Inspection into Thames Valley Police​​ commissioned​​​ by the police and crime commissioner

Letter information

From:
Roy Wilsher OBE QFSM
His Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary
His Majesty’s Inspector of Fire and Rescue Services

To:
Matthew Barber
Thames Valley Police and Crime Commissioner

Sent on:
23 October 2023

I write in response to your letter dated 15 June 2023, which requested us to carry out an inspection of Thames Valley Police under section 54(2BA) of the Police Act 1996. You asked us to consider whether there had been any lost opportunities in how the force dealt with intelligence and information relating to a serving officer – Police Constable Luke Christopher Horner – who had been charged with sexual offences.

We have reviewed how well the force vetting unit, counter-corruption unit and professional standards department dealt with information and intelligence relating to PC Horner. We only considered intelligence and information up to the point the allegation was made against PC Horner.

This letter summarises our main findings. I have enclosed an annex that sets out our findings in more detail.

First, I should make it clear that we don’t consider the force could have reasonably anticipated that PC Horner would commit such abhorrent sexual offences against a child.

But, commenting with the benefit of hindsight of course, my conclusion is that the force missed (at least) five opportunities to take stricter action against PC Horner. If taken, these might have led to him being either refused initial vetting clearance or dismissed. In the sections below, I have set out what we found to be the missed opportunities.

Initial vetting stage

At the initial vetting stage, the force should have asked Luke Horner for more information about a potential sexual assault allegation against him in 2016. This may have revealed information that would have affected the vetting decision.

The force should have also made enquiries with the military about Luke Horner leaving the army early. It is unusual for a soldier to leave the army purely because of a lack of job satisfaction. These enquiries may have revealed other reasons for him leaving the army early that, again, would have been relevant to the vetting decision.

Questions about PC Horner’s honesty and integrity

During PC Horner’s police service, the force didn’t identify that there were questions about his honesty and integrity, which arose during several incidents. One incident involved him taking various items of evidence home in his bag. PC Horner reported the bag had been stolen from his car. However, a member of the public had already reported finding the bag in a river.

When he reported the bag as stolen, PC Horner failed to disclose all the items that were in his bag. When the bag was found and the contents examined, the sergeant asked him to explain the full contents. The clear mishandling of evidence was assessed as misconduct. It would more properly have been assessed as gross misconduct. If the subsequent investigation had then concluded that there was a case to answer for gross misconduct, dismissal would have been a potential outcome.

Intelligence from Crimestoppers

During PC Horner’s police service, the force’s counter-corruption unit received anonymous intelligence from Crimestoppers. This information suggested that PC Horner had been chatting online to a 15-year-old female and had asked her to send him naked pictures of herself. When a person gives information to Crimestoppers, they have the option to keep communication channels open while remaining anonymous. This communication channel stays open for 14 days.

The counter-corruption unit made one attempt to contact the person who gave the information to Crimestoppers. Given the gravity of the information – an allegation of a sexual offence by a police officer against a child – we believe the counter-corruption unit should have made repeated and exhaustive attempts to contact the person within the 14-day period. This could have led to additional information being provided to support the allegation. The counter-corruption unit supervisor should also have checked the investigator had completed the further enquiries. This would have confirmed that all reasonable lines of enquiry had been concluded before finalising the investigation.

Failure to assess behaviour as gross misconduct

At the time of an incident involving PC Horner’s misuse of his taser, he was still the subject of a live written warning (for the mishandling of evidence). Taking this into consideration, together with further evidence of dishonesty that the investigation revealed, we believe that the professional standards department should have – without hesitation – assessed the behaviour as gross misconduct. This could have led to a gross misconduct hearing, again with a potential outcome of dismissal.

PC Horner’s development plans

During our review, we also identified other incidents that clearly indicated that PC Horner wasn’t suited to being a police officer, especially when considered together.

He was on development plans for most of his probation. These included informal development plans for his poor performance, sickness attendance action plans and a formal Regulation 13, stage 1, development plan.

As required by section 55(1) and (2) of the Police Act 1996, we will publish this letter and annex in such manner as appears to us to be appropriate. We won’t publish them until we are satisfied there is no likelihood that doing so could prejudice the criminal case against PC Horner.

If you would like a briefing on the findings, I would be happy to provide one.

