An inspection into how effectively the police investigate crime

Foreword

The effective investigation of crime is fundamental to the legitimacy of policing and to public confidence. It is integral to the concept of policing by consent. The service provided to victims directly affects the level of public trust and confidence in policing and the wider criminal justice system. It also influences how safe people feel and it prevents future offending.

When a crime is reported, the public have a right to expect that the police will record and investigate it effectively. They also have a right to expect that the service they receive includes regular updates, and that it is consistent with the rights contained in the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime.

Therefore, as part of our 2022–25 programme of inspections, we have inspected how effectively the police investigate crime. The focus of this report is on volume crime.

During our fieldwork, we spoke to many officers and staff who work tirelessly to investigate crime and achieve positive outcomes for victims. However, too often, their efforts are hampered by ineffective force processes for recording, assessing, allocating and investigating crime. These processes don’t always involve putting the victim first.

When forces measure how well they support victims, they often focus on quantity rather than quality. That is, they record how many times they update victims, rather than recording how effective the updates are at giving victims information and support. This means victims don’t always receive the best service. As a result, they have less confidence in the criminal justice system.

It is clear that outcomes for victims are not good enough. Victims often withdraw their support for investigations, citing delays in the criminal justice process as a key factor. These delays can be caused by problems such as high officer workloads, delays in obtaining charging decisions, or the time it takes for a case to be tried in court.

Over the past decade, many forces introduced operating models whereby some officers and staff only respond to calls, while other teams investigate crimes. This approach has contributed to many officers and staff not understanding their role as investigators and inhibiting the development of a wider investigative mindset in the workforce as a whole.

The accumulative impact of this approach is that many forces lose investigative opportunities from the moment when an incident or crime is reported, then at various other stages in the process. Chief constables need to make sure all officers and staff understand their contribution to, and the impact they make on, the service forces give to victims and the effectiveness of crime investigations.

This inspection report makes recommendations that should help forces to improve, but it is evident that chief constables do not have sufficient resources to investigate all volume crime to a standard that they and the public wish to see. To further compound this problem, many responders, investigators and their supervisors have fewer than five years’ service and are inexperienced at investigating and supervising crimes. Training needs to improve for volume crime investigators and their supervisors.

To more accurately assess how many investigators their forces need, senior leaders must have a better understanding of their overall crime-related demand. We repeatedly found that investigators’ workloads were too high. The complexity of crimes is increasing, as is the time forces take to investigate them. Many investigators told us that the pressures of their role meant they couldn’t give victims the service that they wanted to give them and that those victims were entitled to receive.

Despite this, we saw numerous examples of initiatives forces have introduced to improve the standard of crime investigations and achieve better outcomes for victims. We have included 24 case studies in this report to highlight some of these initiatives.

I encourage chief constables to consider how they can adopt these or similar initiatives in their forces.

In this report, I make 11 recommendations.

These recommendations are designed to help forces improve the standard of their crime investigations and achieve better outcomes for victims by:

• building a better understanding of their crime-related demand and the resources they need so they can meet it;
• designing more effective processes for recording, assessing, allocating and investigating crime, putting victims at the heart of the process;
• providing better training for investigators, their supervisors, and any other officers or members of staff who have a role in an investigation; and
• improving the supervision of crime investigations.

As we have established through many of our inspections, there is little in policing that is more important to the public than investigating crime. The consequences of not doing it consistently well are lower levels of public trust and confidence in policing, and in the wider criminal justice system.

Forces undoubtably need more officers and staff, but with the resources they have, there is much they can do to improve the effectiveness of crime investigations and the service they give to victims.

Lee Freeman KPM

His Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary

Summary

The effective investigation of crime is fundamental to the legitimacy of policing and to public confidence. It also influences how safe people feel and it prevents future offending. When a crime is reported, the public have a right to expect that the police will record and investigate the crime effectively.

There has been a long-term decline in successful prosecutions, meaning that too few criminal investigations are leading to justice for victims. There is a general perception among the public that the police aren’t doing a good job of tackling the crimes that affect local communities.

Therefore, as part of our 2022–25 programme of inspections, we inspected how effectively the police investigate crime.

During our inspection, we saw numerous examples of initiatives forces have introduced to improve the standard of crime investigations and achieve better outcomes for victims. We have included 24 case studies in this report to highlight some of these initiatives.

Understanding demand

Crime experienced by individuals and households has generally decreased over the last 10 years. However, since 2015, police-recorded crime rates per 1,000 population have increased by 44 percent. Improved police recording practices, and an increase in public reporting of crime, are likely to have contributed to this increase in police-recorded crime. Since 2010, after accounting for changes in the population, the number of police officers in England and Wales has decreased by 6 percent. Over this period, the number of police staff decreased by 13 percent and the number of police community support officers decreased by 59 percent.

We have previously reported that a shortage of resources negatively affects the police’s ability to detect crime. During our fieldwork, we heard about a lack of resources in every force we inspected. Interviewees told us that officers and staff often couldn’t investigate crime as well as they wanted to because their workloads were too high, they were under pressure and they didn’t have enough time.

Frequently, we also saw the effect of this strain on their supervisors, line managers and chief officers, who repeated the same message. We concluded that in order to investigate volume crime more effectively, forces need more officers and staff.

Forces don’t have an in-depth understanding of their crime-related demand. Most forces have a good understanding of their crime patterns, but analysis of future crime rates is inconsistent. The amount of digital evidence that investigators need to gather and examine has increased considerably over the past decade. This increase in digital evidence adds complexity to crime investigations. Forces need to consider this when analysing their crime-related demand.

Recruiting and retaining investigators

A long-standing challenge for forces has been to recruit enough investigators. We found that forces usually made sure they had enough officers and staff to investigate the most complex and serious crimes. However, as budgets are finite, this could often be at the expense of allocating resources to investigating volume crime. Due to the difficulty in recruiting investigators, many forces used untrained officers and staff to fill vacancies.

There is no consistent model to help forces decide how many investigators they need or a consistent approach across forces to recruiting them. Without an in-depth analysis of all crime-related demand, forces can’t accurately determine how many investigators they need, or the impact of these decisions on the service they provide to victims.

Once forces have recruited investigators, it is important that they have in place a strong commitment to retaining them. We found that most forces were taking steps to retain investigators once they had recruited them, but that they still found it hard to stop some of them leaving the force or looking for other roles.

Workload and well-being

Home Office data shows that over the past decade, the number of crimes recorded per police constable has increased by 32.6 percent. This data could suggest that workloads for investigators have increased over that period. Many investigators and their supervisors told us they were frequently overwhelmed by the size of their workloads.

Most forces identify investigators with high workloads and take steps to support them. We found that a manageable workload and good supervision could lead to more effective investigations.

Workload and the working environment are closely linked to well-being. We found that all the forces we inspected had systems and processes in place to monitor and manage investigators’ well-being. However, some officers and staff told us they thought force well-being policies were just a tick-box exercise.

The National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) recruitment, retention and well-being of investigators group has created a wellbeing of investigators toolkit. We encourage all chief constables to make sure their force uses the toolkit to support its investigators’ well-being.

Dealing with reports of crime

Investigative mindset

The effective investigation of crime requires the police officers and staff involved – all of whom are acting as investigators – to adopt an investigative mindset. They should adopt it from the moment the force receives a report of a crime.

Over the past ten years, many forces introduced operating models that didn’t require response officers to investigate crimes, other than carrying out initial actions at the scene. These operating models prevented or discouraged officers and staff from developing and maintaining an investigative mindset throughout their service. This has resulted in a generation of officers, and their supervisors, who have had limited experience of investigating or supervising crime.

Forces continue to restructure their teams and allocate their officers and staff without having a complete understanding of the effectiveness or efficiency of different operating models. Forces don’t always consider how they will record, assess, allocate and investigate volume crime under new operating models, and the potential consequences of this for victims.

The period immediately following the report of an offence or incident is a time-critical opportunity to take effective early action to secure evidence that would otherwise be lost, damaged, concealed, destroyed or altered. Everyone involved – call handlers, responders and other investigators – plays a key part in investigating crime, so it is important that they all have an investigative mindset. We found that this was frequently missing because many officers and staff didn’t see themselves as investigators.

Some call handlers see themselves as investigators, but many response and neighbourhood officers don’t think their primary role is to investigate crime. If they don’t have an investigative mindset, they may miss opportunities to secure and preserve evidence, and to identify lines of enquiry.

Reasonable lines of enquiry

Officers and staff should identify and follow any enquiries that could reasonably be expected to help them successfully investigate a crime. We found that they were generally confident in their understanding of what is a reasonable line of enquiry. However, in the absence of a clear explanation of what constitutes “reasonable”, they tended to use their own judgment when deciding which enquiries to progress.

Guidance about what is “reasonable”, together with examples, would help officers and staff make better decisions about what lines of enquiry to follow.

Dealing with initial telephone or online reports of crime

People can report crimes to the police in several ways. The usual ways of doing this are by telephone or online. Performance in responding to crimes reported online, and by phone, varies across forces.

In some forces, online reports of crime can take longer to deal with. We found that when call waiting times were too long, some forces moved call handlers from dealing with online reports to answering phone calls. This could lead to delays in responding to online reports of crime.

As technology develops, and its use increases, it is likely that more people will report crimes online. It is therefore important that forces have effective processes to deal with online reports of crime.

Responding to reports of crime

The public have a right to expect the police to arrive quickly, or within their locally published response times. Worryingly, in all seven forces we inspected, interviewees told us that there were delays in their force’s response to reports of crime.

Demand for police resources often outstrips the supply and availability of officers and staff. This means that, too frequently, officers and staff are under pressure to leave crime scenes and respond to the next incident. Many chief officers told us they wanted their officers and staff to attend calls promptly and investigate thoroughly while they were at the scene. However, due to the lack of officers and staff available to attend these calls, it was often impossible to achieve both.

High demand in response policing negatively affects the quality of investigations. Some interviewees said that response officers were under so much pressure to respond to new calls, they were often unable to begin an investigation when responding to a report of a crime. This was a recurring theme in our fieldwork.

Investigating reports of crime

Allocating crime reports for an investigation

Most forces have a crime allocation policy, but some policies are more effective than others. Generally, we found that forces allocated crimes to the right teams, but not always to the right investigators within those teams. This was often because the teams didn’t have enough appropriately trained and accredited investigators.

Some forces have designed internal systems and processes to record, assess and allocate crime investigations, but these systems and processes inherently cause delays and are not victim focused. In forces that have such convoluted processes, there can be a significant delay in contacting victims. We believe this is having a major impact on the willingness of victims to support some investigations. This also negatively affects forces’ ability to successfully investigate crime, and it erodes public confidence.

Investigation plans

Investigation plans help investigators record information such as the reasonable lines of enquiry they have identified, and how they intend to carry out the investigation. Not all forces have clear guidance in relation to investigation plans, including what they should contain and who should complete them.

We found that some forces didn’t use investigation plans effectively. This included not using them at all, having different approaches as to who completed them, and copying and pasting from other plans. We also found that in some of the forces that monitored whether investigations had plans, they measured the quantity of completed plans, rather than their quality.

Timeliness of investigations

In far too many cases, officers and staff take too long to complete crime investigations. The reasons for this vary but are often outside the investigating officers’ control. The reasons include forces diverting officers and staff from their normal duties to other work, a lack of digital investigators and support, and high officer workloads.

The decrease in police officer numbers between 2010 and 2018, and then the rapid increase in numbers as a result of the Police Uplift Programme, has led to a large proportion of officers having fewer than 5 years’ service. In the year ending 31 March 2016, 14 percent of police officers across forces in England and Wales had fewer than 5 years’ service. By the year ending 31 March 2024, this figure had increased to 36 percent. Interviewees often told us that the inexperience of investigators and supervisors contributed to delays because they didn’t know how to progress investigations.

When investigators complete files, legal requirements, such as those that relate to disclosure, can cause delays. Many investigators told us they thought Crown Prosecution Service processes caused too many delays to investigations. However, if the police improve file standards, this would reduce delays relating to Crown Prosecution Service advice.

Identifying and dealing with crime scenes and evidence

To provide a foundation for an effective investigation, it is important for officers and staff to secure and preserve evidence. We found that call handlers, responders and investigators were often inexperienced. This meant they had a limited understanding of the need to do this, and how to do it.

Some forces give guidance and support to officers and staff to help them understand the importance of securing and preserving evidence. This includes specialist investigators, such as digital forensics experts and crime scene investigators, attending scenes and giving advice. However, interviewees in some forces told us there weren’t enough crime scene investigators.

Forces need to accredit their forensic science activities, but at the time of our inspection, not all forces had achieved accreditation. Many interviewees told us about the adverse effects of accreditation, such as an increase in the time it takes to examine a crime scene. The Forensic Science Regulator has noted these concerns and is taking steps to resolve them.

Using technology in crime investigations

Forces are increasing their use of IT, but lack of knowledge and incompatible systems are hindering further progress.

An example of the IT available to forces is the Police National Database (PND), which holds records from more than 55 agencies, including police forces in England and Wales, the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and Police Scotland. The PND holds more than 6.2 billion searchable records and is an invaluable tool for all investigators. However, its use varies considerably between forces.

In our fieldwork, we found that forces didn’t use PND facial searching as much as they could. This was often due to a lack of knowledge of its capabilities and a misunderstanding of the benefits it can bring to an investigation. We also found that some forces promoted its use more than others.

We heard about the steps the NPCC is taking to improve awareness of the PND. However, there needs to be a national awareness campaign to make sure the benefits of the PND reach all relevant officers and staff.

Supervising crime investigations

Supervisors have a very important role in making sure investigators carry out high‑quality investigations.

We found that supervisors were generally effective at giving advice and direction to call handlers. However, in some forces, supervisors had limited oversight of calls to report crimes.

In too many investigations, supervision isn’t effective. Inexperienced supervisors often lack confidence and the ability to direct investigations. High workloads mean that many supervisors can’t provide effective supervision.

Early supervision of investigations is important, particularly for inexperienced investigators. In some forces, the mandated first supervisory review is too late into the investigation. Supervisors should play an important role in making sure investigators follow all reasonable lines of enquiry, but some forces are more effective than others at doing this.

Some forces have processes to improve the quality of their investigations and supervisory reviews. However, many forces’ performance management systems appear to be more focused on compliance and quantity, rather than on assessing the quality of investigations. This means that rather than focusing on the quality of their work, investigators and supervisors may focus more on activity that is easier to measure and targets that are easier to achieve.

The forces in which we found effective supervision had clear policies and procedures. They also had effective oversight, governance and performance management of supervisory actions.

Supporting victims throughout an investigation

Identifying repeat and vulnerable victims

Forces generally define repeat victims as those who have been a victim of crime more than once within a 12-month period. It is important that forces identify repeat victims as it can be an indication that they may be vulnerable.

Force IT systems can usually identify repeat or vulnerable victims, but some have limitations. For example, systems may not recognise a repeat victim if they call from a different phone number or if a third party makes a report on their behalf. Police need to become much more sophisticated in the way they identify and deal with repeat victims.

The Victims’ Commissioner for England and Wales (Victims’ Commissioner) told us she believes that forces let themselves down in the way they identify victims and manage the harm caused by a crime. She said that forces often see individual cases as standalone, especially when dealing with antisocial behaviour, stalking and harassment.

We found that after the initial assessment, not all forces had effective processes to monitor and review calls for vulnerability and repeat callers. When there are delays in allocating the call to a responder, there may be an increased risk to victims.

Dealing with and supporting victims

Victims don’t always receive the best service. In a previous report, we said that a combination of competing demands, high workloads, poor communication and lack of experience contributed to victims not always receiving the best service. We also said that too often, officers and staff didn’t have the skills and knowledge to give a good service to victims.

The services that organisations should give victims, and the minimum standard for these services, are set out in the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (Victims’ Code). The Victims’ Commissioner told us she believes there is a general lack of understanding of the Victims’ Code. Victims report to her that the initial contact with police is normally good, then their satisfaction decreases as the investigation continues. Victims have told her this is mainly because of the lack of updates and contact from the police. Findings from the Victims’ Commissioner’s survey show that victims lack confidence in the criminal justice system.

Support for victims is often available at the initial point of contact, and some forces have specialist teams in the control room to give support and advice when victims first contact the police.

Responders and investigators told us they couldn’t always give victims as much support as they wanted to. During our fieldwork, many officers and staff told us they were doing their best and wanted to provide a good service to victims. However, they said their workload prevented them from doing this as well as they wanted.

Support is usually available for victims during an investigation. We found that forces had processes in place for responders and investigators to refer victims to support services.

Too many victims disengage from the criminal justice process because of delays. We heard that these delays were often caused by problems such as high officer workloads, delays in obtaining charging decisions or the time it took for a case to be tried in court.

The Victims’ Code

Forces should prioritise improving compliance with the Victims’ Code. In our 2023–25 PEEL inspections, we found that many forces needed to improve:

• the way they assessed the needs of all victims so they could properly support them;
• their compliance with the requirements of the Victims’ Code; and
• their completion of victim contracts.

All forces have various levels of scrutiny to make sure officers and staff comply with the Victims’ Code. However, this scrutiny usually involves a quantitative tick-box process, rather than measuring the quality of the work forces do to support victims. Victims should be at the heart of the criminal justice process. It is important that they receive a high-quality service from the police, and that forces can measure the quality of that service, not just tick boxes.

Investigative training

To provide officers and staff with effective training to equip them to investigate crimes well, forces need to know the skills and experience the workforce has, and the skills it needs, to investigate crimes. Most forces have a good understanding of the investigative skills and capabilities officers and staff need.

The College of Policing sets the curriculum and learning outcomes for investigative training, and it produces guidance for investigators. It licenses forces to provide the training locally. The professionalising investigations programme sets out processes for investigator training and accreditation.

Investigative training for call handlers, responders and investigators

The College of Policing has a curriculum to train staff who have a role in supporting investigations. This includes call handlers and police community support officers. In most forces we inspected, part of the initial training for these roles related to investigations. However, not all forces give the College of Policing training to their staff who have a role in supporting investigations.

All responders, whether they attend the scene or not, have an important part to play in the investigative process and they should receive basic investigative training. We found that investigative training given to responders is inconsistent. Senior officers in most forces spoke positively about the quality and quantity of crime-related training their forces gave to responders. However, their positivity wasn’t always reflected by their officers and staff, many of whom told us their training didn’t equip them to investigate crime effectively.

Some forces have recognised that the investigative training provided to student officers wasn’t effective in preparing them to investigate crime. As a result, they have developed further training to supplement it.

Some forces have taken steps to overcome the lack of experience of their investigators and supervisors. They use more experienced investigators, including retired detectives, to give advice, guidance and support. Measures of this kind can work well.

We found that the training for those who investigate more serious offences was structured and standardised across forces, as was the training for their supervisors. However, many investigators and supervisors who work on volume crime told us their training was insufficient.

Many interviewees told us that investigative training, especially relating to case file preparation, wasn’t good enough. They also said that supervisors were often young in service and couldn’t give advice or guidance to officers and staff about completing a case file.

Records about investigative training and accreditation vary across forces. If forces don’t keep adequate records of investigative training and continuing professional development, they won’t be able to accurately assess how much training and continuing professional development they need to provide.

Investigative training for supervisors

Good supervision often leads to more effective investigations. It is therefore vital that supervisors receive sufficient training and guidance to supervise investigations.

Forces provide specific investigative training, using the College of Policing’s curriculum, for supervisors who oversee serious and complex investigations. Many interviewees told us that this training was effective. However, there is no similar training for those who supervise investigators who carry out volume crime investigations.

Most forces provide courses for newly promoted sergeants, police staff supervisors and inspectors. However, some supervisors who had attended them told us these courses focused on leadership and management skills, rather than training them on how to supervise crime investigations.

Some forces have taken steps to improve the way supervisors oversee investigations. These include:

• testing the ability of promotion candidates to supervise investigations;
• using peers to provide crime-related coaching and mentoring to supervisors; and
• providing training to improve supervisors’ investigative mindset.

We are pleased that the College of Policing has recognised that there is a gap in this area and is taking steps to improve investigative training for supervisors.

Understanding outcomes for reported crime

Positive outcomes

The police investigate millions of crimes every year. In the year ending 31 March 2024, they recorded 5.4 million crimes. Of these, 605,695 resulted in a positive outcome. However, between the years ending 31 March 2015 and 31 March 2024, the positive outcome rate across forces in England and Wales has steadily decreased. Over this period, the rate has decreased from 25.4 percent to 11.3 percent. This is worrying.

During this inspection, we examined some of the factors that may have contributed to this decrease. These include the amount of crime, changes in police officer and staff numbers, workloads, and the increased complexity of investigations.

Positive outcome rates vary from force to force. For example, for the year ending 31 March 2024, for forces in England and Wales, they ranged from 19.9 percent in the best-performing force to 6.8 percent in the worst-performing force.

For the year ending 31 March 2024, the positive outcome rate for the PSNI was 32.2 percent, which is higher than the rate for forces in England and Wales. During our inspection, we set out to understand why this is the case. The PSNI operates in a different social and political context to forces in England and Wales. We found several factors that we think have contributed to the service’s better positive outcome rate. These include:

• effective supervision of investigations;
• high-quality investigation plans;
• investigators following almost all available lines of enquiry; and
• officers and their supervisors having a good investigative mindset and seeing themselves as investigators.

Understanding and improving positive outcome rates

Police forces need to analyse and understand their outcome rates effectively. If they don’t do this, leaders can’t be confident they fully understand:

• what factors lead to specific outcomes;
• whether the outcomes are appropriate; and
• the improvements they need to make to provide justice for victims.

In most of the forces we inspected, we saw evidence of clear practices that allowed them to analyse, understand and improve outcome rates. However, some forces didn’t fully understand the factors that affect their outcome rates.

It is important that forces use the correct outcome codes when they finalise crimes. This means they can have a better understanding of why they close crimes, how they communicate with victims, and in what respects they need to improve.

During our fieldwork, we found that some forces had processes in place to make sure they supervised crime finalisations effectively and appropriately. However, at the time of this inspection, of the 31 forces we had inspected as part of our 2023–25 PEEL inspection programme, we found that many of them were using outcome codes incorrectly.

Out-of-court resolutions

In our ‘State of Policing: The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2022’ report, we said that since 2014, forces’ use of out-of-court disposals (now known as out-of-court resolutions) has more than halved. In our inspection, we saw consistent evidence of forces having an increased focus on out-of-court resolutions, although not all officers and staff understand the benefits of using them.

