An inspection of South Wales Fire and Rescue Service: Effectiveness, efficiency and people

Background to our inspection

Following the publication on 3 January 2024 of the independent review by Fenella Morris KC on the culture and values of South Wales Fire and Rescue Service (independent culture review), the Welsh Government used its powers of direction under section 29(5) and (6) of the Local Government (Wales) Measure 2009. It removed the elected members from the governance functions of the fire and rescue authority and appointed four commissioners.

The commissioners are responsible for making sure the recommendations from the independent culture review, and from other thematic reviews by the fire and rescue adviser to the Welsh Government, are fully implemented where possible. They are also responsible for making sure that these recommendations are implemented in a way that can be sustained.

On 4 July 2024, the commissioners asked HM Chief Inspector of Fire and Rescue Services for assistance, in line with powers under Schedule A3 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, in carrying out a full inspection of the efficiency and effectiveness of South Wales Fire and Rescue Service.

We already have an established inspection methodology for fire and rescue services in England. We considered and applied any appropriate adjustments to our existing methodology for the context of South Wales Fire and Rescue Service.

We have assessed:

• the operational service it provides to the public, including the effectiveness of its prevention, protection and response activities;
• the service’s efficiency, including how well it provides value for money, allocates resources to match risk, and collaborates with other emergency services; and
• how well the service looks after its people, including promoting service values and culture, training its staff and making sure they have the skills they need, ensuring fairness and promoting diversity in the workforce, and developing leadership and service capability.

This report sets out our inspection findings for South Wales Fire and Rescue Service.

Read more information on how we assess fire and rescue services.

Terminology in this report

Our reports contain references to, among other things, ‘national’ definitions, priorities, policies, systems, responsibilities and processes.

In some instances, ‘national’ means applying to England and Wales. In others, it means applying to England, Wales and Scotland, or the whole of the United Kingdom. Where ‘national’ applies to Wales only, we have specified this in the relevant part of the report.

HMI summary

His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services hasn’t previously carried out an inspection of South Wales Fire and Rescue Service, so it was a privilege to be invited to inspect it, and it was a pleasure to visit.

I would like to thank all those who contributed to or helped us with this inspection. I understand that the service has been the subject of various reviews recently, the results of which may have been difficult to hear. I am grateful for the positive and constructive way in which South Wales Fire and Rescue staff worked with our inspection team.

In our inspections, if we identify a serious, critical or systemic shortcoming in a service’s practice, policy or performance, we report it as a cause of concern.

Sadly, I have concerns about the service’s performance in keeping people safe and secure from fire and other risks. In particular, I have concerns about the effectiveness of its strategies for making sure its activities consistently identify, prioritise and mitigate risks for the public. I am also concerned that it doesn’t have effective systems and processes in place to gather and record relevant and up‑to‑date risk information to help protect firefighters, the public and property during emergencies.

The service’s protection department has some positive aspects, but I also have concerns about the way in which it operates – specifically, how it prioritises activity based on risk, and using a systematic approach to reviewing fire safety compliance in non-domestic premises. It also needs to make sure it has the right resources in place to carry out its work.

I am encouraged that the service has invested in and developed a transformation programme, which will help it manage the amount of change it needs to make.

In view of these findings, I have been in contact with the chief fire officer and commissioners as I don’t underestimate how much improvement is needed. I am encouraged by the commitment they have shown to improving matters.

Roy Wilsher

HM Inspector of Fire & Rescue Services

Service in numbers

Understanding the risk of fire and other emergencies

Each fire and rescue service should identify and assess all foreseeable fire and rescue-related risks that could affect its communities. It should use its protection and response capabilities to prevent or mitigate these risks for the public.

We set out our detailed findings below.

Main findings

The strategic plan sets out the service’s long-term strategy

The service has a ten-year strategic plan, which sets out its long-term strategy. It consists of eight themes:

1. Keeping you safe – focusing on prevention work.
2. Responding to your emergency – ensuring a quick and effective response.
3. Working with partners – working with public service boards and others to deliver what communities need.
4. Engaging and communicating – ensuring all communities and staff are involved in providing an excellent service.
5. Protecting and enhancing the environment – carrying out activities in a sustainable way.
6. Using technology well – using technology to improve service.
7. Valuing people – supporting a diverse, well-trained and motivated workforce, which represents its communities.
8. Continuing to work effectively – ensuring value for money and accountability.

Before updating its strategic plan, the service produces an annual improvement plan. It uses this to review the impact of improvement activities over the previous year. It holds a public consultation about its proposed plans for the year ahead. It then uses the outcome of the consultation to inform the way it updates the strategic plan.

As part of its planning process, the service has assessed some risks and threats. When assessing risk, it uses information it has collected from internal and external sources and datasets. The improvement plan states that the service considers data to understand some of its local risks. That includes census, NHS Open Exeter and Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation data, as well as the service’s own incident data.

When appropriate, the service has consulted and held constructive dialogue with its communities and other relevant parties to understand risk and explain how it intends to mitigate it. For example, the service works with public service boards and partners such as a water rescue charity, health services and housing organisations to understand community risk.

There are no approved prevention, protection or response strategies in place to make sure the service carries out its strategic plan consistently, or in a way that prioritises risk

The service’s strategic plan isn’t underpinned by departmental strategies. Without strategies in prevention, protection and response, there is limited detail explaining how the service intends to achieve its aims. This results in a lack of direction, focus and prioritisation. The service doesn’t always prioritise local outcomes by risk.

The service’s improvement plan states that each of the service’s 47 fire stations produces annual community risk management plans (CRMPs). These plans should identify local risks and prioritise service activity based on communities’ needs. The CRMPs should clearly link to and support the service’s strategic priorities. However, we found that CRMPs aren’t always in place and are inconsistent in how effective they are at identifying local risks and priorities, and how operational work links to the overarching strategy.

The service needs to improve how it identifies, gathers and maintains risk information

Various teams in the service are involved in maintaining risk information. The service told us its building risk reduction group sets the types of premises for which the service must gather risk information. The risk management team then co-ordinates the gathering of site-specific risk information (SSRI). That team advises station staff on what SSRI they need to gather. Once staff have gathered the SSRI, the information is returned to the risk management team. Members of that team upload the record to the mobile data terminals (located in fire engines) for operational staff to access.

The service told us that in 2023/24, it carried out 342 visits to make sure firefighters were familiar with commercial properties in their station area. This is 21.2 percent of the sites (1,611) that it considers for these visits. There is no target for the number or frequency of visits.

Some staff told us that the service needed to improve its approach to making sure it robustly identified the information it gathered and prioritised it by risk. There is a lack of central oversight, which means it isn’t clear how quickly the service reviews risk information. There are no performance indicators to make sure the service updates SSRI records on time. The lack of a risk-based process to inform how often reviews take place means that the decision is based on the professional judgment of the person carrying out the review.

We also found little evidence of the service systematically carrying out any quality assurance. Some of the information we reviewed was limited, inaccurate or out of date. For example, some of the records that we examined for high-risk sites were overdue a review, and some records didn’t contain an adequate level of risk information. Some staff told us that the process was confusing. Some also said they hadn’t had enough training on gathering risk information.

We found some evidence of protection, prevention and response teams sharing risk information to help bring about a common understanding of risk. Staff can use a referral process. They can also share information through operational working groups. However, some staff told us the service needed to make improvements to make sure information-sharing happened in a consistent and robust way between all departments, including fire control.

We found that the service could improve its processes for recording and sharing short‑term (dynamic) and urgent risk information. This type of risk information can come from sources such as the resilience and planning team, fire control and/or the community safety team. Fire control issues a ‘flash’ message in its mobilising system to alert operators to any short-term and/or urgent risk information. This can then be passed to operational staff responding to an incident.

It isn’t clear how the service assures itself that all information is consistently recorded, shared and reviewed.

Staff at the locations we visited, including firefighters and fire control staff, were able to show us that they could access, use and share risk information, when it was available, to help them resolve incidents safely.

The service should improve the way it uses information from operational activity to inform planning, risk assessments and fire cover arrangements

The service told us it hadn’t carried out a review of its fire cover arrangements since 2011. At the time of our inspection, it had no documented degradation policy. It uses a ‘static’ approach involving seven key stations that must be available at all times. However, it didn’t give us a rationale as to how it chose those seven stations.

This means the service can’t be sure that its planning assumptions, risk assessments and fire cover arrangements are up to date, effective and efficient. The service recognises that it needs to make improvements in this area. It aims to introduce a dynamic resourcing system, which it will use to give an updated view based on risk data and information.

We found limited evidence that the service learns from and acts on feedback from either local or national operational activity. It is unclear how well the service carries out its ‘learning evaluation after a fire’ (known as LEAF). Staff don’t always know what learning the service has identified as a result of evaluation.

There is an organisational learning process in place, but the service doesn’t consistently follow it. We found little evidence that the service examined outcomes and used them to improve its operational response, or that it always shared those outcomes across the service.

We found evidence that staff were involved in exercises to familiarise themselves with risk in their station area, but these exercises weren’t routinely structured, and they weren’t consistent throughout the service.

The service has risk registers in place to monitor significant risks

The service has departmental risk registers in place to monitor significant risks that emerge from and affect one or more departments. It monitors any service-wide risks through the strategic risk register.

When we reviewed the registers, we found that some risks in departmental risk registers were strategic, rather than department-specific. These included risks relating to staff health and well-being, and postal address updates used to underpin various key information systems. Some risks, such as staff retention, aren’t listed in the registers.

We found that some of the detail in the registers was unclear. In the strategic risk register, an item about marauding terrorist attacks (MTAs) wasn’t clear as to whether it referred to the service’s MTA capability or an attack on the service’s headquarters. We also found a lack of detail about COVID-19 in the risk register. The service should make sure it regularly reviews and updates its risk registers.