Annex A: Detailed findings of our police and crime commissioner-commissioned inspection into Thames Valley Police

Introduction

This annex provides more detailed findings than those we set out in the enclosed letter. It also includes an explanation of the work we have undertaken during this review.

We make it clear that we don’t consider the force could have reasonably anticipated that Police Constable Luke Christopher Horner would commit such abhorrent sexual offences against a child. We found the force lost (at least) five opportunities to take stricter action against PC Horner. If taken, these might have led to him being either refused initial vetting clearance or dismissed.

There were other incidents that clearly indicated that PC Horner wasn’t suited to being a police officer, especially when considered together. We also identified some learning for the force.

Our terms of reference

The terms of reference agreed with the police and crime commissioner were:

• HM Chief Inspector (HMCI) will carry out a review of Thames Valley Police’s handling of information and intelligence relating to a serving officer arrested for sexual offences. Reference in these terms to HMCI include references to any person acting on his behalf.
• HMCI will examine how effectively Thames Valley Police dealt with any intelligence it received in relation to the officer.
• HMCI will only consider intelligence and information up to the point of receipt of this recent allegation.

Specifically, HMCI will examine:

• the initial vetting procedures followed in relation to the officer. This will include the vetting enquiries carried out, the decision-making process including the recording of rationale, and the use of any risk mitigation measures. In particular, the review will consider how effectively the force assessed any adverse information identified during the vetting process;
• how effectively the force vetting unit communicated any identified risks to the force counter-corruption unit, and how well the two units worked in partnership to agree and implement any appropriate risk mitigation measures;
• how well the force handled, developed and supervised the management of any intelligence, self-referrals, complaints and conduct matters or other relevant information in relation to the officer; and
• whether the counter-corruption unit or professional standards department shared any relevant information with the force vetting unit to allow them to consider the officer’s continued suitability to have vetting clearance.

This annex addresses the terms of reference by setting out, in chronological order, our assessment of the relevant events and incidents involving PC Horner.

We only considered intelligence and information up to the point the allegation was made.

Luke Horner’s background

On 12 October 2020, Luke Horner joined Thames Valley Police. On 20 January 2021, after his initial training, he was posted to Amersham police station as a uniformed patrol officer. He remained in that role until the date of his arrest and suspension.

Before joining the police, Luke Horner had served in the British Army for a year, from January 2019 to January 2020.

Our review of Luke Horner’s initial vetting

On 20 May 2020, Luke Horner submitted his vetting forms as part of his application to join Thames Valley Police. The initial vetting decision was made in June 2020. The vetting officer would have used the College of Policing’s 2017 authorised professional practice (APP) on vetting (PDF document) to carry out the required checks as part of the vetting decision.

Before our inspection, the force asked an experienced vetting manager from another force to independently review the vetting of Luke Horner to see if there were any lessons to be learned. This vetting manager agreed with the force’s decision to grant Luke Horner initial vetting clearance.

During our review, an HMICFRS peer inspector, who is a subject matter expert, reviewed Luke Horner’s vetting file. Although the peer inspector also agreed with the force’s decision to grant Luke Horner initial vetting clearance, they identified two lost opportunities: asking Luke Horner for more information about a potential sexual assault in 2016 and making enquiries with the military about why he had left the army early. However, they accepted the decision to grant initial vetting clearance was consistent with vetting decision-making at the time, where limited weight was given to non-conviction information.

The information in the vetting file showed that the only contact with police Luke Horner had disclosed related to when he had been a victim of an assault in a McDonald’s in 2019. That investigation was still ongoing at the time of his application to join the police.

The College of Policing’s APP on vetting listed the checks that forces should carry out as part of the vetting process. Thames Valley Police carried out all the necessary checks, apart from open-source checks, such as using internet search engines and checking social media sites. And it didn’t check with the Ministry of Defence in relation to Luke Horner’s service in the army.

Luke Horner’s failure to disclose all relevant information

The force vetting unit found all the available information when they carried out their checks. This information showed that Luke Horner hadn’t disclosed on his vetting form the following incidents where he had previously come into contact with the police.

In 2010, Luke Horner was a witness to a sexual assault at a family gathering. He was only 12 years old at the time.

