Staffordshire – National child protection re‑inspection

Foreword

All children deserve to grow up in a safe environment, cared for and protected from harm. Most children thrive in loving families and grow to adulthood unharmed. Unfortunately, though, too many children are abused or neglected by those responsible for their care; they sometimes need to be protected from other adults with whom they come into contact. Some of them occasionally go missing, or end up spending time in places, or with people, harmful to them.

While it is everyone’s responsibility to look out for vulnerable children, police forces – working together and with other organisations – have a particular role in protecting children and meeting their needs.

Protecting children is one of the most important things the police do. Police officers investigate suspected crimes involving children and arrest perpetrators, and they have a significant role in monitoring sex offenders. They can take a child in danger to a place of safety and can seek restrictions on offenders’ contact with children. The police service also has a significant role, working with other organisations, in ensuring children’s protection and well-being in the longer term.

As they go about their daily tasks, police officers must be alert to, and identify, children who may be at risk. To protect children effectively, officers must talk to children, listen to them, and understand their fears and concerns. The police must also work well with other organisations to play their part in ensuring that, as far as possible, no child slips through the net, and to avoid both over-intrusiveness and duplication of effort.

His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) is inspecting the child protection work of every police force in England and Wales. The reports are intended to provide information for the police, the police and crime commissioner (PCC) and the public on how well the police protect children and secure improvements for the future.

Summary

This report is a summary of the findings of our re-inspection of police child protection services in Staffordshire, which took place in March 2023.

2021 inspection

Our first inspection took place in September 2021. It was part of our rolling programme of child protection inspections.

In April 2022, we published our findings from our Staffordshire Police national child protection inspection. In our report we concluded that, at the time of the inspection, the force wasn’t adequately protecting all children who were at risk, owing to widespread serious and systemic failings. The force’s leadership and senior management oversight needed to improve to make sure the weaknesses in practice identified during that inspection were addressed. We also made 15 recommendations aimed at improving practice in Staffordshire Police.

2023 re-inspection

Because of the serious concerns raised in the 2022 report, in March 2023, we carried out a full re-inspection of Staffordshire Police’s approach to child protection. This examined the effectiveness of the police response at each stage of their interactions with or for children, from initial contact through to investigation of offences against them. It also included scrutiny of the treatment of children in custody, and an assessment of how the force is structured, led, and governed in relation to its child protection services. We assessed the progress made by the force against the recommendations of our 2022 report.

Main findings from the re-inspection

Staffordshire Police has introduced an action plan to improve its services for children. These improvements include:

• clarifying its senior leadership and governance arrangements;
• more effective use of information technology;
• contributing to multi-agency child protection arrangements;
• better operating procedures for investigating online child sexual abuse; and
• effective registered sex offender management.

The structure and leadership roles for overseeing all aspects of child protection are now effective. But leaders and managers need to improve their use of performance information to understand what is working well and where improvements and more scrutiny are needed.

During our inspection, we examined 70 cases in which the police had identified children at risk. We assessed the force’s child protection practice as good in 17 cases, requiring improvement in 19 cases, and inadequate in 34 cases. This was similar to our 2021 assessment of 77 cases. In that assessment, we found that the force’s practice in 19 cases was good, in 23 cases required improvement and in 35 cases it was inadequate.

This shows the force still needs to do more to give a consistently good service to all children. Specific areas for improvement include:

• better risk assessment and allocation of responses by the force contact centre (FCC);
• better responses to children reported missing from home;
• better investigations and safeguarding plans;
• better processes to assess and share information with other organisations to help protect children;
• better availability and use of intelligence and problem profiles for exploited children;
• better recording of the voice of the child (VoC) and of details of ethnicity and cultural heritage; and
• better supervision and management scrutiny.

Conclusion

Staffordshire Police has made progress in some of the areas where we made recommendations after our 2021 inspection. These improvements are mostly in the force’s governance and specialist support arrangements. The force should continue to consolidate this improved practice, including developing its qualitative performance information.

But more improvement is still needed, particularly in the quality of child protection investigations. We found that officers and supervisors aren’t focused on effective investigations to safeguard children and bring offenders to justice. The FCC’s processes and decisions aren’t consistently sending the right help at the right time to vulnerable missing children and children at risk of domestic abuse. Some of the force’s information sharing and risk assessment processes are inefficient, ineffective and confused.

Underlying this is ineffective supervision. The force has clear policies, and it trains the workforce to capture the VoC and to record information about children’s ethnicity and cultural heritage. But police personnel still don’t routinely record this information on the force’s systems. Supervisors and managers don’t rectify the situation as they should. And the force’s leaders haven’t addressed it either. We have issued a further recommendation as a result.

1.  Introduction

The police’s responsibility to keep children safe

Under section 46 of the Children Act 1989, a constable is responsible for taking into police protection any child they have reasonable cause to believe would otherwise be likely to suffer significant harm. The same Act also requires the police to inquire into that child’s case. Under section 11 of the Children Act 2004, the police must also keep in mind the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.

Every officer and member of police staff should understand it is their day-to-day duty to protect children. Officers going into people’s homes for any reason must recognise the needs of any child they meet and understand what they can and should do to protect them. This is particularly important when officers are dealing with domestic abuse or other incidents that may involve violence. The duty to protect children includes those detained in police custody.

The National Crime Agency’s (NCA) strategic assessment of serious and organised crime (2021) established that the risk of child sexual abuse continues to grow, and is one of the gravest serious and organised crime risks. Child sexual abuse is also one of the six national threats specified in the Strategic Policing Requirement.

Expectations set out in the ‘Working Together’ guidance

The statutory guidance published in 2018, Working together to safeguard children: a guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children sets out what is expected of all agencies involved in child protection. This includes local authorities, the integrated care board, schools and voluntary organisations.

The specific police roles set out in the guidance are:

• identifying children who might be at risk from abuse and neglect;
• investigating alleged offences against children;
• inter-agency working and information sharing to protect children; and
• using emergency powers to protect children.

These areas are the focus of our child protection inspections. Details of how we carry out these inspections are in Annex A of this report.

2.  Context for the force

Staffordshire Police has a workforce of approximately:

• 1,929 police officers;
• 1,533 police staff;
• 211 police and community support officers; and
• 149 special constables.

The force serves a population of approximately 1.1m people, including 243,500 children, across a county area of 1,000 square miles.

The force, together with the NHS integrated care board, works with local authorities to safeguard children through the Staffordshire Safeguarding Children Board and the Stoke-on-Trent Safeguarding Children Partnership.

3. Leadership, management and governance

Leadership, management and governance: Recommendations from the 2021 inspection report

We recommend that Staffordshire Police immediately reviews its governance and performance management arrangements for child protection so that these include all parts of the organisation that contribute to improving the police response and the end results for children.

We recommend that Staffordshire Police immediately improves the effectiveness of its information technology and systems, so operational staff have access to the information and resources they need to complete their duties to protect vulnerable people.

We recommend that Staffordshire Police immediately reviews the training it provides its workforce and improves this provision so that all staff are clear about their responsibility to safeguard vulnerable children.

Leadership, management and governance: Re-inspection findings

Clear governance and management are in place

Since our 2021 inspection, the police and crime commissioner has published the force’s Police and Crime Plan 2021–2024, and the new chief constable published the force Policing Plan 2022–23. This clearly describes the force’s priorities and how it will work to reduce vulnerability, fight crime, respond to the public, and work with other organisations to help prevent harm to its communities. The force has a vulnerability strategy, clearly setting out its plans and commitment. This strategy is child focused, with a slogan that appears on many force communications: ‘See Me, Hear Me, Protect Me – Think Vulnerability’.

Force leaders reviewed the force’s child protection arrangements and consulted their partner agencies. They commissioned consultants to assess the force’s processes and advise on more effective ways of working. The force is investing in additional specialist personnel and managers and changing its operating model to improve how it responds to vulnerable people and children. Some changes are in place and others are planned for the near future.

The force now has a clearly defined public protection unit (PPU) with leaders and terms of reference. The PPU governance structure requires chief officers or senior PPU managers to chair a sequence of meetings. These meetings, and the force performance board, the strategic vulnerability board and a monthly child protection governance meeting, inform leaders about work to tackle risk and reduce vulnerability in the force area.

A regularly updated action plan allows leaders to check on the progress of the force’s improvements to the child protection and safeguarding arrangements.

The force works closely with its statutory safeguarding partners from the two local authorities of Stoke-on-Trent and Staffordshire, and with the NHS integrated care board. It also works with other organisations providing safeguarding and child protection services in the area. The partners we spoke with were all complimentary about the force’s commitment to joint working to protect children.

The changes the force has made mean it has an effective strategy to improve its child protection arrangements. The new governance arrangements clearly identify the leaders and managers who are responsible for the force’s commitments to safeguarding children.

The force still needs to improve the quality of its performance data

The force has performance data about crime and incident demand. A monthly child protection performance report informs PPU leaders about demand in the range of vulnerability themes they are responsible for. The force is also working to increase qualitative information about its responses to risk and vulnerability.

