and conditions and advertised the posts separately. We found that, while this wasn’t efficient, SWROCU was still able to support new national projects and manage its SOC threats.

SWROCU senior leaders told us that, during the 12 months before our inspection, it had reduced its vacancy rate from 20 percent to 12 percent. We found that most SWROCU teams were well staffed and able to meet demand. These included the gateway function, the sensitive intelligence unit, and the operational hubs in the north and south of the region. But the operational hubs were operating with fewer qualified surveillance officers than national guidelines recommend. SWROCU told us that surveillance officers work together when required.

We heard during focus groups and interviews that some of the regional forces weren’t advertising SWROCU roles or weren’t releasing officers to take up posts. For example, Wiltshire Police was refusing to release any officers to SWROCU. This was most apparent for detective posts as police forces were struggling to maintain their number of experienced detectives. The RDT told us it often didn’t have enough personnel because of this.

To address this, SWROCU has recruited officers with little experience of investigating SOC. SWROCU has introduced a process to train these officers in post. But it will take a long time for these officers to be fully trained. One team leader from SWROCU told us that there needed to be a balance between experienced officers and those in training. SWROCU had extended its recruitment to all UK police forces. This resulted in the appointment of 15 officers.

We heard that personnel roles in SWROCU can attract different rates of pay. This is because some staff recruited into SWROCU remain on their force pay scales which can vary a lot.

SWROCU’s regional information technology isn’t well connected

Personnel in SWROCU have difficulty accessing individual IT systems in regional forces, making it hard for them to do their jobs. We heard that personnel often have to log into each system individually and some systems don’t allow data to be extracted.

Tackling SOC and safeguarding people and communities

SWROCU should improve the quality of 4P plans and how it appoints LROs

This part of the report is relevant to the area for improvement in our section on regional findings.

Some SWROCU personnel told us that managers had recently introduced the use of the national template for 4P plans. During our inspections we aim to review ten of these plans, but only three were available to us. When we reviewed these plans, we found that they had only recently been written. Some LROs we spoke to didn’t understand their role in managing 4P plans.

SWROCU has a varied approach to appointing LROs. In some cases, regional forces nominate LROs based on their geographical area. But we found examples of the SIO from SWROCU also taking on the LRO role. We often find that force-based LROs are better able to identify opportunities to protect victims and prevent SOC. We also heard examples of forces not wanting to provide LROs for SOC threats identified by the NCA. When this happened, SIOs from SWROCU had to carry out both roles.

SWROCU is working to tackle SOC in prisons, but more needs to be done

SWROCU has identified the threat from SOC in prisons as a regional priority. But police forces in the region don’t fully understand what help SWROCU can provide. The assistant chief constable responsible for SWROCU works well with prison governors in the region. They meet four times a year and they hosted a conference with prisons, police forces, the NCA and the Crown Prosecution Service.

SWROCU has a regional prison intelligence unit (RPIU). The unit has good relationships with the prisons in the region. It has a dedicated prison intelligence officer for each of these prisons. SWROCU has a strategic analyst who supports the offender management work and gives the prison intelligence officers intelligence updates about offenders in their prisons. The analyst also keeps a record of all OCG members and county lines offenders in the regional prisons.

We examined disruption data held on APMIS and documents sent to us before the inspection. From this information, we found that most disruptions recorded by SWROCU were to stop offenders continuing their criminal activities in prison. In the year ending 31 March 2024, 69 percent of lead disruption activity recorded by SWROCU related to targeting SOC offenders.

SWROCU has a multi-agency response to serious and organised crime (MARSOC) team to disrupt high-harm SOC offenders. At the time of our inspection, it was only managing three offenders. Members of the team told us that they thought their workload was low because police forces in the region didn’t fully understand what the MARSOC team offered. MARSOC team members had visited forces to improve understanding, but the number of referrals was still low.

SWROCU has an economic crime unit that supports regional forces

The SWROCU economic crime unit may be missing opportunities to investigate money laundering. We heard from personnel in the economic crime unit that they concentrate on applying for court orders such as production orders. However, they told us that these can be time-consuming and sometimes limited their ability to investigate money laundering.

We heard from members of the economic crime unit that they work with operational teams to support their investigations. The unit also supports forces in the region, advising their financial investigators on how to progress their investigations.

SWROCU has established a small team focused on protecting people that are vulnerable to fraud. It works across the region, providing police forces and other agencies with advice for them to share with vulnerable communities.