Preventing fires and other risks

Fire and rescue services must promote fire safety, including giving fire safety advice. To identify people at greatest risk from fire, services should work closely with other organisations in the public and voluntary sectors, and with the police and ambulance services. They should share intelligence and risk information with these other organisations when they identify vulnerability or exploitation.

Areas for improvement

We set out our detailed findings below.

Main findings

The service needs to develop its prevention strategy

The service doesn’t have a detailed prevention strategy. This means it isn’t clear how the service can make sure its activity aligns with its strategic plan, and how it should prioritise its day-to-day activities. Without a prevention strategy, there is no clear rationale for the level of activity it needs to prevent fires and other risks.

The service told us work was underway to develop a three-year departmental plan, which will clarify how the prevention objectives and outcomes align to the service’s overarching strategic plan.

The service has a large community safety team, which works across each of the ten unitary authorities in the service’s area. Community safety and operational staff in stations carry out prevention work. Station staff develop their own CRMPs using their local knowledge and some data. However, we found that the CRMPs were inconsistently effective at identifying local risks and priorities. We also found that the community safety team didn’t always know about and wasn’t always involved in the prevention activities that station staff carry out, and vice versa.

Good practice and trends identified in one area aren’t always shared with others.

The service doesn’t always prioritise those most at risk

The service carries out a range of interventions. As part of its home safety checks (HSCs), it gives advice about general safety, home fire detection, hoarding, electrical safety, smoking, and carbon monoxide, among other things. The service also takes part in the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) fire safety weeks, giving fire, water and road safety advice in schools and at community events.

The service uses some information and data to target its prevention activity, for example, Census, NHS Open Exeter and Acorn data, as well as its own incident data.

Data published by StatsWales shows that for the year ending 31 March 2024, the service carried out 15,003 HSCs, which is an increase when compared to the 12,308 HSCs it carried out the previous year. It identifies recipients of HSCs through partner referrals and campaigns, as a result of requests from members of the public, and after incidents.

When the service receives a referral, it clearly details the person’s vulnerabilities. It assesses this information, and a member of the home safety team assigns a risk level. The team considers risk factors such as age, mobility, and whether the person lives alone or has been hoarding, among other things. Of the HSCs the service carried out in 2023/24, 77.5 percent (11,629 out of 15,003) had one or more risk factors recorded, and 18.1 percent (2,718 out of 15,003) involved four or more risk factors.

The community safety team carries out HSCs for people with the most complex risks. Local station staff carry out HSCs for those assessed as medium to low risk.

Community safety staff don’t have a target for the number of HSCs they should carry out. Station staff have a target of carrying out 12 HSCs per watch per month. However, not all station staff we spoke to knew about this. The service told us this target was based on funding and capacity, and there was no evidence of risk being a consideration.

Staff also have a target of completing an HSC within 45 days of receiving the referral, irrespective of the risk level. We found evidence showing that although some HSCs were prioritised according to the level of risk associated with the person, some weren’t. In those cases, staff carry out the HSCs chronologically.

As a result, members of the public, including vulnerable people, may not be getting the support they need.

The service needs to improve the way it quality assures HSCs to make sure it completes them to a consistent standard

Staff have the right skills and confidence to carry out HSCs, and some told us about training they had received on first aid, dementia and domestic violence.

There is some evidence of staff quality assuring HSCs, but not all staff involved in prevention activities do this consistently. We analysed a sample of HSC records, and we found variation in the level of detail staff had recorded about the advice they had given. The records also show that not all HSCs are prioritised by risk.

Staff can respond to safeguarding concerns

The service has a process in place to respond to safeguarding concerns. It provides a mandatory safeguarding e-learning module, which all staff should complete. However, when we reviewed a sample of training records, we found that not all staff had completed that training. The service should make sure all its staff complete the mandatory training.

Most staff we interviewed told us they felt confident and trained to act appropriately and promptly. Staff told us about various incidents in which they had taken action. One staff member told us that while carrying out an HSC, they had identified evidence of hoarding. This prompted a referral to a community safety practitioner and social services. Another staff member told us they had made a safeguarding referral after a person had had a family bereavement. This gave much-needed support to a lone parent.

The service works well with partner organisations

The service works with a range of other organisations to prevent fires and other emergencies.

We found evidence that the service routinely refers people at greatest risk to organisations that may better meet their needs. It works effectively with partner organisations to support older people in their homes. For example, it works with the Care & Repair charity, responding to referrals to give advice and carry out adaptations, such as fitting alarm systems or fire-resistant bedding for people who are deaf.

The service also receives HSC referrals from other organisations. Data published by StatsWales shows that in the year to 31 March 2024, 23.6 percent of the HSCs the service carried out (3,544 out of 15,003) were following a referral from another agency.

The service also refers vulnerable people to partner organisations so that they receive the right support. This might include help with benefits, or installing safety aids such as handrails.

It is unclear, however, whether the service uses the insights it gains during its activities to challenge planning assumptions and inform the way it targets prevention activity.

Staff also told us about prevention activities they carried out with partner organisations. These include:

• working with Deliveroo and Cardiff Council on electric bike safety;
• attending local schools across the service’s area to give safety messages; and
• working with Christchurch’s Asian community and Newport City Council to give safety messages to home-schooled children.

The service has initiatives in place to tackle fire-setting and antisocial behaviour

The service has a range of suitable and effective interventions to target and educate people with different needs, including those who show signs of fire-setting behaviour.

The arson reduction team supports operational staff and shares insights with partner organisations, focusing on specific issues that it has identified. The team promotes community safety while working to reduce deliberate fire-setting and attacks on firefighters. For example, around Bonfire Night, it carries out Operation Bang to give the public messages about safety.

The service also works with young people to reduce antisocial behaviour. It runs projects that involve talking to young people and informing them about the dangers of arson and crime. But at the time of our inspection, the service told us it had paused some of this activity due to a lack of resources. The service should review its resource requirements for this work.

The service runs a cadet programme, through which it offers young people the opportunity to develop personal and social skills through activities that promote self‑discipline and teamwork.

Carrying out these activities shows the service’s compliance with the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015.

When appropriate, the service shares information with relevant organisations, such as the police and women’s aid charities, to support the prosecution of arsonists.

The service takes action to promote water safety

Since 2017, flood response and water rescue have been statutory duties for Welsh fire and rescue services. The service works with water safety groups, as well as partner agencies such as local authorities, the police, the coastguard and the Royal National Lifeboat Institution. This allows those organisations to share best practice and to work cohesively to provide education, and to promote safety messages and campaigns.

The service told us it carries out safety campaigns in high-risk areas next to rivers. It also works with charitable water rescue organisations, involving them in public events such as agricultural shows and fire station open days.

Staff in some stations told us they gave water safety advice when visiting schools and attending community events. The service has a water education vehicle, which it can send to local events. The vehicle can simulate what happens to a person in scenarios involving water.

The service also benefits from partnership working with Severn Area Rescue Association, which is a volunteer lifeboat and inland search and rescue charity. This helps the service improve its understanding of the different types of water rescue risks.

The service needs to improve the way it evaluates its prevention activities

Although the service carries out a variety of prevention activities, we found limited evidence that it carried out evaluation to understand:

• how effective its activity is; and
• how it makes sure all its communities get appropriate access to prevention activity that meets their needs.

As a result, the service is missing opportunities to improve its prevention work for the public. The service recognises that it needs to develop the way it evaluates its prevention activities.

Protecting the public through fire regulation

All fire and rescue services should assess fire risks in certain buildings and, when necessary, require building owners to comply with fire safety legislation. Each service decides how many assessments of high-risk premises it does each year. In order to do this, it should have a locally determined, risk-based inspection programme for enforcing the legislation, and to prioritise and focus its audit activity.

We set out our detailed findings below.

Main findings

The service doesn’t have a current risk-based inspection programme

The service doesn’t have an approved protection strategy or risk-based inspection programme. Its strategic plan also lacks detail about the risks the service has identified, and how it plans to target them. The service has no clear view of the level of activity it needs in order to inspect, regulate and enforce fire safety, or how it should prioritise its day-to-day activities.

The service carries out very few audits of self-defined high-risk premises. Data provided by the service shows that as at 31 March 2024, it had audited 4.9 percent of the high-risk premises in its area (341 out of 6,932).

However, the service has reduced the proportion of audits with a ‘no further action’ result. Data published by StatsWales shows that in 2023/24, the service carried out 625 fire safety audits. Of these, 16.8 percent (105 out of 625) resulted in no further action, compared with 21.8 percent (143 out of 655) the previous year.

We found that the service didn’t consistently audit or target buildings based on risk. It is also unclear what timescales the service is working towards. It uses a SharePoint system to store protection records, but it doesn’t have an automated system to prioritise inspections based on risk.

Due to the lack of an effective system, the service relies on a manual process to prioritise its inspection activity. It considers factors such as the type of building, and historic information. However, the information isn’t always accurate so staff use professional judgment.

During our inspection, we reviewed a sample of audit records. We found evidence of an inadequate re-inspection schedule for sleeping accommodation. For example, records for a hotel showed that ten years had passed between audits.

We also found evidence that the service didn’t appropriately audit newly registered care homes quickly enough. For example, a new care home received an audit from the service five years after it had been registered.

The service hadn’t carried out any fire safety activity in relation to industrial premises that had previously had a significant fire that resulted in one fatality.

We found that after a fire, the service didn’t routinely carry out post-incident fire safety inspections or audits at premises covered by the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. We couldn’t find any records associated with three properties in which fires had occurred since 2022.

We found no records of post-fire audits taking place, or records from the duty desk officer or other fire safety inspector confirming what decisions had been taken after a fire.

The service’s inspection process is labour-intensive. This is because of the lack of an effective risk-based process and management information system to prioritise inspections, including revisit activity. Most importantly, the service may be missing some high-risk premises that it needs to audit.