Prioritising investigations

Chief officer priorities

If officers and staff understand that carrying out high-quality crime investigations is a priority for the force, and chief officers make this clear, they are more likely to focus on it. Generally, we found that chief officers were effective at communicating this, but sometimes the message got lost when there were too many other priorities and competing demands.

Even when the message from senior officers about the importance of effective crime investigation was clear, we found that it could conflict with the force’s focus on responding to calls. Many interviewees felt that if officers had to decide between carrying out an initial investigation or promptly attending the next call, their focus would be on the latter.

We found that most forces had structured governance arrangements about crime investigations. However, interviewees in some forces told us that these arrangements, along with performance management frameworks, often focused on things that were easiest to measure and scrutinise, rather than on the quality of investigations.

During our fieldwork, we checked whether forces were routinely deprioritising or screening out any type of crime. Screening out crimes is when forces close a case before any investigation takes place.

It may be entirely appropriate to close a case before an investigation starts if there are no reasonable lines of enquiry or if it isn’t proportionate to carry out a line of enquiry. However, it isn’t appropriate for forces to routinely screen out crimes when there are proportionate and reasonable lines of enquiry.

In our fieldwork, we didn’t find any evidence that forces had policies setting out specific crime types that they wouldn’t investigate. Senior officers in some forces told us that they used to screen out certain types of crimes, such as low-value theft or minor criminal damage, but they no longer did this. In every force, interviewees told us that their force would investigate all crimes in which there was a reasonable line of enquiry.

One indicator that forces may be screening out some crime types is how quickly they close crime reports. When forces close crimes quickly, it could mean they haven’t had enough time to carry out a meaningful investigation or consider if there were reasonable lines of enquiry.

We examined data relating to the length of time between recording and closing a crime, and specifically those crimes that forces closed within 24 hours of recording them. Between the years ending 31 March 2018 and 31 March 2024, the proportion of offences that forces in England and Wales closed within 24 hours decreased from 24 percent to 16 percent. This may support what forces told us in our fieldwork: that they screen out fewer crimes for investigation than they did previously.

Retail crime

In 2014, a change in legislation led to a view among some retailers, police and members of the public that the police wouldn’t attend or investigate offences if the value of the stolen goods was under £200. Whether or not this view is correct, it is clear that from 2014 onwards, shoplifting offences in England and Wales began to increase. By the year ending 31 March 2024, recorded shoplifting was at its highest level in 20 years.

However, these figures relate only to the shoplifting offences that retailers report to the police and that the police record. A representative of the British Retail Consortium told us that retailers under-reported shoplifting offences. They said that some of the reasons that retailers didn’t report offences included:

• a lack of confidence that the police would do anything;
• a view that the police response was poor; and
• a perception that forces didn’t believe it was worth acting on thefts under £200.

In October 2023, the NPCC introduced its ‘Retail Crime Action Plan’. The aim was for the police to attend all reports of retail crime in which shop staff had detained a suspect or violence was involved. The British Retail Consortium reported that by January 2024, there was evidence that to some extent, this was working. They said that some forces were attending more incidents.

However, despite the efforts forces are making, it is clear that there is still a long way to go if the police are to improve retailers’ and the public’s confidence that they will treat shoplifting offences seriously.

Recommendations

Introduction

Background

One of the police’s greatest responsibilities is to investigate crime. In our ‘State of Policing: The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales 2023’ report, we described the three basic activities that the public would expect of the police:

• promptly answering the phone;
• attending incidents within their published response times; and
• investigating all reasonable lines of enquiry and keeping victims informed.

Too often, the police don’t meet these expectations. There has been a long-term decline in successful prosecutions, meaning that too few criminal investigations are leading to justice for victims.

This has adverse effects on the level of public trust and confidence in the police, which is unacceptably low. There is a general perception among the public that the police aren’t doing a good job of tackling the crimes that affect local communities.

At the time of our inspection, of the 31 forces that we had inspected as part of our 2023–25 PEEL inspection programme, we only graded one force as good at investigating crime, and none as outstanding.

We designed this inspection to help forces get better at investigating crime.

About us

His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) independently assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of police forces and fire and rescue services to make communities safer. In preparing our reports, we ask the questions that the public would ask, and publish the answers in accessible form. We use our expertise to interpret the evidence and make recommendations for improvement.

Our commission

This inspection forms part of our 2022–25 policing inspection programme and framework.

The National Police Chiefs’ Council, the College of Policing and the Independent Office for Police Conduct jointly supported our inspection.

We also worked closely with the Policing Productivity Review team, which has reported separately on how police forces could improve their productivity in relation to crime investigations.

Our terms of reference

Our terms of reference were to address the following questions:

• how effectively forces investigate crime and bring offenders to justice, including through following reasonable lines of enquiry;
• how well forces understand crime-related demand in their areas and match their resources to it;
• how effectively forces prioritise their investigations to maximise all opportunities to solve or prevent crime; and
• how effectively the police support victims through investigations from start to finish, including investigations that don’t result in a prosecution.

Methodology

The focus of this report is on volume crime. Our fieldwork took place between May and July 2024. We inspected Cheshire Constabulary, Cumbria Constabulary, Essex Police, Greater Manchester Police, Norfolk Constabulary, the Police Service of Northern Ireland and West Midlands Police. We carried out:

• a document review, in which we examined 130 documents, including policies, processes and force management statements;
• a review of all 31 published HMICFRS inspection reports from the 2023–25 PEEL inspection programme;
• a review of other relevant HMICFRS reports, and reports from other organisations;
• a case file review in which we examined 180 crime investigations, including at least 20 from each force, speaking directly to the investigators and, in some cases, their supervisors, and assessing the quality of the investigations;
• a joint review with the College of Policing of 79 initiatives forces have introduced to improve the standard of crime investigations, jointly assessing whether these initiatives amounted to either innovative or promising practice, and highlighting the most effective of these initiatives in case studies;
• a review of the main findings of the victim service assessments from the first 31 forces that we have inspected as part of our 2023–25 PEEL inspection programme, in which we assessed 3,199 investigations;
• a total of 63 interviews with senior police officers and staff, including leads for crime investigations and criminal justice;
• a total of 83 focus groups in police forces including supervisors, investigators, neighbourhood and response officers, and contact centre officers and staff;
• a further 32 interviews with chief officers, national police leads and external organisations; and
• reality testing cross each force we visited by speaking to individual police officers and staff.

Terminology in this report

To make it simpler to describe the investigative process from start to finish, including the roles involved, we use the following terms in this report. When we use the terms for the roles involved in an investigation, we are referring to the role carried out by an individual in the investigative process. Often, an officer or member of staff may carry out more than one role. For example, a response or neighbourhood officer may be a responder and investigator in relation to the same report of a crime.

Call handler

This includes any officer or member of staff, usually working in a control room, who deals with initial telephone or online reports of crime. It also includes anyone who works in a control room who assigns a call to an officer or member of staff to respond.

Responder

This includes any officer or member of staff who responds to a report of a crime, whether in person or in any other way, such as on the phone. Responders will typically be from a response, neighbourhood or desk-based team.

Investigator

This includes any officer or member of staff to whom a force allocates a report of crime for an investigation. The professionalising investigations programme (PIP) sets out the different levels of investigator, based on the training and accreditation they receive.

In this report, we focus on PIP level 1 investigators who carry out priority and volume crime investigations. We also refer to PIP level 2 investigators, who are usually called detectives. They generally investigate more serious and complex crimes.

Force

The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) is a service rather than a police force. When we refer to the PSNI directly in this report, we refer to it as ‘the service’. However, when we use the generic terms ‘force’ or ‘forces’, this might include the PSNI and the other forces. This is because in our thematic inspection reports, we don’t usually name individual forces or services, unless we are highlighting good practice.

When we refer to Home Office forces, we mean the 43 territorial police forces in England and Wales.

National

Our reports contain references to, among other things, ‘national’ definitions, priorities, policies, systems, responsibilities and processes. In some instances, ‘national’ means applying to England and Wales. In others, it means applying to England and Wales and Scotland, or the whole of the United Kingdom.

Training

We use the term ‘training’ to cover all aspects of learning and development. This includes face-to-face, online and self-taught learning opportunities, as well as the material that supports these courses. It also includes other ways that forces support their officers and staff, such as online guides and mentors.

Victim service assessment

The victim service assessment (VSA) is our assessment of the service each force provides to victims. This is from the point of reporting a crime and throughout the investigation. In this report, we refer to this as “our PEEL VSA reviews”.

Case file and PEEL VSA reviews

Sometimes in this report, the results from our case file reviews differ from the results of our PEEL VSA reviews. This is because they involve different methodologies. In our case file review, we spoke directly to investigators and supervisors. Our PEEL VSA reviews are done remotely, without interviewing investigators and supervisors. This is because of the high volume of reviews we carry out as part of our PEEL inspections.

1.  How effectively forces understand crime-related demand and match resources to it

In this chapter we report on how well forces understand crime-related demand and how effectively they match their investigative resources to it. We also examine how well forces understand the factors that affect their investigative resources, such as recruitment, retention, investigative workloads, and officer and staff well-being.

Understanding demand: How effectively forces understand crime-related demand and match resources to it

To investigate volume crime more effectively, forces need more officers and staff

In our ‘State of Policing 2023’ report, we said: “Systemic factors have negatively affected the police service’s ability to detect crime.” One of these factors was a shortage of resources, followed by a rise in inexperienced officers and staff.

During our inspection, we formed the same view.

We concluded that in order to investigate volume crime more effectively, forces need more officers and staff. We reached this conclusion based on the frequent and persuasive commentary we heard from interviewees about extraordinarily high workloads, findings from our case file reviews, and analysis of the data we include in this report.

We heard about this lack of resources in every force, not only from call handlers but from responders and investigators. Frequently, we saw the effect of this strain on their supervisors, line managers and chief officers, who also repeated the same message.

Interviewees told us that officers and staff often couldn’t investigate crime as well as they wanted to because their workloads were too high, they were under pressure and they didn’t have enough time. In chapter 2, we set out our findings showing that responders feel under pressure to attend the next call, at the expense of carrying out initial investigative enquiries. We also report that investigators sometimes can’t investigate crimes as thoroughly as they want to, or give high-quality updates to victims, because of the sheer volume of their workloads.

It is clear that too often, forces don’t have enough resources to investigate crime, especially volume crime, to the standard the public would reasonably expect. However, for forces to understand how many investigators they require, they also need to have a more thorough understanding of their crime-related demand.

Since 2015, recorded crime rates per 1,000 population have increased

Accurate crime recording is essential to build public trust and confidence in policing and make sure that victims of crimes have access to the right services. Results from the 2024 Crime Survey for England and Wales indicate that crime experienced by individuals and households has generally decreased over the last 10 years. However, despite a slight decrease in the year ending 31 March 2024, police-recorded crime in England and Wales remains higher than in 2015. In the year ending 31 March 2015, there were 62.3 recorded crimes per 1,000 population, compared with 89.7 recorded crimes in the same period in 2024, an increase of 44 percent. Improved police recording practices, and an increase in public reporting of crime, are likely to have contributed to this increase in police-recorded crime. The increase in police-recorded crime suggests there has been an increase in demand on the police.

Figure 1: Total police recorded crime (excluding fraud) per 1,000 population for forces across England and Wales, between the years ending 31 March 2015 and 31 March 2024

Source: Crime in England and Wales: Police force area data tables (year ending March 2015 to March 2024) by the Office for National Statistics, and police recorded crime and outcomes open data tables from the Home Office

The number of police officers and staff per 1,000 population has decreased since 2010

Between the years ending 31 March 2010 and 31 March 2024, after accounting for changes in the population, the number of police officers in England and Wales has decreased by 6 percent.

The lowest number of officers was in 2018, when there were 20 percent fewer officers than in 2010.

Between 31 March 2010 and 31 March 2024, the number of police staff has also decreased by 13 percent.

There has also been a steady decline in the number of police community support officers since 2010. Over this period, the number of police community support officers decreased by 59 percent.

Figure 2: Police workforce over time accounting for population change from the year ending 31 March 2010 to the year ending 31 March 2024

Source: Police workforce open data tables from the Home Office, and estimates of the population for England and Wales from the Office for National Statistics

The increase in digital evidence adds significant complexity to crime investigations

Many investigators said investigations were becoming more complex, due in part to the growing amount of digital evidence. The amount of digital evidence that investigators need to gather and examine has increased considerably over the past decade.

Digital evidence, such as footage from a video doorbell, CCTV or evidence held on a mobile phone, forms a large part of most volume crime investigations. For example, when investigating a burglary at someone’s home, there is often doorbell evidence and other sources of CCTV, such as from the victim, neighbours, the local authority, or nearby businesses. As well as searching for evidence such as witnesses, fingerprints and DNA, responders and investigators need to consider digital evidence as a reasonable line of enquiry. This evidence takes extra time to gather and review.

It also takes additional time to download and review large amounts of data about communications, which is held on mobile phones and computers – for example, when investigating offences such as those relating to domestic abuse, stalking and harassment.

It is highly likely that the amount of digital evidence relating to reports of crime will continue to increase. Forces need to consider this increased complexity when analysing their crime-related demand.

Most forces have a good understanding of their crime patterns

Interviewees in six of the forces we inspected told us they used software to analyse their crime-related data. They told us they used this software to understand the pattern of crimes across their force area and to determine which teams they allocated these crimes to.

For example, senior officers in the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) told us analysis gave them information about crime patterns, and that they could use that information in daily management meetings, where they reviewed demand and resources. They said the service also produced a monthly assessment focusing on the service to victims, local priorities and emerging risk. It showed repeat demand based on the location, offender and victim.

Analysis of future crime rates is inconsistent

Force management statements (FMSs) include information about forces’ analysis of demand. We examined the FMSs of the forces we inspected. Most had a good understanding of their current crime rates. We did see some predictions of future crime rates. However, it wasn’t always clear how forces made these predictions and on what data they based them.

In the FMSs, we saw that some forces made general predictions that certain crime types will increase or decrease. Other forces made specific predictions about percentage increases or decreases for certain crime types. Factors influencing these predictions were cited in FMSs as including:

• the cost of living leading to increased theft, robbery and burglary;
• developments in technology leading to increased cybercrime and fraud;
• increased victim confidence leading to more reporting; and
• circumstances specifically related to events in the force, such as protests and increases in associated offences.

During our fieldwork, we heard limited evidence about future crime rates. As a result, and based on the information in the FMSs, we aren’t confident that forces’ predictions of future crime rates are founded on in-depth analysis.

Forces don’t have an in-depth understanding of their crime-related demand

Crime-related demand doesn’t only include the number of recorded crimes. It also includes factors that affect the number and type of resources forces need to deal with these crimes. Forces can’t have a complete understanding of their crime-related demand unless they know how long it takes to investigate reports of crime and what resources they need to do this. They can then decide how many and what kind of resources they need to investigate those crimes.

In our ‘State of Policing 2023’ report, we said that another systemic factor that negatively affects forces’ ability to detect crime is the increasing complexity of crime investigations and completing case files for court. During our fieldwork for this inspection, a chief officer told us the complexity of investigations has increased, which means they take longer and require different skills to carry out. Many other interviewees also told us crime investigations have become more complex.

Although senior officers in many forces told us they understood their force’s crime‑related demand, this was usually only in relation to the number of recorded crimes. We understand that the circumstances and complexity of every crime are different, and the amount of time to investigate each one will vary. However, we found very limited evidence of forces carrying out any work to analyse complexity and the time it takes to investigate crimes.

Most forces use analysis of crime levels to determine the number of investigators

In four of the forces we inspected, senior officers told us they used their analysis of current and future crime levels to plan and allocate their investigative resources. Their analysis focused on the numbers of current and predicted crimes. It didn’t consider other factors that affect demand and the quality of service forces give victims.

In all the forces, senior officers told us they could move investigative resources to respond to changing circumstances. These could include the need for a fast response to a major crime, or a longer-term response to changing crime levels.

A chief officer in one force told us it carried out a “strategic demand analysis” every six months. This analysed:

• crime rates across the force and the resources needed to deal with those crimes;
• whether the resourcing was at the right level; and
• whether the force needed to move resources to address increasing crime rates in specific areas.

In one force, senior officers told us it had carried out some analysis to determine and allocate investigative resources. However, it still didn’t know how many officers and staff it needed and what level of training the force would have to give them. An interviewee told us: “We will have a gap. We haven’t worked out what we need yet.”

There is no consistent model to help forces decide how many investigators they need

A national lead told us there is no national agreement on a formula to determine how many professionalising investigations programme (PIP) level 2 investigators each force needs. Therefore, forces set their own numbers. These are frequently based on a subjective assessment of their local situation.

The interviewee also said it was difficult to get consistent data from forces on the number of fully qualified and accredited detectives. Unlike some other roles, such as firearms officers, there is no system that monitors investigators’ training, accreditation and continuing professional development. Many forces also use differently qualified officers and staff in the same roles, making a simple count of posts to assess the actual number of accredited investigators inaccurate. For example, an investigator dealing with domestic abuse may be trained to PIP level 2 in one force and to PIP level 1 in another.

We found that forces usually made sure they had enough officers and staff to investigate the most complex and serious crimes. However, as budgets are finite, this could often be at the expense of allocating resources to investigating volume crime.

Without an in-depth analysis of all crime-related demand, forces can’t accurately determine how many investigators they need, or the impact of these decisions on the service they provide to victims

Recorded crime rates have increased over the past decade, as we have shown in figure 1. Over that period, we have also seen:

• an increase in population;
• a reduction in the total number of police officers and police staff, taking into consideration the increase in population;
• an increase in the proportion of officers who have fewer than five years’ service; and
• an increase in the complexity of crime investigations.

As a result of all these factors, we believe that forces need more officers and staff in order to investigate volume crime more effectively.

However, in our view, additional resources are not a silver bullet; forces also need to better understand their crime-related demand, beyond knowledge and analysis of their current crime rates. Without this, they won’t be able to accurately provide an evidence-based assessment of the number of investigators they need and how they will deploy them.

There are many similarities between forces throughout England and Wales. We see these during our PEEL inspections, particularly in call handling, response, neighbourhood policing and local investigations. We acknowledge that many forces have some unique local contexts and challenges, but it is evident from our inspections that many of the risks, challenges and crimes that forces deal with are very similar. Despite these similarities, there is an inconsistent approach to how forces configure, structure and design the way they operate.

Forces continue to restructure their teams and allocate their officers and staff without having a complete understanding of the effectiveness or efficiency of different operating models. They don’t always consider how they will record, assess, allocate and investigate volume crime under new operating models, and the potential consequences of this for victims.

The College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) have a role to play in making sure forces have a consistent and effective approach.

Recruiting and retaining investigators

Forces find it hard to recruit investigators

A long-standing challenge for forces has been to recruit enough investigators. NPCC and His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) data shows that between the years ending 31 March 2018 and 31 March 2024, the number of accredited PIP level 2 investigators had increased from 20,356 to 22,832. However, over the same period, the shortfall in the number of these investigators had increased from 4,353 to 9,441.

This shortfall was based on forces’ own subjective assessments of the number of investigators they thought they needed, rather than being based on in-depth analysis.

An interviewee from a staff association told us that many officers and staff didn’t view the role of an investigator as an attractive career choice. The reasons for this include:

• unpopular shift patterns;
• on-call requirements;
• high workloads;
• high sickness levels;
• lack of welfare support; and
• poor work-life balance.

A senior officer in one force said that another factor deterring potential PIP level 2 investigators is that they would lose approximately £1,100 each year due to not receiving an unsocial hours allowance. Interviewees in many forces told us similar things.

Due to the difficulty in recruiting investigators, many forces use untrained officers and staff to fill vacancies. In our Operation Soteria progress report, ‘Progress to introduce a national operating model for rape and other serious sexual offences investigations’, we found that in nearly every force, half of the teams that investigate rape and serious sexual offences consisted of officers and staff who hadn’t completed their PIP level 2 training and accreditation.

We found a similar situation in our 2023–25 PEEL inspections. For example, in one force, we found several instances of the force moving officers and staff into safeguarding roles without providing any specific training to help them carry out those roles.

In our 2023–25 PEEL inspection, we found that Greater Manchester Police had taken steps to maintain its investigative capability while it carried out its plan to recruit more investigators. To do this, the force had employed 240 agency staff with investigation skills to support its investigation teams.

Across forces, there is no consistent approach to recruiting detectives

All the forces we inspected told us they intended to increase their number of investigators. In five of these forces, we found clear plans to attract more officers and staff to these roles, or to offer more support to those applying to become investigators. For example, interviewees in three forces told us they assessed new recruits to identify potential investigators.

A national lead told us that the route to becoming a detective, which involves completing the national investigators exam (NIE) and being accepted on to PIP level 2 training, isn’t standardised across forces in England and Wales. They said many forces have their own processes for considering applications for detective roles.

We found that some forces had a very structured approach, encouraging officers and staff to apply, and supporting applicants to help maximise success rates. Senior officers in three of the forces we inspected told us they supported officers to pass the NIE. This included providing paid study leave, free learning resources, coaching and places on crammer courses (courses designed to help boost revision). Other forces didn’t put anything in place for applicants until they had passed the NIE at their own expense.

Some forces offer additional payments to officers and staff who become accredited as PIP level 2 investigators:

• In our 2023–25 PEEL inspection of Kent Police, we found that the force gave officers an annual payment as an incentive to becoming detectives.
• A senior officer in Essex Police told us that the force gave detective constables in certain roles an additional £1,200 per year.
• In our 2023–25 PEEL inspection, we found that Staffordshire Police gave £750 bonus payments to accredited PIP level 2 investigators in hard-to-fill roles.

Not all forces use direct entry to detective routes

Direct entry detective programmes offer officers opportunities to become detectives sooner than they would through other entry routes into policing. As well as seeing it as a way of increasing the number of detectives, forces view the direct entry route as a way of attracting a wider range of recruits into policing. This includes attracting applicants with experience in other careers and from diverse backgrounds. Forces started to introduce this entry route in 2017.

A national lead told us that at the time of our inspection, 31 forces had some form of direct entry detective programme in place.

In August 2022, we published our PEEL spotlight report ‘The police response to burglary, robbery and other acquisitive crime: Finding time for crime’. We reported that supervisors in several forces told us they were concerned that direct entry detectives didn’t receive enough training. Some supervisors said those detectives were so overwhelmed with the volume and expectations of the work, they resigned. Some senior detectives told us they arranged extra training to help overcome these concerns.