In 2015, Luke Horner was recorded as a victim of an offence of blackmail. He was 16 years old at the time of the offence. His mother reported that an unknown person had coerced him into sending them a naked picture of himself on a messaging app. The offender then asked for money with a threat that his friends and family would see the photo if he didn’t pay. Police believed the offence was part of a series of blackmail offences that started in Asia and there were more victims in other countries. The police took no further action in relation to this incident.

In 2016, Luke Horner rang Thames Valley Police, asking if the force had received a report of sexual assault naming him as the suspect. He said that he had been told that a female had reported him for sexual assault. He told the police that he didn’t know what this related to and that he didn’t think he had done anything wrong. Thames Valley Police call handlers passed a record of the call to the criminal investigation department in case a member of the public reported a sexual assault. The force took no further action to try to identify if there had been such an assault.

In addition to these incidents, the vetting officer found that Luke Horner hadn’t declared on his vetting form that he had been in a relationship with another Thames Valley Police officer.

A vetting officer held a telephone interview with Luke Horner to ask for further information. During that interview Luke Horner said that he didn’t remember the incident from 2010. In relation to the blackmail, he said that he had been going through puberty at that time and that he would never send naked pictures of himself again. The vetting file doesn’t record whether the vetting officer asked him about the call he made to Thames Valley Police in 2016 about the potential sexual assault.

The APP on vetting states that “inappropriate behaviour which impinges on a person’s suitability to serve in the role” requires particular scrutiny during the vetting process. If it is decided this shouldn’t lead to a vetting rejection, “the full rationale must be recorded and the decision approved by the force vetting manager”. In our view, a potential allegation of sexual assault, even if self-referred, should have resulted in such scrutiny.

Pre-employment checks didn’t take place

Furthermore, no checks were carried out in relation to Luke Horner’s previous service in the army. In Thames Valley Police, the HR department is called the People Directorate. The force told us that, at the time of Luke Horner’s application to join the police, it had decided its People Directorate wouldn’t request references for external applicants. This was due to the administrative time taken to obtain references from external employers, which often only confirmed dates of employment and the job role.

That decision shouldn’t have stopped vetting officers from requesting individual references if they had concerns about any information on a police recruit application form.

Luke Horner served with the army from January 2019 to January 2020. When asked his reasons for leaving the army on his application form, Luke Horner stated: “Lack of job satisfaction and want to pursue previous interests in a career of policing.” He also wrote that no notice period is needed to leave the army. The shortness of his military career struck us as unusual and his explanation for it implausible, so we asked the army to clarify the position.

The Army Terms of Service Regulations 2007 state the length of term for a person enlisted for local service engagement is 3 years, which may be extended (Regulation 8). A person can also enlist for a short service engagement, which is a period of between 6 months and 12 years (Regulation 4). The army told us the commanding officer can override terms of service and release a person from their army service.

We would expect the vetting officer to have made enquiries with the army to check the type of engagement Luke Horner enlisted for, and on what basis his term of service ended. The army may have held information about Luke Horner that would have been relevant to the initial vetting clearance decision.

In November 2022, we published our thematic report An inspection of vetting, misconduct, and misogyny in the police service. We made 43 recommendations. Recommendation 1 stated:

“By 31 October 2023, the College of Policing should update its guidance on the minimum standards of pre-employment checks that forces must carry out before appointing an officer or member of staff. Every chief constable should make sure their force complies with the guidance. As a minimum, pre-employment checks should:

• obtain and verify previous employment history for at least the previous five years (including dates of employment, roles carried out and reason for leaving); and
• verify the qualifications the applicant claims to have.”

We recognise Luke Horner was recruited before we made this recommendation. We made this recommendation to address the lack of pre-employment checks being carried out in many forces.

On 8 June 2020, after the vetting interview, the vetting unit decided to grant Luke Horner conditional vetting clearance. The only rationale recorded was: “Vet [the applicant] has declared the recent assault he was a victim of. He has not disclosed his 2 incidents of police contact. I have spoken to him about this, and I am happy to sign the traces off.”

We were pleased to see that risk mitigation was put in place in relation to Luke Horner’s posting, so that he didn’t work in the same place as his ex-partner. This decision was emailed to the recruitment team. However, no similar information was placed on his ex-partner’s record. This meant she could have been moved to the same area as Luke Horner, therefore undermining the risk mitigation put in place. The vetting officer also gave Luke Horner social media advice to help him avoid putting himself at risk online in future.