Protection work happens in isolation, rather than across the whole service. We found limited evidence that the service’s firefighters identified safety concerns about premises to the protection team when they responded to an incident or carried out a site-specific risk visit.

The service told us it had started a pilot at six stations in which operational staff carried out checks at small commercial premises. But we found that staff at some of the stations involved didn’t know about it and weren’t actively participating in the pilot.

We also found that some business fire safety inspection officers didn’t know about activity taking place as part of the service’s high-rise working group. They also don’t know about the associated recommendations, or which buildings are involved. The service should improve the way it communicates this group’s progress.

Fire safety audit records are of an acceptable standard

We reviewed a range of audits that the service had carried out at buildings across its area. These included audits:

• after fires at premises where fire safety legislation applies;
• after enforcement action had been taken; and
• at high-rise, high-risk buildings.

The audits we reviewed were completed to a high standard in a consistent, systematic way and in line with the service’s policies.

We found some evidence that the service made relevant information from its audits available to operational teams and fire control operators. Protection officers are assigned to stations to keep them informed about protection-related matters. However, it isn’t clear how effective this system is. Some staff told us that fire control no longer received a notification when the service served enforcement notices on premises. This means it can’t pass on all the relevant information to staff responding to an incident.

The service quality assures fire safety audits

The service carries out proportionate quality assurance of its protection activity. It has a robust quality assurance process in place for carrying out audits and issuing letters and notices.

We reviewed several fire safety files and found that appropriate quality assurance was taking place. We found evidence that line managers reviewed audits, associated correspondence and notices.

The service takes appropriate enforcement action

The service uses its full range of enforcement powers, and when appropriate, it prosecutes those who don’t comply with fire safety regulations.

In the year ending 31 March 2024, the service issued 429 informal notifications, 82 enforcement notices and 9 prohibition notices, and it carried out 1 prosecution. In the five years from 2019/20 to 2023/24, it carried out ten prosecutions.

Staff told us that the protection team worked with other regulatory bodies such as the South Wales enforcement group, safety advisory groups, the police and building control.

We also found evidence of the service effectively monitoring enforcement notices. It has a process to revisit premises that have been subject to enforcement action. The compliance team carries out regular case reviews, and the service has access to an independent barrister who specialises in fire law.

However, there is no formal arrangement in place for competent inspectors to be available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to give enforcement advice and to take action when needed. At the time of our inspection, this work was being done on an informal rota basis.

The service needs to make sure it has enough suitably qualified staff to meet its fire safety requirements

Staff get the right training and work to appropriate accreditation. Inspecting officers are trained to the level 4 diploma in fire safety, which they need in order to carry out audits at high-risk premises. The protection staff we spoke to were mainly positive about the training they received.

However, the service doesn’t have enough qualified protection staff to visit and carry out audits at all its high-risk properties. In September 2024, 50 percent of protection officers (19 out of 38) held a level 4 diploma in fire safety.

The service told us that the lack of suitably qualified staff contributed to a backlog of building consultation requests. It said the lack of staff also meant the service couldn’t actively work on primary authority schemes (PASs). The service also acknowledges it needs more staff so it can address problems with data quality issues in its protection records.

The service doesn’t have a workforce plan. This means it is unclear how the service can be sure it has enough staff. It also lacks appropriate training and succession plans to deal with future demand. More detail about workforce plans can be found in the ‘Getting the right people with the right skills’ section of this report.

The service needs to be clear about how it will meet its high-rise audit requirements

The Building Safety Act 2022 was introduced to bring about better regulation and management of tall buildings. The service’s strategic plan states that a working forum has been established with the Welsh Government, fire engineers and other Welsh fire and rescue services to produce a risk-based inspection programme for high-rise buildings. However, the plan has no detail about what the service expects the programme to deliver, or by when.

At the time of our inspection, the service told us it was in phase three of auditing the high-rise buildings in its area. The purpose of the audits is to make sure building owners know about deficiencies and their responsibilities to rectify them.

The service has a list of premises that have received intrusive remediation surveys. It told us it would carry out audits of these properties as a priority. However, it couldn’t give us a timeline for carrying out this work. This was due to the challenge of balancing resources, capability and other work. The service couldn’t be clear about what progress it had made on phase three of its audit programme.

The service has also recorded risk information and floor plans for high-rise buildings, which operational staff can use. However, when we reviewed a sample of that risk information, we found that it was available for some but not all high-rise buildings.

The service works effectively with other enforcement agencies

The service works closely with other enforcement agencies to regulate fire safety, and it routinely exchanges risk information with them. It carries out audits with partners such as local authorities and the Welsh Government.

We reviewed several fire safety files and found that the service appropriately informed external agencies, such as local authority building control and Care Inspectorate Wales, about enforcement action it had carried out on premises that might come under their control. We also found evidence of the service taking joint enforcement action with the police and local authorities.

The service needs to improve its response to building consultation requests

The service doesn’t always respond to building consultations on time. This means it doesn’t consistently meet its statutory responsibility to comment on fire safety arrangements at new and altered buildings.

In 2023/24, the service responded to 71.5 percent of building consultations (804 out of 1,125) within the required time frame. This is a reduction when compared to 2022/23, when it responded to 94.1 percent of building consultations (1,186 out of 1,260) within the required time frame.

The service told us that staff moves and retirements had meant that having the right resources in place to deal with these requests had been a challenge. At the time of our inspection, the service had distributed this work to all qualified staff.

The service could do more to work with local businesses

The service could do more to work with local businesses and other organisations to promote compliance with fire safety legislation. The service told us it had four PASs, which gave advice to large and small businesses about compliance with fire safety legislation. The Community Housing Cymru PAS works well, and the service works with several housing associations because of this scheme. However, other PASs aren’t effective, and generate little activity.

Aside from the work of the PASs, work with businesses is ad hoc. The service signposts employers to information on its website.

The service plans to reduce unwanted fire signals

The service has been slow to reduce the number of unwanted fire signals. At the time of our inspection, the service attended all automatic fire alarms, unless a responsible person or the alarm receiving centre confirmed that there was no fire. In 2023/24, the service didn’t attend 21.9 percent of automatic fire alarms.

Local station commanders work on identifying and resolving problems with repeat alarms. If issues persist, the business fire safety team may then carry out further communication, audits, and informal or formal enforcement action. Despite this work, the number of false alarms the service attends has increased. Data published by StatsWales shows that in 2023/24, the service attended 8,874 false alarms, compared to 8,347 the previous year.

This means fire engines may not be available to respond to genuine incidents because they are attending false alarms. It also creates a risk to the public if more fire engines travel at high speed on the roads to respond to these incidents.

The service told us it was planning to introduce a new policy on unwanted fire signals in early 2025.

Responding to fires and other emergencies

Fire and rescue services must be able to respond to a range of incidents such as fires, road traffic collisions and other emergencies in their areas.

We set out our detailed findings below.

Main findings

The service needs to improve the way it oversees response performance, in accordance with its strategic plan

The service’s strategic plan update, which it published in April 2024, states that the service measures progress on responding quickly and effectively through the calls it receives, the incidents it attends, recruitment, and training and development activities. While these elements might help the service measure effectiveness, it isn’t clear how the service uses them to measure the timeliness of its response.

There are no national response standards of performance for the public, and the service hasn’t defined or published its own. Data we received from the Welsh Government showed that in 2022/23, the service’s average response time to primary fires (calculated by comparing the time of the call to the time the first vehicle arrived at the incident) was 10 minutes and 59 seconds. This is longer than its average response time to primary fires in 2021/22, which was 10 minutes and 32 seconds.

We found that the service didn’t oversee or manage performance in relation to call‑handling times in fire control. The emphasis is on the quality of the call, rather than how long the call lasts. When we analysed a sample of call logs, we found some evidence of calls lasting a long time, with no rationale for why this happened.

The service monitors the response times of on-call fire engines, but not those of wholetime resources. The service told us it had recently put in place scrutiny of all response times. Every two months, it holds a meeting to discuss the length of time it takes fire control to answer calls, how long it takes to mobilise fire engines, how long firefighters spend at incidents, and other response matters. It also told us it was developing more ways of using data to inform its response performance.

The service has a pre-determined attendance (PDA) model, which details the resources it needs to mobilise for each type of incident. This includes the number of fire engines and specialist equipment it might need. The service doesn’t routinely review all its PDAs, but we found evidence of it making changes when it identified a need from operational learning or staff. For example, the service told us that it had increased the number of fire engines that attended incidents at high-rise buildings.

The service needs to improve the availability of its on-call resources

To support its response strategy, the service should aim to have a specific number of fire engines available at any given time. At the time of our inspection, it didn’t have an approved response strategy, although it did provide a draft version. The draft version included an objective for the service to make sure stations maintained a minimum of 70 percent on-call firefighter availability.

The service has 20 wholetime stations, 9 of which also have an on-call complement. There are 27 on-call stations. Wholetime availability for each of the past three years remains static at 99.1 percent. In 2023/24, on-call availability was 68.5 percent, a reduction from 71.2 percent in 2022/23.

The service has a central crewing team, which manages the operational resources in fire stations. The on-call support team, made up of wholetime staff, can support on-call availability when there are significant shortages.

On-call availability is one of the highest risks included in the service’s strategic risk register. The service recognises that it needs to do all it can to improve on-call availability.

Staff have a good understanding of how to command incidents

The service has trained incident commanders. This helps it safely, assertively and effectively manage the whole range of incidents it could face, from small and routine ones to complex, multi-agency incidents.

The service told us that for the past 3 years, 100 percent of level 1, 2 and 3 incident commanders have been accredited within date. Seven people in the service are Wales gold (multi-agency gold incident command) accredited.

As part of our inspection, we interviewed incident commanders from across the service. Most of them could confidently explain how they completed risk assessments, made decisions and recorded information at incidents in line with national best practice. Staff also understand operational discretion and are familiar with the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP).