SWROCU works with relevant partner agencies to tackle SOC

We found that SWROCU works with a wide range of partner agencies to tackle SOC. Agencies including His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Services, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the NCA, have personnel working in SWROCU. During our inspection, SWROCU personnel told us how they had worked with other partners to investigate SOC and protect vulnerable people. In one example they worked with a local authority in Scotland to investigate an OCG that was travelling.

We also heard that the tackling organised exploitation team was working with immigration enforcement and UK Visas and Immigration, to tackle modern slavery and human trafficking and OIC.

But some of the personnel from the agencies working with SWROCU told us that joint working could be improved. For example, they told us that they attended tasking and co-ordination meetings but they weren’t always involved in discussions and decision‑making. Partner agencies aren’t invited to the strategic governance group meetings. Some personnel in the partner agencies told us that they would be able to contribute to these meetings.

Avon and Somerset Constabulary

Avon and Somerset Constabulary requires improvement at tackling serious and organised crime.

Understanding SOC and setting priorities to tackle it

The constabulary should use local profiles to inform a multi-agency response to SOC

This part of the report is relevant to the area for improvement in our section on regional findings.

At the time of our inspection, the constabulary hadn’t updated its SOC local profile since 2021. The constabulary told us this was because it had no strategic analysts to produce the profile. Following our inspection, the constabulary told us that it had produced a new SOC local profile including a fact sheet for each local policing area.

We found that the constabulary didn’t have formal working arrangements with relevant partner agencies. We explain this in more detail in the section where we discuss how the constabulary needs to work more effectively with partner agencies to tackle SOC. The SOC local profile includes a recommendation that the constabulary should re‑establish relationships with relevant partner agencies. The constabulary needs to do this to make sure it has an effective multi-agency response to SOC.

The constabulary is improving how it manages its response to SOC

At the time of our inspection, the constabulary was planning to introduce a new governance structure to manage its response to SOC. This included new tasking and co-ordination arrangements. We weren’t able to assess the effectiveness of this structure during this inspection. But during interviews and focus groups some personnel told us that they didn’t fully understand the planned changes. The constabulary has told us since our inspection that it has improved how it explains these changes to its workforce. Since our inspection, the constabulary has produced a new strategic assessment.

The constabulary has a clear focus on drug supply. The constabulary also has specific governance and performance structures to address serious violence. But we found the constabulary was less focused on other SOC threats. For example, within the constabulary’s area there is a large construction site with a diverse workforce, including foreign national workers. The constabulary hadn’t interacted with this community or highlighted that they may be at risk of exploitation.

Similarly, some constabulary senior leaders explained to us that 80 percent of the constabulary’s SOC assessments focused on the illegal supply of drugs. They believed that the constabulary probably had gaps in its intelligence gathering, particularly in relation to OIC and Western Balkan organised crime.

Resources and skills

The constabulary needs to improve how it works with partner agencies to tackle SOC

This part of the report is relevant to the area for improvement in our section on regional findings.

The constabulary doesn’t have effective relationships with senior representatives of relevant partner agencies. This limits how the constabulary tackles SOC. Some constabulary senior leaders told us that the constabulary had cancelled its SOC disruption panels during the pandemic. At the time of inspection, the constabulary hadn’t re-established these panels. Some constabulary personnel we interviewed explained that disruption panels used to be a good forum to brief partners about SOC intelligence and find out if they could offer any help.

After the inspection, we met with constabulary senior leaders. They told us that they were reintroducing disruption panels in some areas of the constabulary. We encourage the constabulary to reintroduce these panels in all areas of the constabulary.

The constabulary is improving training and support for LROs

The constabulary has improved its support for LROs but still needs to do more. The constabulary appoints neighbourhood inspectors or intelligence managers as LROs, based on geographical location. Before LROs start the role, the constabulary provides them with a one‑day training course. We also found that there was guidance available to LROs on the force intranet. But some LROs told us that they hadn’t received training, and others told us the training wasn’t enough to prepare them for the role.

Some neighbourhood inspectors told us they didn’t have capacity to be an LRO. Constabulary senior leaders explained to us that they intended to train more LROs to resolve this problem. Force LROs give regular updates on activity at local tasking and co‑ordination meetings. They can also ask for additional resources at these meetings.

We found that the skills and experience of constabulary LROs varied. We reviewed several operations during our inspection. The LRO for one of these operations had recorded limited information on the 4P plan. They had focused on pursuing offenders with little activity aimed at protecting vulnerable people or preventing SOC from happening. Some LROs told us that they didn’t consult with partner agencies when preparing and updating 4P plans.