Senior officers in Cheshire Constabulary told us they had carried out work to find out why some officers who had joined the constabulary in June 2021 as part of its first direct entry detective cohort had ended up leaving the scheme. The constabulary identified various reasons. One reason was that some applicants wanted to join the constabulary but not as detectives. They had joined through the direct entry detective programme as it was the only entry route into the constabulary at that time. That programme comprised two years of training to be a constable, with additional detective training. Some officers left the constabulary, and others decided to stay in uniformed roles rather than becoming detectives.

The senior officers told us that another reason for direct entry detectives leaving the role was that prior to joining, they didn’t fully understand what the role of a detective involved.

To help retain its direct entry detectives, the constabulary designed a new fast-track detective entry programme. It told us that all officers who joined under this entry route in 2023 had remained on the programme.

The constabulary carries out recruitment campaigns and clearly explains the different entry routes. It also holds extensive familiarisation sessions for both detectives and uniformed officers. Senior officers spoke directly to those who joined under the 2023 fast-track direct entry programme to make sure they understood what the role involves. The constabulary also makes sure direct entry detectives receive mentoring and support throughout the various learning stages from senior detectives in the areas in which the applicants were posted.

During our inspection, we heard both positive and negative views about the direct entry detective programme. In one force, an experienced detective told us: “There are some really switched-on officers, who will make good leaders in the future. We’re privileged to have a lot of these young people.”

Other interviewees spoke of their concerns that the scheme recruits to detective roles people who lack policing experience. They said this meant that direct entry detectives didn’t have the basic policing skills that detectives need.

Officers often find it hard to move into investigative roles

Even in forces that have a direct entry detective programme, most investigator applications are from officers in response and neighbourhood teams. In many forces, we heard there was a shortfall in the number of response officers. Those forces therefore found it hard to release officers who applied to become investigators. In three of the forces we inspected, interviewees told us that the force didn’t always release officers from response teams when they applied to become investigators.

Many forces find it hard to retain investigators

Once forces have recruited investigators, it is important that they have in place a strong commitment to retaining them. We found that most forces were taking steps to retain investigators once they had recruited them, but that they still found it hard to stop some of them leaving the force or looking for other roles. In one force, some investigators told us that many of their colleagues had resigned as they felt they hadn’t received adequate training for the role.

Retention is also affected by recruitment campaigns in other forces or regions. For example, senior leaders in one force told us that the force’s geographical location made it hard for them to retain detectives. The force is located between several other large forces, which can offer more competitive financial incentives or direct entry to specialist units. Interviewees in the force told us it had put in place exit interviews. Also, when officers and staff are thinking about leaving, the force gives them the opportunity to discuss their reasons. Interviewees told us this approach was beginning to reduce attrition.

Interviewees in other forces also told us senior detectives carried out a form of exit interview with investigators to identify any themes or opportunities to retain them.

In another force, investigations supervisors told us they had seen an increase in the number of people resigning from local investigation teams and leaving the force. One said the reason for investigators leaving was their “high-risk, high-volume workloads”, which continued to increase. To keep up with that level of work, investigators had to regularly work long hours, often having an adverse effect on their home life. Some were therefore leaving to work in roles with less stress and fewer hours. Interviewees also said that some investigators looked for transfers to other units and specialist posts, where their workload and levels of stress would be much lower.

Senior officers in some forces told us that promotion was another factor affecting their ability to retain detectives. Often, detectives want to progress in their careers and apply for promotion. This normally means that they move (at least temporarily) to non‑detective roles on promotion. Interviewees told us they were considering measures to reduce the effect this was having on detective numbers. These measures included allowing detectives to stay in investigative roles on promotion. There are arguments for and against this approach.

Greater Manchester Police has introduced PIP coaches to improve the way it recruits and retains investigators.

Workload and well-being

Most forces identify investigators with high workloads

Home Office data shows that between the years ending 31 March 2014 and 31 March 2024, the number of crimes recorded per police constable has increased from 34.9 to 46.3 a year. This is an increase of 32.6 percent. Although not all these recorded crimes result in an investigation, this data could suggest that workloads for investigators have increased over the past ten years.

We found that all the forces we inspected had systems in place to monitor investigators’ workloads. However, these systems were usually based solely on monitoring the number of cases, rather than also considering the complexity of each investigation. In all the forces, we heard from many investigators that their workloads were too high.

Senior officers in most forces told us that if the number of investigators’ cases goes above a threshold, the force offers them extra support. For example, Cheshire Constabulary and Cumbria Constabulary offered additional support to investigators with more than 20 cases.

In Cheshire Constabulary, this support included:

• giving them time to complete their investigations;
• not allocating new investigations to them;
• giving them a weekly opportunity to meet experienced supervisors to discuss their cases and get advice; and
• contact with a chief officer to discuss whether they needed further support.

Interviewees in Greater Manchester Police told us a quality assurance team monitored the quality of investigations and officers’ workloads. When it identified a problem with the standard of an investigation, or any officers who had high workloads, members of the team intervened to offer support and guidance, or to reallocate some of those officers’ investigations.

PSNI investigators and their supervisors told us that their high level of supervisory scrutiny of investigations meant that supervisors had a good understanding of their teams’ workloads.

However, in one force, some investigators told us they believed the focus of senior officers was to improve performance, rather than to support investigators and reduce workloads. They felt that the feedback from senior officers focused on what investigators were doing wrong, rather than what senior officers could do to support investigators.

Investigators and their supervisors are frequently overwhelmed by the size of their workloads

In one force, interviewees told us that to try to keep on top of their work, supervisors and investigators logged on to force systems when they should have been on their days off. In another force, some investigations supervisors told us they regularly worked for four to five hours on their days off. One said this was “just to keep on top of things”.

In a third force, some detective inspectors told us they were working on their days off to make sure they kept on top of their crime investigation reviews. For example, one told us their team had 980 open investigations, and that they had to review all of them every 90 days.

Response supervisors in one force told us they had unmanageable workloads, which took them away from some of their core duties. They told us this led to them being mostly desk-based. They said they didn’t get to go to many crime scenes and often did unpaid work when they should have been off-duty. This was to complete reviews that they couldn’t do in their working hours.

Cumbria Constabulary’s FMS states that the constabulary gives officers on training courses time to manage their crimes. Training course timetables incorporate “crime time” to allow officers dedicated time to manage their crimes. However, in some other forces, we heard that student officers kept their cases while they were on courses at university. This increased the time taken to investigate those crimes and often overwhelmed students.

Investigators in another force told us they were carrying too many cases. They said they didn’t understand the allocation policy and that the crime allocation was random. They also said they didn’t think the force understood the effect on investigators of having high workloads. They told us the force allocated many of these cases to local investigation teams, which consisted of student officers who had little experience. Interviewees said the student officers on these teams were overwhelmed by the volume of work and that their lack of experience led to poor-quality case files.

A manageable workload and good supervision can lead to more effective investigations

In our case file review in the PSNI, we saw examples of responders investigating crimes that other forces would normally allocate to PIP level 2 investigators. In our view, responders investigated these cases well, and there was effective supervision. Responders told us they were comfortable investigating these crimes. They said their supervisors gave them enough time to carry out the enquiries, and investigators from specialist departments were available to support them.

We also found that investigators in the PSNI had a caseload that was generally lower than that held by investigators in the other forces we inspected. One investigations supervisor told us they believed workloads were considerably higher for investigators and supervisors in other forces. The supervisor commented that, in their opinion, this was “setting the officers [in other forces] up to fail from the outset”.

All forces have well-being policies and processes

We found that all the forces we inspected had systems and processes in place to monitor and manage investigators’ well-being. However, some officers and staff told us they thought force well-being policies were just a tick-box exercise. Forces need to make sure they are fully committed to putting these processes in place.

When asked about investigators’ well-being, much of the information forces gave us related to the general well-being of the workforce, rather than being specifically about investigators. Examples forces gave us of their processes to monitor and improve well-being included:

• discussions with supervisors in personal development review meetings;
• occupational health units;
• employee assistance programmes;
• access to regional treatment and rehabilitation centres; and
• force well-being plans and boards.

In one force, senior officers told us that part of the well-being support they gave their investigators was to give them protected time to catch up with work. However, investigators in that force told us the force often cancelled this protected time without notice because of new work. This left them unable to manage their workload effectively, or deal with witnesses or victims.

Senior officers in Essex Police told us the force had some initiatives to manage the well-being of its officers and staff. For example, as part of a well-being project, an NHS therapist provides support and counselling to officers and staff who investigate online child abuse offences. The NHS therapist works in partnership with the force’s counselling and well-being team.

Workload and the working environment are closely linked to well-being

Investigators in one force told us high workloads were having a negative effect on well-being. They said that when they struggled with their mental health due to the stress of having a high workload, they felt they could approach their supervisor. The supervisor could reallocate crimes to reduce their workload, but there was a limited number of officers and staff to allocate them to. This resulted in officers and staff with already high workloads having to take on even more investigations. One investigator told us: “It just goes to someone else – a revolving circle.”

Investigations supervisors in one force told us members of the senior leadership team were approachable and supportive. However, the working environment of investigators was often poor, with old furniture and equipment, and dirty offices.

Interviewees in some forces told us there were mandatory or voluntary psychological assessments, or additional well-being support for investigators in high-risk roles. In other forces, we heard that they had withdrawn this support because of a lack of funding. We heard that when support wasn’t mandatory, officers and staff in relevant roles didn’t always take it up. In another force, interviewees told us that funding problems had led it to reduce the size of its occupational health unit. This meant the level of support the unit could give officers and staff had reduced.

The NPCC recruitment, retention and wellbeing of investigators group has created a wellbeing of investigators toolkit. It did this by working with other organisations, including the College of Policing, Oscar Kilo, the Police Federation of England and Wales, HMICFRS and police forces. We encourage all chief constables to make sure their force uses the toolkit to support its investigators’ well-being.

2.  How effectively police deal with reports of crime

In this chapter we consider whether officers and staff involved in receiving reports of crime, and those deployed in the subsequent responses, have an investigative mindset. We also report on what officers and staff understand by the term ‘reasonable lines of enquiry’ and how well they:

• deal with initial reports of crime;
• assess threat, harm and risk;
• give advice about securing and preserving evidence; and
• allocate resources to reports of crime.

We also examine whether forces give officers and staff enough time and support to manage crime scenes and identify reasonable lines of enquiry.

Investigative mindset

Officers and staff should have an investigative mindset from the moment the force receives a report of a crime

The effective investigation of crime requires the police officers and staff involved – all of whom are acting as investigators – to adopt an investigative mindset. This is a mindset characterised by professional curiosity, a desire to collect information, check it thoroughly, and, very importantly, maintain an open and questioning mind. They should adopt an investigative mindset from the moment the force receives a report of a crime.

Our reports that followed two police investigations, one concerning a serial killer and one concerning false allegations of child abuse, illustrate the disastrous consequences of the police not adopting an investigative mindset.

The police use the term golden hour principle to describe the period immediately following the report of an offence or incident (not strictly an hour). This is a time-critical opportunity to take effective early action to secure evidence that would otherwise be lost, damaged, concealed, destroyed or altered. Everyone involved – call handlers, responders and other investigators – will have their own golden hour opportunities. Officers and staff in these roles often play a key part in investigating crime, so it is important that they all have an investigative mindset.

We found that this was frequently missing. While some officers and staff had an investigative mindset, we found that too many didn’t because they didn’t see themselves as investigators.

Some call handlers see themselves as investigators

In all the forces we inspected, we spoke to many call handlers who viewed themselves as investigators. In one force, an interviewee told us that as part of the seven-week training package call handlers received, the force “drummed into them in the classroom” what an investigative mindset was. Other interviewees in the force expressed the same sentiment. In a different force, although the call handlers considered themselves to be investigators, they said it wasn’t in their job description. Control room supervisors in one force thought the call handlers wouldn’t consider themselves to be investigators. However, a focus group of call handlers in that same force said they felt they had a role as crime investigators.

In one force, chief officers told us they didn’t view call handlers as part of the investigative process. In another force, some call handlers told us that although they recognised that the questions they asked callers would help an investigation, crime investigations weren’t their primary focus when they took calls.

It is important that forces equip and train call handlers to discharge their investigative responsibilities. We address this in chapter 5, recommendation 10.

Many response and neighbourhood officers don’t think their primary role is to investigate crimes

In two of the forces we inspected, some neighbourhood officers who respond to reports of crime told us they considered themselves to be investigators. Response supervisors in another force told us they encouraged their officers to apply professional curiosity, and to have an investigative mindset when attending crime scenes. However, supervisors who review crime files in that force told us response officers had little consideration about investigating crimes or securing evidence. One said: “It’s been happening a while and getting worse due to new officers and loss of experience.”

In another force, response and neighbourhood officers didn’t think their primary role was to investigate crime. Neighbourhood officers told us they saw themselves as problem solvers, and response officers said they considered themselves to be responders.

In a different force, supervisors told us that the role of response officers was to record details of crimes, but not to investigate them. This was because of the pressure to move on to the next call. One interviewee said: “You either arrest or write it off. There’s nothing in between. Response cops just want to get rid rather than long-term problem solve.”

If responders don’t have an investigative mindset, they may miss opportunities to secure and preserve evidence, and to identify lines of enquiry.

The police need to build a stronger investigative mindset and culture

Over the past ten years, many forces introduced operating models that didn’t require response officers to investigate crimes, other than carrying out the golden hour actions at the scene. A chief officer told us these operating models prevented or discouraged officers and staff from developing and maintaining an investigative mindset throughout their service.

Chief officers in another force told us they faced challenges in changing the culture among officers and staff who hadn’t investigated crime for the past ten years. They told us that many supervisors also hadn’t supervised a crime investigation during that time.

One senior officer told us that many forces had moved away from this model of policing, but it had resulted in a generation of officers, and their supervisors, who have had limited experience of investigating crime. In chapter 3, we comment further on the importance of effective supervision.

We found that some forces have made positive progress in this area, but forces need to do more to resolve the gaps in knowledge and experience.

To achieve the best possible outcomes for victims of crime, chief officers should encourage their officers and staff, particularly those who receive and respond to the initial report of a crime, to have an investigative mindset. We refer to inexperience throughout this report and examine what some forces are doing to address it.

Reasonable lines of enquiry

Officers and staff are generally confident in their understanding of what is a reasonable line of enquiry

The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 Code of Practice states:

“In conducting an investigation, the investigator should pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether these point towards or away from the suspect. What is reasonable in each case will depend on the particular circumstances.”

In the forces we inspected, we found that officers and staff usually identified and followed reasonable lines of enquiry. They were generally confident in their understanding of what reasonable lines of enquiry were and could give us good examples to show this.

However, in the absence of a clear explanation of what constitutes ‘reasonable’, they tended to use their own judgment when deciding which enquiries to progress. This led to some officers and staff applying different interpretations of ‘reasonable’ and not following lines of enquiry that their colleagues would. For example, we found that sometimes officers and staff decided not to follow a line of enquiry because they incorrectly assumed that the force’s budgetary limitations would prevent them following it.

When officers and staff told us what they thought a reasonable line of enquiry was, they included explanations such as:

• common sense;
• the need to be proportionate to the crime;
• what the public would expect them to do; and
• anything else they could do to try to find an offender, such as collecting and reviewing any CCTV, carrying out house-to-house enquiries, and arranging for forensic examinations of crime scenes.

Officers and staff need a clearer explanation of what is reasonable

Many officers and staff told us there were no clear guidelines in relation to what reasonable lines of enquiry are. In one force, interviewees told us the force didn’t define reasonable lines of enquiry. In other forces, we didn’t find any documents defining reasonable lines of enquiry. Interviewees in one force told us it had drafted a document describing reasonable lines of inquiry but hadn’t yet introduced it.

We examined the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice (APP) linked to investigations (investigation APP) to see what guidance it gives to police officers and staff. We don’t think reasonable lines of enquiry are clearly defined in the investigation APP.

The College of Policing should produce additional guidance about what is reasonable, together with examples, to help officers and staff identify and develop the reasonable lines of enquiry they should consider following in each investigation. The guidance should take a proportionate approach to what would be considered reasonable under the circumstances. This should also help the police comply with the requirements of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 Code of Practice.

Dealing with initial telephone or online reports of crime

Performance in responding to crimes reported online, and by phone, varies across forces

In this report, we use the phrase “deal with report of crime”. By this, we mean the period from the initial receipt of the report of crime, at the first point of contact, through to the response. The response might include contacting victims and witnesses, and attending the crime scene.

People can report crimes to the police in several ways. The usual ways of doing this are by telephone or online. All police forces should promptly answer telephone calls and other forms of contact from the public. We found that some forces dealt with calls to report crime and online reports of crime much better than others.

We found evidence that some forces dealt with online reporting as effectively as they dealt with telephone reporting. These forces made good use of technology to make their processes for responding to initial telephone or online reports of crime effective and efficient.

For example, we found Greater Manchester Police had a system that automatically converted Single Online Home reports to incidents on its command and control system. This meant the force reviewed online reports of crime in the same way as crimes reported on the telephone. Operators didn’t have to check email accounts for these online reports.

As technology develops and its use increases, it is likely that more people will report crimes online. It is therefore important that forces have effective processes to deal with online reports of crime.

In some forces, online reports of crime can take longer to deal with

We found that when call waiting times were too long, some forces moved call handlers from dealing with online reports to answering phone calls. Also, not all teams assigned to dealing with online reports were available 24 hours a day. This could lead to delays in responding to online reports of crime.

In one force, we found that victims who used online reporting may not have received the same service as those using the telephone. The force had a range of online channels available for people to report crimes. Some call handlers dealt with the online reports. However, when demand was high, they were often moved to answer telephone calls. We found a similar situation in another force. This delayed the response to online reports.

In another force, we found delays in processing non-urgent calls to report crimes. From 7am until 7pm each day, staff reviewed emailed reports of crime. However, they didn’t review reports received outside these hours until the following day.

In our 2023–25 PEEL inspections, we also found several examples of forces in which processes for responding to initial telephone or online reports of crime were ineffective.

Assessing threat, harm, risk and the seriousness of the offence

In some forces, delays and ineffective processes mean there is still room for improvement when assessing risk

It is important that forces carry out timely, accurate and consistent assessments of the seriousness of the offence and the level of threat, harm and risk. This is already a core part of our PEEL Assessment Framework (PAF) 2023–2025. In our PEEL VSA reviews, we found evidence that call handlers assessed risk effectively in 2,351 (95 percent) of the 2,468 applicable cases we reviewed.

However, in four of the seven forces we inspected, we found that the assessments of threat, harm, risk and the seriousness of the offence weren’t always effective. In one of these forces, call handlers had to complete a risk assessment if a person reported a crime to them. However, the force didn’t require a risk assessment if someone reported a crime in person to an officer or member of staff.

In another force, some interviewees told us that call handlers didn’t always gather and record enough information to accurately assess the risk. They gave an example of a call to report a serious crime in which the call handler didn’t include all the relevant details on the incident record and didn’t assess the associated risk effectively. We found that the force also didn’t always assess the risk effectively, particularly when there were delays in reviewing reports of crime.

In a different force, we found that there weren’t enough officers and staff to deal with online reports effectively. This could mean that risk assessments weren’t carried out quickly enough. A supervisor in that force told us that one online report of rape was “days old”.

We found another force’s systems didn’t automatically link victims to other crimes in which they had also been the victim. This could mean that the risk assessment wasn’t effective.

Giving the public advice about securing and preserving evidence

Call handlers sometimes miss opportunities to give advice about securing and preserving evidence

We spoke to call handlers and their supervisors about giving advice on securing and preserving evidence to callers reporting a crime. Most call handlers told us their knowledge of scene preservation came from their initial training, on-the-job experience and by asking colleagues for advice.

We found that some call handlers were inexperienced. They had a limited understanding of the need to secure and preserve evidence, and how to do this. In one force, call handlers told us they could access crime-specific guides through the force intranet. This gave them step-by-step guidance on preserving evidence. In other forces, call handlers told us they had access to online help, such as templates, scripts, prompts and frequently asked questions.

However, for online reports of crime, there was often a delay in giving advice about securing and preserving evidence. In some cases, by the time a call handler dealt with the report, the force had missed opportunities to secure and preserve evidence.

In our PEEL VSA reviews, we found evidence that call handlers gave appropriate advice on preserving evidence in only 625 (78 percent) of the 803 applicable cases we reviewed. This means that in about one in five incidents, forces may have missed an opportunity to gather evidence that could have led to a positive outcome.

Responding to reports of crime

Demand often outstrips the supply and availability of officers and staff

The public have a right to expect the police to arrive quickly, or within their locally published response times. Worryingly, in all seven forces we inspected, interviewees told us there were delays in their force’s response to reports of crime.

Many interviewees told us there often weren’t enough officers and staff to respond to incidents. In one force, response officers told us they found their role “challenging” because there weren’t enough of them. They said that at times of high demand, the force didn’t have enough response officers available to respond to incidents, including reports of crime.

We found that some forces had desk-based officers and staff who dealt with crime reports without the need to send an officer. For example, in the Police Service of Northern Ireland, call handlers dealt with crimes and incidents, giving advice to victims when there were no lines of enquiry to follow. When officers didn’t need to attend in person, call handlers could refer calls to the telephone resolution unit. A sergeant in the unit assessed whether it could deal with the incident. If appropriate, the unit allocated the call to an officer to deal with over the telephone. Crimes that the service deemed potentially suitable for the telephone resolution unit included low-value theft and criminal damage with no witnesses.

Too frequently, officers and staff are under pressure to leave crime scenes

We found that, all too often, officers and staff attending reports of crime were under pressure to leave the scene and respond to the next incident. This meant those attending reports of crime couldn’t always:

• take the necessary time to speak to victims and witnesses;
• obtain a full account;
• identify lines of enquiry; or
• begin an investigation.

During our fieldwork, we found that forces prioritised answering calls and attending crime scenes promptly over carrying out enquiries and gathering evidence. This situation is far from ideal, but we could also see why it was happening as forces must make very difficult choices about what to prioritise. Many chief officers told us they wanted their officers and staff to attend calls promptly and investigate thoroughly while they were at the scene. However, due to the lack of resources available to attend these calls, it was often impossible to achieve both.

High demand in response policing negatively affects the quality of investigations

In one force, supervisors told us that the volume of calls meant that officers struggled to carry out all elements of the initial investigation. Interviewees said response officers were under so much pressure to respond to new calls, they often couldn’t begin an investigation at the time of the initial response. Other interviewees told us they felt that the number of officers and staff across the force wasn’t high enough to provide a good service and to carry out effective investigations. One interviewee said: “I’m not sure where everyone has gone.” Another said: “Everyone is just spinning plates.”