When we reviewed a sample of incident logs, we found that incident commanders were sending timely and informative messages. However, none of the logs we reviewed had been completed consistently using the M/ETHANE methodology. Many of the informative messages lacked information such as the name of the incident commander and the use of tactical modes. The service should make sure it structures messages appropriately and that it consistently records the relevant information. This will allow it to share that information with other agencies when needed.

Fire control staff are involved in training, exercises and debriefs

The service operates a joint fire control, which is made up of staff from South Wales Fire and Rescue Service and Mid and West Wales Fire and Rescue Service. All fire control staff handle 999 calls and mobilise vehicles and equipment for both services. Fire control staff are trained using the NFCC’s national occupational standards.

We found some evidence that the service’s fire control staff were integrated into its command, training, exercise and debrief activity. The service invites fire control staff to attend debriefs virtually or in person. For example, fire control staff had recently contributed to debriefs following a large fire at a car dealership and an explosion on an industrial estate. When necessary, fire control can also request that the service carries out a debrief.

Some fire control staff also told us that they had been involved in high-rise and multi‑agency exercises, but others said they hadn’t.

The service needs to improve the risk information and general information it uses to support staff responding to incidents

We found that most operational staff could access risk information via mobile data terminals in fire engines. However, when we reviewed a sample of risk information, including information for firefighters responding to incidents at high-risk, high-rise buildings, we found that some information was limited, inaccurate or out of date. The service’s draft response strategy cites an objective to make sure all operational firefighters have timely access to current risk-based information.

We also found that risk information about buildings was available to fire control staff on the command and control system. However, it doesn’t include information such as internal floor plans or tactical plans. The service told us that hard-copy tactical plans were available in the fire control room. This may cause problems in making sure updates to the hard and electronic copies are consistent.

Fire control operators use a suite of general information notes, which give guidance to support the service’s response. For example, this guidance may include the types and locations of vehicles and equipment, as well as hazards and staff contact numbers. However, we found that the service didn’t always review and update general information notes quickly enough. This is because of a lack of staff capacity. The service knows about this and told us it planned to reintroduce staff to address the issue.

The service needs to improve the way it learns from operational incidents, and the way it aligns with national operational guidance

The service’s debrief policy details its approach to learning from operational activity. It can carry out debriefs about operational incidents or exercises, or service initiatives or workstreams. There are structured debriefs and standard debriefs, including hot debriefs. The complexity, impact or scale of the event determines the type of debrief.

As part of the inspection, we reviewed debriefs on a range of emergency incidents, including:

• a large commercial fire – we found no feedback or evidence of a debrief;
• a house fire – we found that feedback from an operational assurance officer who attended the incident identified a missed hazard of loose brickwork, but we found no evidence that the service acted on this;
• an incident involving hazardous materials – we found no debrief, but a themed incident report was completed; and
• an explosion at a commercial property – a structured debrief was completed, which included recommendations, but evidence of a follow-up was incomplete.

Most staff we spoke to told us the service carried out a hot debrief after an incident.

The debrief policy is unclear about how the service communicates learning to staff. Not all staff could remember the service sharing information after a debrief, but some staff gave us examples of this – for example, the service sharing safety messages about asbestos contamination and stowing water kits on fire engines. After debriefs, the service should make sure all staff can understand what it has identified and what action it has taken as a result.

We were disappointed to find that the service didn’t always act on learning it had identified, or should have identified, from incidents. This means it doesn’t always update internal risk information after an incident. It also means it isn’t routinely improving its service to the public.

The service has a dedicated lead for dealing with learning from other fire and rescue services, and operational learning the service gathers from emergency service partners. However, we found only limited evidence that the service contributed to and acted on this learning.

The service’s recent draft response strategy states that it will create a structured post‑incident review framework, through which it will record learning from incidents and exercises. It says the framework will involve using data and insights to inform training, improve operational procedures, and share best practice service-wide. This will be underpinned by clear pathways for integrating lessons learned into policy updates and training.

So that staff command incidents in line with national operational guidance (NOG), the service has carried out gap analysis of some of its policies and procedures, comparing them with NOG. However, despite the analysis showing that the service was aligned with NOG on two-yearly assessments of incident commanders, we found that this wasn’t the case. The service subsequently told us it will be moving to a two-yearly revalidation period.

Together with Mid and West Wales Fire and Rescue Service, the service has also carried out NOG gap analysis of its fire control policies and procedures. This analysis showed them to be compliant. However, the service told us it hadn’t yet put in place guidance about contacting multiple people at risk to inform them about a change of advice, or about evacuation during an incident at a high-rise property.

The service acknowledges that it needs to do more work to review its alignment with NOG.

The service recognises that it needs to improve the way it communicates with the public

The service has some systems in place to inform the public about ongoing incidents and help keep them safe during and after incidents. For example, it shares information in co-operation with and under principles agreed by the local resilience forum. It also uses social media to give safety messages.

The service has given some managers media training to help them give information to the public.

The service has a dedicated communication and engagement project. Staff have identified the need to improve the way the service tells the public about ongoing incidents.

Responding to major and multi-agency incidents

All fire and rescue services must be able to respond effectively to multi-agency and cross-border incidents. This means working with other fire and rescue services and blue light services.

We set out our detailed findings below.

Main findings

The service needs to improve the way it identifies risks, and shares risk information with neighbouring services

The service has anticipated and considered the foreseeable risks and threats it may face. These risks are listed in both local and Welsh national risk registers. For example, the service has plans to deal with wildfires and flooding.

However, the service needs to improve the way it communicates information about the significant risks in neighbouring fire and rescue services, which it might ask staff to respond to in an emergency. The service has limited capability in place to share risk information with neighbouring services. It does this reactively, when incidents occur.

Firefighters can’t access cross-border risk information via the mobile data terminals in fire engines. The service knows about this issue and plans to address it, but progress is slow.

The service told us it hadn’t completed all its multi-agency site-specific response plans. This work is underway, but there is no timescale for completion.

The service needs to complete staff training for incidents in tall buildings, and introduce its standard operating procedure and processes

During our inspection, we assessed the way the service had collected risk information for tall buildings and how well prepared it was to respond to a major incident at a tall building, such as the tragedy at Grenfell Tower.

The service told us it had fitted all high-rise properties with a ‘premises information box’, which contains information about the block, the evacuation strategy, and firefighting information. We also found that the service had reviewed its PDA for high‑rise residential premises and sent more fire engines to high-rise buildings fitted with aluminium composite material cladding. However, when we reviewed a sample of risk information for high-rise buildings, we found that it was available in some but not all instances.

The service told us it was in the process of giving staff training about high-rise buildings. We found that some staff had completed it and others hadn’t.

We found evidence of some staff taking part in high-rise exercises. For example, at a high-rise property in Cardiff Gate, crews showed fire control staff the layout for the bridgehead (the position where firefighters are carrying out firefighting operations) and talked through an incident to give them a better understanding. Some firefighters told us they had attended an exercise on using new smoke screens at a disused high‑rise building. Some other staff told us about an exercise at a local university, as well as a high-rise exercise with North Wales Fire and Rescue Service.

The service told us it was still in the process of developing its standard operating procedure for safely managing incidents in high-rise buildings. It said it planned to introduce the standard operating procedure when all staff had received the associated training. It couldn’t give us a specific date, but it was aiming to introduce it in early 2025.

At this type of incident, fire and rescue services receive a high volume of simultaneous fire calls. The service has a ‘buddy’ fire control at North Wales Fire and Rescue Service, which can take overflow calls. Through Operation Willow Beck, other services can also take calls if needed. The service can share electronic incident information with other services.

In such an incident, the service would set up a command room in fire control. When occupants of the high-rise building call fire control, staff record their flat and floor numbers on a whiteboard. If there is a change of evacuation policy, the service adds a flash message to the mobilising system to advise operators, who in turn can advise the building’s occupants. However, there is no documented process for this type of situation, and actions would be dependent on the individuals involved at the incident. The service hasn’t carried out an exercise for this process, so it isn’t clear how effective it is.

These systems are too open to error and could compromise the service’s ability to safely deal with a major incident at a tall building.

The service has resources and arrangements in place to support other fire and rescue services, locally and nationally

The service supports other fire and rescue services responding to emergency incidents. For example, it has a joint fire control room with Mid and West Wales Fire and Rescue Service. All three Welsh services second staff to work with the English fire sector and the English national resilience programme.

The service can form part of a multi-agency response with several national resilience capabilities, including:

• urban search and rescue;
• high-volume pumping;
• chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear;
• mass decontamination; and
• detection, identification and monitoring.

In accordance with sections 13 and 16 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, the service has mutual assistance arrangements with neighbouring services. It actively uses these arrangements to respond to incidents in its own area and in neighbouring services’ areas.

The service recognises the need for a formal cross-border exercise plan

The service doesn’t have a structured cross-border exercise plan with neighbouring fire and rescue services. However, we found some evidence of it carrying out exercises with neighbouring fire and rescue services, such as Hereford and Worcester Fire and Rescue Service and Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue Service.

The service would benefit from having a structured and consistent approach to working together more effectively to keep the public safe. This would also provide more learning opportunities, and inform risk information and service plans.

The service told us it recognised the need for a more formal cross-border exercise schedule and improved sharing of risk information.

The service should make sure all staff understand arrangements for responding to an MTA

South Wales Fire and Rescue Service provides Skills for Justice training for its incident commanders to make sure they are trained in and familiar with JESIP. The service also gives Wales gold and silver strategic co-ordination group training for incident commanders. Most of the incident commanders we interviewed as part of our inspection had been trained in or were familiar with JESIP.

The service doesn’t have a specialist MTA response team. It told us it had given non‑specialist training to staff, and that some fire engines carry MTA-specific equipment, such as tourniquets and blast bandages.

The service carries out exercises to test its response to MTAs. We found evidence that some staff were also involved in multi-agency exercises, such as a desktop exercise in which fire control and police staff created an MTA incident, assigned resources and shared information.