The constabulary has invested in information technology to share management information

The constabulary uses an IT system called Qlik. This allows its personnel to access several constabulary systems including intelligence briefings about SOC. At the time of our inspection, the Violence Reduction Partnership was in the final stages of producing a Qlik dashboard to identify the ten most vulnerable children. This would help personnel to focus activity on reducing the vulnerability of these children.

However, some frontline personnel told us that they don’t routinely use the Qlik system. There were several reasons for this including them not being sure about how to navigate the system and being too busy dealing with incidents.

The constabulary is recruiting volunteers with specialist skills to tackle cyber and economic crime

The constabulary has recruited volunteers with specialist skills into several roles including cyber and economic crime. Many of these volunteers have experience from working in the private sector. Constabulary supervisors can deploy them to support specialist investigations and to advise on tactical options.

The constabulary has also recruited and vetted two volunteers to assist with its complex financial investigations. These volunteers identify money laundering and professional enablers of SOC. One of the volunteers has worked as an accountant and the other as a mortgage advisor. These volunteers have also attended searches of premises to identify potential criminal assets for confiscation.

Tackling SOC and safeguarding people and communities

The constabulary should improve the standard of its 4P plans

This part of the report is relevant to the area for improvement in our section on regional findings.

We found that the constabulary was using 4P plans but constabulary personnel were completing them to an inconsistent standard. During our inspection we reviewed several of these 4P plans. In some cases, we found that the planned activities were focused on pursuing offenders with less emphasis on preventing SOC and protecting vulnerable people. It was clear from speaking to personnel working on SOC investigations that they were carrying out lots of work, but it wasn’t always being recorded on the 4P plans.

The constabulary does some work with partner agencies to prevent SOC and protect victims

Earlier in this section, we explained that the constabulary needs to improve how it works at a senior level with its SOC partners. But we did find examples of the constabulary working well with its partner agencies at an operational level.

We heard that constabulary offender management and safeguarding teams were sharing information with partners when managing high-risk cases. In one example, the safeguarding team shared information about knife crime with the Community Safety Partnership. This led to education services explaining the risks of SOC at several schools.

When we spoke to locally based officers, many knew who was available to help them divert people from SOC. This included making referrals through safeguarding teams known as Lighthouse teams. These Lighthouse teams are co-located with safeguarding partner agencies, such as victim support, in local policing areas. They work together to review referred cases and provide interventions to reduce vulnerability.

Personnel in the Operation Topaz team told us how they had worked with partners to secure an interim anti-slavery and trafficking risk order to disrupt a county lines gang. They also worked with licensing and trading standards to prevent SOC from happening. We also heard from some constabulary LROs that they didn’t work with partners to progress the 4P plans.

The constabulary is managing its SOC offenders in the community

At the time of the inspection, the constabulary had 15 SCPOs. It had eight SCPOs against offenders in the community and seven SCPOs against offenders in prison. The constabulary has an expert in the intelligence bureau to support constabulary personnel who are applying for SCPOs. The constabulary uses the national ViSOR IT system to record SCPOs.

The constabulary allocates responsibility for managing SCPOs to LROs at the tasking and co‑ordination meetings. The LROs use local policing teams to enforce these orders. But, during some interviews, we heard that local teams weren’t always managing SCPOs in the same way. And that the management of offenders in prison is less effective.

The constabulary struggled to establish a Clear, Hold, Build site

In January 2023, the then Home Secretary requested all police forces in England and Wales implement Clear, Hold, Build by 31 March 2024. Avon and Somerset Constabulary didn’t meet this deadline. We heard that this failure was for several reasons including being unable to agree with some local authorities on a suitable location. Since our inspection, the constabulary has told us that it had identified a site and is holding discussions with partner organisations.

Devon and Cornwall Police

Devon and Cornwall Police requires improvement at tackling serious and organised crime.

Understanding SOC and setting priorities to tackle it

The force is improving its strategic governance to manage the response to SOC

At the time of our inspection, the force had a new strategic assessment and control strategy. In this strategy, SOC is identified as one of six force priorities. There was also a new SOC strategy for 2024–2028.

In late 2023, the force appointed a new director of Intelligence responsible for SOC governance. People we interviewed told us that this person had improved the force’s response to SOC.

The force needs to make sure that it fully assesses SOC threats

This part of the report is relevant to the area for improvement in our section on regional findings.