The force’s policing model includes ten harm reduction hubs (HRHs), where police teams and staff from other organisations work together to reduce risk and vulnerability in the local communities. The hubs align with local authority districts and cover the whole force area. But the force hasn’t yet introduced a management framework to understand the performance of these hubs.

The force inconsistently records information about ethnicity and cultural heritage

Leaders know the force’s records about the ethnicity and the cultural heritage of people involved in incidents and crime is inaccurate. Positively, in 2022 they acted to upgrade the force’s records management (NICHE) system to improve the recording of ethnicity. This system change took place on 23 March (during the first week of our inspection).

We found that details about ethnicity and cultural heritage weren’t recorded consistently. Frontline officers and those in specialist roles acknowledged they didn’t always record this information. Officers told us they are so busy they usually only complete the mandatory information sections in their reports. The changes to the NICHE system will help the force to improve its data.

Our concern is that this is not simply a data recording problem. Rather, it is a sign of underlying weakness in the force’s understanding of vulnerability and risk to individuals and certain communities. Examples of these include communities where children may be at risk of harm from abusive cultural practices such as: female genital mutilation, forced marriage, so-called honour-based violence, or being trafficked for criminal exploitation.

All personnel should recognise and understand these vulnerabilities. They should accurately record this important information about the people they deal with. This information is a vital part of officers’ risk assessments for deciding whether immediate action needs to be taken. These details also make for better referrals to other organisations to get help to vulnerable people and children.

The inconsistency in the recording of ethnicity and cultural heritage between officers and their supervisors means they don’t fully understand why this information is vital to protecting children. Leaders need to address this situation without delay.

The force benefits from reliable information technology

We found the force has improved its information technology (IT) systems. Operational staff now have access to reliable IT resources so they can effectively communicate with others both in the force and from other organisations. They can now see information on the force’s systems to help them understand risk and vulnerability and make better operational decisions.

We still found examples of risk and vulnerability markers not being visible on force IT systems – in some cases for missing or exploited children. But this was because staff hadn’t added the markers, rather than due to system errors.

In 2021, the force’s IT systems frequently failed. These failures interrupted the efficiency of vital meetings such as the daily management meeting, and meant personnel couldn’t attend meetings online. Now, the force is confident that attendees can contribute to its daily management meetings wherever they are.

We joined meetings online and saw that personnel from across the force area could use their IT systems to communicate effectively with colleagues. This meant the force assigned appropriate resources to make sure responses to high-risk incidents were effective.

All personnel have reliable IT systems, and this helps improve flexibility, supports remote working and reduces the need to travel for meetings. The force’s safeguarding partners told us the new police IT had also improved their own access to police advice and information.

The force is developing its use of IT to better understand the information it holds about crime, vulnerability and the outcomes of its operational activity. It is introducing Power BI technology so that personnel can see and use the force’s data to support their operational objectives. This is positive because both local authorities in the force area use this technology. Multi-agency responses to reduce vulnerability will benefit from richer information sources.

We saw the force’s use of the Violent and Sex Offender Register (ViSOR) database has improved. ViSOR is used to manage high-risk offenders in the community. The database has been in use across the UK since 2004, but Staffordshire Police wasn’t making good use of it. The force now uses the ViSOR database effectively and routinely produces performance management information.

The force’s investment in improving its IT systems is helping its workforce and its partners work together more effectively to protect vulnerable people. The aim of this recommendation has been achieved.

The force has improved the provision of safeguarding training to its workforce

The force’s learning and development department has a clear understanding of the force’s training requirements. They map demand and provide the courses and training programmes that department managers need for their officers. The force is actively addressing the gaps in the number of fully trained detectives and accredited child protection officers.

The force updates its records about the workforce’s training status, and this helps it prioritise its training provision. For example, not all officers on the child protection and exploitation team (CPET) are fully trained. But all these officers are receiving training and working towards full accreditation on the College of Policing’s specialist child abuse development investigators programme.

Leaders told us they are continuing to prioritise VoC training for all sections of their workforce. This includes more specific training from specialists and using supporting materials that work well in other forces, for example Suffolk Police’s Arthur prompt. (Arthur is a mnemonic used to train officers to assess incidents and promote the VoC. We identified this as innovative practice in our 2022 Suffolk National Child Protection Inspection report.)

But, despite extensive campaigns, initiatives and training, too many personnel still aren’t capturing the VoC. This means officers and supervisors don’t fully understand why it is vital for protecting children. For example, apart from some Arthur posters in various police buildings, we didn’t see any evidence that personnel were using the prompts in their responses to incidents with vulnerable children.

The force intranet has information about when public protection notices (PPNs) should be submitted. It also has guidance about what should be recorded about a child’s behaviour and demeanour. But frontline and specialist officers, and their supervisors, told us they don’t always read information on the force’s intranet. They said they are so busy that they only do the things that are mandatory.

Managers don’t consistently challenge and guide their staff when force policy isn’t followed

Staffordshire Police has an enthusiastic but very inexperienced frontline workforce. This also applies to many frontline supervisors. It means the force’s more experienced supervisors and managers need to be vigilant and check that their staff receive the direction and guidance they need to be effective.

But we found that middle-ranking managers in various roles don’t reinforce force priorities for vulnerability well enough. Their lack of scrutiny results in inconsistency in how the workforce identifies and deals with risk to children. We saw this in many of our audits where risks to children weren’t fully considered and vital information about children wasn’t recorded on PPNs.

The force now routinely audits records of incidents and investigations where there are vulnerable children. But managers don’t consistently give feedback to their staff or act to rectify the concerns highlighted by the audits.

We asked the force to re-check the safeguarding responses in 5 of the 33 cases it self-audited prior to our inspection because it wasn’t clear that all the children involved in these incidents were safe. The force appropriately responded to our requests. But the force knew about these concerns, and managers should have dealt with these problems when they first found them.

Managers aren’t doing enough to improve the quality of child protection investigations. We did see examples where officers completed timely and thorough child-centric investigations that were well supervised and ended with positive results for the victims. But in many cases we found delays after the initial response. Supervision was ineffective or absent; children were left at risk and offenders continued their abusive behaviours.

The quality and level of supervision in the FCC mean the response to missing children is often at the wrong risk level and too delayed.

We also found FCC managers endorsed systematic delays in responding to children and families at high risk from domestic abuse. Appointments were routinely made to visit these addresses, often days later. It meant that risk to children was unknown and unassessed. This FCC practice was directly contrary to the force’s vulnerability strategy. We told force leaders about our concerns, and they acted promptly to rectify the problem.

Managers haven’t improved the effectiveness of information sharing about risk to children

At the time of this re-inspection, managers hadn’t introduced clear and consistent guidance about responsibility for risk assessment and information sharing. We found officers’ completion of PPNs was inconsistent. The information they chose to record was also inconsistent, and so was how they recorded it. This meant there were gaps in the force’s records about risk and vulnerability and that some referrals to get children help were delayed or missed.

There are terms of reference for the multi-agency safeguarding hub (MASH) and HRHs. However, we found some operational duplication and inconsistency. Each of these arrangements should complement the other, to provide effective service provision.

HRH personnel are small teams within each local policing team (LPT) who are assigned to deal with vulnerability. The force plans to realign these teams to PPU line management. HRH personnel are not experienced child protection specialists, but they do have access to advice and guidance from specialist officers. They receive some training for this role. This includes guidance on dealing with child neglect and the importance of recording the VoC. Since our 2021 inspection, the HRH personnel review all child concern PPNs. They make decisions about which of these children to refer to children’s services.

The force’s specialist MASH team and CPET also review all incidents where there are child protection concerns. They make referrals to children’s services for any children where the partnership threshold for intervention is met.

For domestic abuse incidents, the force assesses all cases centrally in the MASH, but holds all multi-agency risk assessment conferences at HRHs. HRH staff told us they duplicated the MASH research in their own domestic abuse incident assessments.

4.  Case file analysis

Results of case file reviews

For our inspection, Staffordshire Police selected and self-assessed the effectiveness of its work in 33 child protection cases. Under our criteria, the cases selected were a random sample from across the area.

Our inspectors also assessed 31 of these cases.

Cases assessed by both Staffordshire Police and us

Force assessment:

• 9 good
• 9 require improvement
• 13 inadequate.

Our assessment:

• 6 good
• 8 require improvement
• 17 inadequate.

Our inspectors selected and assessed 39 more cases during the inspection.

Additional 39 cases assessed only by us

• 11 good
• 11 require improvement
• 17 inadequate.

Total 70 cases assessed by us

• 17 good
• 19 require improvement
• 34 inadequate.

Breakdown of case file audit results by area of child protection

Cases assessed involving enquiries under section 47 of the Children Act 1989

• 2 good
• 3 require improvement
• 5 inadequate.

Common themes include:

• in most investigations, there are early strategy discussions with children’s services;
• the investigators make joint visits with children’s services;
• but the force doesn’t record investigation plans well (with actions and updates);
• officers are inconsistently recording the VoC;
• officers don’t always record children’s ethnicity;
• officers don’t always identify and address wider safeguarding risks; and
• supervision is inconsistent and ineffective.

Cases assessed involving referrals relating to domestic abuse incidents or crimes

• 2 good
• 1 requires improvement
• 7 inadequate.