The service told us it had carried out a practical MTA exercise, involving armed suspects, with other agencies in Newport and Cardiff. It also told us about an MTA exercise with South Wales Police, which involved Welsh counter-terrorism officers.

Fire control staff have a clear understanding of what actions to take in relation to an MTA. We also found that most incident commanders understood what action to take, but we found limited understanding among other staff. Some staff don’t know what arrangements the service has in place to respond to an MTA incident, and are unfamiliar with the JESIP (non-specialist responder) MTA principles. The service should make sure its staff understand its approach, as well as the information it gives in its training.

The service told us it would declare a major incident if an incident was a significant drain on its own resources. Some staff told us they didn’t think the service always declared a major incident when it was appropriate to do so.

We found some evidence of debriefs taking place after multi-agency incidents and/or exercises. For example, after an exercise involving the military, police and other agencies in February 2024, a task and finish group was established and a report, including recommendations, was produced. However, staff struggled to recall seeing any feedback from the exercise. The service acknowledged that it could do more to share debriefs with its staff.

The service is an active member of the local resilience forums

The service has good arrangements in place to respond to emergencies with partners and is an active member of the South Wales and Gwent local resilience forums. The service is a valued partner and participates in a number of sub-groups, taking the lead on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capability.

The service takes part in regular training events with other members of the local resilience forums. It supports training and exercises by providing venues and staff.

It takes part in an annual large-scale exercise in the Severn Tunnel with partners such as South Western Ambulance Service, Network Rail and the police. Learning from exercises such as this one can be used to develop planning assumptions about responding to major and multi-agency incidents.

The service makes use of national learning

The service makes sure it knows about national operational updates and joint organisational learning from other fire and rescue services, as well as joint organisational learning from other organisations, such as the police and ambulance service.

The service has a dedicated lead who reviews learning from other services and organisations. That person refers it to the operational development steering group on a quarterly basis so it can take action.

The service is also a member of a joint operational learning working group, which is made up of representatives from the police, fire and rescue service, ambulance service and local resilience forums.

There is some evidence that the service uses national learning to inform planning assumptions that it makes with partner organisations. For example, the service now has a dynamic PDA in place for major incidents.

Making best use of resources

Fire and rescue services should manage their resources properly and appropriately, aligning them with their risks and statutory responsibilities. Services should make best possible use of resources to achieve the best results for the public.

The service’s revenue budget for 2024/25 is £95.84 million. This is a 7.2 percent increase from the previous financial year.

We set out our detailed findings below.

Main findings

The service needs to review its resources to make sure it allocates them according to its risks and priorities

The service needs to make sure it uses its resources well to manage risk. Its financial plans aren’t aligned with its strategic plan or departmental plans, where they exist, such as those for fleet and IT.

The service doesn’t have an effective workforce plan, and it lacks detailed strategies on prevention, protection and response. Staff told us the service based resource requirements on what it had, rather than what it needed. Therefore, it isn’t clear how the service has allocated resources to support its risks and priorities.

The service told us that managing fire control resources was a challenge. It told us it sometimes had to delay training and use overtime. We found that the fire safety function didn’t have an appropriately resourced risk-based inspection programme. And there are no formal arrangements in place to give specialist protection advice out of hours.

We found evidence that some areas were well resourced, such as operational wholetime staffing. However, we found that other areas, such as finance and training, weren’t well resourced. The service is taking steps to address some of these weaknesses and has recently restructured its people services team to improve ways of working.

However, some staff told us that the service’s structures were fragmented, and that silo working led to a lack of accountability and cohesion.

The service should review its resources and structure to make sure it manages risk well. Its resources and structure should clearly help it carry out its strategic plan.

The service should review its staff duty systems to make sure it provides an effective and efficient response to incidents

The service hasn’t evaluated its mix of crewing and duty systems for several years. It also hasn’t reviewed its response cover and can’t make sure it deploys its fire engines and response staff to manage risk efficiently.

The service told us it had an approved number of operational staff, which stayed the same each year. However, it has needed to bring in extra support to help maintain on‑call staff availability. A team of wholetime staff has opted to work at on-call stations on their days off when there are gaps. This is in order to keep fire engines available.

The service recognises that it needs to evaluate its mix of crewing and duty systems, and carry out a fire cover review, so it can be sure it is providing the most effective and efficient response for the public. The fire cover review should also inform the way the service develops its estate strategy.

The service recognises that it needs to improve performance management and its understanding of workforce productivity

The service’s arrangements for managing performance are weak and don’t clearly link resource use to its strategic plan and priorities. Staff told us that the lack of departmental strategies meant they didn’t always fully understand their departments’ aims and objectives. This is further compounded by the vast number of recommendations the service has received from reviews in recent years, which it is yet to fully address.

The service has key performance indicators (KPIs), which it publishes annually on its website as part of its improvement plan. The KPIs show how many incidents the service has attended, how many HSCs it has carried out, and how many fire safety audits it has done. Some of the KPIs have targets, but most don’t.

We found that not all staff knew about performance targets. For example, the service told us that operational staff should carry out 12 HSCs per month, but not all relevant staff knew this.

We found that there were no set targets for carrying out business fire safety activities, and the service didn’t have a response time target.

During our inspection, various staff showed us the business management information system (BMIS). BMIS gives staff a central source of information and statistics on the service’s performance, which supports reporting. However, we found that not all staff were using the system effectively. Some said they found it difficult to navigate, and others expressed concerns about the reliability of the data.

The senior leadership team receives a quarterly service delivery report from staff who attend the service delivery meeting. This report includes data and narrative about the service’s performance in relation to its KPIs. However, it contains little detail about action the service takes to bring about improvements.

We found little evidence of the service managing performance, bringing about improvements and giving assurance that activity focused on the highest risks. The service recognises that it needs to improve performance management. At the time of our inspection, the service told us it was putting in place a new governance structure. The service hopes that this will improve its approach to performance management, as well as the quality of reports and data.

Most staff at stations have a set routine that they carry out on a daily basis. This might include appliance checks, equipment testing, training and maintaining competencies. But the service doesn’t fully understand how it uses its wholetime firefighters. It acknowledges that it needs to address this problem.

The service told us it was taking steps to make sure workforce time is as productive as possible. This includes carrying out thematic reviews, broadening roles and giving operational training to put in place new ways of working. It also includes collecting data on how staff spend their time during day and night shifts.

We found some evidence that the service was taking steps to make sure its workforce was as productive as possible. These include considering new ways of working. For example, the service told us about a pilot in which operational staff would carry out some protection activity. However, at the time of our inspection, the pilot wasn’t fully active. On-call staff are also involved in carrying out HSCs.

The service is investing in flexible work areas at two of its stations so staff can work closer to home.

The service collaborates with other services, but it needs to regularly review the arrangements and evaluate the benefits

The Local Government (Wales) Measure 2009 creates a general power for fire and rescue authorities to collaborate. We were pleased to find that the service routinely considered opportunities to collaborate with other public services.

The service has a joint fire control with Mid and West Wales Fire and Rescue Service. It is located in the joint public service centre at South Wales Police headquarters. The service also told us about a collaboration with the Welsh Ambulance Services University NHS Trust, whereby the ambulance service quality assures the fire and rescue service’s first aid training.

The service has also partnered with the Severn Area Rescue Association, which is a volunteer lifeboat and inland search and rescue charity. Fire control can mobilise the charity’s water rescue team.

The service shares several buildings with other emergency services. For example, in Abertillery, the emergency services station accommodates police, fire and rescue, and ambulance personnel.

The service needs to improve the way it monitors, reviews and evaluates the benefits and results of its collaborations. We found that since the joint fire control was set up, there had been no evaluation of the benefits or return on investment.

Some staff also told us that arrangements to share buildings had changed without monitoring or review. At the time of our inspection, the service hadn’t formalised or standardised its charging for these arrangements – for example, in relation to shared and non-shared areas, and gym provision.

The service needs to make sure it has effective business continuity arrangements in place, and that it regularly tests them

The service has some continuity arrangements in place for areas in which it considers threats and risks to be high.

The service has a plan in place for industrial action by operational staff. It told us it had access to auxiliary firefighters and fire control staff, and that it had plans for how they would be used. It also has continuity arrangements for fire control.

The service has carried out exercises on some of its industrial action arrangements. However, staff told us the service hadn’t recently tested arrangements for fire control, and that it might not have fully considered the impact of any local industrial action.

At the time of our inspection, the service had a static degradation policy, which meant that it would maintain fire cover at seven locations. It should put in place a more flexible approach to fire cover arrangements. The service also aims to introduce a dynamic resourcing system.

The service told us it hadn’t yet considered business continuity arrangements for its people services function.

The service also told us it was reviewing its business continuity plans to make sure all areas were resilient and well prepared.

The service needs to continue to focus on how it provides value for money

The service considers its financial plans alongside those of other fire and rescue services. Senior leaders are involved in making the plans, which are subject to external challenge from the commissioners. We also found that the service received reasonable internal audit assessments.

The service carries out some zero-based budgeting for non-pay areas and is reviewing these to reduce costs. Through this process, the finance team scrutinises budget proposals, and challenges departmental expenditure.

The service is actively working to reduce energy consumption across its estate. It has invested in a new-build carbon-neutral fire station at New Inn, Pontypool.

The service carries out sustainable procurement in line with Welsh Government legislation, and it considers the whole life of the procurement. This makes sure the service achieves value for money while generating benefits for the organisation, for society and for the economy.

The service works with other fire and rescue services to consider joint procurement. For example, it has worked with North Wales Fire and Rescue Service and Mid and West Wales Fire and Rescue Service to jointly procure uniform, branded items and breathing apparatus. This shares the workload, increases the staff expertise available to design contract specifications and helps bring about economies of scale.