PC Horner’s request for access to contact management software

On 30 January 2021, PC Horner sent a request to the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) department, asking for access to the Contact Management Programme (CMP) software. The ICT department responded by asking PC Horner to confirm that he had completed the CMP e-learning course. On 4 February 2021, PC Horner responded, saying that he had completed the training, but it wasn’t showing on his record: “I have messaged e-learning to get this sorted as I have completed it, but it may not be showing, can you allow me access in the meantime due to having to ask other colleagues to do stuff for me.” The ICT officer gave PC Horner the access he had requested.

We checked the training records for the CMP e-learning course. These records showed that PC Horner enrolled on this course on 4 February 2021. However, he only viewed the front page and didn’t complete the course at that time. The evidence suggests PC Horner may not have been entirely truthful when he said that he had completed the course.

We accept that it isn’t realistic to expect ICT staff to check whether officers are telling them the truth. So, while this wasn’t a lost opportunity to deal with PC Horner, it is an example of his apparent willingness to lie to colleagues.

PC Horner’s performance issues

PC Horner’s sergeant told us that, between February and November 2021, supervisors identified some issues with his general performance. The sergeant described PC Horner as very immature. He said PC Horner had poor organisational skills and problems managing his workload and investigations. PC Horner’s supervisors identified that he didn’t always handle evidence correctly. For example, on one occasion, officers smelt cannabis in the office and found some in PC Horner’s personal work tray. The cannabis had been there for three or four weeks. On another occasion, his supervisors found in his bag a master copy of CCTV evidence which related to a crime under investigation. On both occasions, when challenged, PC Horner told his supervisors that he didn’t know the process for dealing with evidence. His sergeant checked this with PC Horner’s tutor constable. His tutor confirmed that he had taught PC Horner the correct process to deal with property and evidence. Again, this should have cast doubt on PC Horner’s honesty and integrity.

PC Horner’s sergeant advised him about his performance and put him on an informal development plan to help him improve his performance.

Public complaint received on 26 March 2021

On 26 March 2021, Thames Valley Police received a complaint from a male stating that PC Horner had given him a warning about his behaviour without questioning him about it first. This would have established he was talking with the wrong person. PC Horner’s explanation was that he mistakenly dealt with the complainant because of a data inputting error made by the Contact Management Centre. PC Horner apologised and the matter was closed. No one verified PC Horner’s explanation. And no one identified this matter as a possible personal data breach.

The Information Commissioner’s Office requires an organisation to report a personal data breach under the General Data Protection Regulation 2016 or the Data Protection Act 2018. A personal data breach is a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data.

We consider this matter should have been referred to the Information Commissioner’s Office.

Speeding offence

On 3 April 2021, PC Horner was issued with a fixed penalty notice for a speeding offence. The Thames Valley Police Driver Policy and Management of Police Vehicle Incidents Policy both state that all officers and staff are required to notify the driver risk unit and professional standards department of any traffic summons or endorsable fixed penalty notices they receive. This requirement applies to both occupational driving and driving private vehicles while off duty. The policies state that failure to do so will be considered a disciplinary matter. PC Horner didn’t notify the professional standards department and was therefore in breach of the policy. The force didn’t know about this offence, so it didn’t take any disciplinary action against him. We don’t know whether PC Horner chose not to notify the professional standards department or whether he was unaware of the policy and the need to do so. A deliberate decision to conceal this offence would be another honesty and integrity issue.

PC Horner took part in two driving courses after receiving the fixed penalty notice. The first was on 15 July 2021 and was a one-day basic driving course. The second started on 29 July 2022 and was a three-week response driving course. The driver training school’s assessment record for the course on 15 July 2021 contains an entry relating to PC Horner’s three penalty points. However, it doesn’t indicate whether driver training staff had checked that PC Horner had notified the professional standards department about these penalty points, or had advised him to do so if he hadn’t. There is no expectation from the force that the driver training staff would inform the professional standards department because notification is the officer’s responsibility.