At the time of inspection, the force told us they were managing 16 OCGs. During focus groups, some officers told us that they believed that there were more OCGs operating in the force area. They stated that this was because the force wasn’t developing some intelligence enough to identify an OCG. Two of the force operations we reviewed were targeting groups that hadn’t been assessed as OCGs. But we think that they should have been. One operation related to class A drug supply and the other to fraud.

The force should use local profiles to inform a multi-agency response to SOC

This part of the report is relevant to the area for improvement in our section on regional findings.

In February 2024, the force produced a SOC local profile. To assist with producing this profile the force consulted relevant partner agencies to understand their opinion of SOC. However, we found that the profile was lacking some data from partner organisations such as health and education.

We heard during interviews that the force had shared the local profile internally and with SOC partners. But we found no evidence of the force working with these partners to act on relevant recommendations in the local profile.

Some frontline officers we spoke to weren’t aware of the local profile. The force is working with local policing inspectors to make sure it updates the information in local profiles and uses it in frontline policing.

Resources and skills

The force investigation teams don’t have adequate resources

The force has proactive teams to cover the whole force area. But, in some locations, these teams don’t have enough officers to operate effectively. We heard that one of these teams hadn’t been involved in a single proactive operation in the 12 months before our inspection.

The force locates all its specialist teams, including the surveillance team, in one area of the force. The force’s geographical area is large, making the deployment of this team to distant parts of the force area challenging. We also heard that in some geographical areas of the force, frontline officers hadn’t had any SOC training.

The force has enough resources to analyse intelligence

The force has analytical personnel to examine tactical and strategic intelligence. Force senior managers told us that recruitment and retention of analysts in the force was good. The force had appointed a senior operational analyst to make sure that its strategic products included operational intelligence.

At the time of the inspection, Merseyside Police was providing the force with an analyst to review county lines intelligence. There was also an analyst supporting the force’s dedicated source unit to make sure that covert human intelligence sources were recruited in line with force priorities.

The force should improve how it manages LROs

This part of the report is relevant to the area for improvement in our section on regional findings.

We found that the way the force allocated LROs to manage SOC threats was inconsistent. The force told us that when it identifies a SOC threat, an LRO is allocated at the tasking and co-ordination meeting. During some interviews we heard that this wasn’t always the case. We found examples of the force not appointing LROs to some SOC threats.

We found that the force identifies investigators to support LROs. These investigators concentrate on identifying offenders and targeting them. The LRO is responsible for protecting victims and preventing people from becoming involved in SOC. But we heard that LROs and investigators didn’t always work together. This may be a reason why some SOC threats focused on pursuing offenders and not preventing SOC.

Some LROs told us that they had only received minimal training for the role. The force told us that it had recently introduced training for LROs. Some LROs based in local policing told us that other demands sometimes reduced how much time they could dedicate to their LRO responsibilities.

The force needs to review its capacity to investigate money laundering

The force doesn’t assign a financial investigator to every identified OCG. During our inspection we heard on several occasions that there wasn’t enough capacity in the economic crime team to maximise asset recovery.

But we did hear about an ongoing case where the economic crime team was leading an investigation into a banking fraud. This had led to a restraining order for £2.6 million, evidence of money laundering overseas and identification of professional enablers. We heard that the SOC investigation team has trained officers that can carry out financial investigations.

We were pleased to find that the force had three officers trained in investigating crypto currency. However, these officers felt that if there were more officers trained, the force would be more able to confiscate this type of currency.

Tackling SOC and safeguarding people and communities

The force should improve the quality and consistency of 4P plans

This part of the report is relevant to the area for improvement in our section on regional findings.

The force had 4P plans for each of its identified OCGs. But most 4P plans we reviewed had been written just before our inspection and didn’t have enough detail to be effective. For example, when we discussed an operation with the LRO we found that the activities described in the 4P plan didn’t fully match what we had been told by interviewees.

The force had decided to review 4P plans at its latest quarterly OCG forum. The force should make sure that all 4P plan reviews are carried out on time.

The force is improving the way it identifies and protect victims of fraud

The force has used funding it received from the Home Office Asset Recovery Incentivisation Scheme to improve its understanding of the threat from fraud. The force prioritises investigations into reported fraud offences based on harm, economic loss and urgency. The force has trained its frontline personnel on how to work with victims of fraud.