Common themes include:

• supervision is inconsistent;
• officers submit PPNs but they often lack detail;
• responding officers don’t fully assess risk and vulnerability;
• details of the children’s living conditions aren’t always included; and
• officers don’t consistently record the VoC.

Cases assessed involving referrals arising from incidents other than domestic abuse

• 1 good
• 2 require improvement
• 3 inadequate.

Common themes include:

• inconsistent approaches to children at risk;
• officers don’t always consider all the children who may be at risk;
• PPNs contain good information;
• some children don’t reach children’s services quickly enough;
• supervision is inconsistent and ineffective; and
• officers don’t often record children’s ethnicity.

Cases assessed involving children at risk from child sexual exploitation

• 5 good
• 2 require improvement
• 11 inadequate.

Common themes include:

• the initial response to victims is usually good;
• online investigations are risk assessed and notified to children’s services without delay;
• digital forensic support is available;
• officers often miss golden hour opportunities to gather evidence;
• there are delays in arrests for sexual abuse suspects;
• opportunities for disruption activity are missed;
• officers don’t always identify wider safeguarding risk for other vulnerable children;
• supervision is often ineffective, which can cause delays and missed investigation opportunities; and
• details about the VoC and children’s ethnicity are inconsistently recorded.

Cases assessed involving missing children

• 0 good
• 2 require improvement
• 4 inadequate.

Common themes include:

• control room staff always record a THRIVE risk assessment;
• initial risk gradings are inconsistent because all available information isn’t considered;
• exploitation risk is overlooked or diminished;
• supervisory oversight is inconsistent;
• investigations are often delayed, particularly overnight;
• missing children are reviewed and discussed at force daily meetings; and
• return to home interviews are timely and of good quality.

Cases assessed involving children taken to a place of safety under section 46 of the Children Act 1989

• 2 good
• 4 require improvement
• 0 inadequate.

Common themes include:

• in most cases, police attend incidents quickly and safeguard children well;
• the end of the use of police protection power isn’t always recorded;
• in most cases, strategy discussions with children’s services staff are held quickly;
• officers don’t always speak to all the children; and
• officers don’t always record details of children’s ethnicity.

Cases assessed involving sex offender management in which children have been assessed as at risk from the person being managed

• 5 good
• 1 requires improvement
• 0 inadequate.

Common themes include:

• officers work well with probation officers and social workers to assess offenders’ risk;
• officers act consistently when offenders commit offences;
• officers make new assessments when offenders’ circumstances change;
• supervision is consistently in place; and
• officers inform social workers without delay about risks to children.

Cases assessed involving children detained in police custody

• 0 good
• 4 require improvement
• 4 inadequate.

Common themes include:

• delays in appropriate adults attending detained children;
• children are seen by healthcare and liaison and diversion professionals;
• information about risk to children isn’t always recorded on force systems or referred to children’s services;
• custody officers don’t consistently understand the requirement to contact the local authority for alternative accommodation for detained children; and
• when alternative accommodation for some children isn’t available after they are charged, custody officers don’t escalate the problem to senior officers.

5.  Initial contact

Initial contact: Recommendations from the 2021 inspection report

We recommend that Staffordshire Police immediately improves supervision and processes within the Force Contact Centre (FCC) so that:

• risk and vulnerability are effectively identified;
• responses are correctly graded and assigned;
• FCC staff are fully trained and understand their responsibilities towards safeguarding vulnerable people and children;
• flags and warning markers are accurate and used to inform and prompt responding officers;
• decisions and open incidents are checked by supervisors and responses escalated where appropriate; and
• an audit process is in place to identify concerns and inform learning.

We recommend that Staffordshire Police immediately improves all its arrangements and practices for managing and responding to incidents of missing children. So the workforce is clear about its responsibilities and there is a more effective focus on reducing the risks to these vulnerable children.

We recommend that within six months Staffordshire Police ensures that staff responding to incidents don’t overlook vulnerable children at the location or others associated with the adults who are causing concerns, by:

• training staff to understand the VoC;
• clarifying when staff should complete PNNs and what should be recorded; and
• making sure that incidents are supervised effectively before they are closed.

Initial contact: Re-inspection findings

Risk to vulnerable children and their families isn’t always prioritised

The force provides vulnerability training for all its FCC staff and supervisors. This includes training on the VoC and on making better risk assessments. FCC personnel use the THRIVE model to assess risk and allocate responses to incidents.

The force told us its monitoring showed that THRIVE was used for 95 percent of calls to the FCC. Supervisors give feedback to individuals and use overall findings from its monitoring to update team training materials.

FCC staff sometimes add information from existing warning markers on the force’s systems to active incidents and use this to inform risk assessments. But this isn’t always done. And FCC supervisors don’t routinely check these assessments for accuracy and to make sure the assigned level of response is appropriate, or that it is still appropriate when there are delays in responding.

FCC staff told us the control room supervisors don’t have the capacity to carry out reviews or reassess open incidents. The force has recognised this problem and has assigned funding to increase the number of FCC supervisors from May 2023.

We saw that the FCC didn’t always give responding officers information about risk and vulnerability markers from the force’s systems. For example, we saw some incidents where children on child protection plans had witnessed domestic abuse, but there was no evidence recorded that the child protection plan had been used to inform officers’ decisions.

FCC staff aren’t routinely prompting responding officers to turn on body-worn video, to capture the VoC or to complete PPNs.

The force routinely delays responses to children at risk from domestic abuse

We found that the force wasn’t always responding quickly enough to domestic abuse incidents where children were present. Delays meant officers sometimes didn’t attend incidents, and instead were allocated appointments to attend at a later date. FCC managers told us they only made these decisions after arranging appointments with adult victims, who are usually the children’s mothers.

This approach means FCC managers aren’t considering children as victims in their own right. It also means that officers aren’t attending crime scenes and starting investigations quickly enough, in line with established golden hour principles.

When we checked the FCC outstanding domestic abuse appointment list, we found seven incidents with children that hadn’t been attended by officers. The risk to children and adults was unknown and unassessed. PPNs weren’t recorded, and referrals to children’s services were delayed and potentially missed.

It also meant that the force hadn’t told the schools about these children. Informing schools when pupils have experienced domestic abuse is something the force should do as part of Operation Encompass, to make sure affected children are given appropriate support. Failing to do this means some children won’t be helped. And it means that children at potential risk from the offenders in other households may be overlooked.

This practice also delays positive police action to arrest or disrupt the offenders.

Positively, force leaders immediately responded to our concerns and introduced measures to improve their safeguarding responses.

Frontline responders generally record their concerns for children in domestic abuse incidents, but actions aren’t effectively supervised

Officers responding to domestic abuse incidents consistently submit PPNs, which include details of a child’s demeanour and behaviour. This means that information can be shared with partners when children are affected by domestic abuse, so that they can be helped and safeguarded.

But the quality of the information recorded is inconsistent. For example, a description of the children’s living environment is often missing. And officers don’t routinely use body-worn video to record the condition of the children’s homes, or when they speak with children.

Responding officers are responsible for initially grading the risk of all domestic incidents they attend. But many frontline responders are inexperienced officers, and their work and reports aren’t routinely supervised by their line managers. We saw an incident where a risk graded standard by a responding officer was changed to high by staff in the MASH because of the risks to the children. MASH staff immediately referred those children to children’s services.

When responding officers don’t recognise high risk to children, they are likely to miss opportunities to gather evidence of abuse and neglect. This may also result in delays in action to disrupt offenders and safeguard children.

MASH staff provide supervisory assessment of domestic abuse incidents. But they don’t work in the evenings or at weekends. This means there are sometimes delays to research and fuller risk assessment.

The force has introduced changes to its missing people policies, but these are still inconsistent

Following our 2021 inspection, the force changed its missing people policy and practices. The new practices have reduced the average time it takes to find missing children from 12 to approximately 8 hours.

FCC call handlers generally record comprehensive details about children’s vulnerabilities and any risks to them and make THRIVE assessments. Missing children are never assessed as low risk or no apparent risk, which is positive.

Call handlers use warning markers and vulnerability flags on the force’s systems to assess missing children’s risk levels. Sometimes these markers prompt call handlers to make wider checks on intelligence systems.

FCC staff can access specialist 24/7 intelligence from their i24 team. They are told about all high-risk missing children. But we saw no evidence that they were routinely assigned with helping to assess risk or use the force’s intelligence systems to help find these children.

The force’s missing persons investigation team helps operational responders with desk-based investigative support. PPU managers told us that all frequently reported missing children either have trigger plans or, for those who reside in children’s homes, Philomena protocol plans in place.

The missing persons coordinator told us they use professional judgement to create and record trigger plans for missing children on the force’s system. The force has no definitive guidance or policy for this action. We were told that it is the responsibility of local police and community support officers to speak with children’s home staff and children to create Philomena protocol records.

We found that most FCC staff and frontline responders don’t fully understand what the Philomena protocol and trigger plans are. It means they don’t seek out the information in these plans to help them find children quickly.