Response officers in another force told us they felt they were “slaves to the radio”, and that they felt under pressure to go to the next high-priority incident. They said the workload and demand on them negatively affected the quality of investigations. They said they didn’t always have the time they needed to identify and progress all reasonable lines of enquiry. These officers said they were constantly exhausted and as they were likely to be responsible for investigating crimes from the further calls they responded to, the pressure on them increased. They worried about adding to their workload. Sometimes their supervisors allowed them to stay in the office to carry out investigations. However, one said that the lack of officers meant they were too frequently “dragged off” to deal with incidents.

In the same force, neighbourhood officers and staff told us they had time to deal with their enquiries. Unlike their colleagues in response teams, the control room didn’t put them under pressure to finish a call. However, they said the force diverted them from their neighbourhood role and used them for tasks such as covering for response teams and guarding crime scenes. This reduced the time available for them to investigate crime effectively.

In another force, we also heard that there was pressure on response officers to respond to the next call. Response officers told us their supervisors and call handlers asked how long they were going to be at a call. Only experienced officers had the confidence to challenge this when they knew the call would take time for them to deal with effectively.

Investigative supervisors in the same force told us that when they received investigation files from response officers, they were often poor and key lines of enquiry (golden hour principles) were sometimes not completed. This was because the priority for those officers was to meet response times rather than to start an effective investigation. This was a recurring theme in our fieldwork.

3.  How effectively forces investigate reports of crime

In this chapter we report on how effectively forces allocate and investigate crimes. This includes:

• how well investigators use investigation plans;
• the timeliness of investigations;
• how investigators deal with suspects and crime scenes; and
• the technology available to support crime investigations.

We also examine how well supervisors oversee crime investigations.

Allocating crime reports for an investigation

Most forces have a crime allocation policy, but some policies are more effective than others

To allocate crime effectively, forces should, without unnecessary delay, allocate crimes to appropriately trained and accredited investigators.

In our PEEL VSA reviews, we found evidence that forces allocated crimes for investigation effectively in 3,081 (96 percent) of the 3,197 applicable incidents we reviewed. However, in our case file reviews during this inspection, we found this was the case in 141 (78 percent) of the 180 investigations we reviewed. Performance varied considerably across the seven forces.

We found that four forces allocated all cases, or the vast majority of them, to the right officers and teams to investigate. However, in two of the other forces, we found this was the case in only 30 percent and 41 percent of investigations respectively.

We found that most forces had a crime allocation policy, but some policies were more effective than others.

During our inspection, we found that Cumbria Constabulary had an effective crime allocation policy, which helped the constabulary make sure it appropriately allocated crimes to investigators. The constabulary gave each crime type a category of 1, 2 or 3, using a crime allocation matrix. Professionalising investigations programme (PIP) level 1 investigators retained responsibility for category 1 crimes – for example, theft and criminal damage. Category 3 crimes, such as robbery or a burglary of a person’s home, went to PIP level 2 detectives. A detective sergeant reviewed category 2 crimes, such as stalking and harassment, and decided which team to allocate the crime to. There was also flexibility in the policy to take into account other factors, such as complexity and vulnerability. This meant the constabulary could allocate lower-level crimes to more experienced investigators if necessary. Supervisors allocated crimes to individual investigators after considering their workloads. The policy also had a process for resolving any disputes between different departments about these allocations.

In another force, however, interviewees told us the allocation policy wasn’t effective. The interviewees said that less experienced investigators had to negotiate with more experienced or specialist colleagues before reallocating a complex crime to them. On occasions, this resulted in some investigations inappropriately remaining with PIP level 1 investigators. Examples interviewees gave us included a complex fraud case, possession of drugs with intent to supply, and sexual offences.

Forces don’t always allocate crimes to the most appropriate investigators

Generally, we found that forces allocated crimes to the right teams, but not always to the right investigators within those teams. We found examples of serious and complex crimes being allocated to inexperienced investigators. In many cases, this was because although the force allocated these crimes to the right teams, often the teams didn’t have enough appropriately trained and accredited investigators.

We found that one force allocated some crimes to officers who didn’t have the appropriate skills, knowledge or experience to investigate them. For example, interviewees told us about a PIP level 1 officer who was investigating an allegation of importation of cannabis. This involved digital evidence and the potential exploitation of a child. One of the interviewees said that the officer “had no understanding” about how to proceed with the investigation. This was because the officer didn’t have the right level of training and accreditation. The interviewees said that the officer received the digital download but didn’t know how to present evidence from it.

Interviewees also told us about another officer who was investigating a complex fraud involving multiple suspects. They told us the force didn’t allocate a financial investigator to support the officer.

Interviewees in one force told us neighbourhood officers were feeling the pressure of carrying investigative workloads. This was because many officers hadn’t investigated crime in the past ten years. Although individual officer workloads weren’t particularly high, the officers weren’t experienced in carrying out investigations. An interviewee told us: “It’s not complex but they’ve never investigated anything before. They are quite fearful.”

In our 2023–25 PEEL inspections, we found similar problems of inappropriate crime allocations in several forces. In one force, newly recruited officers were investigating crimes that included obvious vulnerability, such as those involving indecent images of children, child abuse, and sexual offences. In another force, neighbourhood officers were investigating organised crime groups, seemingly in contravention of the force’s crime allocation policy.

Some forces have systemic delays in their processes to allocate crimes for an investigation

Some forces have designed internal systems and processes to record, assess and allocate crime investigations, but these systems and processes inherently cause delays and are not victim focused.

We found that one force was taking as long as two weeks to allocate some crimes for an investigation. When the force received a report of a crime, if it didn’t need an emergency response, the force sent the report for quality assurance, processing and then allocation. In this force, we found large backlogs and long delays in dealing with calls to report crimes.

In another force, we saw evidence of lengthy delays before it allocated crimes to investigators. A supervisor in the force told us it took three weeks for the force to allocate a crime to an investigator. They said that delays of up to two weeks weren’t unusual. They said this was because of delays in the quality assurance and linking processes for investigations.

In our case file reviews, we also found delays in allocating investigations. In one force, we reviewed 20 investigations and found that in 9 of them, there were delays of 48 hours or more before the force allocated them to an investigator. The force also allocated an additional 5 cases to investigators who didn’t have the skills or experience to carry out the investigation. In another force, we reviewed 22 investigations and found that the force hadn’t allocated 6 of them for between 4 and 14 days. Ineffective processes caused some of these delays. Other delays were because of the time it took supervisors to allocate the crimes. The force appeared to incorrectly allocate a further 3 of the cases. In some cases, we found that the force allocated crime investigations to the correct department, but not all investigators in that department had the appropriate levels of investigative training and accreditation.

In forces that have such convoluted processes, from the initial report of a crime to allocating it to an investigator, there can be a significant delay in contacting victims. We believe this is having a major impact on the willingness of victims to support some investigations, particularly those involving violent crime. This also negatively affects forces’ ability to successfully investigate crime, and it erodes public confidence.

Investigation plans

Investigation plans can help, but only when forces use them effectively

Investigation plans help investigators record information such as the reasonable lines of enquiry they have identified, and how they intend to carry out the investigation. Some forces have clear guidance in relation to investigation plans, including what they should contain and who should complete them.

In our PEEL VSA reviews, we found an appropriate investigation plan in 1,864 (86 percent) of the 2,164 applicable files we reviewed. In our case file reviews for this inspection, in 5 forces we found an appropriate investigation plan in all the crimes we reviewed.

However, in one force, we found that only 2 of the 22 files we reviewed had a good investigation plan. The other 20 investigation files either had no investigation plan or one that was of poor quality. Interviewees in that force told us it didn’t require investigators or supervisors to complete them. When we reviewed the quality of the 22 investigations, we found that investigators had followed reasonable lines of enquiry in only 10 of these cases.

In the Police Service of Northern Ireland, we noted the excellent quality of the investigation plans in the files we reviewed. All the cases we reviewed had an investigation plan. In some of the cases, supervisors had drafted them before allocating the crime to an investigator. All showed in detail the actions that were taken, as well as the actions proposed.

We also found that Cumbria Constabulary made good use of investigation plans as part of its approach to investigations. The constabulary’s principles of investigation framework provided a clear structure at all stages of the investigative process. The constabulary used several mnemonics to help with this. It also gave officers and staff detailed guidance about what they should include in the plan.

In our case file reviews in Cumbria Constabulary, we assessed the way investigators and supervisors were using this framework. In all the crimes we reviewed, we found an appropriate investigation plan, in line with the framework.

Some forces don’t use investigation plans effectively

In one force, we found that investigators and supervisors were using and formatting investigation plans inconsistently. This was because the investigation plans differed, depending on who wrote them. Some supervisors told us they believed it was the responsibility of the officer to create the investigation plan, while other supervisors said they wrote the plan.

In another force, we found little evidence that senior officers recognised the importance of investigation plans. As a result, there wasn’t an explicit direction to use them. Senior officers in that force told us investigation plans weren’t necessary in all cases. One chief officer said: “I don’t think you necessarily need them. It has to be proportionate.” We found evidence that officers and staff rarely used investigation plans in that force. When they did, the plans were often ineffective. In a focus group in the force, one officer reported that when their supervisor reviewed and allocated investigations, very often the tasks or investigation plans were a generic set of actions copied from another document.

Investigating officers in the force told us that their sergeants didn’t always put investigation plans on crime reports. Some supervisors simply wrote “to investigate” on the report and expected officers to know what they needed to do. Our case file review in this force found that the number of appropriate investigation plans, the effectiveness of supervision and the quality of the investigations were all poor.

Some forces measure the quantity of investigation plans, rather than assessing their quality

We found that in some of the forces that monitored whether investigations had plans, they measured the quantity of completed plans, rather than their quality.

For example, we found that one force’s performance management system identified if an investigator had completed an investigation plan, irrespective of the quality of the plan. Simply put, if an investigator had attached a plan to the crime report, the system recorded it as a positive result. When we reviewed the performance management system, we found that there were very few investigations that included a plan. We examined some of the investigation plans. Even though the performance management system had given a positive result, we found the plans to be very brief and lacking detail. For example, one plan said: “H2H, MG11, arrest S.”

Timeliness of investigations

There are too many delays in completing investigations

In far too many cases, officers and staff take too long to complete crime investigations. In our PEEL VSA reviews, we found there were unjustified delays in 281 (9 percent) of the 3,189 applicable cases we reviewed.

In our case file reviews for this inspection, we found evidence of delays in investigations in 53 (29 percent) of the 180 applicable cases we examined, across all seven forces. The reasons for the delays varied but were often outside the investigating officers’ control.

During our fieldwork, interviewees told us that the reasons for delays included:

• investigators spending time in training, at events and on policing operations;
• investigators covering for response teams;
• the time it takes to obtain digital, forensic and medical evidence;
• investigators’ high workloads, leading them to prioritise higher-risk cases at the expense of lower-risk ones;
• investigators’ and supervisors’ inexperience;
• the legal requirements relating to disclosure and redaction (explained in more detail later in this chapter); and
• Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) processes.

Investigations are sometimes delayed by forces diverting officers and staff from their normal duties

Investigators we spoke to, in both interviews and as part of our case file review, often told us that when the force diverted them from their normal duties, it caused delays in their investigations. They said this was for a variety of reasons, including:

• covering for response teams;
• training;
• constant observations of high-risk people in custody;
• guarding crime scenes or detainees in hospital; and
• policing operations and events.

Interviewees also told us that student officers with protected learning time, or who had to attend university, were struggling to complete their investigations. This can cause delays to investigations and lead to investigators having to cancel appointments with victims and witnesses. Delays to investigations can undermine public confidence in policing.

A lack of digital investigators and support can contribute to delays in investigations

Delays in obtaining digital evidence was the cause investigators cited most frequently for their investigations taking so long.

Some investigators said they waited months to receive evidence from digital downloads. This included evidence from examinations of both victims’ and suspects’ devices. One officer said: “I submitted a phone for a full digital download [on a drug importation offence valued at £10,000], but once it was sent back, I had no understanding of how to examine the download and how to evidence the contents. No one will help me.”

Supervisors in another force told us about delays in cases relating to offences of possession of indecent images of children. The force policy was for officers not to make arrests until digital examiners had fully examined devices and given the relevant evidence to the investigator. This meant that sometimes investigators didn’t arrest potential offenders for several months. Any delay in arresting a potential offender means that they could commit further offences.

In a national interview, a representative of the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) digital, data and technology coordination committee told us there aren’t enough digital investigators. These are specialist investigators who gather and analyse evidence from digital devices. This results in lengthy delays in obtaining evidence from digital devices, and it leads to loss of evidence that is only held on a device for a limited time, such as content on some social media applications. The interviewee also said that digital investigators are often not available, as many forces don’t yet recognise the necessity for round-the-clock access to them. As such, forces are often continuing to miss quick-time investigation opportunities.

We found that some forces were addressing this by using digital technology.

Some forces have reduced delays in obtaining medical and forensic evidence

Investigators in several forces told us about delays in obtaining forensic or medical evidence, such as a statement from the doctor who treated a victim for their injuries. Delays in receiving medical evidence are particularly relevant in cases of domestic abuse and other violent offences.

If investigators can’t obtain this evidence while a suspect is in custody, it can lead to forces releasing suspects, and to lengthy delays before the CPS makes a charging decision.

Some forces (see the case study below) receive medical evidence for crime investigations much more quickly than was previously the case.

High officer workloads lead to delays in some investigations

In one force, an investigator told us: “We don’t have the time or space to investigate properly.” Interviewees said that on some days, they don’t get any opportunity to progress ongoing cases as they are dealing with new cases. Some investigators only have two days in every ten when they can progress existing cases and investigations. One investigator told us: “Victims call for updates, and we can’t tell them anything. It’s embarrassing really.”

Investigators told us that when they had a high workload, they sometimes didn’t manage to investigate the lower-priority cases because they had received new ones that were a higher priority.

In one force, supervisors told us investigators should investigate and close lower-risk child protection investigations within 28 days. However, they said that because of the high workloads in some specialist teams, this rarely happened. In another force, interviewees told us that because of increased workloads, some investigators chose to investigate those cases that offered “quick wins” to the detriment of more prolonged investigations.

In a national interview, we heard that in several studies, researchers have examined the relationship between police crime workload and case outcomes. These studies suggest that higher police workloads are linked to fewer positive outcomes. The interviewees also said that national data suggests that as workload increases, the challenge to manage each investigation grows, together with the ability to complete investigations. The analysis indicates that investigators tend to prioritise investigations based upon the seriousness of the crime. This could mean they may not pursue high-volume, less serious crimes that they may be able to successfully investigate.

The number of inexperienced police officers has increased rapidly

Between 31 March 2010 and 31 March 2018, the number of police officers in the 43 Home Office forces in England and Wales decreased from 143,734 to 122,404. In July 2019, the Government announced plans for a Police Uplift Programme to recruit an additional 20,000 police officers by 31 March 2023. To achieve this, and taking into account the number of officers leaving for reasons such as retirement and resignation, forces had to recruit more than 46,000 new officers.

One of the consequences of the gradual reduction in police officer numbers from 2010, and the rapid increase since 2018, is the effect this has had on the level of inexperience. Home Office data shows that, in the year ending 31 March 2016, 14 percent of police officers across forces in England and Wales had fewer than 5 years’ service. In the year ending 31 March 2024, this figure had increased to 36 percent. The inexperience of officers, staff and supervisors is a theme running throughout this report.

The inexperience of investigators and supervisors contributes to delays

Interviewees often told us that the inexperience of investigators and supervisors contributed to delays because they didn’t know how to progress investigations. For example, we found response officers were investigating crimes that were beyond their capability and training, such as complex fraud.

An interviewee in Cheshire Constabulary told us the constabulary had recognised that officers’ inexperience hindered effective investigations. As a result, in 2022, the constabulary created a route for all student officers, which took them from their initial training to 12 weeks’ tutorship in response policing. From there, officers joined an area-based investigation team, in which they carried out volume crime investigations. Officers weren’t allowed to apply for other roles until they were competent investigators, could build a prosecution file, and understood the legal requirements of disclosure.

When investigators complete files, legal requirements can cause delays

At the end of December 2020, the Director’s Guidance on Charging (sixth edition), the revised Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure and the revised Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 Code of Practice came into force. These changes have considerably increased the work the police must do before sending a file to the CPS for a charging decision. For example, the police must redact all rebuttable presumption material and complete schedules of unused material.

In October 2023, the Policing Productivity Review reported that investigators spend about 770,000 hours each year redacting text material. The forthcoming report on the inspection into joint case building by the police and the CPS, carried out jointly by us and His Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, will contain more detail about these requirements.

One interviewee described disclosure obligations as a “nightmare”. They said investigators spend huge amounts of time on disclosure for case files, which has a knock-on effect on the time they have available to investigate other crimes. Although time-saving redaction technology is available, the onus is on the investigator to do any redaction, rather than the CPS doing it.

In another force, supervisors who review files told us that redaction standards need to improve. They said that officers had limited knowledge of what they had to redact. The CPS had given feedback to the force about the poor standard of redactions in crime files.

Investigators believe that CPS processes cause too many delays to investigations

In most forces, investigators told us of their frustrations with the amount of time CPS processes added to their investigations, and the delays this caused. In our interviews with investigators, a common cause of their frustrations was the incompatibility between the police and CPS IT systems.

This is an area that will be covered in greater detail in the forthcoming report on joint case building by the police and the CPS.

Improving file standards would reduce delays relating to CPS advice

In this inspection, a senior officer in one force told us that investigators often complained to them about the CPS causing delays to investigations and sending back lengthy action plans. However, the force couldn’t challenge the CPS about this because it recognised that its own file quality standards were poor. The interviewee said: “Files are sent back for things being scanned in upside down. We’ll start challenging them on that when we get more than 50 percent file quality being sent to them.”

The interviewee also told us that CPS lawyers were frequently having to write multiple actions plans and review files three or four times. This means both the police and the CPS sometimes have to do more work due to the police submitting unnecessary or poor-quality files.

In a national interview, an interviewee told us about how the police and CPS were looking to improve their working arrangements. Cheshire Constabulary, Merseyside Police and the CPS were trialling the use of real-time conversations to resolve issues. This helps prosecutors and the police resolve issues in real time, rather than relying on written advice notices and responses.

Identifying and dealing with suspects

Some forces don’t identify and deal with suspects effectively

In our fieldwork, we examined the way investigators identified and dealt with suspects. Earlier in this chapter, under ‘Timeliness of investigations’, we discussed delays in investigations and why they occur. Delays in investigations often result in investigators not arresting or interviewing suspects as quickly as they should.

In our case file reviews, we found evidence that investigators hadn’t identified and dealt with suspects effectively in two of the seven forces. In one force, investigating officers arrested or interviewed suspects at the earliest opportunity in only 12 of the 20 applicable investigations we reviewed. This was mainly due to the workloads of response officers, who investigated some crimes. We had similar findings in another force.

Performance was better in the other five forces. For example, in Cumbria Constabulary, we found good processes to identify and deal with suspects. Supervisors monitored outstanding suspects as part of their regular reviews of investigations. During the initial investigation, investigators and supervisors prioritised identifying and managing suspects. Response sergeants described how, during ongoing incidents, they immediately directed an officer to identify and search for suspects. In our case file reviews in the constabulary, we found that investigators had identified and dealt with suspects effectively in 17 of the 20 investigations we reviewed.

Some forces deal with suspects effectively

In our 2023–25 PEEL inspections, we found some good examples of forces identifying suspects and dealing with them effectively.

For example, we found that Kent Police could identify its outstanding suspects and had an effective governance structure to manage and prioritise the suspects’ arrests. The force used a predictive analytical product to prioritise action against those suspects who posed the highest risk. Many were suspects for offences linked to domestic abuse. The force made effective use of its dedicated domestic abuse proactive teams to locate and arrest these suspects.

Similarly, we found that Merseyside Police proactively pursued offenders and effectively managed outstanding suspects and high-risk offenders to protect the public. It monitored high-risk suspects daily and assigned officers to locate and arrest them. The force had a proactive policing team, Operation Hunted, which it could direct to locate and arrest offenders. The force had good governance and oversight of its use of bail. It also had a good understanding of performance through its performance management system and dashboard.

Non-attendance by defendants at court delays the victims receiving justice

In an effective justice system, it is reasonable for the public to expect that when an offender is charged, bailed or summoned to attend court, they attend. When this doesn’t happen, it often has negative effects on victims, witnesses and the criminal justice system. These include:

• causing distress and inconvenience to victims and witnesses;
• delays in court proceedings; and
• eroding public trust and confidence in the criminal justice system.

Most importantly, it leads to delayed justice for victims.

Defendants not attending court also puts additional demands on His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunal Service, the CPS and the police. These include:

• ineffective use of court time and facilities;
• re-scheduling court appearances;
• issuing warrants;
• updating national IT systems; and
• the need to locate and, in many cases, arrest the defendant.

As a result, making sure defendants attend court would considerably reduce these negative effects and additional demands.

Identifying and dealing with crime scenes and evidence

Some forces give guidance to officers and staff to help them understand the importance of securing and preserving evidence

In our fieldwork, we found that officers and staff in many forces understood the golden hour principle, and the importance of securing and preserving evidence when responding to reports of crime. In some cases, forces gave officers and staff documents to help them better understand what actions they should take at a scene. For example, Cheshire Constabulary’s investigation standards and crime management policy had a specific section on the golden hour principle.

We found that Norfolk Constabulary neighbourhood officers and staff had a good understanding of the golden hour principle, and about preserving the scene and identifying witnesses. An eight-point plan guided them. Cumbria Constabulary, meanwhile, had trained police community support officers to help investigators with crime investigations, such as by doing house-to-house and CCTV enquiries. The constabulary gave training and tutorship to help them.

Inexperienced officers and staff don’t always secure and preserve evidence at crime scenes

To provide a foundation for an effective investigation, it is important for officers and staff to secure and preserve evidence. We found that call handlers, responders and investigators were often inexperienced. This meant they had a limited understanding of the need to secure and preserve evidence, and how to do this.

In one force, we found that some responders didn’t always understand the value of securing and preserving evidence at the scene of a crime. A supervisor told us that some responders had to be “spoon fed” and that supervisors attributed this to inexperience. One supervisor in the force told us neighbourhood officers were often young and inexperienced so weren’t used to managing crime scenes. They said: “They’re better at problem solving rather than scene management.”