The force should improve how it co-ordinates work with partner agencies to prevent SOC and protect victims

We found that the force wasn’t always involving relevant partner agencies in its work to tackle SOC. We found that, in most local areas, partner agencies are represented at regular meetings about SOC and associated vulnerability. Personnel at some partner agencies told us that they shared information with the force but the force didn’t share information with them. They also told us that some officers weren’t aware of the powers that partner agencies had.

The force has appointed someone to lead its approach to preventing crime and anti‑social behaviour. However, partner representatives told us that policing commanders led most partnership working.

When we visited local policing teams, the evidence about partnership work was inconclusive. In one local area we were told that they frequently worked with partner agencies, but not necessarily to tackle SOC.

We did find some examples of the force working with partners to tackle SOC threats. For example, the force has funding to tackle OIC. Analysts review OIC intelligence and refer emerging threats to the force tasking and co-ordination meetings. The force works with partner agencies to raise community awareness of this type of OIC.

The force identified that there was a significant health risk to users of synthetic opioids. To tackle this the force worked with the University of Bath to develop quick testing of drug samples to identify the presence of synthetic opioids. The force has communicated these risks with harm-reduction partners and local communities. The force also introduced a policy to protect officers at scenes who may be exposed to these substances.

The force’s approach to managing SOC offenders varies

We found that the force had a structure to manage SCPOs but not all personnel understood the approach. The force has produced a process chart to explain how it manages SOC offenders and SCPOs. At the time of our inspection, the force told us they had seven live SCPOs. These SCPOs had been allocated to LROs for management.

The force uses a detective inspector in the intelligence team to check the quality of new SCPO applications. During focus groups we heard that this process had increased the number of successful SCPO applications at court. The force works with His Majesty’s Prison & Probation Service to manage offenders subject to SCPOs before they are released from prison.

Dorset Police

Dorset Police requires improvement at tackling serious and organised crime.

Understanding SOC and setting priorities to tackle it

The force is improving strategic governance to manage its response to SOC

We found that the force was developing how it managed SOC. But improvements were still needed. The force had different approaches to SOC management in the different force areas. These structures were clearer in some areas than others.

The force includes SOC in its strategic assessment. It had also developed a new action plan to improve how it tackles SOC.

The force had also introduced new tasking and co-ordination meetings to prioritise SOC and other high-harm work. But some personnel we spoke to didn’t understand the role of these new meetings. The force has told us since our inspection that it has improved how it communicates these changes with its personnel.

The force should use local profiles to inform its local response to SOC

This part of the report is relevant to the area for improvement in our section on regional findings.

In 2016, we inspected Dorset Police’s response to SOC. Our report included an area for improvement to develop a SOC local profile. Since then, the force has produced several SOC local profiles, most recently to cover 2023/24. During reality testing with frontline teams, we found very little awareness of these SOC local profiles.

The strategic analyst had prepared the SOC local profile. We found that it contained mainly police data. Some force analysts told us that it was difficult to get relevant information from some of the partner agencies.

The force should make sure that it assesses its SOC threats

This part of the report is relevant to the area for improvement in our section on regional findings.

We weren’t confident that the force was consistently using MoRiLE to identify SOC priorities and OCGs. We heard during interviews that the force had only introduced MoRILE into sensitive force tasking meetings in October 2023. We also heard that the force made most decisions about prioritising OCG operations at the sensitive tasking meetings.

We reviewed a SOC operation that the force had assessed as high risk. We found that no operational activity had happened for 15 months. The force explained it hadn’t been able to allocate resources to continue the investigation. Since our inspection, the force has told us that another agency has taken responsibility for this operation.

Resources and skills

LROs need more training and support from the force to effectively tackle SOC

This part of the report is relevant to the area for improvement in our section on regional findings.

In January 2024, the force introduced a new LRO model. The force normally allocates LRO responsibility to neighbourhood inspectors. But on occasions the force will appoint the LRO from specialist departments including the force intelligence directorate. During a focus group with LROs we heard that some of them hadn’t received training for the role.

Some LROs had limited knowledge of subjects such as regional capabilities and ancillary orders. We also heard from some LROs that they believed they were secondary to and supportive of the SIO. We don’t believe that this is the correct approach. LROs should use a 4P plan to manage the SOC threat, while the SIO takes responsibility for the investigation. The force told us that it was introducing new processes to encourage LROs and SIOs to work better together.

The force intelligence function is well resourced

We found that the force had enough intelligence personnel to collect and analyse intelligence. The force has four threat desks to monitor intelligence. These all had analytical support. The force control room had an intelligence team to provide live intelligence support 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. We were pleased to find that most intelligence personnel were in the process of achieving their professional certification.