We saw in our audits that FCC staff don’t routinely use these plans within their initial risk assessments or share them with the officers assigned to find the missing child. FCC and frontline officers told us they can’t easily find trigger plan information on the force’s systems, so they don’t include it. This means the force isn’t using the information it already has and is wasting the resources used to gather that information. At the time of this re-inspection, managers hadn’t yet acted to solve this problem.

Ongoing missing children incidents are included in the force’s daily management meeting. This informs and updates senior leaders about high-risk missing children so they can be certain that enquiries are supported with enough resources.

There are delays in responses to find vulnerable children who are reported missing from home

The initial risk gradings of missing children in the FCC are inconsistent because FCC personnel don’t always use all the available information to accurately inform these assessments. This includes, for example, information about a child’s vulnerability given by the person reporting them as missing.

Force incident managers (FCC inspectors) don’t always add appropriate priority actions to high-risk missing children’s incidents. In two of our audits, we saw these inspectors use inappropriate and victim-blaming language. For example, “this is clearly a planned missing episode” and “they always return back”. Their entries on records are often templated, generic formats which aren’t specific enough to the missing child’s circumstances, risk and vulnerability. It means the force doesn’t consistently prioritise investigations to find missing children who are at risk.

Generally, the responsibility for finding missing children falls to frontline officers. We saw delays in their responses to find missing children. These were particularly evident overnight when, too often, officers and their supervisors made few or no enquiries to find the child. This concern also applies to high-risk missing children.

We saw inconsistency in the supervision of missing person investigations. It is often unclear who is leading the investigation and reviewing the priority lines of enquiry.

The force works closely with its safeguarding partners to prevent children going missing and to find those who are missing, but information isn’t always used effectively.

The missing persons investigation team personnel and the missing persons co‑ordinator gather information about risk and vulnerability from reviewing missing incidents. They enter flags on the force’s systems about children’s risk and vulnerability. But this is inconsistent. We saw an incident where information about high-risk sexual and criminal exploitation for a boy was recorded on the missing record, but not on the force’s intelligence system. This means this information might not be seen by officers responding to future incidents.

We also saw information about missing children being partially duplicated on separate systems, such as FCC incident logs and the missing person case management system, COMPACT. This is confusing for personnel and means that in live incidents it is difficult for them to clearly see all the relevant information.

Information about missing children’s ethnicity and cultural heritage isn’t consistently recorded on police systems. This means certain risks and vulnerabilities may not be considered and included when setting investigation priorities.

Officers who complete prevention interviews when children are found or return home don’t consistently record the VoC. Missing persons investigation team personnel told us that officers often don’t record information about missing children on PPNs, so they contact them later to remind them to do this. We saw an example where there is a child who has gone missing over 100 times, but only two PPNs about these incidents were recorded on the force’s systems. This indicates that officers and their supervisors are unclear about what they should record.

The force and its safeguarding partners meet weekly to discuss and plan to reduce risk for missing children. The specialist organisation Catch22 is commissioned by the local authorities to visit missing children when they are found and complete return to home interviews with them. These meetings are arranged without delay. Any information about risks or exploitation of the child is passed to the safeguarding partnership. The force records these return to home interviews on its systems. This information should be used to update warning markers and trigger plans.

Positively:

• HRH personnel also hold meetings with other organisations in the areas where missing children live. Records of these meetings, actions and plans to help children are recorded on police systems; and
• the force automatically notifies local authorities about every missing child.

However, the force hasn’t made enough progress against our three recommendations to improve its initial contact with vulnerable children.

6.  Assessment and help

Assessment and help: Recommendations from the 2021 inspection report

We recommend that within three months Staffordshire Police reviews its assessment and information-sharing practices so it can:

• identify vulnerable children at the earliest possible stage; and
• refer those children without delay to the most appropriate level of support.

We recommend that within three months Staffordshire Police improves its attendance rate at child protection case conferences held in Stoke-on-Trent and Staffordshire. So that police attend these meetings in person to contribute more effectively to decision-making about the measures needed to protect a child from risk.

We recommend that within six months Staffordshire Police introduces a process to review all its PPNs:

• to check the information is complete;
• to check that any immediate safeguarding action is in place;
• to include any other relevant information from police systems for context;
• so that crimes are recorded; and
• that it is necessary and proportionate to forward the information to the other organisations.

Assessment and help: Re-inspection findings

The force’s arrangements to safeguard children in domestic abuse incidents duplicate some risk assessment activities between specialist and non-specialist personnel

Police officers responding to domestic abuse incidents often find children at risk of harm. They make referrals for these children within domestic abuse, stalking, harassment and honour-based violence (DASH) assessments. The officers grade the incidents as standard, medium or high risk. They don’t submit any more PPN referrals for children involved in these incidents. The information within DASH assessments isn’t checked by frontline officers’ supervisors.

When officers complete DASH assessments they can automatically send Operation Encompass referrals to inform children’s schools that their pupils have been involved in domestic abuse incidents. This means school communities can help and support these children.

The MASH team and local authority staff jointly review the DASH assessments. If they find children at risk they refer them to children’s services and hold strategy meetings to plan interventions.

HRH staff told us they also review all domestic abuse incidents in their areas. This work duplicates the domestic abuse focus of the specialist MASH team, but this duplication is justified; many frontline responding officers are inexperienced, and their reports aren’t supervised by line managers. And the HRHs arrange all the multi-agency risk assessment conferences (MARACs).

LPT chief inspectors are trained to chair MARACs. Relevant local partners attend these meetings either virtually or in person to share information and jointly plan how to help and safeguard families. HRH teams include domestic abuse coordinators who facilitate MARAC meetings. However LPT and HRH personnel aren’t child protection specialists, and very few of them have detective or child protection investigation accreditation.

HRH and MASH personnel don’t generally work at weekends when domestic abuse incidents often occur. This means there can be delays in fully assessing risk to children that responding officers have missed or overlooked.

The force supports multi-agency safeguarding arrangements to share information and assess risk to children

During our 2021 inspection, Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent had combined arrangements for information sharing and strategy meetings. These have changed, and the two authorities now have separate arrangements. The force and other safeguarding partners continue to work closely with both local authorities to share information and make plans to protect children.

Currently the force’s MASH operates during office hours from Monday to Friday. There aren’t enough police personnel in the MASH to make sure the caseload is always completed without delays. There tend to be backlogs on Mondays, when personnel must deal with all the incidents that have taken place over the weekend. It means some research and information requests aren’t completed as quickly as they need to be. But supervisors try to prioritise the cases they assess as high risk.

MASH governance benefits from multi-agency oversight. The managers meet regularly to jointly review operational performance. They use this opportunity to improve multi-agency working arrangements. But they only have limited data. This means managers don’t have a full understanding of demand across the different levels of risk and vulnerability.

The force has effective arrangements for child protection strategy meetings

The force supports close multi-agency child protection working practices. They know different organisations hold complementary information about children, their families and those who are a risk to them. A specialist team operates the force’s MASH system and works closely with child protection specialists from other safeguarding partner organisations. The team receives relevant police safeguarding and multi‑agency child protection training. This means its members understand the way the partnership works, and only share relevant information with partners when it is necessary to do so.

The MASH team checks the force’s systems and other national police databases, such as the Police National Computer and the Police National Database, for information about any children that the local authority has referred to the MASH for child protection concerns. They also carry out research for children’s cases that the force wants to refer to the local authority, such as children at risk of harm from domestic abuse. They assess these referrals in preparation for child protection strategy meetings.

MASH supervisors review incidents when officers take children into police protection. They give advice and feedback to officers and arrange for early strategy meetings with children’s services staff.

MASH sergeants hold strategy meetings with safeguarding partners where they share information and plan joint investigations to protect children from harm. Strategy meetings for both local authority areas are generally well attended by relevant agencies, such as health and education. The agencies often attend meetings virtually. This arrangement means that delays in getting help to children are reduced. Outside MASH office hours, duty social workers and police officers can hold meetings together. This arrangement works well for both local authority areas.

The MASH sergeants and children’s services managers decide which referrals should be progressed as either single or joint-agency child protection investigations. When MASH sergeants decide the police will investigate, they assign the crimes to the appropriate teams in the force.

The force is inconsistent in how it assesses risk to children and makes referrals to get them help

The force uses multiple routes to share information with its safeguarding partners.

• Information about vulnerability and risk in custody and offender management is shared directly by those teams with children’s services.
• Information about missing children, and information to promote other children’s welfare or for child abuse concerns, is sent to children’s services by the HRHs.
• Information about domestic abuse risk or when partners formally request this for child protection purposes is shared in the MASH.

The MASH team focuses on high-level child protection risk. It doesn’t routinely assess PPNs about concerns for children’s welfare and safety. HRH personnel are responsible for reviewing PPNs and deciding which concerns need to be referred to children’s services or to early help providers.

But there is no clear force policy for when officers must submit PPNs. And although the submitting officers are asked to grade PPNs as standard, medium and high risk, some of these officers told us they don’t fully understand what information to use to assign risk levels. This means PPNs are inconsistently submitted.

We saw evidence in our case audits where PPNs weren’t submitted for very vulnerable children. We also saw cases where officers hadn’t recorded the VoC or enough information about risk on the PPN. Many PPNs lacked information about children’s ethnicity and cultural heritage. Because PPNs aren’t routinely supervised before being entered on the force system, the officers’ line managers weren’t identifying these omissions.