Alleged theft of police property and evidence from PC Horner’s private car

On 11 November 2021 at 6.30am, PC Horner reported a theft from his private car. He said that the theft took place overnight on 10–11 November 2021 while the car was parked on the driveway at his home. At the time of reporting the theft, PC Horner said that his body armour and a bag containing his police laptop had been stolen. When asked about this by his sergeant, he said that he had his body armour in the car to take it home to clean it, and his laptop in case he had to work from home due to COVID-19. His kit belt, which held his radio, handcuffs and baton, was also in the car but he didn’t report this as stolen.

A while later, PC Horner approached his sergeant and told him that the bag also contained two computer discs. These were a master copy and working copy of a recorded suspect interview. He said they were still in his bag because the interview had finished late in the evening, but this was a few days earlier. It is normal practice for suspect interview discs to be secured and remain on police premises.

A short time later, PC Horner again approached his sergeant. He told him that the bag might also have contained a written witness statement that included a page containing personal details of the person who gave the statement.

At 5.50am on 11 November 2021, a member of the public called Thames Valley Police to report finding a bag in a river half a mile from PC Horner’s house. This turned out to be PC Horner’s bag. It was found to contain:

• four pairs (master and working copies) of recorded suspect interview discs;
• a disc that was a working copy of another recorded suspect interview;
• a disc containing a download from a suspect’s phone;
• PC Horner’s pocket notebook;
• PC Horner’s police laptop; and
• some typed witness statement forms.

The discs related to criminal investigations that were three to four months old. The body armour wasn’t found.

When officers went to the river, they found a further disc that was a master recording of a suspect interview. PC Horner’s sergeant challenged him about the amount of property that was in the stolen bag. He said that he had forgotten they were there. The sergeant asked PC Horner to tell the Crown Prosecution Service about the discs in case any of the associated investigations were proceeding to court. The sergeant didn’t check that PC Horner had notified the Crown Prosecution Service. Police investigated the reported theft from PC Horner’s car, but the case was subsequently closed with no further action taken.

PC Horner’s sergeant referred the matter to the professional standards department on 11 November 2021. On 15 November 2021, the professional standards department assessed the matter as misconduct and allocated it to an investigator. On 2 December 2021, the investigator submitted the investigation report to the head of the professional standards department. They decided that PC Horner had a case to answer for misconduct and directed that he appear at a misconduct meeting. The misconduct meeting took place on 1 March 2022, at which the chair found the matter proven and issued PC Horner with a written warning that was to remain live for 18 months.

In our view, the professional standards department investigation into this matter should have been more thorough. We believe that the investigator should have carried out the additional enquiries listed below.

Obtaining a statement

The investigator should have taken a statement from PC Horner’s sergeant. This sergeant’s knowledge of previous incidents and PC Horner’s changing account of the property and evidence that was in the bag was relevant. It would have identified that there were honesty and integrity issues to investigate.

Carrying out an interview

The investigator should have interviewed PC Horner instead of requesting a written account. An interview would have allowed the investigating officer to challenge his account.

Checking links with suspects

The investigator should have checked whether there was any link between PC Horner and the suspects in the cases related to the interview discs he had kept in his bag.

Checking accuracy of the information provided

Checking whether PC Horner’s account to his sergeant of carrying out an interview late on his working shift was correct. No discs that related to a recent interview were found in the bag after it was recovered. This indicates that PC Horner’s account either wasn’t true or suspect interview discs remained unaccounted for.

Lack of rationale for decision-making

The professional standards department didn’t record the rationale for the decision that this mishandling and loss of police property should be dealt with as misconduct and not gross misconduct. It certainly appears to us that there was enough information available to assess the circumstances as gross misconduct. While there is no defined list of specific incidents that would constitute gross misconduct, we recognise that assessment of a misconduct allegation is a subjective test. However, in our view, there are aggravating factors in this case that should have resulted in the professional standards department assessing it as gross misconduct. These factors are outlined below.

PC Horner didn’t fully disclose the property in his bag

PC Horner didn’t disclose the full extent of the property he had kept in his bag at the first opportunity. His initial explanation was he had discs in his bag because the suspect interview finished late in the evening on the night of the theft. However, the discs found in his bag related to interviews held three or four months before his bag was stolen. The discs he said were in his bag were never found. This was an honesty and integrity issue.

A data breach wasn’t referred to the Information Commissioner’s Office

The loss of discs and completed witness statement forms was a data breach, even though the material was missing for only a few hours and the property was eventually recovered. We consider this matter should have been referred to the Information Commissioner’s Office.