We found that the force was using a web-based intelligence portal to manage actions raised in intelligence meetings. This means that it can track progress made on allocated actions.

The force supplies enough resources to effectively manage covert operations

The force has a sensitive tasking and co-ordination meeting. The chair of this meeting deploys the force surveillance personnel to support operations. This meeting also reviews deployments to establish if the objectives had been achieved. We found evidence that the surveillance teams also support other covert methods in investigations.

Tackling SOC and safeguarding people and communities

The force should improve its 4P plans

This part of the report is relevant to the area for improvement in our section on regional findings.

The force should use 4P plans to make sure that local policing teams are included in the response to SOC. This will help to prevent SOC and protect vulnerable victims.

During our inspection, we reviewed a sample of force 4P plans. We found that LROs had only recently completed some of these plans. Some plans lacked information about the SOC threat. We also found that some 4P plans didn’t include local policing teams in the response.

The force works well with partner agencies to prevent SOC

We found that the force had local partnership meetings. These were attended by several agencies including local authority housing, the Environment Agency and Immigration Enforcement. We were told that following a discussion at one of these meetings a local authority had successfully applied for a community protection order. We also heard that HMRC and the Environment Agency were using their powers to help tackle an OCG.

The force uses Clear, Hold, Build in one area

Before our inspection, the force had identified an area suitable for Clear, Hold, Build work. The force was using covert policing tactics in the area and had arrested several suspects. The force told us that it was planning a partnership event to formally introduce Clear, Hold, Build.

Gloucestershire Constabulary

Gloucestershire Constabulary is inadequate at tackling serious and organised crime.

Understanding SOC and setting priorities to tackle it

The force should use local profiles to inform a multi-agency response to SOC

This part of the report is relevant to the area for improvement in our section on regional findings.

Shortly before our inspection, the force had completed a SOC and exploitation local profile. We reviewed this document and found that it contained good analysis of local SOC threats. But analysts told us that they hadn’t been able to get relevant data from partner organisations. The force told us that it had recently appointed a SOC tactical advisor. Part of their role was to improve relationships and data sharing with relevant partners. But one senior manager told us that the force struggled to work with SOC partners at a senior level.

When we carried out reality testing in neighbourhood teams, we found that most officers we spoke to weren’t aware of SOC local profiles and didn’t understand their potential local benefits.

Resources and skills

The force has a dedicated SOC unit

The force SOC unit, which includes a surveillance team, focuses on complex investigations. But at the time of our inspection the team only had three qualified detectives. This was limiting the number of investigations the team could support. The team also had additional personnel to provide intelligence support.

The force secured additional funding to increase its number of financial investigators. The force told us that it allocates financial investigators to SOC threats. We reviewed several SOC operations and confirmed that the force had allocated financial investigators. The force uses its additional resources to carry out daily reviews of suspicious activity reports (SARs) to identify perpetrators and victims of fraud.

The force supports its LROs

We found that the force provided its LROs with training and support for the role. The force told us that it appoints inspectors and chief inspectors to the LRO role. The force gives each LRO two days training for the role. Most of the LROs we spoke to told us that their workload was manageable. Generally, the force allocated each LRO no more than two SOC threats to manage at the same time. Some LROs told us that the force sometimes allocates them a SOC threat from outside their local area. The LROs explained that this can cause difficulties for them as they don’t control the local resources they need.

The force holds LRO meetings every other month. At these meetings, the senior responsible officer manages the LROs’ progress with their assigned SOC threats. The force uses these meetings to give its LROs tactical advice and opportunities for continuous professional development. Some LROs told us that they couldn’t always get the operational support they needed from senior investigators and investigation teams.

Immediately before our inspection, the force recruited a SOC tactical advisor. The responsibilities of this role included supporting LROs and developing partnership working. It was too early for us to assess the effectiveness of the role. The force was planning to identify 12 personnel across the force’s local policing areas as ‘SOC champions’.

The force finds analytical capability challenging

The force was improving how it recruits and retains analytical personnel. But we found that the force still had several vacancies. The force had removed the principal analyst post. The force had three senior analysts, but these analysts couldn’t fulfil all the roles of the principal analyst. For example, making sure data was available from all partner agencies.

At the time of the inspection the force had analyst vacancies. Force personnel told us that recruiting and retaining analysts was difficult. Some new recruits had left for other sectors after the force had trained them. To address this, the force has worked with a local college to develop an 18-month analytical apprenticeship scheme. The force had recruited five analysts in this way.