HRH personnel told us they don’t receive large numbers of PPNs. They don’t use the officers’ risk grades to prioritise work, and they can’t regrade the original grades.

HRH usually research PPNs to give more context to the reported concerns and incidents. These checks help to identify repeat victimisation. HRHs and their local safeguarding partners use problem-solving methods or take action when they are concerned about escalating risks to children.

But most PPNs about concerns for children aren’t accepted as referrals by children’s services. This is because single incident information without more context about risk and vulnerability means the high-risk threshold for statutory social work often isn’t met.

HRH personnel and social workers have phone conversations to decide what, if anything, should be done with PPNs that appear to fall outside this threshold. But the force doesn’t have a clear policy for its staff to record what information they discussed and what decisions were made. Some HRH personnel have received training from the local authority about their thresholds for making referrals about concerns for children. But the force hasn’t trained the HRH personnel to research its systems and to understand what and when information should be shared with other organisations.

There isn’t a clear pathway for early help referrals in the eight Staffordshire areas. For example, in Stafford and Lichfield, HRH personnel support any parents who need early help to refer themselves to early help provision. This is because the local providers won’t accept referrals from the force unless they have the children’s parents’ consent for this. In Burton-upon-Trent an early help social worker regularly visits the HRH to directly receive referrals.

We also found other inconsistent operating processes across the HRHs. For example, local authority-designed templates have been introduced in Stoke to record triage decision-making. But in the other hubs, there is no clear or consistent process. So, the quality of decision-making and the type of information shared varies from hub to hub, meaning some children may not get the right help at the right time.

The force needs clearer and more effective information-sharing processes to support its safeguarding responsibilities. It should issue guidance, so all personnel understand how to manage disclosures to other organisations. And quality assurance monitoring should be routinely in place in PPU governance arrangements.

The force effectively contributes to child protection conferences

Representatives from the force now attend between 96 percent and 100 percent of initial child protection conferences in both local authority areas.

Case conference staff research information from the force’s systems. They provide timely and comprehensive reports to inform multi-agency discussions about how best to protect children from harm.

Children’s services managers from both local authorities praised the force’s contribution to child protection conferences. They said the force was making a valuable contribution to multi-agency child protection work.

When a child is the subject of a child protection plan, the police enter warning markers about this on the force’s systems. This means that officers responding to incidents about the child or where the child lives will know about their vulnerability.

PPU managers told us they were working to increase the force’s attendance at review child protection conferences, rather than relying on sending update reports to these meetings.

We found that child protection conference minutes aren’t routinely included on the force’s systems. This means that police responders to incidents with a child may not have all the information they need about risk and vulnerabilities.

The force has achieved the aims of our recommendation for participation in child protection conferences.

The force works with its partners in multi-agency child exploitation meetings to protect children from risk

Not all risk to children is from their own families. Too many children are at risk from people who exploit or traffic them for criminal or sexual purposes. Many of these children are vulnerable because of their family situation, mental or physical health or because of their associations with people who groom them for their own purposes.

These contextual safeguarding risks relate to each child’s situation. The risks can change quickly, and children can’t easily protect themselves. Professionals can help these vulnerable children. But they need to work jointly, share information, build trust with the child and flex their plans to deal with changing risks.

Both local authority areas hold multi-agency child exploitation (MACE) meetings. Police and a wide range of partner agency staff attend. Attendees share information to help plan how to protect children from exploitation. The attendees use a risk factor matrix tool to assess the risk and resilience of the children.

Each MACE meeting deals with about 45 to 60 children vulnerable to child criminal exploitation (CCE), child sexual exploitation (CSE) and dual-risk cases. Attendees discuss, make and revise safeguarding plans for the children. A comprehensive summary is provided for each child. Actions are clear, with timescales and a named responsible lead.

Local authority and police managers told us most information about child exploitation is focused on CCE – typically drugs supplied by organised crime groups and county lines.

In Staffordshire, about 60 percent of MACE cases are for CCE, and in Stoke-on-Trent it is approximately 75 percent. This means very little activity is focused on children at risk from CSE. These children are at increased risk because the force’s limited proactive resources are mainly used to tackle drug supply.

The multi-agency partnership is not effectively using all the information it has to tackle child exploitation

At the time of this inspection, the force didn’t have a current CSE/CCE profile for its area containing information about where offences had occurred, who the victims were, who the suspects were and when incidents took place. This means that leaders and operational teams don’t have the information to help them deal effectively with these crimes. The force’s intelligence analysts aren’t dedicated to this area of risk.

Both local authorities gather extensive information about exploitation risk to children. This data is available to the safeguarding partnership, and it is used to inform MACE discussions.

The force has numerical data for incidents of child sexual abuse, CCE and CSE crime. This data includes information about repeat victims, gender, age and where the offences occur. But this data doesn’t include ethnicity.

Managers told us the partnership was considering ways to use its information about child exploitation more effectively, including using Power BI technology.

The force and its partners work together to protect children from contextual risk

The partnership has a violence reduction unit, which aims to influence, direct and disrupt potential offenders to reduce the risk of harm. The unit is jointly arranged by the force, the police and fire commissioner and local authorities. It follows a public health approach to addressing youth violence. The violence reduction unit manages a cohort of approximately 80 vulnerable children and young people.

Frequently missing children are very likely to be at risk of exploitation. The force works closely with local authority staff to jointly plan interventions to reduce risk to these children. They meet regularly to discuss the latest incidents and any new information obtained in these children’s prevention or return home interviews. Police and community support officers are assigned to liaise with staff in children’s homes, which is where the majority of the high-risk missing children live. They initiate the Philomena protocols for these children and gather updated information to help find them.

The force works well with its statutory safeguarding partners in Operation Makesafe. But managers told us they thought risk to some exploited children could be reduced if the force developed and improved its contacts with some non-statutory organisations, such as hotel chains and fast-food restaurants.

The force uses warning markers on its systems to alert its workforce to children’s vulnerability from contextual risk. It also uses child abduction warning notices. These protect specific children and are used to disrupt offenders’ grooming and exploitative behaviours. But PPU managers told us warning markers and child abduction warning notices aren’t fully understood by most frontline personnel.

7.  Investigation

Investigation: Recommendations from the 2021 inspection report

We recommend that Staffordshire Police immediately improves child protection investigations by making sure:

• it effectively supervises investigations, with reviews clearly recording any further work that is needed;
• safeguarding referrals are prompt and comprehensive;
• the VoC is clear and included in decision-making;
• it appropriately supports joint multi-agency investigations;
• it assigns investigations to officers with the skills, capacity and competence to progress them effectively;
• it regularly audits the quality of practice, including how effective safeguarding measures are; and
• it focuses on achieving the best end results for children.

We recommend that within three months Staffordshire Police reviews its arrangements for investigating online crime against children by making sure:

• it reduces the backlog of referrals to Operation Safenet from national and international law enforcement agencies;
• it quickly identifies risks to children by sharing information with other safeguarding organisations;
• it makes decisions in consultation with children’s services to improve the safeguarding response to children;
• it records and effectively supervises investigation and safeguarding activity;
• it always considers the VoC in investigations and reflects this in decision-making;
• it explains and records decisions about how it manages the risk from offenders; and
• with other safeguarding organisations, it considers and addresses wider safeguarding risks the offender may present to other children.

We recommend that within three months Staffordshire Police reviews how it manages information about online child abuse from national and international law enforcement agencies. This should include:

• improving how it uses the CAID; and
• identifying accurately addresses on other systems that are outside the force’s area and passing on this intelligence without delay so other forces can act on it.

Investigation: Re-inspection findings

The force allocates child abuse investigations without delays

When child abuse concerns are reported directly to the police, FCC staff search force systems and assess risk using THRIVE. Frontline officers contact the MASH and the CPET for advice if they find children at risk.

Strategy meetings are held quickly and benefit from multi-agency attendance. Police information is shared promptly with partners in the MASH to help with risk assessment and joint decision-making. The minutes are recorded on police systems, so partnership information, decisions and next steps are visible to the wider organisation. The MASH sergeants allocate child abuse investigations to specialist investigators in the CPET.

Other safeguarding investigations, such as children sending self-generated indecent images on their digital devices, may be allocated to non-specialist, locally based officers. Police and partners make joint visits to assess children’s vulnerability and investigate allegations of abuse and neglect. This helps to decide if children need specialist help to communicate, such as intermediaries or interpreters.

The CPET doesn’t have enough capability to deal with current demand

The CPET has clear terms of reference and more managers and supervisors in place than in 2021. The force has now assigned two detective chief inspectors, one to manage the north and one for the south of the county.

CPET staff are dedicated and passionate about their work. They care about the victims and want to make a positive difference to the lives of children. The team provides a 24/7 response to the sudden deaths of children.

The force provides CPET officers with counselling and well-being support. Team managers are very supportive of their staff and recognise the effects of the team’s caseload and the cases’ subject matter on individuals and the wider team.