Where appropriate, the service also uses national procurement frameworks – the Welsh National Procurement Service and the UK-wide NFCC frameworks – to maximise value for money – for example, in its procurement of gas protection monitors.

We found some evidence that the service challenged fleet suppliers to make sure charges were appropriate, and that it managed inflation costs and got value for money. However, the service doesn’t routinely hold review meetings with suppliers. It also doesn’t effectively evaluate the benefits it receives from procurement. At the time of our inspection, the service was in the process of introducing contract management meetings and KPIs to better manage and monitor procurement contracts.

Making the fire and rescue service affordable now and in the future

Fire and rescue services should continuously look for ways to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. This includes transforming how they work and improving their value for money. Services should have robust spending plans that reflect future financial challenges and efficiency opportunities, and they should invest in better services for the public.

We set out our detailed findings below.

Main findings

The service should improve its approach to identifying, realising and monitoring savings and efficiencies

The service is funded through a levy placed on the ten unitary authorities in the service’s area. It consults with them about its requirements and any proposed increases to the levy. The medium-term financial strategy is based on realistic forecasts and estimates. Its future financial forecast is based on reasonable assumptions and a worst-case scenario plan. However, although it is unlikely, if there were any changes to the service’s funding arrangements, it has no plans in place to say how the service would deal with this scenario.

The opportunities the service has identified to make savings or generate further income are limited. Its strategic plan doesn’t detail the service’s approach to identifying, realising and monitoring efficiency savings if future spending reductions are needed, or if funds are used to invest in new ways of working.

The service knows about some of its future financial challenges, such as pay rises and inflation, but these aren’t detailed in its risk registers. The service also acknowledges that it needs to review community safety to make sure it can continue to carry out its work against a backdrop of reduced grant funding.

The service works with other Welsh fire and rescue services to provide broadly consistent planning assumptions. It also works proactively with the Welsh Local Government Association to communicate the scale of future cost pressures to the Welsh Government.

The service needs to improve its plans for maintaining its financial reserves

The service has a plan for using its reserves, but it isn’t clear if this is sustainable. It has adequate general reserves. Earmarked reserves are available to support change and project plans, which are subject to independent scrutiny and challenge.

However, we found that the service needed to develop plans to increase its general reserve levels to meet future financial risks, such as higher-than-anticipated pay rises. These plans should also include replenishing earmarked reserves after using them. The service also doesn’t have a published reserves strategy covering the period of its current medium-term financial strategy.

The service needs to show more clearly how its estate plans are linked to its strategic priorities

The service has a fleet strategy, which has been independently reviewed. It also has an estate plan but no estate strategy.

The service has a seven-year capital programme in place, which is informed by building condition surveys. It is proactively taking steps to reduce its carbon footprint, and it has invested in electric vehicles and infrastructure. It has also invested £7 million in a new-build carbon-neutral fire station at New Inn, Pontypool.

It has procured four new welfare vehicles. This procurement was informed by a working group and was subject to an equality impact assessment.

The service told us it was in the early stages of introducing a decontamination facility. Although this is positive, it has had a negative impact on other areas of the service’s work. The lack of an estate strategy may result in the service changing plans without enough consideration. It hasn’t carried out a fire cover review for many years, which means it can’t be sure its assets and estate meet its current and future requirements.

The service uses KPIs to assess how effectively and efficiently it uses its fleet. It uses operational feedback to make sure its vehicles are in the right locations and meet operational needs. The service told us it had taken on the maintenance of the Welsh national resilience fleet. This was previously carried out by an external contractor. The service expects that this will result in savings, and it planned to evaluate the arrangement once it had been in place for six months.

The service needs to make sure its IT supports current and future requirements

The service has an annual IT plan, and its strategic plan includes a theme about making good use of technology. However, the IT strategy and plan don’t effectively link to the strategic plan. The IT strategy doesn’t explain how it will use innovation or technology to support future requirements.

The service has recently invested in IT support to improve its cybersecurity, but it rarely proactively considers how changes in technology and future innovation can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its workforce. The service has a reactive approach to considering IT investments, rather than a proactive approach to carrying out strategic priorities.

The service doesn’t have a suitable electronic system for managing prevention and protection activities. It has introduced a multi-agency incident transfer system to its fire control operation, which means it can share information with police forces. However, at the time of our inspection, it hadn’t yet procured a dynamic fire cover tool or given operators a visual representation of where resources were.

Many staff at all levels expressed concerns to us about the number of systems in use, their accessibility, and how easy they were to use. For example, some staff told us that it was difficult to find the information they needed on the intranet and BMIS. Others said that some systems were fragmented and needed to be integrated, including those that supported training and people services activities.

The service rarely considers exploiting these opportunities to improve efficiency and effectiveness. In some cases, the IT systems hinder staff performance.

The service should have sound programme management approaches in place to support change

The service has limited capacity and capability to bring about sustainable change. We also found limited evidence that it worked with others to improve efficiency, and the benefits of the work it did weren’t well defined. We found a lack of strategic planning, direction and decision-making. This was because of a change of senior leaders and regular turnover of managers.

To manage the amount of change it needs to make, the service has developed a transformation programme called Step Forward, focusing on the following areas:

• governance and strategy;
• leadership;
• communications and engagement;
• ethics, values and behaviours;
• policies and procedures;
• talent management;
• diversity, inclusion, cohesion and equity;
• digital transformation; and
• a safe, positive environment.

The service has invested in some new staff to carry out its transformation programme. However, it told us that it faced challenges in recruiting enough people to professional roles in finance, estates, health and safety, and procurement. At the time of our inspection, it was also unclear what finances the service would need to carry out its transformation programme.

The service doesn’t have an established project management approach or policy. We found evidence of projects not being completed on time and plans not being updated. In recent years, the service has received some recommendations from various reviews. A sound project management process is crucial to the service acting on the recommendations and carrying out improvements.

The lack of robust business cases means that the service isn’t fully articulating or evaluating the impact, costs, benefits and outcomes of its projects.

The service receives some grant funding

The service has received some additional funding from the Welsh Government for operational activities, and to support sustainable fleet and infrastructure – for example, in relation to community safety, and electric vehicles and infrastructure, as part of the service’s sustainability priorities.

High interest rates have also given the service some interest income, but there are limited opportunities for the service to generate additional income.

Promoting the right values and culture

Fire and rescue services should have positive and inclusive cultures, modelled by the behaviours of their senior leaders. Services should promote health and safety effectively, and staff should have access to a range of well‑being support that can be tailored to their individual needs.

We set out our detailed findings below.

Main findings

The service should make sure senior leaders demonstrate service values

As part of our inspection activity, we carry out a staff survey to give us an understanding of perceptions of working in the service, and to make sure all staff have the opportunity to communicate with us. During this inspection, 427 of the 1,736 staff (24.6 percent) at South Wales Fire and Rescue Service responded to our survey.

The service has a statement of values, which includes the NFCC Core Code of Ethics. Our staff survey showed that 94 percent of respondents (401 out of 427) were aware of the service’s values.

The culture of the organisation doesn’t always align with its values at all levels. Some behaviours we saw or were told about didn’t meet the standards expected, and there wasn’t a strong culture of challenge. For example, some staff told us that they felt uncomfortable giving feedback to or challenging senior managers or leaders. We heard that some staff felt undermined by leaders, or were worried that speaking out could affect their career.

Our staff survey showed that 81 percent of respondents (324 out of 401) agreed that their manager consistently modelled and maintained the service’s values. And 89 percent (356 out of 401) agreed that their colleagues consistently modelled and maintained the service’s values. However, staff felt that senior leaders didn’t always act as positive role models, as only 48 percent of respondents (194 out of 401) agreed that senior leaders consistently modelled and maintained the service’s values.

We also heard mixed views about staff experience of senior leader visibility and engagement, and about a lack of leadership and decision-making.

The service recognises that it needs to do more to communicate its values and make sure they are understood by everyone, so it has developed a programme called Educate to Prevent. The programme is being rolled out to staff at all levels, starting with the senior leadership team. It includes face-to-face sessions, with themes such as expected standards and behaviours, and banter versus bullying. At the time of our inspection, the service was piloting the programme, with roll-out to follow over the subsequent six months.

The service has also made a commitment to acting on the recommendations from the independent culture review. It has recruited a director of change and a culture change programme manager to lead this work. However, staff don’t feel that the service has communicated the progress in this area well.

The service has good well-being support for its workforce, but it could improve work-life balance for some staff

Although its well-being strategy is out of date, the service does have well-being policies in place. It has used NFCC guidance to inform its menopause and maternity policies.

A range of well-being provision is available to support staff with their physical and mental health. For example, there is an employee assistance programme and occupational health services, which staff can access directly. Most staff spoke positively about the service’s well-being support.

However, staff gave mixed reports about their experience of the support available to them following a traumatic incident. At the time of our inspection, staff were contacted via email after a traumatic incident. The email signposts where they can find support if needed. Some staff said that the follow-up could be formalised, and that the service could check to find out if an individual did need support. The service is taking steps to improve the support available to staff following a traumatic incident.

The service has some processes in place to understand its workforce’s well-being needs. For example, the ‘your health’ governance group includes representatives from across the service, and it examines risks and concerns. At the time of our inspection, it had recently considered post-incident care after exposure to contaminants.

The service told us that the personal reviews that took place between staff and managers included a well-being check. If staff raise any concerns in these reviews, the manager can refer them for further support.

Most staff feel that they can access services to support their mental well-being. Of those who responded to our staff survey, 84 percent (357 out of 427) agreed that they felt able to access services to support their mental well-being.

However, in our staff survey, only 63 percent of respondents (267 out of 427) agreed that they achieved a good balance between their work and private life. Some staff told us they felt fatigued by the number of thematic and independent reviews of the service. Some staff feel this is leading to constant changes in priorities, and that there is a lack of strategic direction. Resourcing issues in some departments are also leading to excessive workloads.