Investigators in the same force told us that when they were handed investigation files so they could continue an investigation, the quality of those files was very poor. One supervisor described the quality as “atrocious”, and said that there was often no CCTV, house-to-house or medical evidence contained in the files. The interviewee told us this was due to the force having a young-in-service workforce, which lacked experience and faced demands it couldn’t readily meet. They said response officers “go from grade 1 [attending an emergency call] to grade 1 without doing the basics. There’s not enough of them.”

We found similar situations in our 2023–25 PEEL inspections. Some officers reported that the quality of handovers and investigations could be extremely variable, and that some were of very poor quality with a lot of outstanding actions. This meant responders hadn’t always secured and preserved evidence. It created additional demands on investigators, who had to then go to crime scenes to secure any evidence that responders hadn’t initially gathered.

Some forces support inexperienced investigators to help them manage crime scenes

We found that some forces use specialists to support inexperienced officers and staff to manage crime scenes, and to secure and preserve evidence. In one force, response officers told us that depending on the seriousness of an offence, trained and accredited investigators would visit crime scenes to support them. In another force, interviewees told us that in some cases, digital forensics experts offered advice about which digital items to seize as potential evidence. Deploying experts to a crime scene allows them to assess it more quickly and triage digital devices.

In the same force, a specialist investigator told us they thought people in their role had “the luxury of time” to properly investigate their cases. The investigator said that officers and staff in local policing, who deal with volume crime and attend incidents, had limited time to investigate.

Crime scene investigators support officers and staff to secure and preserve evidence

In all the forces we inspected, investigators felt that crime scene investigators (CSIs) supported them well. Many interviewees told us CSIs advised responders on securing and preserving evidence. They attended scenes of crime and incidents to recover and document forensic evidence, such as fingerprints and DNA. In one force, interviewees spoke highly of the force’s CSIs and felt that being located at the same sites was a huge benefit. They said CSIs were approachable and would discuss cases with investigators to make sure they had considered all forensic lines of enquiry.

In three forces, interviewees said that CSIs also gave advice to members of the public about how to preserve evidence.

Digital technology helps CSIs give advice to investigators and the public

Earlier in this chapter, in case study 3, we reported on Cumbria Constabulary’s digital capabilities, which include the support CSIs give to responders, investigators and the public in that force. As part of the joint review with the College of Policing of force initiatives, we visited the multi-force CSI control room in West Yorkshire. We were impressed by the system, as well as the guidance the CSIs gave to officers and the public.

In some forces, there aren’t enough CSIs

In our 2022 PEEL spotlight report on the police response to burglary, robbery and other acquisitive crime, we said that some forces didn’t have enough CSIs or forensic experts, and this meant they couldn’t investigate or solve serious acquisitive crimes well enough.

In this inspection, we found similar evidence. In three forces, we heard that CSI numbers didn’t meet demand. In one force, interviewees told us that the geography of the force area and high levels of CSI vacancies were causing problems or delays in attending crime scenes. The force prioritised using CSIs for serious crimes and major incidents. As a result, there was limited availability of CSIs to support response teams. A senior investigator said that there had recently been a stabbing in the force area and there was only one CSI for three crime scenes, which all had evidential value. They said: “There is a high threshold to call out a CSI.”

Some forces haven’t achieved accreditation for their forensic science activities

In 2023, the Home Office published the Forensic Science Regulator: Code of Practice. This sets out the accreditation forces need for their forensic science activities. To achieve accreditation, forces need to make sure their facilities, policies and processes, people, systems, and equipment comply with the relevant international standards. At the time of our inspection, some forces hadn’t yet achieved full accreditation.

In two forces, we heard that the requirement for the force to achieve and maintain accreditation had reduced the number of operational CSIs and their supervisors. One interviewee told us that their force’s financial position meant it couldn’t pay for additional subject matter experts to implement accreditation. Therefore, it had to use operational staff to do this, reducing their availability for their core role.

In one force, interviewees told us that some of the locations where its CSIs were based weren’t accredited. This meant the force had to reduce the number of bases. As a result, CSIs covered larger geographical areas and often took longer to get to crime scenes.

In several forces, interviewees told us that accreditation had increased the time the CSIs needed to spend at crime scenes. In one force, an interviewee told us that forces now had to apply anticontamination procedures in the same way at all crime scenes, whether it was serious and complex, or volume crime.

A CSI lead in another force told us that “an average burglary used to take 45 minutes. It now takes three to four hours. Rather than attending six or seven burglaries a day, CSIs can only attend two.” This reduces the availability of CSIs because they examine fewer scenes during a shift.

An NPCC lead told us that the Forensic Science Regulator had noted the adverse effect of accreditation on crime scene examinations. As a result of this, and the views of others including senior police forensic leads and the Forensic Capability Network, the Regulator has made amendments and clarifications to version 2 of the code of practice, which is due to be laid before Parliament in 2025.

The NPCC lead also told us that the changes to the code of practice that the Regulator intends to make will make sure regulation is effective and proportionate. The lead said that chief constables, forensic leads and practitioners support the changes.

An interviewee in one force told us it had moved to a new contract with external forensic providers, which led to a 20 percent increase in costs. They said that due to resource and capacity issues among forensic providers, the providers weren’t achieving their contractual turnaround times for case submissions. For some cases, it was taking 12 months or more to receive forensic results. When the force needs a faster turnaround, they have to pay the provider additional costs. This was having a substantial negative effect on the force’s budget for external forensic analysis.

Using technology in crime investigations

Forces are increasing their use of IT, but lack of knowledge and incompatible systems are hindering further progress

We found evidence of an increasing use of technology to support crime investigations. Examples included:

• analysing CCTV images;
• using artificial intelligence to help with case file redaction obligations; and
• video calls with victims and witnesses.

We found that some forces were developing the way they use body-worn video to give officers and staff advice and direction.

We were impressed with Cumbria Constabulary’s investment in and use of technology – for example, auto-redaction software. One investigator told us that using this software was a “godsend” on a large investigation. They said: “It has saved a lot of time. Something that would have taken a full day takes a few hours now.”

Like other forces, the constabulary uses drones for investigative purposes. Cumbria Constabulary covers a large, rural area, and it frequently uses drones to help search for high-risk missing people. The constabulary also makes particularly good use of CCTV.

However, the range of IT platforms in use, and the incompatibility of these platforms across forces, means sharing initiatives relating to technology with other forces is unnecessarily difficult.

The Police National Database

The Police National Database is an invaluable tool for investigators

The Police National Database (PND) holds records from more than 55 agencies, including police forces in England and Wales, the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and Police Scotland. If there is intelligence on a person in one area of the country, police can check what other forces and agencies know about that person.

The PND holds more than 6.2 billion searchable records and is an invaluable tool for all investigators. The number of records is increasing all the time as new databases and agencies are added.

Investigators can complete several types of search using the PND. The most common one is when investigators search for what is known about people, objects, locations or events. Investigators can also use the PND to carry out searches automatically at set times. These are called scheduled searches. For example, investigators can schedule a weekly search to check for new information. In addition, the system can run triggered searches. For example, if an investigator identifies an individual of interest, they can place a marker on them. If any new information is added about this person, the investigator will receive an automatic notification.

If an investigator sends an image to the PND, the system will search it within minutes against the images in its database. The PND will then send back the best‑matching results. These results are for intelligence purposes only and it is for the investigator to further research the results. We found numerous positive examples of investigators using facial searching.

Forces use the PND inconsistently

Home Office data shows that forces across England and Wales use the PND inconsistently.

For example, the data shows that in the year ending 30 September 2024, three forces had completed more than 30,000 scheduled searches each, and two further forces had completed more than 10,000 scheduled searches each. In the same period, five forces had completed fewer than 50 scheduled searches each.

Officers and staff need training and a licence to use the PND

Users of the PND must receive training and a licence that allows them to access the system. In several forces, interviewees told us that there weren’t enough licences, and that this was limiting their ability to use the PND.

Home Office figures show that from 1 January 2024 to 30 April 2024, there were 12,666 enabled licences for Home Office forces in England and Wales and the PSNI to use the PND. However, during that period, the forces only used 76 percent of these licenses.

From 1 August 2024 to 30 November 2024, the number of enabled licenses had decreased to 11,895, and forces’ use had increased to 83 percent. While this is a move in the right direction, forces with the licences need to make sure they issue them to the right people to get the maximum benefit. It is important that officers and staff in control rooms and custody centres can access this important intelligence tool.

Forces are using the PND facial searching technology more, but not enough

In our fieldwork, we found that forces didn’t use PND facial searching as much as they could. This was often due to a lack of knowledge of its capabilities and a misunderstanding of the benefits it can bring to an investigation. We found that PIP level 2 investigators had a better knowledge of PND facial searching than PIP level 1 investigators. The use of facial searching is increasing, but most forces don’t fully exploit its capabilities.

In one force, we found that it was predominantly PIP level 2 investigators who used facial searching. We found that PIP level 1 investigators rarely used it. In another force, some investigators used PND facial searching capabilities and saw it as a beneficial tool. However, other investigators preferred to share images locally with colleagues to identify suspects. In our case file reviews, we found that in two forces, officers and staff had no knowledge, or very limited knowledge, of facial searching using the PND.

There may be several reasons for the inconsistency in the way forces use facial searching. We found that some forces promoted it more than others. For example, in some forces, investigators couldn’t close an investigation in which there was an image that hadn’t been sent to the PND. In our view, all forces should introduce facial searching as part of their investigation policy.

To help chief constables achieve this, the College of Policing should update relevant authorised professional practice (APP), and any other related training material, to give guidance to officers and staff about searching images against the PND and any other relevant databases. This should include guidance that forces should not close an investigation until they have checked that investigators have searched images against these databases.

Awareness of PND facial searching needs to improve

We heard about the NPCC lead for the PND’s efforts to improve awareness of the PND. This included quarterly meetings with regional representatives to address any problems and highlight instances in which the PND has had a positive effect on investigations. However, there needs to be a national awareness campaign to make sure the benefits of the PND reach all relevant officers and staff.

In November 2023, the NPCC lead, together with the Home Office, started a facial searching pilot project in 15 Home Office forces. The aim was to increase forces’ use of facial searching. The project team worked with the pilot forces, and they identified some barriers that were preventing an increase in forces’ use of facial searching. The pilot led to changes, including:

• improving policy;
• making sure each force had a senior officer lead for the PND; and
• local awareness campaigns.

From 1 October to 31 December 2023 compared to 1 January to 31 March 2024, there was an increase of 69.3 percent in the pilot forces’ use of facial searching for recorded crimes. This was compared to an increase of only 31.6 percent in the other Home Office forces in England and Wales plus the British Transport Police. Chief constables should make sure they are aware of the findings from this pilot and take steps in relation to any learning.

Supervising crime investigations

Supervisors are generally effective at giving advice and direction to call handlers

In all the forces we inspected, we saw evidence that supervisors usually provided effective direction and advice to call handlers and monitored how they dealt with the calls.

We found that Cheshire Constabulary had a dedicated quality assurance function in the force control room. Six members of staff quality assured the response to initial reports of crime. In another force, call handlers told us they felt supported by their supervisors. Call handlers said they could always go to a supervisor for advice, and that the supervisors were knowledgeable, approachable and helpful.

In some forces, supervisors have limited oversight of calls to report crimes

We found that one force limited its quality assurance to dip sampling five calls per month for each call handler. Supervisors in another force had to dip sample two calls per month for each of their call handlers. However, the checklist they used to assess how the call handler dealt with the call didn’t include anything to assess how they began an investigation when taking a report of a crime. None of the supervisors could remember ever giving a member of their team feedback about initial investigative actions.

Call handlers in another force told us they received inconsistent advice from their supervisors. In a different force, call handlers told us that their supervisors didn’t tend to get involved in their responses to calls unless they specifically requested it. One said that supervisors “very seldom” sit in and listen to calls unless they ask them to.

In too many investigations, supervision isn’t effective

In our case file reviews, we found that supervision was effective in only 138 (77 percent) of the 180 applicable cases we reviewed. Performance varied considerably from force to force.

In one force, all the investigations we reviewed had effective supervisory oversight. In another force, all but one of the 24 investigations had good supervision. However, in a different force, only 7 of the 22 investigations we reviewed had effective supervision. The other 15 investigations had either no supervisor reviews or the reviews were ineffective, of poor quality and lacked direction.

For example, one investigation was over 12 months old and there was an outstanding suspect who the investigator hadn’t interviewed. There was no investigation plan and no update from the investigator for three months. The crime had several supervisory reviews, but these reviews just noted that the case was still open. One review simply said: “Case ongoing.”

This isn’t good enough.

Evidence in our PEEL VSA reviews was similar to the findings in our fieldwork. In our PEEL VSA reviews, we judged that supervisors provided effective supervision at the start and throughout the investigation in only 2,155 (80 percent) of the 2,699 applicable cases we reviewed. The problems we identified were predominantly inconsistent supervision, inexperienced supervisors and high workloads.

In 11 of the first 31 forces that we have inspected as part of our 2023–25 PEEL inspection programme, we found consistent evidence that forces didn’t have effective supervisory oversight of crime investigations. In each of these forces, we issued the force either an area for improvement or made a recommendation to address this problem. This included making sure there was an investigation plan where applicable, supervisory oversight, and that investigators take all investigative opportunities.

Inexperienced supervisors often lack confidence and the ability to direct investigations

Supervisors have a very important role in making sure investigators carry out high‑quality investigations. In our PEEL VSA reviews, we found a strong link between effective supervision, including investigation plans, and cases that we assessed as having been investigated effectively.

A consequence of a young-in-service workforce is that many supervisors are also inexperienced. Many have little experience of completing effective investigations. They therefore don’t have the ability or confidence to give effective advice and direction to make sure officers and staff carry out all reasonable lines of enquiry.

In one force, some neighbourhood policing team supervisors said their lack of experience affected their ability to give direction and advice to responders. The supervisors also said they didn’t have much experience of investigating crimes, and that they hadn’t received any investigative training since their initial training.

In another force, officers told us that inexperienced supervisors reviewed their investigations. They said that the force had a lot of temporary sergeants, who weren’t held in the same high regard as substantive sergeants. They said temporary sergeants didn’t close crimes when it was appropriate to do so because they were worried about getting it wrong.

Response officers in another force told us that the force expected supervisors to review crime investigations, give advice, agree lines of enquiry, and approve the investigation plan. However, some supervisors weren’t experienced enough to do this and didn’t review their crime investigations well enough. The interviewees thought that supervisors needed to have more crime investigation experience. We make a recommendation about supervisors’ crime-related training in chapter 5, recommendation 10.

High workloads mean that many supervisors can’t provide effective supervision

Many supervisors told us that their workloads were so high, they couldn’t effectively supervise investigations. In one force, responders told us that their supervisors had the experience and knowledge in most instances to support them to progress their investigations. However, they said that the quality of the supervisory reviews was often poor. They thought this was because supervisors’ workloads were too high.

The responders said that supervisors should review investigations every 30 days. However, responders told us that the demands on the supervisors meant that when they reviewed a crime investigation, it was a tick-box exercise and their entries were, as one responder put it, a “copy and paste job”. Their supervisors told us they found it hard to carry out all the crime investigation reviews they needed to do. One said they often spent most of their shifts completing these reviews.

Supervisors in another force told us they struggled to give effective direction and advice to investigators. In one of our focus groups, a sergeant said that their team of 5 investigators had 125 crimes, which the sergeant had to review. They said there were too many investigations for them to effectively supervise. They also said there were too many crimes and not enough investigators.

In two other forces, supervisors said they were faced with such high administrative demands, they were unable to effectively supervise and support officers. In another force, supervisors said they generally never attended crime scenes unless the force required them to do so, such as when a death had occurred. However, they said they did offer advice on the radio to officers and staff.

In our 2023–25 PEEL inspections, we found that PIP level 2 investigators sometimes supported responders by giving advice and direction on golden hour actions. However, some forces had reduced the number of investigators on duty overnight, and others had removed them from overnight duty completely. In addition, supervisors didn’t support officers and staff at crime scenes because the supervisors were rarely available to attend.

Early supervision of investigations is important, particularly for inexperienced investigators

It is important that supervisors complete an early review of crime investigations. This is particularly the case when the force allocates the crime for investigation by an inexperienced investigator. The supervisor’s review is an opportunity to:

• review the investigator’s caseload;
• review any actions taken, including those to assess and manage risk;
• set or approve an investigation plan; and
• set a date for a further review.

The supervisor should also make sure investigators have put in place the appropriate support for victims, and that they are complying with the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (Victims’ Code). A delayed supervisor’s review can mean forces lose opportunities to gather evidence, quickly address gaps in the investigation, and support victims.

Generally, officers and staff felt their supervisors supported them. Most forces had a policy that detailed when supervisors should review crime investigations. However, not all supervisors reviewed investigations in line with their own force policies.

In some forces, the mandated first review is too late into the investigation

The College of Policing’s investigation APP states that, as a minimum, supervisors should carry out reviews in line with the timescales set out for victim updates under the Victims’ Code. For significant updates, such as the arrest of a suspect or a decision not to investigate, the Victims’ Code states that all victims should receive the update within five working days. This decreases to one working day for victims who are vulnerable or intimidated. The Victims’ Code also states that the police and the victim should agree the timing of other regular updates.

In our view, linking supervisory review requirements to the Victims’ Code is confusing. We think that the investigation APP should clearly set out when supervisors should carry out the first review of an investigation and subsequent reviews.

Two of the forces we inspected had policies instructing supervisors to review new crime reports by the end of their shift. In one of these forces, the oncoming supervisor would sometimes do this if it was near to the end of the previous supervisor’s shift. Another force’s policy stated that supervisory reviews should take place within 96 hours.

However, in the other four forces, their policies were to review crime files after 7, 14, 28 or 30 days respectively. When the earliest review is a week or more after an investigation has started, it may lead to missed opportunities. In one of those forces, officers told us that although they had to complete investigation plans and a variety of closure documents, they often didn’t comply with this instruction and the force didn’t hold them to account.

In one force, in a unit dealing with vulnerability, we found that there was a lack of supervisory oversight of crimes. Interviewees told us sergeants weren’t reviewing crimes often enough. They said that some crimes had supervisory reviews that were more than two months old, and that there had been no progress or update on the crime since the last review. One officer said: “The last time I went through my workload with a sergeant was a couple of years ago … It’s so busy, it’s hard to get the time.”

Some forces are taking steps to improve the skills of their investigators and supervisors

In our fieldwork, we were pleased to note that some forces had recognised that they needed to improve their investigators’ and supervisors’ skills, and had taken steps to address this. In case study 19, we highlight two forces, Greater Manchester Police and Hampshire Constabulary, which have employed retired detectives to give advice and guidance to inexperienced investigators and supervisors. Both forces told us their officers and staff welcomed these initiatives.

We encourage all forces to consider what steps they could take to improve crime investigations by supporting and guiding both their investigators and their supervisors.

Supervisors should play an important role in making sure investigators follow all reasonable lines of enquiry

Earlier in this chapter, we explained how important it is that supervisors complete early reviews of crime investigations. It is equally important that supervisors continue to review investigations until they have finalised them. These regular, ongoing reviews help supervisors to review the progress investigators are making and identify any further actions. Put simply, the role of the supervisor is to guide, direct and encourage investigators throughout a crime investigation.

Failing to follow reasonable lines of enquiry can have extreme consequences

In March 2022, The Rt Hon Lady Elish Angiolini LT DBE PC KC started her inquiry into how an off-duty police officer was able to abduct, rape and murder a member of the public. The inquiry noted that eight allegations of indecent exposure had been reported to the police at or shortly after the time those alleged offences took place. The Angiolini Inquiry found that the relevant police forces consistently failed to identify and follow reasonable lines of enquiry. It stated:

“There was a lamentable and repeated failure to deal, in a reasonable and professional manner, with the several allegations reported to different police forces by a number of people prior to Sarah Everard’s murder.”

Some forces are more effective than others in making sure they follow all reasonable lines of enquiry

In our case file reviews, we found evidence that investigators followed all reasonable lines of enquiry in 143 of the 180 applicable cases we reviewed. However, this varied from force to force. In two of the seven forces, we found this to be the case in almost every investigation we reviewed.

In Cheshire Constabulary, we found that investigators had followed reasonable lines of enquiry in 30 of the 31 cases we reviewed. In the PSNI, we were satisfied this happened in every case we reviewed. This was consistent with the culture we found in the PSNI, where we noted that everyone involved in an investigation approached it with an investigative mindset to gather and secure evidence. In another force, we found that investigators followed reasonable lines of enquiry in all but 3 of the 20 investigations we reviewed.

In the other forces, there was room for improvement

In another force, we found evidence that investigators followed all reasonable lines of enquiry in only 10 of the 22 applicable cases we reviewed. There were some examples of poor investigations, in which investigators failed to:

• take statements from victims or witnesses;
• obtain CCTV evidence when it was available;
• complete house-to-house enquiries; or
• secure evidence from mobile phones and laptops.

We found similar problems in our reviews in the other three forces, although to a lesser extent. In some cases, investigators identified lines of enquiry but didn’t always progress them. For example, we found a case of a commercial burglary in which an investigator hadn’t followed up a fingerprint identification four months after receiving it. There were some supervisory reviews of this investigation, but the supervisor hadn’t given any direction to the investigator. We spoke to the investigator and their supervisor, and neither could give us a reason why this enquiry was still outstanding.

Forces are taking steps to improve in this area

We found that forces were taking steps to improve their performance in this area. For example, one force had established a centralised team to improve the quality of investigations. This team made sure all investigators and supervisors had followed outstanding lines of enquiry before closing a crime. Interviewees in that force told us investigators often sent crimes to be closed prematurely. They said the centralised team returned around 25 percent of files that investigators had submitted to be closed. The main reason that the team returned the files was because there were outstanding lines of enquiry.

Measuring quantity is easier than assessing quality

In one force, we found that senior officers believed the force was effective at making sure investigators followed all reasonable lines of enquiry throughout the investigation. Supervisors acknowledged the force’s intention to promote this. However, some supervisors told us that the force’s performance management systems appeared to be more focused on compliance and quantity, rather than on assessing the quality of investigations.

In a different force, a senior officer told us the force found it difficult to measure the quality of investigations. They said: “Quantity is really easy to measure. Quality is always going to be a dip sample. Quantity always gets measured more.” This means that rather than focusing on the quality of their work, investigators and supervisors may focus more on activity that is easier to measure and targets that are easier to achieve.