But many CPET officers are inexperienced. A quarter of the officers aren’t fully qualified detectives, and less than half of them have completed the specialist child abuse development investigators programme. The force recognises this, and all unqualified officers are taking part in training programmes to close this knowledge gap. CPET officers also receive other relevant training, such as trauma‑informed training, and supervisors are given the force’s ‘investigation masterclass training’. But CPET officers told us that most of them haven’t been trained to investigate exploitation offences.

Unqualified and trainee officers don’t have the skills and experience to carry high caseloads – particularly when these investigations are complex or protracted. But all CPET investigators have high caseloads. Most CPET cases are reactive investigations for allegations of child abuse and neglect, and officers are also assigned child exploitation investigations where different investigative demands exist.

In addition to its own caseload the CPET team also helps with other teams’ investigations. These include online child abuse investigations led by the force’s Operation Safenet team or when the major investigations department needs specialist support. But positively, the force’s recent increase in numbers of Operation Safenet staff has reduced the need for CPET to support online child protection investigations.

There is also extra demand because CPET officers are assigned to some other long‑term investigations, such as complex and lengthy CSE investigations. CPET officers and their managers told us that they are not provided with officers to replace the abstracted CPET officers. This means that the remaining officers have more caseload pressure and less time to complete investigations.

Officers and managers told us vacant positions reduce team resilience and cause delays in investigations. PPU leaders do have plans to reduce these vacancies, but we found that the CPET is struggling to deal with its current level of demand.

Since our last inspection, the force worked with consultants to complete a demand analysis and process mapping to better understand victims’ experiences through the criminal justice system. The force is in the implementation phase of a new operating model for its PPU services. This model includes an increase of 99 staff members to make sure there is sufficient resource in CPET and other departments to manage the workload.

Child protection investigations aren’t always timely or effective

Although most CPET investigations begin after a multi-agency strategy meeting, we saw no records of review strategy meetings for ongoing child protection investigations. This means that joint working isn’t a priority during investigations, and opportunities to share new information and jointly assess the safety of the children may be missed.

We found officers didn’t always recognise risk to children in their investigations, and they didn’t always use PPNs to record risk and inform partners about a child’s vulnerability.

CPET officers know about capturing the VoC, but even so they don’t always speak with the children involved in the investigation. Their records lacked context to better understand the children’s needs. It means those investigations aren’t fully focused on getting the best result for the children.

Specialist investigators don’t always consider all aspects of vulnerability in their planning. In most of the investigations we audited, the ethnicity and cultural heritage of a child or a suspect weren’t recorded.

Investigators don’t always arrest or interview suspects. This means that opportunities to gather corroborative evidence from searches are missed. It also means that officers can’t use bail conditions to safeguard children and their families from offenders. Officers told us that long delays in custody procedures were one of the reasons why officers weren’t arresting suspects.

We also found that officers and supervisors don’t often use protective powers such as child abduction warning notices to safeguard children.

Supervisor reviews of investigations are inconsistent and ineffective. Supervisors don’t always direct investigative or safeguarding actions. We saw examples where investigating officers didn’t follow the supervisory direction, but supervisors didn’t challenge their staff about this.

CPET supervisors told us that they don’t have enough time to comply with the force’s supervisory review schedule. The schedule sets periodic investigation reviews by detective sergeants at 28 days. Detective inspectors should carry out reviews after 3 months, detective chief inspectors after 9 months and, for protracted investigations, a superintendent review should take place at 15 months.

We saw officers and supervisors recording on open child protection investigations that they were too busy with other work to either progress or supervise that investigation. If this is the situation, those investigations should be escalated immediately to senior leaders to review and assign more resources. Child abuse investigations shouldn’t be delayed in these circumstances.

Supervisors close some child abuse investigations too early

Supervisors close some investigations too quickly. Sometimes they close investigations before relevant enquiries are completed. Some investigations we examined were closed before officers saw the children.

In our audits, we saw officers had closed investigations into child sexual abuse or CSE cases without considering all the evidential opportunities, or the risks the suspects continued to present to other children. For example, a sports club coach wasn’t arrested when allegations about him sexually grooming children at the club were made. His home and the digital devices he used to communicate with children weren’t searched or seized for evidential examination.

Officers and supervisors don’t always consult children’s services or the local authority designated officers when closing investigations with no further action. This practice can leave some children at risk either as existing victims or in the wider context of the offender’s risk to others.

We saw examples where CPET investigators closed investigations only because the victims didn’t want to support prosecutions. In these cases, investigators should consider the viability of other investigative techniques to gain evidence to bring offenders to justice. The techniques might include providing greater support for victims, other investigation opportunities and evidence-led prosecutions.

Arresting suspects is also an essential evidential tool. It often allows officers to gather important evidence at an early stage, such as evidence from suspects’ devices.

The digital forensic unit (DFU) provides a responsive and flexible service to prioritise device and computer examinations. When suspects are in custody, the DFU seeks to give investigating officers information within 24 hours. The DFU works hard to provide this service, and it has reduced delays in many cases to less than three months. This improved service helps investigators to expedite their enquiries and place stronger bail conditions on suspects. This reduces the suspects’ risk to victims.

The force has improved its online investigation of child abuse

The force’s Safenet specialist investigation team acts on intelligence and referrals about sexual offenders who make and distribute indecent child sexual abuse material. Some of these offenders also commit contact child sexual assaults.

Online sexual abuse investigations by specialist officers are generally of better quality than those allocated to frontline officers. The Safenet team’s initial response to referrals is effective and timely, and there is a clearly understood operating procedure in place.

Strategy meetings are organised quickly with children’s services, and information is shared with safeguarding partners to help plan the timing of investigation activity. This means the team identifies potential victims at an early stage.

The force has reviewed the demand and terms of reference of the Safenet team. It has also increased the numbers of Safenet personnel and supervisors, and provided better technical equipment to help the team examine devices. Safenet use this equipment effectively to examine devices at an early stage in investigations. This practice reduces demand on the DFU staff. It also provides early evidence and means that some offenders admit offences and are charged at an earlier stage.

The force has reduced DFU backlogs for examining suspect electronic devices. This means investigating officers get evidence at a much earlier stage and can complete their enquiries efficiently. DFU efficiency means the force can offer vulnerable victims better support and it reduces the risk in managing some child sexual abuse suspects.

The force has recruited a victim identification officer to assess sexual abuse cases where children are involved. The victim identification officer takes images of scenes of sexual abuse and pictures of other people associated with child victims. They then check these against the Child Abuse Image Database (CAID). This allows the force to identify child abuse victims. Any first-generation images (new images that aren’t already on the system) are added to the CAID to help any future investigations where the images are found.

The force now routinely uploads images to the CAID once a week. In 2021, the force made the lowest contribution of images to the CAID out of any police force in the UK and Northern Ireland. Now its level of CAID uploads means it is an effective contributor to the system. This positive action makes sure that more child victims are identified. The CAID manager checks all devices examined by the DFU against images held on the CAID. This saves time when viewing downloads and identifying indecent images of children.

The force receives intelligence and referrals about online sexual offenders from national and international policing organisations such as the National Crime Agency and the Child Rescue Coalition. The Child Rescue Coalition provides forces with a secure link to the information it gathers about potential online sexual offenders in their areas. This intelligence allows forces to start investigations to identify offenders and safeguard children.

But we saw that Staffordshire Police isn’t proactively acting on all levels of risk on the system. This means that risks to children from some online offenders isn’t assessed or dealt with by the force. We raised this concern with the force. And the detective inspector with responsibility for the Operation Safenet team immediately acted to deal with the lower levels of risk on the system. The force’s increase in resources to Operation Safenet means this improved practice is sustainable.

This positive action means the force is using this intelligence effectively to safeguard children from sexual abuse.

The improvements the force has made means that it has completed the recommendation we made about managing information it receives on online child abuse and improving the use of CAID.

Investigations into sexual offences are often ineffective

When officers initially respond to calls about online sexual abuse they don’t consistently prioritise golden hour actions. This means that opportunities to secure evidence and identify any more possible victims or suspects could be missed.

Officers responding to online sexual abuse incidents don’t always recognise children’s vulnerability. In one example we saw, a child victim was very worried about the reaction of their parents if they were told about the abuse. But the officer didn’t take steps to reassure the child and explain why they needed to speak with their parents.

Supervisors don’t consistently challenge and redirect investigative actions. This means important areas of enquiry may be missed. For example, some witnesses and victims may not be spoken to.

Supervisors don’t always make sure that comprehensive investigation and safeguarding plans are in place. They don’t instruct non-specialist officers to get advice and guidance from specialists. And in the cases we audited, plans weren’t reviewed and updated to keep them focused on getting the best results for the children.

In some cases we audited, we saw records that showed that, after the initial police responses, officers think children’s services are responsible for safeguarding children. This isn’t the case. The police have a continuing responsibility to make sure victims and other children get the right help and advice. This includes involving parents, schools and other specialist organisations.

If victims are uncertain or reluctant to support prosecutions, officers don’t consistently consider evidence-led investigations. This means that even when suspects are known, officers will seek to close investigations at an early stage.

Responding and investigating officers don’t consistently record information about offenders and victims. They don’t always record information about ethnicity and cultural heritage or assess these factors against risk and vulnerability. Supervisors don’t check for this problem and rectify it. This indicates a gap in the force’s approach to diversity and making sure it is focused on reducing risk in all its communities.