PC Horner received informal advice

PC Horner had received informal advice on more than one previous occasion about his mishandling of property and evidence.

Continuity of evidence

The loss of continuity of the evidence in relation to the suspect interview discs, which may have been needed in criminal proceedings, had the clear potential to undermine the prosecution case.

Following the misconduct meeting, the circumstances were correctly referred to the force vetting unit to review PC Horner’s vetting status. His vetting file shows that vetting checks were carried out. However, the results of these checks and any subsequent decisions weren’t recorded.

Data breach

The reported theft of the suspect interview discs and completed witness statement forms led to Thames Valley Police losing control of that sensitive information, although it was recovered a few hours later. This data breach was referred to the Joint Information Management Unit (JIMU). However, PC Horner only told the JIMU about the discs and not the written statements. Staff in the JIMU assessed the information he gave them. They decided that because all the property had been recovered, they didn’t need to make a referral to the Information Commissioner’s Office. JIMU staff relied on PC Horner’s assessment that there was “no detriment to any data subjects or cases”.

JIMU staff are office based. They rely on reporting officers and staff to identify whether there is an operational risk and to inform them if that is the case. The role of the JIMU is to identify whether the correct process was followed rather than to make operational assessments of risk.

It is our view that there was a data breach and that Thames Valley Police should have referred itself to the Information Commissioner’s Office. However, we accept that the decision not to refer this matter was based on incomplete information.

Crimestoppers intelligence

On 4 February 2022, Thames Valley Police’s counter-corruption unit received anonymous intelligence from Crimestoppers. This suggested that PC Horner had been chatting online to a 15-year-old female and had repeatedly asked her to send him naked pictures of herself.

When a person gives information to Crimestoppers, they have the option to keep communication channels open while remaining anonymous. This communication channel stays open for 14 days.

A counter-corruption unit supervisor promptly reviewed the intelligence and allocated the investigation to an investigator. The investigator requested further information from the informant via Crimestoppers and passed on their contact details. The investigator made no further attempts to try to communicate with the informant within the 14-day period.

Further enquiries included:

• a review of PC Horner’s vetting file to get background information;
• social media checks;
• an audit of the force crime and intelligence recording system; and
• checks of emails and text messages on PC Horner’s police devices.

The supervisor directed the investigator to carry out wider enquiries to try to identify the victim.

The counter-corruption unit also tasked the regional organised crime unit to carry out covert online enquiries, to see if PC Horner was engaging with victims online.

None of these enquiries revealed any relevant information.

The counter-corruption unit investigation file recorded that wider enquiries were being undertaken. The investigator who was allocated the case recorded that all enquiries were complete. The supervisor closed the file without checking the details of any further enquiries that had been considered or carried out.

Force counter-corruption units usually hold risk registers of officers who pose a potential risk to the public or force. PC Horner’s details weren’t on Thames Valley Police’s register. We didn’t find any record explaining why he wasn’t on the register.

Further performance issues and Regulation 13

In February 2022, PC Horner’s supervisors decided to start the Regulation 13 process. This process is designed to deal with officers in their probationary period who aren’t “likely to become an efficient or well conducted constable”. Several incidents had led to his supervisors making this decision. These included:

• persistent lateness;
• leaving police equipment at home;
• failing to carry out timely investigations;
• failing to learn from previous mistakes; and
• not maintaining performance improvement following informal performance plans being issued.

On 3 March 2022, PC Horner started a three-month Regulation 13 development plan, which he successfully completed in June 2022.

On 11 October 2022, PC Horner’s probationary period ended, and he was confirmed in the rank of constable.

Change of circumstances

In a performance development review meeting held with his sergeant on 10 February 2023, PC Horner disclosed that his address had changed. His sergeant advised him to submit a ‘change of circumstances form.’ On 24 February 2023, PC Horner submitted this form to the People Directorate by email. The People Directorate sent him a clarification question as he hadn’t included the date that he had moved into that address. PC Horner didn’t respond to that email and the People Directorate didn’t chase him up for an answer to its question. This meant that PC Horner’s correct address wasn’t recorded on Thames Valley Police systems on the day of his arrest.

The force told us that the People Directorate doesn’t usually share change of address details with the force vetting unit. This creates an obvious risk, as officers may move to an unsuitable address.