Some forces have processes to improve the quality of their investigations and supervisory reviews

Some forces use quality assurance thematic testing (QATT) for crime investigations to improve investigation standards and overall performance. The aim of QATT is to identify good practice and areas for improvement.

We spoke to representatives from some of the forces that use QATT and found they were using it inconsistently. Some forces were reviewing the quality of investigations, but others were more focused on reviewing compliance with processes. Forces using QATT need to make sure their reviews cover both these aspects.

We found that two of the seven forces we inspected used QATT. In Cheshire Constabulary and West Midlands Police, inspectors carried out QATT reviews every month. This included assessing the quality of supervisory reviews, and the timeliness and quality of the investigation. Greater Manchester Police, meanwhile, gave those completing crime audits clear guidance about what to look for in the investigation.

We found examples of effective supervision in some forces

The forces in which we found effective supervision had clear policies and procedures. They also had effective oversight, governance and performance management of supervisory actions.

The VSA review for the 2023–25 PEEL inspection of Cumbria Constabulary found that the constabulary supervised investigations well. In our fieldwork, we also found this to be the case. In chapter 3, case study 2, we referred to the constabulary’s ‘principles of investigation’ framework. We found that the constabulary used these principles to make sure supervisors carry out timely and effective reviews of cases.

Supervisors in Cumbria Constabulary told us they reviewed investigation plans within 96 hours of the force recording the crime. One said: “It’s done ruthlessly.” Interviewees also told us that in the daily management meeting, senior officers checked whether supervisors had completed these reviews. The force performance management system identified crimes in which supervisors hadn’t reviewed the investigation plan within the timescale. One supervisor told us: “We’re held to account in quite microscopic level.”

Evidence review officers have an important supervisory role in crime investigations

When forces want to take a case to the CPS for a charging decision, a police decision maker must review the case first to see whether it meets the standards to go to the CPS. This responsibility usually falls upon sergeants. Some forces have evidence review officers (EROs) who do this role. Other forces refer to the role as a gatekeeper. EROs and gatekeepers can give advice and direction to investigators throughout investigations.

In certain cases, they can decide to use out-of-court disposals or to take no further action. We found large variations across the forces we inspected in whether they used EROs or not, and the way in which they used them.

Most of the seven forces we inspected didn’t have officers or staff who did this as a full-time role. They usually carry it out alongside their day-to-day job. One force has EROs for domestic abuse investigations. For other cases, sergeants carry out the ERO role for their teams’ investigations. All sergeants in the force had received ERO and advanced domestic abuse training. However, in another force, interviewees told us that sergeants hadn’t received any training to carry out this function. In some forces, we found that this was the responsibility of all sergeants on investigative teams.

We also found that sometimes, the role of gatekeeper only focused on checking that the correct forms were in a file, rather than whether they were of a good quality. A senior officer in one force told us that the force was piloting the role of ERO at two custody blocks. They said that they wanted the EROs to focus on evidential quality and that the force was considering using artificial intelligence to check that the necessary forms were in the file.

Investigators and their supervisors value the ERO role

Interviewees in the PSNI told us that the service had a small team of gatekeepers. The interviewees told us that officers valued the role and could access them easily. The gatekeepers gave advice, including about the proportionality of lines of enquiry, and about relevant legislation.

Supervisors from one force told us it had removed the ERO function. They said removing it took away essential support from investigating officers and negatively affected the quality of crime investigations. Investigators in the same force told us that because the force had removed the ERO role, they didn’t have many opportunities to ask for advice during an investigation. They said they spent a lot of time building a full file and redacting it so they could send it to the CPS, only for the CPS to say it wasn’t going to progress the case. One officer said: “It would be better to have a pre-charge review earlier on.”

4.  How effectively police support victims through investigations from start to finish

In this chapter we report on how effectively the police support victims through investigations from start to finish, including investigations that don’t result in a prosecution. We examine how well forces identify victims, including those who are repeat and vulnerable, and how well they then deal with victims.

Identifying victims

Call handlers are generally good at identifying victims

We saw evidence in all forces that officers and staff were good at identifying victims at the initial point of contact. Call handlers told us that they asked enough questions to identify victims and witnesses. They also search on police systems to get information to help them identify victims and witnesses. For example, they told us they checked intelligence, warning markers, and names recorded against the caller’s phone number. One call handler said that it was “drilled into us from the beginning to find out if the caller is the victim”.

In most forces, responders and investigators are confident that they can identify victims

Neighbourhood officers and staff in one force told us that the crimes they dealt with tended to be more straightforward. They said that it was “usually fairly obvious” who the victims and suspects were, but that it could become more complicated when there were counter-allegations.

In another force, neighbourhood officers and staff told us that when they attended reports of crime, their priority was to identify all those involved and whether they were victims, witnesses or suspects. They said this was essential to help them establish what crimes the suspect had committed. They said they tried to get the bigger picture of what had taken place and then considered aspects of the crime, such as the scene, or if any tools or weapons were involved.

Response officers in the same force appeared confident in their ability to identify victims, witnesses and suspects. One said: “It’s common sense, really.” Response officers told us they used their communication skills to draw further details out of the people they spoke to.

We found that once investigators received a crime, they usually took steps to identify any additional victims and witnesses. However, some officers told us they experienced difficulties in establishing victim and witness details because they were dealing with crimes in which victims were reluctant to support the investigation.

For example, an interviewee in one force said that victims of domestic abuse had fed back to the force that they often wanted to support a prosecution but didn’t want to be seen to be doing so. In another force, we heard that victims of gang violence often refused to communicate with the police. One interviewee in a team that deals with gang violence said they could “count on one hand the number of victims that have engaged”.

Repeat and vulnerable victims

Force IT systems can usually identify repeat or vulnerable victims

Forces generally define repeat victims as those who have been a victim of crime more than once within a 12-month period. It is important that forces identify repeat victims as it can be an indication that they may be vulnerable.

All seven forces we inspected had processes in place to identify repeat and vulnerable victims at the initial point of contact. Call handlers use an assessment tool and their force systems to do this. Most force systems automatically check the details of the person making contact to see if they have had previous contact with police. If a person is a repeat caller, the system makes the call handler aware of this.

Cheshire Constabulary told us it provided training to officers and staff to make sure they identify and support vulnerable victims. It has also changed the front screen on its command and control system to identify vulnerable and repeat victims. This means the system can alert the crime-recording unit about these victims at the earliest opportunity.

In Cumbria Constabulary, call handlers told us they also checked force systems, such as those that recorded missing persons and potentially vulnerable people, as well as checking for alerts for vulnerability. Call handlers in Essex Police and Greater Manchester Police told us they used question sets to help them identify vulnerable and repeat victims.

Call handlers in Norfolk Constabulary told us that when they opened an incident, the system identified the instances in which the caller’s location, address or telephone number had been linked to a previous call. They could then read brief details of those previous calls. This information helped them consider whether the caller:

• was a repeat victim of crime;
• may have vulnerabilities in relation to that crime; and
• would need any support during the investigation.

In our PEEL VSA reviews, we found that call handlers carried out an effective check to identify a repeat victim in 2,165 (92 percent) of the 2,359 applicable cases we reviewed. In 833 of 946 applicable cases (88 percent), forces effectively used the information gathered when they identified a repeat victim. There was also evidence of call handlers checking for a vulnerable victim or other vulnerable person in 2,311 (94 percent) of the 2,471 applicable cases we reviewed.

Sometimes call handlers don’t have enough information when they receive a report of a crime to be able to assess whether a victim is repeat or vulnerable – for example, if a third party reports a crime and doesn’t know the identity of the victim. We found that if forces didn’t identify repeat or vulnerable victims at the first point of contact, responders usually made this assessment.

Although force IT systems usually identify repeat and vulnerable victims, they have some limitations. For example, they may not recognise a repeat victim if they call from a different phone number or if a third party makes a report on their behalf. Police need to become much more sophisticated in the way they identify and deal with repeat victims. Advances in artificial intelligence and other technology may give them opportunities to do this. The National Police Chiefs’ Council should explore these opportunities.

Many forces have plans to deal with repeat and vulnerable victims

In most forces, interviewees told us that responders continued to assess for repeat victims and vulnerability while they dealt with reports of crime. Call handlers usually update responding officers and staff if the incident involves a repeat or vulnerable victim. All forces we inspected equipped responders with mobile devices. The responders could usually access force systems on these devices to check for repeat and vulnerable victims.

Interviewees in the Police Service of Northern Ireland told us the service maintained a list of repeat victims. The service gives these details to the neighbourhood policing team (NPT). NPT officers and staff contact the victims to identify and try to resolve the underlying reasons for them becoming victims. In most areas, the service also has vulnerability teams, which make sure vulnerability is identified during investigations.

Interviewees in Norfolk Constabulary told us that the constabulary identified the top 30 repeat victims and used a problem-solving approach to support these victims. In another force, responders told us it focused strongly on identifying repeat and vulnerable victims. NPT supervisors in the same force told us that at monthly performance meetings, the force held them to account for reducing the number of repeat victims.

Some interviewees in Greater Manchester Police told us that NPT officers and staff usually knew who the repeat and vulnerable victims in their areas were. The NPT officers and staff also repeat the risk assessment on crime reports to check that they haven’t missed anything. We also heard that investigators in the force carried out their own checks on force systems to see if victims were already known to the police. They check for previous incidents involving the victim and look for anything that may be relevant to their investigation.

Many stalking, harassment and antisocial behaviour offences, and those that relate to domestic abuse, involve repeat victims. We found examples of forces introducing initiatives to support such victims.

In our 2022 PEEL spotlight report on the police response to burglary, robbery and other acquisitive crime, we found that some forces were “failing to recognise repeat victims or conduct a good enough vulnerability risk assessment”. We found similar evidence in this inspection.

Forces sometimes fail to recognise repeat victims and vulnerability

In 2010, the Government appointed the first commissioner for victims and witnesses. This role is now called the Victims’ Commissioner for England and Wales (Victims’ Commissioner). The role of the Victims’ Commissioner is to promote the interests of victims and witnesses. The Victims’ Commissioner told us she believes that forces let themselves down in the way they identify victims and manage the harm caused by a crime. She said that forces often don’t join the dots with repeat offences and locations. She said they often see individual cases as standalone, especially when dealing with antisocial behaviour, stalking and harassment. She also said that forces don’t identify or support many repeat victims, which means those victims often disengage from the criminal justice process.

We found that after the initial assessment, not all forces had effective processes to monitor and review calls for vulnerability and repeat callers. When there are delays in allocating the call to a responder, there may be an increased risk to victims. We found that one force didn’t review the initial risk assessment throughout the time it took to allocate the crime to an investigator.

Dealing with and supporting victims

Victims don’t always receive the best service

The services that organisations should give victims, and the minimum standard for these services, are set out in the Victims’ Code. The Victims’ Code includes 12 rights that organisations should comply with in order to meet these minimum standards.

In 2023, we carried out a joint inspection with His Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate and His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation into how well the criminal justice system supports victims of crime, ‘Meeting the needs of victims in the criminal justice system’. We found that a combination of competing demands, high workloads, poor communication and lack of experience contributed to victims not always receiving the best service. We also found that too often, officers and staff didn’t have the skills and knowledge to give a good service to victims.

The Victims’ Commissioner told us she believes there is a general lack of understanding of the Victims’ Code. She said she receives anecdotal evidence that compliance with the Victims’ Code’s expectations is patchy. Victims report to her that the initial contact with police is normally good, then their satisfaction decreases as the investigation continues. Victims have told her this is mainly because of the lack of updates and contact from the police.

Victims lack confidence in the criminal justice system

The ‘Annual Victims’ Survey 2023’, carried out by the Victims’ Commissioner, asked victims of crime in England and Wales about their experiences of the criminal justice system, including the police. The findings showed that the police, and other elements of the criminal justice system, need to do more to support victims.

For example, 40 percent of respondents said they were dissatisfied with the police response to the reported crime. Common problems that contributed to poor victim experiences with the police included:

• a lack of police investigation into reported crimes;
• delayed police attendance and investigation into reported crimes; and
• a lack of communication from the police.

Only 30 percent of respondents agreed that the police investigated their allegations thoroughly. Only 23 percent of respondents were confident that they could receive justice by reporting a crime.

Support for victims is often available at the initial point of contact

Interviewees in Cheshire Constabulary told us that the constabulary had specialist teams to support victims at the initial point of contact. For example, there is a vulnerability and safeguarding team, which works within the control room and helps to assess vulnerability. When call handlers assess that calls don’t need an emergency or prompt response, the service contacts victims to offer them additional support. Interviewees in the constabulary also told us that when a call involves domestic abuse, call handlers give initial safeguarding advice. The victim and safeguarding team then contacts the victim and offers more tailored safeguarding advice. Victims often receive this support before an officer attends the incident.

In Cumbria Constabulary, interviewees told us that call handlers could make referrals for vulnerable victims to Victim Support. In cases of domestic abuse, they can make referrals to a domestic abuse organisation that provides a free advice line. Response officers can also use mobile devices to make these referrals from a crime scene.

Interviewees in Greater Manchester Police told us advisors from its victim service provider were based in the force’s contact centre to give victims of crime a faster and better-quality service. Call handlers can ask advisors directly for guidance, or they can transfer calls to advisors to make sure victims receive support from the initial point of contact.

Responders and investigators can’t always give victims as much support as they want to

During our fieldwork, many officers and staff told us they were doing their best and wanted to provide a good service to victims. However, they said their workload prevented them from doing this as well as they wanted.

In one force, neighbourhood and response officers told us they tried to support victims of crime and provide the level of service they needed, especially for those with complex needs or specific vulnerabilities. However, they frequently couldn’t do this. They told us that this was because the force constantly diverted them from their normal role, asked them to deal with unrelated investigation actions, or just told them to deal with other tasks.

One officer gave an example of spending three hours with a very vulnerable domestic abuse victim, who was unsure about supporting a prosecution. Just as the officer felt they had gained the victim’s trust, they received a direction to leave the victim and get on with other tasks. The interviewee told us that the victim subsequently withdrew all support for the police actions.

Investigators in the same force told us they faced competing demands on their time. They said this meant they couldn’t prioritise investigations or serve victims as well as they should. They said that when they started a shift, they sometimes needed to deal with suspects in custody. This meant they felt unable to maintain contact with victims of crime from their existing investigations. The unpredictability of what they dealt with each shift made it difficult to arrange and keep appointments. One investigator said: “Victims’ expectations are not being met.”

Investigators in another force said they were frustrated about not being able to meet victims’ needs, and that this was because of heavy workloads. One said: “Everybody tries the best they can, but we can’t … If I were the victim, I’d be annoyed because we may not be getting back to them.”

In one force, we found in our case file review that investigators didn’t deal appropriately with victims and witnesses in 6 of the 22 applicable cases we reviewed. This was mainly because of the workloads of investigators on response sections. Officers told us they constantly found it difficult to contact victims because of the other demands on their time.

Support is usually available for victims during an investigation

Investigators in every force told us they do their best to support victims. One told us: “To them, it’s everything. To you, they are one of many, but it doesn’t make them less important.”

In Greater Manchester Police, we heard that district victim services coordinators promoted improved care for victims. This includes improving compliance with the Victims’ Code obligations and putting victims in touch with external support agencies. They also work with the force to scrutinise body-worn video footage of officers and staff attending incidents related to domestic abuse.

Most forces have commissioned services that support victims. Interviewees in Cheshire Constabulary told us that investigators use a commissioned service, Cheshire CARES, to make sure victims receive support throughout the investigation process. The constabulary also uses the witness care unit to support victims as they prepare for court. Both Cheshire CARES and the witness care unit liaise directly with the investigator, the Crown Prosecution Service and the court, making sure they continuously address and meet the victim’s needs. To help with this support process, the constabulary has recruited a special measures advisor, who has a dual role. They support investigators and review cases going to court to make sure the investigator has completed a victim needs assessment and applied for appropriate special measures.

Some forces have a form of directory that lists support organisations. Officers and staff can access this directory to help them identify the most appropriate service to refer a victim to.

Another way investigators try to support victims, especially victims of domestic abuse, is by carrying out evidence-led prosecutions.

Too many victims disengage from the criminal justice process because of delays

All forces recognised that some victims disengaged from the criminal justice process because of delays. We heard that these delays were often caused by problems such as high officer workloads, delays in obtaining charging decisions or the time it took for a case to be tried in court.

In most cases, once an investigation is complete, whether it has been closed or has gone to court, the investigating officer has no further contact, or minimal contact, with the victim. In all the forces we inspected, we found evidence that they signposted victims to other agencies for support where appropriate.

We found that further support for victims after an investigation was complete usually came from victim and witness care units. These units support victims until cases reach court, keeping them engaged throughout the process, arranging special measures and offering reassurance. Sometimes external organisations support victims after the conclusion of an investigation.

However, we heard that court backlogs were making the work of victim care officers more difficult. In one force, a senior officer told us that the force’s victim care officers were managing a growing number of victims and witnesses due to an increasing number of prosecutions and court backlogs. This increases the length of time victims and witnesses wait for justice, so witness care officers have more work to do to keep them engaged in the criminal justice system. One officer told us: “Demand is more stressful, not just more volume.”

Interviewees in Norfolk Constabulary told us that for some investigations, neighbourhood officers were involved in victim care after the investigation had finished. This was usually when an investigation had been very prolonged and drawn‑out, or when the incident had caused significant community impact.

The Victims’ Code

Forces should prioritise improving compliance with the Victims’ Code

In all the forces we inspected, we heard that officers and staff were aware of the Victims’ Code. However, results from our PEEL VSA reviews didn’t show such a positive picture. Overall, we assessed that forces gave victims an appropriate level of service in only 2,613 (86 percent) of the relevant 3,055 cases we reviewed. Forces recorded an appropriate victim needs assessment in only 1,703 (77 percent) of the 2,219 relevant cases we reviewed. Forces completed a victim contract in 2,041 (85 percent) of the relevant 2,393 cases we reviewed.

In our 2023–25 PEEL inspections, we described how seven forces needed to improve their performance in respect of assessing the needs of all victims so they can properly support them. We call this ‘issuing an area for improvement (AFI)’. We issued further AFIs to five forces about the need for them to comply with the requirements of the Victims’ Code. In a further four forces, we issued an AFI for them to complete victim contracts where appropriate.

The Victims’ Commissioner told us that police officers’ awareness of the Victims’ Code was poor, as was the way they explained it to victims. She said this meant victims often didn’t remember being told about it, even if they had received an explanation. In the ‘Annual Victims’ Survey 2023’, only 19 percent of respondents said they had heard of the Victims’ Code.

Evidence review officers in one force told us the most common file failures related to the Victims’ Code – for example, a lack of victim personal statements and a lack of consideration of special measures. Their view was that when investigators first submit a file, they are either unaware of the requirements of the Victims’ Code, or they choose to ignore them. They also believed that time pressures have an effect on the support investigators can give victims.

Failure to provide good enough support to victims or to keep them properly updated often results in more calls to the force. Call handlers in one force told us that the poor quality of victim updates created “failure demand” in the form of additional calls from victims asking for updates. They said that more frequent and better-quality updates to victims from investigators would remove this extra demand. It would also reassure victims and give them a better service.

Scrutiny of compliance with the Victims’ Code usually involves ticking boxes rather than measuring quality

Our joint inspection on meeting the needs of victims found that rather than trying to meet victims’ needs, the police, Crown Prosecution Service and Probation Service focused more on complying with the Victims’ Code. In some cases, where the organisations had complied with the victims’ rights, we found that this was often a box‑ticking exercise with no evidence of the quality of the support. We also found that complying with the Victims’ Code doesn’t automatically mean that the police meet victims’ needs. We found similar evidence in this inspection.

Interviewees in all forces told us that their force had various levels of scrutiny to make sure officers and staff complied with the Victims’ Code. However, they said this scrutiny usually involved a quantitative tick-box process, rather than measuring the quality of the work forces did to support victims. For example, all forces have systems that show them whether an investigator has completed a victim contract, or whether a victim has received an update. However, these systems only measure whether an investigator has completed these actions, and not whether they were meaningful and in accordance with the victim’s needs.

An interviewee in one force said that the force was taking steps to overcome a cultural issue of some supervisors viewing contact with victims as an administrative process.

This can have a negative effect on the way officers and staff treat victims. For example, in one force, interviewees told us that some investigators were not victim-focused and sometimes preferred to send text messages to update victims rather than speak to them face to face.

The report on our joint inspection on meeting the needs of victims included the following recommendation:

“By 30 September 2024, the Ministry of Justice should develop Victims’ Code performance metrics and reporting systems. These should include how criminal justice bodies engage with victims and the quality of the engagement. Performance metrics should also include measures of how well criminal justice bodies obtain feedback from victims and how well they use this to assess the quality of engagement and improve the quality of services.”

In May 2024, the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 received Royal Assent, although very few sections of the Act came into force at that time. Some of the provisions of the Act that relate to victims came into force on 29 January 2025. This legislation places a duty on the police, and other criminal justice bodies, to comply with the Victims’ Code. The Act states that the criminal justice bodies must collect and review information about compliance with the Victims’ Code. At the time of our inspection, the Ministry of Justice told us it was exploring ways to assess the quality of compliance with the Victims’ Code.

Victims should be at the heart of the criminal justice process. It is important that they receive a high-quality service from the police, and that forces can measure the quality of that service, not just tick boxes.

In view of the ongoing work of the Ministry of Justice to develop a method of measuring the quality of compliance with the Victims’ Code, and the outstanding recommendation from the report on meeting the needs of victims, we don’t make a further recommendation on this subject in this report. However, we urge the Ministry of Justice and the criminal justice bodies to make sure these important improvements take place as soon as possible.

5.  How effectively forces train officers and staff to deal with and investigate crime

In this chapter we examine the training and learning and development opportunities for investigators and other officers and staff who play any part in an investigation. This includes call handlers, responders, investigators and supervisors. Training includes any course, plus any advice or guidance given to officers and staff, together with any other support, such as the provision of mentors and advisors.

With such an inexperienced workforce, it is vital that officers and staff receive effective training to equip them to investigate crime. It is equally important for supervisors to know how to supervise crime investigations.

Understanding and developing investigative skills

Most forces have a good understanding of the investigative skills and capabilities officers and staff need

To provide officers and staff with effective training to equip them to investigate crimes well, forces need to know the skills and experience the workforce has and the skills it needs to investigate crimes. With the rapid advance in technology and the effect this has on crime, such as cybercrime, it is important that investigators have the right digital investigative skills. This means forces must also have an understanding of what investigative skills their officers and staff will need in the future.