Ineffective investigations mean that offenders aren’t brought to justice and may continue to harm children. The force still needs to make substantial improvements to improve its child abuse investigation services.

Progress has been made in online child abuse investigation, but there is still some work to do to make sure the force uses the intelligence it receives about online child offenders to protect children more effectively.

8.  Decision-making

Decision-making: Recommendation from the 2021 inspection report

We recommend that within three months Staffordshire Police improve its practices for when children are taken into police protection to:

• ensure that strategy discussions are always held with children’s services;
• officers accurately record relevant information and decisions;
• ensure that criminal offences are investigated and recorded; and
• inspectors regularly review and endorse the use of protective powers.

Decision-making: Re-inspection findings

Frontline officers use police protection powers well

It is a very serious step to remove a child from a family by way of police protection. When there are concerns about children’s safety, such as parents leaving young children at home alone or being intoxicated while looking after them, we found officers handle incidents well.

When assessing the need to take immediate action, officers use their powers appropriately to remove children from harm’s way. In the cases we examined, decisions to take a child to a place of safety were well-considered and made in the best interests of the child.

Officers keep records of discussions with children’s services and places of safety on the force’s systems

The force quickly contacts children’s services and its emergency duty teams for advice to help protect children from harm. The force and children’s services hold strategy discussions to make plans to keep children safe. We found records of the minutes of these meetings and decisions clearly recorded on police systems.

Officers generally make comprehensive records of any relevant information and of any actions they have taken to protect children and find help and shelter for them. They appropriately challenge social workers if they believe there are unnecessary delays in getting help for the children, and they record information about suitable places of safety for children on the records of the incident.

But we found the quality of officers’ records of children’s cultural heritage and ethnicity are inconsistent. This means that assessments of risk to these children may not understand all aspects of a child’s vulnerability.

Officers also don’t always record enough detail about the VoC for children they place into police protection. This means that officers may not be aware of the full effect an incident has had on a child. It also means that the child’s wishes may not have been taken into consideration when deciding how best to help them.

We saw officers identify criminal offences, such as physical abuse and neglect. They gathered evidence of these offences using body-worn video cameras. They recorded this information clearly and used it in plans to safeguard the child. Supervisors endorsed these investigations and safeguarding plans.

Inspectors usually complete their designated duties

In the incidents we audited, where officers took children into police protection, inspectors were usually contacted and took the role of designated officer. Generally, they gave good and timely direction to the officers, prioritising the welfare of the children.

Designated officers usually recorded the times of their period of responsibility, including when they had handed the role over to another colleague. They also made records of concerns such as delays in children’s services finding suitable accommodation for children under police protection.

Most designated officers completed documents and recorded the time when the use of police power to protect the children ended. But we saw incidents where designated officers didn’t make sure the time children were taken into police protection was recorded. And we saw records where the end of the use of the power wasn’t recorded. This is essential, as a clear reason should be recorded for why use of power is no longer needed to keep children safe.

The force has made progress towards achieving our recommendation for improving its practices when children are taken into police protection. But further improvements in inspectors supervision of decision-making are still needed.

9.  Trusted adult

Trusted adult: Re-inspection findings

It is important children feel they can trust the police. We saw that, in some child protection cases, officers carefully considered how best to approach a child and their parents or carers. Officers also explored the most effective ways to communicate with them. Such sensitivity builds confidence and creates stronger relationships between children, their parents or carers and the police. Staffordshire Police works well with other safeguarding organisations and professionals to protect children when they need immediate safeguarding.

Local police engage with children’s homes and schools

Police and community support officers are individually assigned to engage with schools and children’s homes. These officers are based in LPTs that are aligned to the force’s HRHs. These officers are a vital part of the force’s strategy to build trust with children in places where they live and are supported.

Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent local authorities are responsible for looking after large numbers of children. Many of these looked after children are vulnerable and need extra support to keep them safe.

The police and community support officers work with children’s home staff to implement the Philomena protocol arrangements to reduce risks to missing children. They also work to improve relationships between the police and school communities. Their structured contributions to some of the schools’ lessons teach children about risks, and how to contact the police or others who can help them if they feel vulnerable.

Police engage closely with children

There are currently about 190 voluntary police cadets in the force area. Young people aged between 13 and 18 years join cadet teams that are attached to the HRHs across the force area. There is also a mini cadet scheme for children aged 8–10 years. The cadets meet weekly, and officers and guest speakers train them on subjects such as safeguarding and dangers. Some cadets have supported local policing projects and activities. The youth offending team may also refer children who at risk of being involved in crime to the cadet scheme.

Force leaders consult children through the young persons’ independent advisory group. This helps them to work directly with this group to gain an understanding of how particular force policies and practices may affect children.

The force also works closely with the Staffordshire and Stoke-on Trent Youth Offending Service to reduce the criminalisation of children.

10. Managing those who pose a risk to children

Managing those who pose a risk to children: Recommendation from the 2021 inspection report

We recommend that Staffordshire Police should immediately review its arrangements for sex offender management, including its supervision and management information systems, so that it is satisfied that the unit is fully effective within its terms of reference.

Managing those who pose a risk to children: Re-inspection findings

The force has improved the arrangements in its sex offender management unit

The sexual offence management unit (SOMU) manages registered sex offenders (RSOs) in the community. The number of RSOs increases yearly by about 7 percent. The force recently increased the size of the SOMU team. This means its supervision ratio of offender managers to RSOs is close to the College of Policing authorised professional practice guidelines.

SOMU officers work closely with officers from the National Probation Service. Probation officers manage offenders who are subject to court-imposed licence restrictions. A probation officer works one day a week in the SOMU office, and they will plan and attend joint visits to offenders. This improves the quality of assessments and risk management plans. The multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) co-ordinator and team are located in the same building as the SOMU team.

During our 2021 inspection, we found worrying delays in the work of the SOMU team. But the team has since greatly improved its performance. Offenders are now allocated to offender managers on a geographical basis. This has improved the timeliness of visits.

The team used overtime to reduce the high numbers of outstanding supervisory backlogs. This has helped it to understand and manage risk. In September 2021, there were 1,678 overdue registered sexual offender visits. In January 2023, this had reduced to 111 overdue visits. The force data we saw showed a sustained improvement, with monthly reductions in these numbers.

The force’s daily management meeting covers topics including wanted offenders, exceptional incidents and other planned activity. This allows the force to make sure there are enough resources to deal with high-risk SOMU demand.

The unit has clear performance targets for visiting and assessing offenders and updating the management plans. Its managers make sure the team achieves these.

The force now collects reliable monthly performance information. The data covers areas such as outstanding risk assessments, visits to offenders and completed risk management plans. Other data indicates the outcomes of the units work. For example, their arrests, the criminal charges and which offenders are in custody. This data helps SOMU managers understand demand levels. It means they can manage offenders according to reliably assessed risk levels, and prioritise work towards high-risk offenders.

The sexual offence management unit team is well trained

All SOMU personnel and managers are trained in the management of sexual offenders and violent offenders (MOSOVO), and trained in the use of ViSOR.

Team managers arrange two continual professional development training days a year. All SOMU personnel get regular training on the force’s priority subjects, such as vulnerability and capturing the VoC. SOMU personnel we spoke with clearly understood their need to focus on safeguarding children.

Much of the SOMU’s work is with other safeguarding organisations. Training courses run by probation officers help to improve SOMU personnel’s understanding of their role in MAPPA, and of subjects such as recalling offenders to prison.

Staff told us this this training helps them to recognise risk and supports them to do their jobs more effectively.

Personnel understand they need to work with digital media specialists

The force doesn’t yet have the capability to remotely monitor RSO’s digital devices and check that offenders aren’t breaching conditions or management orders such as sexual harm prevention orders. But the force has secured funding from the Home Office to provide better digital triage equipment and training in its use.

Currently, SOMU staff contact the force’s enhanced digital investigation unit to monitor and check offenders’ digital devices. SOMU personnel told us the digital investigation staff are helpful and will adapt their working hours to help offender managers complete effective visits to offenders’ addresses.

The force’s DFU understands the importance of SOMU work in safeguarding children. They fast-track examinations of devices seized by SOMU investigators when offenders are arrested and in custody. This helps with gathering good evidence so that offenders can be charged at an early stage and remanded to court in custody.

Offender managers and their supervisors have improved their practice

The SOMU supervisors routinely quality assure ViSOR records. They check the records’ accuracy and make sure they are maintained in line with the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice. The supervisors share their findings with staff to help improve record-keeping skills.

MOSOVO personnel now use the ViSOR system more effectively. They record actions correctly, and supervisors check these records are comprehensive. Offender managers record intelligence about offenders on both ViSOR and the force’s wider systems. This makes sure that frontline responders can access this information to help them manage risk.

The unit’s reactive management practice now adheres to authorised professional practice. This means offenders with civil orders in place are no longer inappropriately placed under reactive management. An annual review process is in place for every offender in reactive management.

To refer concerns about offenders who have access to children to children’s services, staff complete a Person of Risk to Children form. Information about any related safeguarding activity is also recorded on the force’s own systems.