The service should make sure all staff receive adequate health and safety training

The service has effective and well-understood health and safety policies and procedures. Of those who responded to our staff survey, 88 percent (376 out of 427) felt that the service had a clear procedure to report all accidents and near misses. Some staff told us that any urgent health and safety information was shared via a ‘flash’ notice, which they were required to read.

However, feedback from representative bodies was inconsistent. Some of these bodies – but not all – told us that the service managed the health and safety of its staff well. Not all representative bodies said that the service involved them in health and safety matters.

We also found that although the service gave staff initial health and safety training, it didn’t provide refresher training. When we checked a sample of staff training records, we found that some staff hadn’t completed health and safety training.

The service has a fitness policy, and dedicated health and fitness advisors carry out tests.

For people in firefighting roles (firefighters, crew managers and watch managers), breathing apparatus wearers and training instructors:

• those with an aerobic capacity equal to 42.3mlO2/kg/min but below 44mlO2/kg/min must complete a fitness test once every 6 to 8 months; and
• those with an aerobic capacity of 44mlO2/kg/min or above must complete a fitness test once every 12 to 24 months.

For incident command roles (station managers and above) and breathing apparatus wearers:

• those with an aerobic capacity equal to 36.8mlO2/kg/min but below 40mlO2/kg/min must complete a fitness test once every 6 to 8 months; and
• those with an aerobic capacity of 40mlO2/kg/min or above must complete a fitness test at least once every 3 years.

If staff fail the tests, the service gives them support to achieve the required standard.

We found that most of the service’s fire stations had adequate fitness and gym facilities. In our staff survey, 87 percent of respondents (225 out of 259) agreed that they had time to maintain operational fitness; 96 percent (247 out of 258) agreed that they could access the equipment they needed.

Absence management processes are fit for purpose, but the service could improve its systems and data

The service has a welfare and attendance monitoring policy, which applies to all staff. However, we found it was out of date. Most staff we spoke to were positive about the way the service manages absence.

The people services team holds a weekly welfare and well-being meeting to discuss any specific cases involving people or teams, and what support it can offer. It also attends a monthly meeting with the central staffing team to discuss any issues. We found little evidence that the service considered any trends or took action as a result.

The service told us that absence data was limited, and that it was in the process of developing a new BMIS dashboard to give demographic data about absence – for example, gender, age and length of service. However, staff told us that the quality of the data relied on the service updating its systems, and that the systems involved were convoluted, inefficient and ineffective.

Some managers also told us that they would welcome more support and training to help them deal with managing absence.

The service doesn’t monitor staff working hours effectively

In the year ending 31 March 2024, 25.9 percent of the service’s wholetime firefighters were recorded as being on a dual contract within the same service. In addition, 0.2 percent had a contract with another service, and 27.3 percent had a secondary contract of employment outside the service and sector.

The service has a policy about secondary employment, with a mandatory obligation on staff to declare it and request approval. Under the ‘outside employment’ policy, the service must make sure staff comply with the Working Time Regulations 1998 and health and safety legislation.

However, we found a lack of oversight of staff who had a dual contract. The service’s arrangements to make sure appropriate rest breaks are in place, and that staff don’t work excessive hours, are not fit for purpose.

The service has acknowledged that it needs to improve the way it monitors the working hours of those with secondary employment and dual contracts, so it can better support their well-being.

Getting the right people with the right skills

Fire and rescue services should have a workforce plan in place that is linked to their strategic plan. It should set out their current and future skills requirements and address capability gaps. This should be supplemented by a culture of continuous improvement, including appropriate learning and development throughout the service.

We set out our detailed findings below.

Main findings

Workforce planning is ineffective

We found little evidence that the service’s planning allowed it to fully consider workforce skills and overcome any gaps in capability. The service doesn’t have a workforce plan, and it can’t be sure it has the skills and capabilities it needs to implement its strategic plan.

The service told us it held a workforce planning meeting, where it considered staff movements and levels. However, there is no clear structure to this meeting. Instead, it reacts to the service’s current needs, with no planning for future requirements. The service recognises that it needs to improve arrangements for workforce planning.

We found little evidence of the service carrying out any succession planning. It doesn’t consider the number of current and future vacancies before it runs promotion rounds. It carries out recruitment campaigns when it identifies a need.

There is a high number of staff in temporary positions. This leads to staff feeling unsettled, and to a lack of continuity. The service needs to do more to improve the way it considers its future needs and succession planning. It told us that reducing the number of temporary positions was a priority.

The service needs to improve the way its systems and team structures support training requirements for all its staff

The service has some understanding of its workforce’s skills and capabilities. Its training plan links to its strategic plan, in relation to operational training and maintaining competence. However, the training plan only focuses on operational staff. It contains little consideration of the training needs of other staff, such as those in fire control, corporate staff and those in specialist roles, such as ICT and finance.

The service’s training and development centre is an approved Skills for Justice awarding centre, providing courses such as the level 3 diploma in emergency fire and rescue services operations for on-call and wholetime staff, and for incident command at all levels. However, the service told us that to meet its training requirements over the next few years, it would need to recruit trainers to fill vacancies.

The service works well with Cardiff and Vale College, which quality assures the training in the service’s apprentice firefighter programme. At the time of our inspection, 150 apprentices had completed the course, and capacity had increased from around 14 to 24 students in each cohort.

However, not all staff feel that they receive enough training. In our staff survey, 75 percent of respondents (319 out of 427) agreed that they had received sufficient training to effectively do their job.

We found that staff didn’t receive the full range of training to help them carry out their role. At the time of our inspection, high-rise training for operational staff was ongoing, and some staff hadn’t received the right training to carry out an SSRI visit. We also found that the service’s three equality, diversity and inclusion modules – unconscious bias, inclusive language and inclusive leadership, and health and safety – were all one-offs, and that staff wouldn’t be receiving any refresher training.

The service doesn’t consider management skills in its training plans. Staff told us that managers and senior leaders needed more people-management training. We found that there was a lack of training to support managers to deal effectively with conflict, grievances and sickness absence.

Although there are systems and structures in place to record and manage staff training, we found that they were disparate and lacking central oversight. There is no overarching arrangement or single system that monitors and manages all training carried out across the workforce.

The service told us it used various systems and teams to maintain staff training and competencies. Operational staff use the pdrPro system for risk-critical training, but the learning and development team uses the E-Hyb learning management system for training on safeguarding and unconscious bias, for example.

Various teams are also involved in providing and supporting training activities. We found no links between the systems, or between the teams involved. This leads to a lack of overall responsibility for training as a whole.

The service gives staff learning and improvement opportunities

The service provides a variety of learning and development initiatives, including leadership masterclasses. It told us that in 2023/24, 118 members of staff (operational and corporate) had participated in masterclass sessions.

The service also has an additional learning fund, which staff can apply for to support them with their training or development needs, if what they need isn’t available as part of the service’s standard training and development provision. This might include academic studies or professional qualifications. The service told us that in 2023/24, 50 people (operational and corporate) accessed the fund.

Although the service offers learning and development to all staff, some staff told us they couldn’t always access them due to work commitments. Some staff also told us that opportunities weren’t consistent across all staff groups.

Our staff survey showed that only 52 percent of respondents (224 out of 427) agreed that they were given the same opportunities to develop as other staff in the service.

The service needs to make sure all its staff can benefit from the learning and improvement provision it offers.

Ensuring fairness and promoting diversity

Creating a more representative workforce gives fire and rescue services huge benefits. These include greater access to talent and different ways of thinking. It also helps them better understand and engage with local communities. Each service should make sure staff throughout the organisation firmly understand and show a commitment to equality, diversity and inclusion. This includes successfully taking steps to remove inequality and making progress to improve fairness, diversity and inclusion at all levels of the service. It should proactively seek and respond to feedback from staff and make sure any action it takes is meaningful.

We set out our detailed findings below.

Main findings

The service needs to improve its approach to asking for and acting on staff feedback and challenge

The service has a range of ways for staff members to raise concerns. These include a whistleblowing policy, the FRS Speak Up Crimestoppers line, Have Your Say and a complaints procedure. However, staff access these initiatives reactively. There is little evidence of the service setting a strategic, proactive approach to how leaders communicate with staff.

Although some staff reported positive experiences of communicating with senior leaders, not all did. The service doesn’t carry out a regular comprehensive staff survey.

During our inspection, some staff told us that the service doesn’t regularly ask them for feedback. They welcomed the opportunity to speak to our inspection team. Without exception, the staff we spoke to interacted positively with our team.

Staff have limited confidence in the service’s feedback processes, and many don’t think they are effective. In our staff survey, only 50 percent of respondents (212 out of 427) were confident in the processes for giving feedback at all levels, with 44 percent (189 out of 427) agreeing that it was safe to challenge the way things were done in the service.

Some staff told us they were afraid to give feedback to or challenge senior leaders. The service should improve staff confidence in giving feedback and feeling safe to challenge the way things are done.

The service told us it held operational and non-operational forums with representative bodies. However, representative bodies and staff associations told us they would like better engagement from the service. At the time of our inspection, the recently appointed chief fire officer told us that from then onwards, meetings with trade unions would take place more often.

We found some evidence that the service communicated with staff about matters that affected them. However, the service recognises that this communication may not always have been successful. During our inspection, many staff members told us that communication with them was ineffective and inconsistent, and that there had been limited evaluation of communication activities.

In our staff survey, 26 percent of respondents (111 of 427) agreed that the service managed change well, and 51 percent (218 of 427) agreed that the service kept them informed about matters that affected them.

The service has recruited more staff to help it improve corporate communication. It also acknowledges that it should communicate with staff earlier about policy development and changes that affect them. The service told us it had put in place a robust communications plan, involving the new chief fire officer visiting every station and every team within the first two months of joining the service.