We found that most forces had a good understanding of the skills and capabilities needed by officers and staff involved in investigating crime from start to finish. Forces normally carry out a training needs analysis to get this understanding. We found evidence of this in five of the forces we inspected. However, later in this chapter, we report that many investigators think their training isn’t good enough. We also examine whether forces understand the skills held by officers and staff.

In Greater Manchester Police, a senior officer told us that each district and unit had its own training needs assessment. Regular reviews of the assessments take place and the organisational learning department receives the information from those reviews. The senior officer told us this has resulted in a large amount of training for investigators. The force uses experienced investigators to provide the training, to make sure it is relevant, meaningful and applicable to officers and staff.

Other interviewees in the force told us the crime management unit carried out regular audits to generate themes relating to both good and bad performance. It uses this information to create training material. Members of the unit then share this material with officers and staff – for example, by giving training to student officers at university.

However, we found that one force didn’t know what skills or qualifications people in different roles across the force needed. Nor did it know who in the workforce had the right skills to carry out these roles. The force told us it had recognised this gap in corporate knowledge and had appointed a senior leader to gather this information.

The College of Policing sets the curriculum for investigative training and produces guidance for investigators

The professionalising investigations programme (PIP) sets out processes for investigator training and accreditation. PIP has four levels. In this report, we focus on the first two levels. The PIP level 1 training is for those who carry out priority and volume crime investigations. The PIP level 2 training is for those who investigate more serious and complex crimes.

For both these levels of training, the College of Policing sets the learning outcomes and curriculum. It licenses forces to provide the training locally to meet these learning outcomes and curriculum. In addition to setting the curriculum, the College of Policing uses the investigation authorised professional practice (APP) to give officers and staff guidance about investigations.

The College of Policing has also developed conducting effective investigations guidelines. This document states that it gives “clear evidence-based practice guidance on how best to ensure that investigations are conducted effectively, regardless of offence type or complexity”. Neither the investigation APP nor the guidelines are step‑by-step practical guides for investigators. They contain information and guidance about the processes, roles and principles involved in carrying out investigations.

Investigative training for call handlers

Not all forces give the relevant College of Policing training to call handlers

The College of Policing’s 2023 PIP programme policy (PDF document) states:

“There are several roles in policing that support the investigation process yet are not in themselves investigative roles. These include contact centre staff, police community support officers or investigation support officers in an investigation team. Staff supporting the investigation process should, as a minimum, complete the ‘Introduction to investigation’ learning programme.”

The College of Policing told us that forces have the curriculum for the ‘Introduction to investigation’ learning programme, but that not all forces give this training to staff who support investigations.

In most of the forces we inspected, call handlers told us that part of their training related to investigating crime. However, in three of these forces, call handlers told us they had no regular training time built into their shift pattern, or that there was no refresher training about crime investigations. In one of these forces, call handlers told us the initial training was sufficient to cover the basics. One call handler said that after that “it’s just a learning curve every day”. Others expressed similar sentiments and said they honed their skills as they became more experienced.

In Cumbria Constabulary, we found that call handlers were police officers rather than police staff. This meant that prior to becoming call handlers, they had already received training in dealing with reports of crime, and they had experience of attending crime-related calls. They told us that they viewed themselves as initial investigators.

A senior officer in Essex Police told us that the force had a training programme for call handlers, which included elements of the PIP level 1 curriculum. This was to help them record investigations during the initial contact with people reporting crimes. The training included how to give callers advice and how to begin investigative actions, without having to pass these tasks to another team.

Interviewees in Greater Manchester Police told us that call handlers used an online toolkit called Sherlock to help them deal with calls relating to crime. Sherlock gives force control room staff, and anyone dealing with victims in the initial contact stages, up-to-date knowledge and guidance. Sherlock also includes information about crime recording, force policies, internal and external contact directories, the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, and risk assessment tools. It also gives advice to call handlers about preserving evidence at crime scenes, and reasonable lines of enquiry for crimes such as burglary, rape, stalking and harassment. Sherlock is available to all members of the force, not just call handlers.

Call handlers in another force weren’t so positive about the crime-related training they had received. They told us that it related more to using force systems and making sure they knew how to record a crime correctly than developing their investigative mindset.

It is important that any member of staff who has a role in supporting the investigation process is suitably equipped and trained to carry out their investigative responsibilities. These roles include contact centre staff, police community support officers and investigation support officers in an investigation team.

We make a recommendation about the College of Policing ‘Introduction to investigation’ learning programme for police staff under recommendation 10, later in this chapter.

Investigative training for responders and investigators

Police officers and staff who respond to reports of crime should receive basic investigative training

Responders are usually from response teams or neighbourhood policing teams. Sometimes desk-based officers and staff also deal with reports of crime without attending a scene. All responders, whether they attend the scene or not, have an important part to play in the investigative process.

Student officers complete their PIP level 1 portfolio as part of their learning and development to become operationally competent police officers. Therefore, when they finish their training, whether they become response or neighbourhood policing team officers, they have received basic training about how to carry out a crime investigation and are accredited PIP level 1 investigators. Later in this chapter, we comment on investigators’ views about their training.

Police community support officers sometimes respond to reports of crime as part of their neighbourhood role. As such, they should complete the College of Policing ‘Introduction to investigation’ learning programme.

Investigative training given to responders is inconsistent

During our fieldwork, senior officers in most forces spoke positively about the quality and quantity of crime-related training and continuing professional development (CPD) their forces gave to responders. However, their positivity wasn’t always reflected by their officers and staff, many of whom told us their training didn’t equip them to investigate crime effectively.

In one force, we heard that student officers didn’t feel that their training effectively prepared them to carry out investigations. This was because they felt their initial training was too theoretical and academic. They said there wasn’t enough practical training about topics such as the golden hour and interviews. The interviewees said that as a result, student officers lacked confidence, and they only gained it by watching and asking colleagues for advice.

In four of the forces we inspected, responders told us that their ongoing crime-related training wasn’t good enough. They told us that they usually used their training days to catch up with their paperwork, rather than to complete training. When doing their online training, they often had it on in the background while they carried out other work.

We make a recommendation about investigative training for responders later in this chapter.

Some forces supplement the student officer curriculum with additional investigative training

Senior officers in three of the forces we inspected told us they had recognised that the investigative training provided to student officers wasn’t effective in preparing them to investigate crime. As a result, they had developed further training to supplement it. For example, Essex Police has extended the initial student officer training and added a week-long investigation course, which covered topics from the initial recording through to cases going to court.

Senior officers in Essex Police told us that the force had also developed a virtual crime academy. The virtual academy is available for all officers and staff to use, regardless of their role, and not just for investigators. For example, officers and staff could watch a video explaining how to package an exhibit. Senior officers told us that since the force started the academy in 2023, there had been 34,000 hits on the virtual academy website.

Senior officers in Norfolk Constabulary told us that the constabulary had recognised that student officers were often coming to the end of their tutorship period without having had enough opportunity to develop a solid foundation in crime investigation. This included custody procedures and case building. The constabulary developed community safety units, which student officers join at the end of their tutorship period until the end of their first year. Within these units, skilled sergeants help the student officers to develop their investigative skills and become more confident investigators.

In Greater Manchester Police, senior officers told us that to improve the standard of investigations, the investigation improvement team had introduced an enhanced support process for student officers who were about to start the second year of their studies. The force allocated two university learning days to the investigation improvement team to give students one-to-one support with managing crimes and preparing files.

Forces provide ongoing investigative training and support in a variety of ways

The College of Policing has given all 43 police forces in England and Wales a licence to provide the PIP level 1 and 2 training for their force. Forces are expected to follow the curricula and learning outcomes set by the College of Policing. We found that when forces give ongoing training to investigators, they do it in a variety of ways.

For example, in Cheshire and Cumbria Constabularies, we heard that both forces used virtual reality to help train investigators. Interviewees in Essex Police told us that the force had an online virtual crime academy to give investigators CPD.

In our 2023–25 PEEL inspection of Suffolk Constabulary, we found it had introduced a new programme of CPD for investigators. Senior leaders consulted with police officers and staff to make sure training was relevant and met their needs. The constabulary redesigned its intranet to make sure advice and guidance was easy to access.

We found that many police forces were trying to improve crime recording, investigation and supervision by providing online guides to officers, staff and their supervisors.

In all forces, we heard about the inexperience of investigators and their supervisors. We found that some forces had taken steps to overcome this lack of experience. They used more experienced investigators to advise, guide and support less experienced investigators and their supervisors. Sometimes this support involved using retired detectives. Measures of this kind can work well.

Many investigators think their training isn’t good enough

We found that the training for those who investigate more serious offences was structured and standardised across forces, as was the training for their supervisors. However, many investigators and supervisors who work on volume crime told us their training was insufficient.

In our 2023–25 PEEL inspections, we found evidence to support this. In eight forces, we found evidence that officers and staff didn’t have the right skills and capabilities to carry out high-quality investigations. In each of these forces, we either issued the force with an area for improvement or made a recommendation about this.

In four of the forces we inspected, interviewees told us that investigative training, especially relating to case file preparation, wasn’t good enough. They said that less experienced investigators learnt from mentors, who also lacked experience. They also said that supervisors were often young in service and couldn’t give advice or guidance to officers and staff about completing a case file.

The College of Policing curriculum for PIP level 1 training includes sections about preparing case files. However, forces are responsible for providing this training, in line with the curriculum. Forces need to make sure they focus enough on the part of the curriculum that relates to case files, taking into account local procedures and case management systems. They also need to offer appropriate CPD so that investigators maintain this important knowledge.

We make a recommendation about case file preparation training later in this chapter.

Records about investigative training and accreditation vary across forces

In most forces, we found that teams that investigate volume crime consisted of a mixture of both PIP level 1 and PIP level 2 trained officers and staff. As we stated previously, all police officers receive training to PIP level 1 as part of their student officer training. Officers and staff can develop their investigative skills further by training to PIP level 2. To do this, they must pass a national investigators’ exam and complete the PIP level 2 curriculum and portfolio.

The PIP programme policy states that forces should keep a register of officers and staff who have achieved PIP level 1 and PIP level 2 accreditation. This should include a record of annual CPD. Forces should maintain the register “to identify the PIP registration status of all individuals who have successfully achieved accreditation”.

The policy also states that to maintain both PIP level 1 and PIP level 2 accreditation, officers and staff must complete annual CPD. It states: “Failure to do so will result in the investigator being registered as ‘PIP inactive’ in the relevant role.” Therefore, if individuals don’t complete their CPD, they should lose their accreditation.

The College of Policing told us that it encourages forces to keep records. However, it also told us that record keeping across forces about numbers of accredited PIP level 2 officers and staff, and their CPD, was inconsistent. If forces don’t keep adequate records of investigative training and CPD, they won’t be able to accurately assess how much training and CPD they need to provide.

We make a recommendation about keeping accurate records of PIP level 2 accredited officers and staff later in this chapter.

Investigative training for supervisors

Investigative training for supervisors needs to improve

In our 2023–25 PEEL inspections, we found that good supervision often leads to more effective investigations. It is therefore vital that supervisors receive sufficient training and guidance to supervise investigations. However, we have issued eight forces with areas for improvement and made recommendations to three forces specifically about supervising crime investigations.

In most of the forces we inspected, interviewees told us that the training for PIP level 2 supervisors was effective. As with the PIP level 1 and PIP level 2 training for investigators, forces train PIP level 2 supervisors using the College of Policing curriculum.

At the time of our inspection, there was no specific PIP level 1 investigative training for supervisors. Most forces provide courses for newly promoted sergeants, police staff supervisors and inspectors. However, some supervisors who had attended these courses told us there was minimal crime-related content on these courses. They said that the courses focused on leadership and management skills, rather than training them on how to supervise crime investigations. Later in this chapter, we refer to the College of Policing’s plans to improve the PIP level 1 investigative training for supervisors.

Response and neighbourhood supervisors in five forces told us they didn’t have adequate training to help them supervise investigations and carry out evidential reviews of crime files. Supervisors in one force told us their leadership training concentrated too much on how to finalise an investigation and give it the correct outcome, rather than on how to supervise an investigation. In another force, supervisors told us they relied heavily on their own experience and talking to colleagues to keep up to date with what they needed to know about supervising crime investigations. One supervisor told us: “Everything is self-taught. Sometimes the PCs [police constables] are teaching the sergeants.”

A supervisor in another force told us they had received no training to supervise crime investigations. They said that when the force promoted them, it was a case of: “Here’s your stripes, away you go.”

Throughout this chapter, we have made a number of observations that we now cover in an overarching recommendation.

Some forces have taken steps to improve the way supervisors oversee investigations

A senior officer in Essex Police told us the force tested promotion candidates’ ability to supervise investigations. They said that officers applying for promotion to sergeant and inspector roles had to pass a case file assessment as an element of the promotion process. The force offers bespoke training to candidates as part of this process. If officers are unsuccessful at the case file assessment, they can’t proceed any further in the promotion process.

An interviewee in Greater Manchester Police told us its investigative improvement team was encouraging sergeants on local investigation teams to have an investigative mindset. The interviewee said the investigative improvement team visited every divisional investigation team sergeant to explain what was expected of them, what to do and why.

We found other examples of support available to supervisors who oversee crime investigations.

The College of Policing is designing additional investigative training for supervisors

In June 2023, following a review of leadership training, the College of Policing launched the police leadership programme (PLP). Stage 2 of the PLP is for first-line supervisors. It was launched in May 2022 and then refreshed in June 2023 as part of the overall PLP launch. The College of Policing sets the curriculum for stage 2 for forces to provide locally. The curriculum is designed to give individuals the right leadership and management skills to be an effective supervisor.

The College of Policing told us that the lack of experience and confidence of first-line supervisors was a barrier to effective investigations. It said that before it introduced the PLP, training for supervisors included content about how to supervise crime investigations. The College of Policing told us it had recognised that the introduction of the PLP created a gap in relation to supervising investigations. It is designing a new programme for officers and staff who supervise PIP level 1 investigators. The intention is for the programme to be modular, and for it to include a mixture of face-to-face training and self-directed learning. The College of Policing plans to pilot this programme in some forces in summer 2025.

In this report, and in other reports, we have stressed the importance of effective supervision. We are pleased that the College of Policing has recognised that there is a gap in this area and is taking steps to improve investigative training for supervisors. Subject to successful evaluation, we encourage all chief constables to adopt this training when it is available.

6.  How effectively forces understand their outcomes for reported crime

In this chapter we report on the crime outcomes framework, the decrease in positive outcomes over the past ten years, and what forces are doing to analyse, understand and increase the proportion of crime investigations that result in a positive outcome. We also examine the effect that high workloads have on outcomes, and the increasing use of out-of-court resolutions.

The crime outcomes framework

The current crime outcomes framework helps forces understand the way they finalise investigations

Between 2013 and 2024, there were several changes to the way forces record how they finalise each crime investigation. The changes make it difficult to accurately compare police performance over this period.

Before April 2013, when an investigator completed an investigation, the force generally categorised it as either ‘detected’ or ‘undetected’. When a force recorded a crime as detected, there were six outcomes that the police could apply.

From April 2013, the Home Office replaced detections with the crime outcomes framework. The new framework initially had nine outcomes. Having a larger number of outcomes helped forces to have a better understanding of how they were finalising investigations.

The purpose of the new framework was to avoid forces favouring one outcome over the others, and to shift the emphasis from hitting targets to applying the most appropriate outcome.

In April 2014, the Home Office added 10 new outcomes. Then between 2015 and 2019, it added a further 3, making a total of 22. A full list is available in the Crime outcomes in England and Wales: Technical Annex.

Our definition of positive outcomes includes crime outcomes 1 to 9 and 22.

Positive outcomes

Since 2015, positive outcomes have steadily decreased

The police investigate millions of crimes every year. In the year ending 31 March 2024, they recorded 5.4 million crimes. Of these, 605,695 resulted in a positive outcome. However, in the main, between the years ending 31 March 2015 and 31 March 2024, the positive outcome rate across forces in England and Wales has steadily decreased. Over this period, the rate has decreased from 25.4 percent to 11.3 percent. This is worrying.

In chapter 1, we examined some of the factors that may have contributed to this decrease. These include:

• the amount of crime;
• changes in police officer and staff numbers;
• workloads; and
• the increased complexity of investigations.

Figure 3: Positive outcome rates as a proportion of all outcomes assigned to offences recorded in the year ending 31 March 2015 to the year ending 31 March 2024, for forces in England and Wales

Source: Crime outcomes in England and Wales 2023 to 2024 from the Home Office

Over the same period, the proportion of offences that resulted in a charge or summons decreased from 15.5 percent to 6.4 percent. The proportion of other positive outcomes also decreased. For example, the proportion of offences that resulted in a caution decreased from 3.1 percent to 0.7 percent.

Although there has been a gradual decrease in positive outcome rates over the past ten years, there was a small increase in the year ending 31 March 2024.

While this is encouraging, as we said in our ‘State of Policing 2023’ report:

“positive crime outcomes … are lower than they could otherwise be in all police forces … The message is clear: some police forces should be doing a better job at solving crime”.

Positive outcomes for the Police Service of Northern Ireland are higher than for forces in England and Wales

For the year ending 31 March 2024, the positive outcome rate for the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) was 32.2 percent, which is higher than the rate for forces in England and Wales. During our inspection, we set out to understand why this is the case.

The PSNI differs from English and Welsh forces due to the political and social context in which it operates. In our 2024 report ‘The Police Service of Northern Ireland: An inspection of crime data integrity’, we said:

“There is still a significant divide between communities in Northern Ireland, most often based on political opinion and religious belief. PSNI personnel continue to be under threat from terrorist groups. In some communities in Northern Ireland the PSNI isn’t welcome, and many people are unwilling to communicate with the service for fear of reprisals. This could adversely affect the number of people willing to report crime to the police. That means that crime-recording comparisons can’t necessarily be drawn with forces in England and Wales.”

The operating context of the PSNI means that the service has to use a large proportion of its budget to resource functions that don’t apply to most police forces in England and Wales. These include functions such as internal security and the close protection of individuals. The service told us this means that the proportion of officers on frontline duties in the PSNI is lower than that in forces in England and Wales.

The service has a different process from other forces for making decisions about charging a suspect. However, we didn’t find any evidence to indicate that this had a notable effect on its positive outcome rate.

Figure 4: Positive outcome rates as a proportion of all outcomes assigned to offences recorded in the year ending 31 March 2015 to the year ending 31 March 2024, for the Police Service of Northern Ireland

Source: Police recorded crime statistics: annual trends in police recorded crime 1998/99 to 2022/23 (published 24 November 2023 data table), and police recorded crime bulletin period ending 31 March 2024, from the Police Service of Northern Ireland

From our interviews, focus groups and case file review, we have identified several factors that we think have helped the PSNI achieve a better positive outcome rate. These include:

• Officers in the service attend all reports of crime, unless call handlers or the telephone resolution team can deal with them, which gives officers the opportunity to carry out golden hour enquiries for the majority of relevant reports of crime.
• Officers follow almost all available lines of enquiry, giving them more opportunities to solve crimes.
• Investigators and supervisors write high-quality investigation plans and use them extensively.
• Supervisors effectively oversee crime investigations by carrying out early first reviews of investigations, and regular and meaningful subsequent reviews.
• Investigators feel that their supervisors support them.
• Officers investigating volume crime feel that the number of crimes they are investigating is lower than forces in England and Wales.
• Officers and their supervisors have a good investigative mindset and see themselves as investigators, resulting in a positive investigative culture.

Although officers in the PSNI follow almost all available lines of enquiry, we found that these lines of enquiry weren’t always proportionate. Some interviewees told us that they carried out some enquiries as they were worried about being the subject of a complaint if they didn’t do all they could to investigate all crime.

The PSNI wasn’t part of the Police Uplift Programme and hasn’t had the same rapid increase in the number of new officers as forces in England and Wales. In the face of a large budget shortfall, the service has made difficult resourcing decisions. Recruitment has been paused and police officer numbers have fallen to the lowest level since the service was formed. This means that the service has a smaller proportion of officers with fewer than five years’ service than forces in England and Wales. In the year ending 31 March 2024, the proportion of officers in the PSNI with fewer than five years’ service was 19 percent. In the same year, for forces in England and Wales, the proportion was 36 percent. This may be another reason for the PSNI’s better positive outcome rate.

Understanding and improving positive outcome rates

Forces are taking positive steps to understand their outcome rates

Police forces need to analyse and understand their outcome rates effectively. If they don’t do this, leaders can’t be confident they fully understand:

• what factors lead to specific outcomes;
• whether the outcomes are appropriate; and
• the improvements they need to make to provide justice for victims.

Positive outcome rates vary from force to force. For example, for the year ending 31 March 2024, for forces in England and Wales, they ranged from 19.9 percent in the best-performing force to 6.8 percent in the worst-performing force. In five of the forces, we saw evidence of clear practices that allowed them to analyse, understand and improve outcome rates. One force had carried out several forms of analysis to help it understand outcome rates. In this force, performance meetings, often chaired by chief officers, reviewed data and scrutinised outcome rates.

We also saw evidence that some forces understood the factors that affected outcome rates. These forces scrutinised and monitored outcome rates to minimise the opportunities for individuals to apply an incorrect outcome. The forces wanted to understand why some of their outcome rates were higher or lower than the national average.

In Cumbria Constabulary, for example, we heard that neighbourhood policing team (NPT) officers had good positive outcome rates, which usually exceeded the force average. Interviewees told us that this was because NPT officers:

• often knew who the suspects were and had the time to progress investigations;
• could spend more time on investigations than their response colleagues; and
• could give more support to victims and witnesses to encourage them to provide statements.

They also said that NPT supervisors reviewed crimes effectively and highlighted evidential opportunities.

In Greater Manchester Police, a performance oversight improvement team reviewed rape offences to help the force better understand why many victims didn’t support a prosecution. This included a review of the initial call to force control room, attending officers’ body-worn video, and compliance with the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime.

The force held focus groups and one-to-one interviews with domestic abuse victims who had withdrawn support for investigations or prosecutions. The aim of these initiatives was to increase the force’s understanding of the reasons for victims withdrawing their support.