All RSOs are flagged on the force’s systems to alert the wider workforce to the risks posed by that offender. This helps other officers to identify these offenders and pass on information about their activities to SOMU for additional risk assessment.

SOMU personnel use information from the police national database when making risk assessments for all new offenders and for those becoming residents in the force’s area. This includes any short-term or transient RSOs. This practice allows the offender managers to access information about an offender’s previous activity in other areas of the country and improves the quality of their risk management decisions.

Positively, the force supports the well-being of SOMU personnel through mandatory in-person occupational health appointments. Staff can also self-refer themselves to these support services.

It is clear to us that the force has made substantial improvements to its arrangements to manage sex offenders. SOMU supervisors are effective and use accurate management information to set priorities and inform decisions. High levels of unassessed risk and case management backlogs are now dealt with. All SOMU personnel receive relevant and good quality training. This supports effective practice. The team operates in accordance with authorised professional practice.

These improvements mean the force has met our recommendation.

11. Police detention

Police detention: Recommendation from the 2021 inspection report

We recommend that within three months Staffordshire Police engages with its safeguarding partners and reviews the effectiveness of arrangements for children in police detention. This should include:

• providing training for all custody staff so they fully understand their safeguarding responsibilities;
• the timely provision of appropriate adults for detained children;
• ensuring that every detained child is seen promptly by a health care professional;
• ensuring children’s services are notified about every detained child;
• making early assessments of the need for alternative accommodation (secure or otherwise) for every detained child; and
• an escalation process for cases when alternative accommodation isn’t readily available.

Police detention: Re-inspection findings

Officers understand that detained children are vulnerable and only arrest them when absolutely necessary

The force encourages its officers to use alternatives to arresting children. It tries to divert children away from the criminal justice system where possible. Custody staff advise officers who are considering arresting children about other ways to deal with them. And they help officers to assess whether arrest is necessary or not.

The two custody facilities in Staffordshire have specially designed discreet areas for receiving child detainees. If these areas aren’t used, the custody officer will record the reasons why not. Staff in the facilities support children’s needs by giving them child-friendly meals and distraction items.

Custody officers use a separate child-centric risk assessment for children entering police detention. This prompts custody officers to consider the welfare of the child when considering the need to detain them.

The force’s senior leaders are told about any children detained overnight in the daily management meeting.

The force routinely collects data about children in custody. Custody managers told us they use this data and case examples to highlight emerging issues and problems in multi-agency children and young person’s meetings.

Detained children receive help and support from specialists, but appropriate adults don’t always arrive promptly

All detained children are seen by specialists from non-police organisations who support and help them while they are in custody. Every detained child is seen by health care professionals, liaison and diversion staff, and workers from the specialist child-focused charity, Catch22.

Children detained in the force’s area don’t always receive early support from an appropriate adult. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 codes of practice state police should ask appropriate adults to come to the custody facility as soon as possible, and appropriate adults should arrive without delay to advocate for the child’s welfare needs, rights and entitlements. But in some cases we examined, there were long delays before an appropriate adult arrived.

The force records the timeliness of its calls for appropriate adults. On average it takes officers one hour to call appropriate adults, and three hours for them to attend. But in our audits we found three cases where appropriate adults didn’t attend for 12 hours, nine hours and four hours.

The force is inconsistent in making referrals to the local authority for children detained in custody

The force has given its custody staff vulnerability and child protection training. Frontline and specialist investigating officers are also trained to record the VoC and make referrals to get help for vulnerable children.

But we found that, despite this training and a child-centric custody risk assessment, custody personnel weren’t consistently recording the VoC.

We also found that officers weren’t consistently recording concerns about the risks to detained children or information about their vulnerabilities. Nor were they recording details about the children’s ethnicity and cultural heritage. This information should be recorded on PPNs and referred to the local authority. But PPNs aren’t always completed for all children in custody. So the local authorities and staff from criminal justice partnerships such as the Youth Offending Service may not be aware of the arrest and important information about the child.

One detained child told custody personnel that he was addicted to cannabis, and he threatened suicide. A PPN about the child was submitted, but it didn’t reflect these significant risks and they weren’t flagged on force’s intelligence system.

The force doesn’t have a clear and systematic practice for recording information about detained children’s risk and vulnerability, or for making referrals for these children.

The force doesn’t consistently review the need to detain children

Some inspectors complete their reviews of a child’s detention without seeing or speaking to them. We found this was often the case where a child was in police custody overnight. We saw one example where three separate reviews didn’t include seeing the child. It meant inspectors didn’t seek the VoC and so it wasn’t taken into consideration. This means the effects of being in custody on the child’s welfare wasn’t properly balanced against the need for continued detention.

Custody officers don’t consistently record the reasons why they refuse bail to children and why it is necessary to keep them in police detention before their first court appearance. They are inconsistent in completing certificates of juvenile detention. This indicates that the force’s custody officers don’t fully understand the statutory guidance in the concordat on children in custody. This document also describes the thresholds for requesting alternative accommodation from the local authority.

The local authority is responsible for giving suitable alternative accommodation to a child charged with offences and denied bail. Only in exceptional circumstances is this not in a child’s best interest (for example, if bad weather makes it impossible to transport them). In rare cases, such as when a child is at high risk of causing serious harm to others, they may need secure accommodation.

But custody officers don’t always challenge the local authority when requests for alternative accommodation for detained children are refused or it isn’t available. We saw a situation where a child was detained for an offence against his mother. She was told to find the child alternative accommodation. The custody officer didn’t challenge children’s services, and the child was detained overnight to appear in court.

Some improvements have been made to the way the force responds to children in custody. But further improvements are needed before the recommendation is met in full.

Conclusion

The overall effectiveness of the force and its arrangements for children who need help and protection

Staffordshire Police has made progress in some of the areas where we made recommendations after our 2021 inspection. These improvements are mostly in the force’s governance and specialist support arrangements. The force should continue to consolidate this improved practice, including developing qualitative performance information.

But in other areas, we found that further improvement is still needed. This is the case particularly in the quality of child protection investigations, where we found that officers and supervisors aren’t focused enough on effective investigations to safeguard children and bring offenders to justice. FCC processes and decisions aren’t consistently getting the right help at the right time to vulnerable missing children and children at risk from domestic abuse. Some of the force’s information sharing and risk assessment processes are inefficient, ineffective, and confused.

Underlying this lack of improvement is ineffective supervision. The force has clear policies, and it trains its workforce to capture the VoC and record information about children’s ethnicity and cultural heritage. But police personnel still don’t routinely record this information on the force’s systems. Supervisors and managers don’t rectify the situation as they should. This needs to be addressed as a priority by the senior leadership. We have issued a further recommendation as a result.

Next steps

Within six weeks of the publication of this report, Staffordshire Police should provide an updated action plan setting out how it intends to incorporate the findings of this re‑inspection into its ongoing work to respond to the recommendations in the inspection report that we published in April 2022.

Annex A – Child protection inspection methodology

Objectives

The objectives of the inspection are:

• to assess how effectively police forces safeguard children at risk;
• to make recommendations to police forces for improving child protection practice;
• to highlight effective practice in child protection work; and
• to drive improvements in forces’ child protection practices.

The expectations of organisations are set out in the statutory guidance Working together to safeguard children: a guide to interagency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.

The specific police roles set out in the guidance are:

• the identification of children who might be at risk from abuse and neglect;
• investigation of alleged offences against children;
• inter-agency working and information sharing to protect children; and
• the exercise of emergency powers to protect children.

These areas of practice are the focus of the inspection.

Inspection approach

Inspections focus on the experience of, and outcomes for, children following their journey through the child protection and criminal investigation processes. They assess how well the police service has helped and protected children and investigated alleged criminal acts, taking account of, but not measuring compliance with, policies and guidance.

The inspections consider how the arrangements for protecting children, and the leadership and management of the police service, contribute to and support effective practice on the ground. The team considers how well management responsibilities for child protection, as set out in the statutory guidance, have been met.

Methods

• Self-assessment of practice, and of management and leadership.
• Case inspections.
• Discussions with officers and staff from within the police and from other organisations.
• Examination of reports on significant case reviews or other serious cases.
• Examination of service statistics, reports, policies and other relevant written materials.

The purpose of the self-assessment is to:

• raise awareness in the service about the strengths and weaknesses of current practice (this forms the basis for discussions with HMICFRS); and
• initiate future service improvements and establish a baseline against which to measure progress.

Self-assessment and case inspection

In consultation with police services, the following areas of practice have been identified for scrutiny:

• domestic abuse;
• incidents in which police personnel identify children who are in need of help and protection (for example, children being neglected);
• information sharing and discussions about children who are potentially at risk of harm;
• the exercising of powers of police protection under section 46 of the Children Act 1989 (taking children into a ‘place of safety’);
• the completion of section 47 Children Act 1989 enquiries, including both those of a criminal nature and those of a non-criminal nature (section 47 enquiries are those relating to a child ‘in need’ rather than ‘at risk’);
• sex offender management;
• the management of missing children;
• child sexual exploitation; and
• the detention of children in police custody.

Back to publication

Staffordshire – National child protection re‑inspection