The force’s information technology systems need to be modernised

The force’s IT systems for managing intelligence and recording crime are old and create risks. Some force personnel told us that these systems were difficult to use. Force senior officers told us that there had been data issues because the system was old. The force also had difficulties extracting meaningful performance management information. The force told us that it was planning to upgrade the IT system.

At the time of our inspection, the force was introducing APMIS to record information about disruptions. The force had 70 licences, but only a small number of personnel were trained and using the system.

Tackling SOC and safeguarding people and communities

The force should improve the quality and consistency of 4P plans

This part of the report is relevant to the area for improvement in our section on regional findings.

The force has adopted the regional 4P plan template. During our inspection we reviewed several 4P plans. We found that the standard of these plans was inconsistent. It wasn’t always clear to us if the force had included its partner agencies during 4P planning. LROs told us that the force had provided them with training, but some LROs were unsure how to prepare a 4P plan.

The force works with partner agencies to prevent SOC and protect victims at a local level

We found good examples of local policing teams working with partner agencies to tackle SOC. A police community support officer from a local policing area works to prevent people from becoming involved in SOC. This includes giving talks to children in schools about the possible consequences of committing crime. In one area, the force operates drones to help it tackle drug dealers using electric scooters. Response teams also patrol high-risk SOC areas when available.

Officers across the force have a good knowledge of the process to safeguard vulnerable people. This includes the use of a form to refer people into multi-agency safeguarding arrangements. The force had introduced a GRIP team to identify people vulnerable to becoming involved in SOC. The team was working with community safety partners to reduce this vulnerability. Frontline teams also visit cuckooed addresses to monitor and enforce closure notices and safeguard vulnerable people. At the time of our inspection, the team was supporting 20 vulnerable people.

But we heard that this work was often un-coordinated and often the result of local decision-making. We found that strategic partnership arrangements to tackle SOC were relatively new and not fully established.

Some force meetings we observed, such as the Vulnerability and SOC and exploitation Board, didn’t have partner agency representation. The force wasn’t able to track initiatives and programmes it was using to prevent SOC and protect victims.

The force had introduced Clear, Hold, Build in one geographical area. The local council had introduced a process to prevent OCG members from becoming residential tenants in council property. At the time of inspection, the force was moving into the Hold phase and had assigned an officer to work with local communities and partners to improve the local environment.

The force should review how it manages SOC offenders and SCPOs

The force should review its processes to manage SCPOs and make sure they are proactively enforced. The force has a policy explaining how to apply for SCPOs and how to record and monitor them.

The force’s IOM team should manage SCPOs. During a focus group, some IOM personnel told us they were managing three SCPOs. But after our fieldwork the force told us that it had 12 SCPOs for offenders in the community and two for offenders in prison. We were unable to find out who was responsible for the nine community SCPOs the IOM team wasn’t managing.

Wiltshire Police

Wiltshire Police requires improvement at tackling serious and organised crime.

Understanding SOC and setting priorities to tackle it

The force should use local profiles to inform a multi-agency response to SOC

This part of the report is relevant to the area for improvement in our section on regional findings.

The force provided us with an interim SOC local profile during our fieldwork. We were told by some intelligence personnel that chief officers had recently asked them to complete it. The intelligence personnel told us that, with more time to prepare the profile, it could have been more comprehensive. We reviewed the document and concluded that, while it provided an overview of SOC themes, it lacked detail about place-based harm and vulnerabilities relevant to local policing.

We found little evidence of how the force planned to use the profile to direct local multi-agency activity. Because the profile was new, we weren’t surprised to find that local policing teams didn’t know about it.

Resources and skills

The force should improve training and support for LROs

This part of the report is relevant to the area for improvement in our section on regional findings.

The force told us it allocates an LRO and an SIO to all OCGs it identifies. The force allocates the LRO role to a mixture of officers in different departments, including local policing. SOC threats are allocated to local LROs based on where the threat is located. The SIO was responsible for activities to pursue offenders and suspects. The LRO was responsible for work to prevent SOC and protect victims.

The force provides LROs with a presentation as well as access to Home Office LRO guidance. Some LROs told us they had received no formal training about the role. They gain understanding of the role from other personnel in the force. The SWROCU community co-ordinators have provided LROs with some training.

Tackling SOC and safeguarding people and communities

The force should improve the quality and consistency of 4P plans

This part of the report is relevant to the area for improvement in our section on regional findings.