The service needs to be more effective in tackling bullying, harassment and discrimination

The service should improve staff understanding of bullying, harassment and discrimination, including their duty to eliminate them. In our staff survey, 17 percent of respondents (73 out of 427) told us they had felt bullied or harassed at work in the past 12 months. Respondents told us the most common factors in the bullying or harassment were performance at work, the role, or the terms of their contract.

Our staff survey also showed that 17 percent of respondents (73 out of 427) had felt discriminated against at work in the past 12 months. Respondents told us the most common factors in the discrimination were the role, the terms of their contract, or gender.

The primary reason why most respondents didn’t report the bullying, harassment or discrimination was that they thought nothing would happen as a result.

The number of disciplinary actions taken by the service increased from 15 in 2021/22 to 31 in 2023/24. The service has developed a discipline and grievance case management database to understand volumes and trends. However, it isn’t clear what the service is doing to use any learning from the information in this database to improve processes, education and training. It is also unclear if the service understands whether staff with a protected characteristic are disproportionately affected.

Although the service has clear policies and procedures in place, staff have limited confidence in how well it can deal with cases of bullying, harassment or discrimination, as well as grievances and discipline. Several staff told us that policies and procedures weren’t fit for purpose as most were out of date. For example, the dignity at work policy was last reviewed in 2016. The service recognises that it needs to carry out a full review of its people services policies and procedures.

The service told us that because of the number of disciplinary actions it was handling, and the need to review historic cases after a recommendation from the independent culture review, staffing and capacity were a problem. This means the service isn’t carrying out some investigations and hearings promptly enough. Some staff involved in investigations told us they hadn’t been appropriately informed or updated on the progress in the investigations. This is having an impact on staff well-being and is making staff feel that there is a lack of transparency.

The service acknowledges that it needs to make improvements. It told us that work was ongoing, and that the people services restructure would give managers specific points of contact. Training is also included in the leadership programme, and at the time of our inspection, lawyers had recently given training to the service’s grievance and disciplinary panel members.

The service has also developed Educate to Prevent, a staff programme about values behaviours, including bullying, harassment and discrimination. At the time of our inspection, it was piloting the programme, with the aim of rolling it out to staff at all levels.

The service needs to do more to improve the diversity of its workforce

The service needs to do more to make sure its recruitment processes are fair and accessible to applicants from a range of backgrounds. At the time of our inspection, the service didn’t have an approved recruitment policy. The service told us that recruiting managers had different requirements, which meant that processes differed. However, this means the service can’t be sure approaches are consistent and consider applicants’ needs.

The service advertises roles externally and internally. It has also introduced blind sifting, and a people services representative oversees interview panels to help make sure interviews are fair. However, some staff don’t think the recruitment process is transparent or fair when it comes to providing reasonable adjustments for candidates.

We found limited evidence that the service understood the diversity of applicants. Some staff told us that although the service had scrutinised a recent wholetime firefighter recruitment process in relation to applicants’ diversity, that hadn’t been the case for other recruitment processes.

The service doesn’t direct all its recruitment campaigns at under-represented groups, and it doesn’t make them all accessible to those groups. At the time of our inspection, it wasn’t carrying out change in this area to increase the diversity of its workforce. The service told us that it didn’t use positive action in recruitment campaigns.

However, we found evidence that the service held specific events for women, including virtual sessions on becoming a firefighter. It has also carried out work at local mosques and in the Somali community to promote careers in the fire and rescue service. It is carrying out a review of the firefighter fitness-testing policy to address any disproportionality in recruitment.

The service has done some work to analyse data to inform recruitment campaigns, but we found that a lack of resources meant it couldn’t continue the work.

The service gave us some workforce data, but it was poor quality. The service has acknowledged that it needs to improve data in this area. This data suffers from the negative impact of historic inconsistencies in collecting and reporting. The service doesn’t know the demographics of a large proportion of its workforce.

As at 31 March 2024, the proportion of unknowns for each demographic in the service were:

• 40 percent for gender;
• 51 percent for disability status;
• 66 percent for sexual orientation;
• 77 percent for religion; and
• 88 percent for ethnicity.

Many members of the workforce choose not to declare their protected characteristics to the service. Some staff told us that internal communications to staff encouraging them to record their demographic data had been poor. The service hopes this data will improve, given the investment it is making in staff communications.

The service has a low number of people who are known to be from groups under‑represented in the workforce, such as women, people from ethnic minority backgrounds, and members of the LGBTQ+ community.

As a result, the service doesn’t reflect the local community it serves.

The service is taking steps to improve its approach to equality, diversity and inclusion

The service needs to improve its approach to equality, diversity and inclusion. It is carrying out a range of measures to support this. The service has a dedicated diversity, inclusion, cohesion and equity (DICE) partner – who is a member of staff in HR – and an inclusive working group. It has several DICE champions and gives staff training on topics such as unconscious bias, inclusive language and communication, and menopause awareness.

The service told us it had made improvements to the accessibility of its courses. For example, it has provided headphones and screen covers to support some staff who are neurodivergent.

The service has a process in place to assess equality impact. It acts to improve equality when needed. It has given managers training to help them carry out equality impact assessments. However, we found that oversight of the process needed to improve, and the service didn’t consider staff equality data as part of the assessment.

A review of a sample of equality impact assessments showed that although the service consulted the DICE partner, there was no involvement from staff networks. We also found that when the service took action as a result of an equality impact assessment, it didn’t monitor it for progress or review it to understand the impact.

The service gives staff some equality, diversity and inclusion training, but they receive little refresher training. The service would benefit from adopting a rolling programme for its training and education to help make sure staff have the understanding they need.

The service told us it had plans to incorporate inclusive facilities into its buildings. In our staff survey, 93 percent of respondents (398 out of 427) agreed that they had access to gender-appropriate workplace facilities. However, we found some evidence that the service wasn’t always prioritising the work to improve inclusive facilities. For example, funding for some of the planned work at a station had been diverted to other areas.

We also found evidence that some staff felt they weren’t treated equally to others. Several on-call staff told us they felt disadvantaged by wholetime recruitment processes. Some staff also said that at some sites the service shared with other emergency services, the arrangements negatively affected the facilities for fire and rescue service staff. Some staff told us they didn’t feel that they had their own space, and that they felt undervalued as a result.

Managing performance and developing leaders

Fire and rescue services should have robust and meaningful performance management arrangements in place for their staff. All staff should be supported to meet their potential and there should be a focus on developing staff and improving diversity into leadership roles.

We set out our detailed findings below.

Main findings

The service needs to do more work to effectively manage individuals’ performance

The service has a process in place for performance and development. It told us that staff should have had a monthly discussion with their manager about their well-being and how well they were performing at work. They should also have an annual discussion about their development needs and career goals.

In our staff survey, 82 percent of respondents (352 out of 427) told us they had had a formal personal development review or appraisal in the past 12 months, but 59 percent (208 out of 352) of them didn’t find it useful. During our inspection, some staff told us reviews were seen as a tick-box exercise.

For 2023/24, we found that completion rates for personal development reviews ranged from 36 to 86 percent across different staff groups. We also found that the content of reviews was inconsistent and didn’t always include a performance discussion. This means not all staff have specific and individual objectives. And not all staff have had their performance assessed in the past year. The service could do more to include performance and personal objectives that support its strategic and improvement plans.

Staff don’t have confidence in the promotion process

The service needs to do more to make sure its promotion and progression processes are fair and seen to be fair. In our staff survey, only 34 percent of respondents (147 out of 427) agreed that the promotion process in the service was fair.

As part of our inspection, we reviewed the documentation from three promotion processes. We found that not all those processes had a consistent and transparent approach. During our inspection, some staff told us they felt there was a lack of transparency around some promotion decisions, and that goalposts were moved during promotion processes.

Some staff are positive about the inclusion of an independent staff member and people services representatives in promotion panels. However, the service needs to do more to make sure all processes are fair and transparent.

As explained earlier in this report, the service doesn’t have strong succession‑planning processes in place. This means it doesn’t effectively manage the career pathways of its staff, including those in roles that need specialist skills.

The service doesn’t manage temporary promotions well. We found evidence of a high number of temporary promotions, some of which had been in place for longer than they should have been. Because of the high number of staff in temporary positions, and the level of staff turnover, decisions keep changing. This means there is confusion about the service’s priorities and direction.

The service is taking steps to diversify its leadership, but it needs to do more

The service knows it needs to do more to increase workforce diversity, especially in middle and senior management. There is some evidence that it is taking steps to improve. For example, all corporate vacancies are now advertised internally and externally. Operational manager vacancies will also follow this approach, unless there are exceptional circumstances that mean the service can’t do this – for example, if the role is temporary.

The service uses various channels to publicise job vacancies. These include its own intranet, the NFCC website, social media and Women in the Fire Service UK.

The service needs to make sure it effectively identifies and develops leaders and high-potential staff at all levels

The service provides various career pathways to staff, based on guidance provided by the NFCC. The pathways are aimed at supporting staff who are working towards progression and promotion at different levels and stages in their career. They include:

• leading yourself;
• leading others;
• leading the function;
• leading the service; and
• the pioneer programme.

Senior leaders may attend an executive leadership programme.

The service told us that completing the relevant pathway is a prerequisite for any member of staff applying for promotion. However, we found that some existing managers didn’t have the right skills or knowledge of the area that they were managing.

Some staff told us they felt the problem had been made worse by the number of managerial changes that had taken place. We also found some evidence of managers themselves feeling that they hadn’t been given enough training and support in managing and leading people.

As it develops its succession planning, the service should consider putting in place talent management schemes to identify and support staff to become senior leaders.

Although the Fire Standards Board doesn’t oversee the professional standards for Welsh fire and rescue services, the service aims to adopt best practice. The service told us it was considering adopting the Leading the Service and Leading and Developing People fire standards.

Back to publication

An inspection of South Wales Fire and Rescue Service: Effectiveness, efficiency and people