Public complaint received on 17 March 2023

On 17 March 2023, Thames Valley Police received a complaint from a girl’s father. He said that PC Horner had issued a community resolution notice to his 15-year-old daughter for an assault. He stated that her parents weren’t present and they weren’t asked for the details of an appropriate adult. The parents didn’t live together. The complaints resolution team dealt with the complaint. They reviewed PC Horner’s entry on the force crime system in relation to the incident. In this entry, PC Horner stated that he had spoken with the girl’s mother, who had agreed a community resolution was the best course of action, and that he would either return to the mother’s address to issue the community resolution notice or go to the girl’s school. The complaints resolution team directed PC Horner to contact the complainant to explain the actions taken in relation to the community resolution before its closure. The team didn’t verify PC Horner’s account and didn’t confirm that he had contacted the complainant as directed.

Misuse of taser

On 2 May 2023, an officer reported to their inspector that the day before PC Horner had aimed his taser at a colleague and had ‘red-dotted’ him. Red-dotting is when an officer activates the laser on the taser and aims at the target person. This causes a red dot to show up on them, indicating to the officer their aim is correct. It also lets a person know that an officer has aimed their taser at them. Activating the laser is classed as the taser being ‘used’.

Taser is for operational use where an officer feels use of the taser is required and proportionate to the threat they face. PC Horner clearly wasn’t under threat and misused his taser. We are encouraged that an officer came forward to report this incident of taser misuse.

The inspector spoke with the other officers present, who said that they hadn’t seen anything. When asked for his account, PC Horner said that he had pointed his taser at the other officer but the red light had only come on for a second when he did the safety check. The inspector removed both officers’ taser authority for 12 months. He gave all the other officers who had been present advice about failing to challenge or report this behaviour.

The inspector referred the matter to the professional standards department, which decided that it was suitable to be dealt with by way of practice requiring improvement. This approach is often used where mistakes, poor performance or low-level misconduct are present and can be dealt with informally.

A taser manager then downloaded data from PC Horner’s taser. This showed that the taser was activated on two occasions – once for eight seconds and the other for seven seconds. This information contradicted PC Horner’s account. As a result of these further honesty and integrity issues, PC Horner’s inspector referred the matter back to the professional standards department.

The force’s records show that PC Horner had attended the required training and had obtained authority to carry a taser less than three months before this incident. The procedures for carrying and using a taser should have been fresh in his mind.

The professional standards department decided that it was still suitable to be dealt with by way of practice requiring improvement.

Sickness

People Directorate records show that, between April 2021 and June 2023, PC Horner had eight periods of sickness, totalling 53 days. Five of these periods of sickness, amounting to 35 days, were while he was in his probationary period. PC Horner was the subject of four attendance action plans during his service.

Communication between force departments about PC Horner

We saw examples of good communication between the professional standards department and the force vetting unit. The force has an established process in place for regular meetings between the professional standards department, legal services department, People Directorate and counter-corruption unit. Attendees at these meetings share information where appropriate to identify those who may pose a risk to the force. PC Horner had a history of informal and formal development plans and excessive sickness. He was also the subject of a misconduct investigation. However, the force didn’t consider him to have met the required level for discussion at this meeting. We disagree.

Conclusion

We don’t consider the force could have reasonably anticipated that PC Horner would commit such abhorrent sexual offences against a child.

However, we have identified that the force lost (at least) five opportunities to take stricter action against PC Horner.

We have identified several learning points that we encourage the force to address. The force:

• would benefit from recording the rationale for its decisions in vetting, professional standards and counter-corruption cases in more detail;
• should make sure it identifies and completes all reasonable lines of enquiry in professional standards and counter-corruption investigations and that outcomes are recorded before a case is finalised;
• should implement a process to make sure all information held by different departments is considered when reviewing concerns about members of the workforce;
• should introduce an effective quality assurance process to review vetting decisions;
• should introduce an effective quality assurance process to review professional standards department decisions, to more robustly deter misconduct within the force; and
• should provide training to the workforce to make sure they understand what constitutes a breach of personal data.

A wider professional standards, vetting and counter-corruption inspection for Thames Valley Police would help the force to understand where improvements can be made. We intend to carry out this inspection of the force by mid-2024.

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​​​Inspection into Thames Valley Police​​ commissioned by the police and crime commissioner