During our inspection, we reviewed several force 4P plans. We found that most were new, and updates were brief. The force told us that this was because it had recently adopted the regional 4P plan template.

We found that most of these plans were generic. There were few references to working with partner agencies, and disruptions weren’t routinely recorded.

The force had recently employed a new SOC tactical advisor to support LROs when completing their 4P plans. But we heard that the advisor hadn’t yet received any SOC training.

Overall, the force works well with partner agencies to prevent SOC and protect victims

Senior force leaders told us that the force was working well with local partners agencies. But they explained that influencing strategic partners can sometimes be challenging.

Some representatives from partner agencies told us that their relationship with the force had improved over the last few years. They were positive about their work with the force and explained that they felt included during meetings they attended.

We heard that the force was working well with partner agencies in one area to establish Clear, Hold, Build. This included the force and partners sharing information effectively and partners using their powers to tackle SOC.

The force’s joint intelligence meeting includes partner agencies such as Trading Standards and the Environment Agency. Police and partner agencies share intelligence in this meeting.

The force has introduced a portal that allows partner agencies to directly submit intelligence. The force also invites partners to attend its disruption intervention panel. The force records partner agency disruptions at this panel and then records them on the APMIS database. LROs present their current operations at this meeting and discuss any difficulties with partners.

The force used to hold a tactical gangs meeting. Some interviewees we spoke to told us that this was a good meeting. They told us that, by working together, they had been able to protect some vulnerable people.

Appendix 1: Map of regional organised crime units

There are ten regions in England and Wales containing nine regional organised crime units:

1. The North East Regional Organised Crime Unit covers Cleveland, Durham and Northumbria.
2. The Yorkshire & the Humber Regional Organised Crime Unit covers Humberside, North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire.
3. The North West Regional Organised Crime Unit covers Cheshire, Cumbria, Greater Manchester, Lancashire, Merseyside and North Wales.
4. Tarian covers Dyfed-Powys, Gwent and South Wales.
5. The Regional Organised Crime Unit for the West Midlands Region covers Warwickshire, West Mercia, West Midlands and Staffordshire.
6. The East Midlands Special Operations Unit covers Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire and Nottinghamshire.
7. The Eastern Region Special Operations Unit covers Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Kent, Norfolk and Suffolk.
8. The South West Regional Organised Crime Unit covers Avon and Somerset, Devon and Cornwall, Dorset, Gloucestershire and Wiltshire.
9. The Metropolitan Police Service, the City of London Police and British Transport Police work collaboratively in the London region.
10. The South East Regional Organised Crime Unit covers Hampshire, Surrey, Sussex and Thames Valley.

There is a separate collaborative arrangement for the London region, incorporating the constituent forces of the Metropolitan Police Service, the City of London Police and British Transport Police. The forces share some ROCU capabilities.

Appendix 2: Data methodology and caveats

The data used in this report was extracted from the national database: the Agency and Partners Management Information System (APMIS).

APMIS contains data that is recorded by police forces throughout England and Wales, ROCUs, the NCA and other organisations (such as HM Revenue & Customs and Home Office Immigration Enforcement).

This data includes:

• the SOC master list, which contains all MoRiLE assessments for the SOC threats identified by forces and organisations.
• event-based disruption data (‘disruption data’) that is recorded following national minimum standards.

At the time of our inspection, minimum standards stipulated that disruption data should only be recorded against organised crime groups, and not priority individuals or SOC vulnerabilities.

MoRiLE assessment data was extracted from APMIS at two different times because the inspection was completed in 2 phases. Further information on which forces were part of each phase can be found in the introduction section. Data for the first batch of forces was extracted on 1 January 2024 and therefore any changes made to assessments since that date will not be accounted for in the analysis. Data for the second batch was extracted on 1 April 2024 and therefore any changes made to assessments since that date will not be accounted for in the analysis. The following filters were used on columns to extract this data: Type is Tactical, Moderation status is Moderated, SOC is SOC, Tier is not Tier 5 and Phase is not closed.

Disruption data was also extracted from APMIS in two batches. Data for the first batch of forces was extracted on 1 January 2024 and includes all disruptions made after 1 January 2023. Data for the second batch was extracted on 1 April 2024 and includes all disruptions made after 1 April 2023.

The following filters were used on columns to extract this data: Disruption type is Lead Disruption, Record data is greater than 31 December 2022/ 31 March 2023 and Assessment Category is Major, Minor and Moderate.

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An inspection of the south‑west regional response to serious and organised crime