Some forces don’t fully understand the factors that affect outcome rates

In our 2023–25 PEEL inspections, we found that several forces didn’t fully understand the factors that affected their outcome rates. We also found evidence that forces didn’t consistently achieve appropriate outcomes for victims. We issued an area for improvement or made a recommendation relating to this to all the first 31 forces that we have inspected as part of our 2023–25 PEEL inspection programme. In six of these forces, we found that the force needed to make sure it was using outcomes appropriately.

In our case file reviews, we found that most of the investigators and supervisors we spoke to had a good level of understanding of how to finalise an investigation and which outcome code to use. However, in one force we found evidence that investigating officers decided on the most appropriate outcome code without any supervisory oversight. The officers and staff told us they hadn’t received any training for this and that they relied on previous policing experience to determine the correct outcome.

Forces are taking steps to improve their outcome rates

We found that Cheshire Constabulary had introduced a team to review outcome rates, give guidance to officers and staff, and correct the recorded outcome code if necessary. Interviewees told us that detective sergeants spent two days per month in their local area investigation teams.

The interviewees said that the sergeants reviewed crimes, offered advice and guidance, and improved the standard of investigations. This included ending investigations when there were no further viable lines of enquiry. They told us that the constabulary also liaised with other forces to identify initiatives that were working well in those forces, with a view to adopting them itself. They said this approach was improving the quality of its investigations, as well as its positive outcome rates.

We found that Cumbria Constabulary had put in place a comprehensive programme of scrutiny to make sure it explores all avenues to achieve a positive outcome. For example, interviewees told us that the constabulary reviewed cases where it was taking no further action so it could see whether there could be a positive outcome. The constabulary told us its business improvement unit reviewed 40 closed cases each day, and an investigations quality standards meeting led to improvements in force performance. As at 31 March 2024, the constabulary’s positive outcome rate was 19.9 percent, the highest in England and Wales.

In Greater Manchester Police, chief officers told us that the force had established an investigations improvement team to improve outcome rates. One chief officer said: “The investigations improvement team is the jewel in the crown.” The force recruits experienced investigators and auditors to the team to identify problems with investigations and outcomes. The team gives investigation teams advice, guidance and support. It encourages investigators to follow golden hour principles and to identify lines of enquiry.

Our PEEL 2023–25 inspection of Northamptonshire Police highlighted promising practice in the criminal justice department.

Many forces have improved their governance of outcome rates

In Cumbria Constabulary we saw evidence that in order to improve its performance, it continually reviewed its approach to crime investigations. The constabulary has a senior investigating officers’ board, which thematic leads and senior detectives attend.

In another force, interviewees told us it had a governance process to review investigative performance. However, we found that there were several strategic governance boards in the force, whose remits appeared to be very similar. This risks causing confusion.

In our 2023–25 PEEL inspection of Greater Manchester Police, we found that the force had improved its governance of crime investigations. The deputy chief constable chaired a victims and performance meeting. The force held senior leaders to account for the performance in their areas and departments. An assistant chief constable chaired a crime and vulnerability accountability meeting, and the head of crime chaired a crime board. Detective superintendents oversaw crime performance in their districts. We also heard that the force had introduced a new audit process to review and improve the quality of crime investigations.

In our 2023–25 PEEL inspections, in many forces we saw initiatives such as dip sampling and auditing crime reports to improve their quality. Often, supervisors and senior officers, who are independent of the investigating officer, carry out these audits. In some cases, other agencies contribute to reviews of crime investigations. For example, North Yorkshire Police has established a domestic abuse scrutiny panel. This panel has an independent chair and works to improve public confidence in the force’s approach to domestic abuse and rape. The panel reviews investigations to improve the quality of service to victims and the quality of the force’s approach to these crimes. A range of other organisations, including the Crown Prosecution Service and Victim Support were involved in the panels.

In our Operation Soteria progress report, ‘Progress to introduce a national operating model for rape and other serious sexual offences investigations’, we also highlighted innovative practice in Durham Constabulary. The constabulary had created a new performance framework called Operation Crystal to review its performance in dealing with rape and other serious sexual offences.

Some forces are effective when finalising crimes and applying outcomes

We found that four of the forces we inspected had processes in place to make sure they supervised crime finalisations effectively and appropriately.

Cumbria Constabulary had a clear closure process for all crimes. Supervisors told us investigators completed any outstanding actions, updated the victims’ care page and applied the correct outcome code. The supervisor then reviews and closes the investigation. This includes reviewing outcomes, using the CLOSED and FILE mnemonics that we referred to in chapter 3, case study 2. Supervisors told us a centralised team checked the final outcome was correct.

As an extra quality assurance check, when an investigator uses specific outcome codes to close any rape, violence against women and girls, or domestic abuse case, an inspector has to review it. Inspectors also dip sample at least five other investigations a month to check that supervisors have closed them correctly. The investigative quality assurance board then dip samples a further 65 investigations per month to identify any themes that the constabulary needs to address.

In another force, interviewees told us that sergeants reviewed the detailed closure plan that had to be in place before closing a crime. They make sure investigators have:

• completed all actions;
• updated the victim (and the suspect if appropriate); and
• used the correct outcome code.

In a different force, interviewees told us that the force had identified that sergeants had applied the wrong outcome in a quarter of crimes. The force had therefore created a crime finalisation team to make sure the investigator had:

• followed all reasonable lines of enquiry;
• used the right outcome code; and
• given the victim appropriate care.

Greater Manchester Police has an outcomes tool to support investigators’ decision making and give guidance on the most appropriate outcome.

In Norfolk Constabulary, an “outcome tree” interactive tool helps investigators decide on outcome codes. Officers and staff can enter details of the crime, and the tool helps them choose the most appropriate outcome code.

Other forces are poor at finalising crimes

In one force, a senior officer told us that although supervisors reviewed and closed investigations, the quality of prosecution files was poor. They told us that only 44 percent of files met disclosure requirements, and only 36 percent met national file standard requirements.

In another force, supervisors told us they were responsible for finalising investigations and making sure investigators had applied the correct outcome code. Specialist investigators in a different force told us their force authorised them to close crimes, even though they weren’t in a supervisory position. However, in both these forces, the interviewees told us that their force hadn’t given them any training about how to close files.

In 10 of the first 31 forces that we have inspected as part of our 2023–25 PEEL inspection programme, we have issued the force with an area for improvement or made a recommendation about using outcomes codes correctly. It is important that forces use the correct outcome codes when they finalise crimes. Forces should establish and implement processes to make sure they do this. Using the correct outcome codes would give them a better understanding of why they close crimes, how they communicate with victims, and in what respects they need to improve.

Out-of-court resolutions

Forces are improving their focus on out-of-court resolutions

In our ‘State of Policing 2022’ report, we said that since 2014, forces’ use of out‑of‑court disposals (now known as out-of-court resolutions (OOCRs)) has more than halved. In this inspection, we saw consistent evidence of forces having an increased focus on OOCRs, although not all officers and staff understand the benefits of using them.

The Norfolk Constabulary force management statement says that the constabulary encourages officers to use OOCRs for some offences. Neighbourhood officers told us they were very supportive of the use of community-based OOCR schemes. They felt that these schemes gave similar outcomes to those that a court would impose but were much quicker to finalise. One officer stated: “I love the restorative justice angle. It’s good for my community if done right.” The constabulary has given officers online training about OOCRs, which coincided with it creating an OOCR team. Supervisors told us they believed that OOCRs were a positive way of dealing with cases.

Cumbria Constabulary’s force management statement says that the constabulary has an OOCR improvement plan. It states that an assistant chief constable has oversight of OOCRs through the operational scrutiny and oversight board. A senior officer chairs a working group to increase the number of OOCRs and improve their quality. The constabulary makes victims aware of OOCRs at an early stage to find out if this would encourage them to support an investigation.

Interviewees in another force told us that it had recognised it had very poor OOCR diversionary options. It subsequently improved the range of OOCRs available to investigators. Interviewees told us that the force had 22 different options for OOCRs, including education and diversion options. The interviewees told us that in order to help investigators maximise their use, the force had included OOCR options in its training for professionalising investigations programme level 2 investigators and their supervisors. Following feedback from officers that the OOCR process needed to be simpler, the force was reviewing how it used them. This included identifying areas of the force that were using OOCRs more than other areas.

A senior officer in one force told us that it had identified that officers and staff weren’t using OOCRs due to a lack of understanding and knowledge. As a result, the force had developed online and face-to-face training material. It had also appointed OOCR officers in each local policing area. The officers identify what options are available and give support to investigators. The senior officer told us that the force had seen an increase in OOCRs as a result. The force also has a multi-agency scrutiny panel, which reviewed the outcomes the force used, including OOCRs.

In a national interview, a National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) lead told us that the NPCC was taking an innovative approach and developing several OOCR-related initiatives. These included a web-based case management system, a digital dashboard and a decision-making app. The aim of these initiatives was to:

• encourage officers and staff to use OOCRs;
• support them to make appropriate decisions;
• help forces to have efficient OOCR case management systems; and
• to produce valuable insights at a local and national level to help understand how forces use OOCRs.

Some officers and staff don’t like using OOCRs

In one force, supervisors told us that neighbourhood and response officers’ knowledge of OOCRs was good and that they made good use of them. However, criminal investigation department officers in the force told us that they rarely used OOCRs because their focus was on charging offenders. They said that most of the offences they dealt with were too serious for an OOCR to be appropriate.

In four forces, we heard from investigators that OOCR processes were time consuming. In one force, NPT officers and staff told us they had to complete four or five forms to show why the OOCR was appropriate and how they had used it.

In one force, inspectors and supervisors told us they were confident that officers were using OOCRs consistently and appropriately. They said the force encouraged officers to use OOCRs as positive outcomes. Investigators in the force told us they sometimes used them in cases of domestic abuse when the complainant didn’t want to support a prosecution.

However, other officers and staff felt that issuing OOCRs was leading them to criminalise young people for very minor crimes in schools or the wider community. They told us that the force’s focus on OOCRs had, in effect, removed their discretion to deal with these young people. They said that if they resolved an investigation by obtaining an admission and giving a verbal warning, their local supervisors and managers encouraged them not to do so in future, or to go back and issue an OOCR. The interviewees felt that they were criminalising young people who were unlikely to reoffend.

7.  How effectively forces prioritise their investigations

In this chapter we report on the way chief officers promote the importance of carrying out high-quality investigations, and how their message sometimes gets confused. We also examine whether forces automatically screen out certain types of crimes.

Chief officer priorities

Chief officers promote the importance of high-quality crime investigations

If officers and staff understand that carrying out high-quality crime investigations is a priority for the force, and chief officers make this clear, they are more likely to focus on it. Generally, we found that chief officers were effective at communicating this, but sometimes the message got lost when there were too many other priorities and competing demands.

In six of the seven forces we inspected, we found evidence that chief officers communicated and promoted to their officers and staff the importance of carrying out effective and high-quality crime investigations.

In Greater Manchester Police, the chief constable had made it clear to the force that effective crime investigation was one of his priorities. An interviewee told us that the force had a very visible chief officer team. In our interviews and review of force documents, we found that chief officers were clear on what they expected in terms of behaviour and standards. Many interviewees told us that the chief constable personally attended roadshows at which he set clear expectations to officers and staff about crime investigation. Sergeants and inspectors signed a pledge to meet these expectations.

Chief officers in Greater Manchester Police told us that the chief constable had personally met every officer of sergeant rank and above, as well as police staff supervisors and managers, to give absolute clarity of what he expected of them. Other interviewees said that he had made it clear that carrying out good-quality crime investigations was very important to him.

Officers and staff in a Greater Manchester Police focus group told us they had noticed a change since the new chief constable arrived. One officer told us that before he arrived, they wouldn’t have attended 40 to 50 percent of shoplifting cases. The officer said that since the chief constable had arrived, officers and staff went to every crime in which there was a reasonable line of enquiry. As a result, the officer said they were seeing many more positive outcomes and felt they were providing a better service to victims. In another focus group, investigators said there was a real focus on the quality of investigations.

In other forces, we also found evidence of chief officers promoting the importance of effective crime investigations. In West Midlands Police, for example, a supervisor told us how chief officers communicated to the whole force the importance of high‑quality investigations. The supervisor told us there was “no ambiguity”, that messages about the importance of high-quality investigations were simple and clear, and that officers and staff understood them.

In Cumbria Constabulary, supervisors told us that the chief constable had held roadshows setting out his priorities. He was visible and passionate about his efforts to reduce crime. The management team communicates the chief constable’s priorities to officers and staff. One interviewee said: “It seems everyone has bought into improving performance.” The chief constable publishes regular blogs that highlight good work, and there are regular commendations that reward good investigative work. One focus group member said: “Morale is the best it has been in the last few years, and this is down to the direction and leadership from the top, which filters down.”

In Cheshire Constabulary, we found that there was a clearly identifiable chief officer who set the standards for crime investigations. Interviewees told us officers and staff received regular messages from the chief officer team, communicating and promoting the importance of achieving effective and high-quality crime investigations. Supervisors told us that the chief constable had made it clear that achieving good outcomes for victims was a priority. One interviewee described this as a “breath of fresh air”.

Performance management focuses too much on things that are easiest to measure, rather than on the quality of investigations

We found that most forces had structured governance arrangements about crime investigations. For example, we found that forces had strategic meetings, chaired by a chief officer, which examined performance in relation to crime investigations. However, interviewees in some forces told us that these arrangements, along with performance management frameworks, often focused on things that were easiest to measure and scrutinise. In one force, interviewees said that the force was more focused on the number of stop and searches and arrests than the quality of crime investigations.

In another force, supervisors told us that communications from their managers focused on performance measurement, rather than on improving the quality of investigations. In the same force, members of a focus group told us that the chief officer team’s focus was on the administration of investigations, rather than on investigative standards.

A chief officer in the same force told us that officers and staff may have been prioritising attending calls, rather than focusing on the initial investigation. This was because the force measured how quickly officers and staff attended calls, but it didn’t measure the quality of an initial investigation.

We heard that the focus on performance resulted in forces holding officers and supervisors to account against these measures. This means that if forces only focus their performance management on things that are easiest to measure, their officers and staff will focus on these activities. As is often said about performance measures, ‘what gets measured gets done’.

In some forces, chief officers’ priorities aren’t always clear

In one force, a senior officer told us that chief officers communicated and promoted the importance of carrying out effective and high-quality crime investigations. However, some responders in that force told us they weren’t aware of the force’s priorities in relation to crime investigation. They felt the chief officers’ emphasis was on officers and staff being visible, attending calls and arresting suspects, rather than on carrying out high-quality investigations.

Interviewees in that force said that some of the importance and meaning of priorities was lost when there was a large number of messages. In another focus group, an interviewee told us that they sometimes missed important information because of the excessive volume of messages from the force. They said: “We get carpet bombed with information.”

In another force, neighbourhood supervisors told us local police commanders regularly promoted their own priorities. They said that because of the high turnover of officers in these posts, these priorities often changed, causing confusion among officers and staff, and in the communities they police.

Interviewees in one force told us that the importance of high-quality investigations was in the force plan but that other priorities diluted the message. They said this caused confusion for officers and staff. One interviewee said there was inconsistent messaging from chief officers about force priorities, such as whether the priority was attending incidents or investigating crime. Other interviewees said everything was a priority, resulting in mixed messages from the chief officers.

In another force, when asked about whether crime investigation was a strategic priority, a chief officer said to us: “I’m not sure we communicate it well.”

Even when the message from senior officers about the importance of effective crime investigation was clear, we found that it could conflict with the force’s focus on responding to calls. Many interviewees felt that if officers had to decide between carrying out an initial investigation or promptly attending the next call, their focus would be on the latter.

Forces no longer automatically deprioritise certain less serious crime types

During our fieldwork, we checked whether forces were routinely deprioritising or screening out any type of crime. Screening out crimes is when forces close a case before any investigation takes place.

It may be entirely appropriate to close a case before an investigation starts if there are no reasonable lines of enquiry that investigators can follow. It may also be appropriate to close a case before an investigation starts if it isn’t proportionate to carry out a line of enquiry. However, it isn’t appropriate for forces to routinely screen out crimes when there are proportionate and reasonable lines of enquiry. These lines of enquiry could lead to the crime being solved and to positive outcomes for victims.

In our fieldwork, we didn’t find any evidence that forces had policies setting out specific crime types that they wouldn’t investigate. Senior officers in some forces told us that they used to screen out certain types of crimes, such as low-value theft or minor criminal damage, but they no longer did this. In these forces, we heard evidence that they were investigating more crimes than they previously did.

In every force, interviewees told us that their force would investigate all crimes in which there was a reasonable line of enquiry. In one force, a supervisor told us the force had a clear focus and direction from the chief officer team to investigate all crimes in which there was a reasonable line of enquiry. The supervisor said: “I used to be embarrassed working for [the force] because of the crimes we were shutting down, but now it is a much nicer organisation to work for because we look at everything and provide the service we should.”

In another force, the investigation policy stated the force would only investigate a crime if it was in the public interest or had the potential to bring offenders to justice. A senior officer told us the force would investigate any crime that had reasonable lines of enquiry. They said that the force didn’t screen out any specific crime type. The interviewee felt this had gone some way to increasing public confidence and addressing concerns that the police didn’t support shops and businesses.

Another senior officer in the same force told us that it only closed cases before any investigation took place when there was no vulnerability and there were no reasonable lines of enquiry to follow.

In 2023, the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing updated their guidance about reasonable lines of enquiry. When we asked interviewees about the impact of this update, their responses were inconclusive.

In one force, a chief officer said that because of that updated guidance, the force was investigating crimes that it used to screen out. The force had checked to see if this led to a large increase in demand. The chief officer told us that this led to it only investigating an extra three crimes per day.

However, in another force, a senior officer told us that the force’s policy to investigate all crimes in which there was a reasonable line of enquiry was having a significant effect on investigators’ workloads.

There is a view that forces indirectly screen out some crime types

In most forces, our document reviews of force policies supported what interviewees told us, in that they didn’t screen out crime types. We didn’t find any evidence in force policies that forces screened out crimes based solely on crime type.

However, one interviewee in a national interview told us that in their view, even where police forces didn’t screen out certain crime types, the lack of investigation amounted to a screening-out policy.

The interviewee referred specifically to volume crimes, with low value or low harm, in which forces closed the investigation within 24 hours of recording the crime. The interviewee believed this showed that while forces stated that they didn’t screen out specific crime types, in effect they did. The interviewee thought that before closing many of these crimes, forces didn’t carry out any meaningful investigation or consider if there were reasonable lines of enquiry.

The proportion of crimes that forces finalise within 24 hours has decreased

We carried out some analysis to check whether forces were screening out some crime types. One way of doing this is to examine data relating to the length of time between recording and closing a crime. We analysed the data relating to all crimes that forces closed within 24 hours of recording them. There are many reasons why forces might do this. It might indicate that the force automatically screens out some crime types, even though there are some lines of enquiry to follow. Alternatively, it might mean that the force has correctly assessed the crime and there are no reasonable lines of enquiry.

Between the years ending 31 March 2018 and 31 March 2024, the proportion of offences that forces in England and Wales closed within 24 hours decreased from 24 percent to 16 percent. This may support what forces told us in our fieldwork: that they screen out fewer crimes for investigation than they did previously.

Figure 5: Proportion of offences with an outcome recorded within 24 hours, for forces in England and Wales, for outcomes recorded in the years ending 31 March 2017 to 31 March 2024, for all offence types

Source: Police recorded crime and outcomes open data tables from the Home Office

Over the same period, for the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the proportion of offences closed within 24 hours stayed within a range of 13 percent to 16 percent. This suggests that the service’s approach to closing crime hasn’t changed.

We also examined the “other neighbourhood crime” category in our PEEL VSA reviews. This is the category that is likely to include low-risk volume crimes. These are the crimes that forces might be likely to screen out. We found that forces allocated most of these crimes for investigation and that the investigation was effective. We didn’t find any evidence to suggest that forces were routinely screening out these types of crimes while there were reasonable lines of enquiry to follow.

Retail crime

Retailers don’t believe the police take shoplifting seriously

In 2014, the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 made low-value shoplifting a summary-only offence. This meant that offences in which the value of the stolen goods didn’t exceed £200 were only triable in a magistrates’ court. This led to a view among some retailers, police and members of the public that the police wouldn’t attend or investigate offences if the value of the stolen goods was under £200.

Whether or not this view is correct, it is clear that from 2014 onwards, shoplifting offences in England and Wales began to increase. In the year ending 31 March 2014, forces across England and Wales recorded 319,175 shoplifting offences. In the year ending 31 March 2018, the figure had risen to 377,151. By the year ending 31 March 2024, it had risen further to 440,413 – its highest level in 20 years. However, these figures relate only to the shoplifting offences that retailers report to the police and that the police record.

A representative of the British Retail Consortium (BRC) told us that retailers considerably under-report shoplifting offences. Data from the BRC Crime Survey 2024 report indicates that in the 12-month period to 31 August 2023, there were 16.7 million “customer thefts”. The BRC representative told us that some of the reasons that retailers didn’t report these offences were:

• a lack of confidence that the police would do anything;
• a view that the police response was poor;
• a view that the police didn’t do enough about violence and aggression directed at retail workers; and
• a perception that police forces didn’t believe it was worth acting on thefts under the value of £200.

The police are improving their response to shoplifting, but they need to do much more

As we stated previously in this chapter, we didn’t find any evidence that forces screen out crime (including shoplifting) based solely on the crime type. In several forces, interviewees told us about initiatives to deal with shoplifting offences. For example, Norfolk Constabulary has a team of desk-based investigators who deal with volume crime, including shoplifting. In Greater Manchester Police, the initial investigations unit investigates all cases of shoplifting to which the force doesn’t need to respond immediately.

In October 2023, the National Police Chiefs’ Council introduced its ‘Retail Crime Action Plan’. The aim was for the police to attend all reports of retail crime in which shop staff had detained a suspect or violence was involved. The BRC reported that by January 2024, there was evidence that to some extent, this was working. They said that some forces were attending more incidents.

A national police lead told us that the retail industry only reports a small percentage of crimes to the police. The interviewee also told us that forces had increased their focus on retail crime, and that the scale of the problem is recognised at a national level. They also said that there is a National Retail Crime Steering Group, which includes representatives from the Government, police and major retailers.

We spoke to a representative from the National Business Crime Centre. They told us about Project Pegasus, which is a partnership between retailers and the police. Its aim is to deal with retail crime, particularly organised retail crime.

However, despite the efforts forces are making, it is clear that there is still a long way to go if the police are to improve retailers’ and the public’s confidence that they will treat shoplifting offences seriously.

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An inspection into how effectively the police investigate crime